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The  object  of  this  research  consists  in  the  various  forms  and  features  of  social 
movements  that  have  emerged  in  Greece  during  the  current  period  of  crisis,  all 
evaluated as part of “the social movement as a whole”. The studied period spans from 
April  2010  to  October  2011,  and  includes  the  emergence  of  different  forms  of 
mobilization  (general  and  sectoral  strikes,  the  “movement  of  the  squares”,  various 
forms of civil disobedience). The focus was placed on the forms of political participation 
and the transformation of the actors’ consciousness in relation to their participation and 
experience, in connection with (1) the objective conditions; (2) their own social position 
in society; and (3) their own conceptualization of the “political”. The development of 
new relations  between  people  and  politics  as  well  as  of  various  forms  of  political 
representation  (existing  and/or  new  ones)  have  been  given  special  attention. 
Methodologically,  this  research  focuses  on  two  key  points.  The  first  concerns  the 
theoretical context of social movements literature and its relevance to the Greek case, 
as well as the detailed study of the Greek social and political formation, of its class 
structure and of the crisis. The second point concerns the specific study of the social 
movement  in  Greece,  including  field  research,  and  using  in-depth,  semi-structured 
interviews. The sample was chosen according to purposeful sampling, in a way that 
provided  the  opportunity  to  investigate  the  forms  and  the  effects  of  political 
participation.  The  criterion  has  been  to  interview  people  with  little  or  no  prior 
relationship  with  politics  and activism.  Since the  focus is  on the consciousness  of 
participation and engagement as developed by the participants themselves, and the 
transformative  effects  of  action  upon  them,  the  theoretical  conclusions  discuss  the 
issue of subjectivity and class consciousness within specific conditions, in relation to 
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Acronym/ 
Abbreviation Meaning
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EEAM Labour sector of EAM
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EFSM European Financial Stabilization Mechanism
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ELTA Hellenic Post Offices
EMEIS Unitary  Front  of  Strong Labour Unions,  trade-union group originating 
from a split from PASKE
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ESM European Stability Mechanism
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FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GD Golden Dawn (fascist party)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GENOP-DEH Workers' trade-union in the DEH
GSEE General Confederation of Greek Workers (in the private sector)
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE-GSEE Labour Institute of GSEE
Initiative Initiative of grassroots unions in the private and public sector
KKE Communist Party of Greece
LAOS Public Orthodox Alert (small party of the extreme-right)
META Front of trade-unionists affiliated to SYRIZA
ND New Democracy (the main right-wing party, of a liberal-conservative 
orientation)
NGGA National General Collective Agreement
NSMT New Social Movement Theory
NTUA National Technical University of Athens
OAED Manpower Employment Organization
OBES Federation of factory trade-unions (in the 1980s)
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIYE Federation of Private Sector Employees of Greece
OLME Federation of school teachers in secondary education
OTE Organization of Telecommunications of Greece
PAME Trade-union front affiliated to KKE
PASKE Trade-union group, affiliated to PASOK
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement (the main social-democratic party)
POE-OTA Panhellenic Federation of Workers in Municipalities
POS Political Opportunity Structure 
PPT Political Process Theory 
PWU Precarious Workers' Unions
RCT Rational Choice Theory 
RMT Resource Mobilization Theory
SBEOD Grassroots assembly of employees working using motorcycles
SEFK Union of teachers working in private tutorial schools
SEO-115 115 Associated Organizations of Labourers and Servants
SMO Social Movement Organization
SMT Union of technical employees
5
SSM Cooks and Waiters' Union
SYBXA Association of employees in bookstores sector of the Attica region
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left (political party originating from the renewing 
Left)
TAIPED Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund
TINA There Is No Alternative
Troika Decision group formed by the EC, the ECB and the IMF
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Social  movements have received increased attention in  the last  few years and 
several theoretical  frameworks have been proposed and elaborated for  establishing 
social movements as a concrete area of research. After the 1970s this field acquired its 
own autonomous dynamic, largely as a result of the various movements occurring in 
the previous decade. The theoretical models emerging out of this broad conjuncture no 
longer perceived social movements as deviant and irrational forms of action, chaotic 
and  disorganized,  but  as  forces  deriving  from,  and  contributing  positively  to  social 
needs,  and  therefore  worthy  of  further  exploration.  This  change  of  perception  has 
produced key insights for establishing a framework for such studies. However, these 
approaches have referred almost exclusively to Western societies, and particularly to 
periods of economic boom and prosperity (Neveu 2010: 169). Nowadays, in a period of 
deep economic recession accompanied by intense social and political crises, they need 
to be critically reviewed to produce a more coherent framework for the study of social 
movements in the present context. Besides, the vested interests inherent in Western 
representative  regimes,  on  the  socio-economic  and  the  political  level,  are  being 
strongly challenged. It is indicative that, among the many studies of social movements, 
instances of research focused on social movements during such a crisis are rarely met. 
This is still the case today, seven years after the emergence of the current crisis, with 
founding figures  of  social  movement  theories  displaying reluctance in  revisiting the 
framework  and  the  overall  approach  in  the  light  of  the  new situation.  This  is  the 
background against which the main social movement theories and their key features 
will be viewed and explored in the first chapter of this thesis with the aim of evaluating 
them critically.
There  is,  therefore,  a  pressing  need  to  deepen  theoretical  descriptions  of 
mobilizations emerging amid the current crisis. The Greek case exemplifies a rebellious 
cycle  emerging  in  a  situation  of  acute  crisis  inducing  a  high  level  of  conflict  and 
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cataclysmic changes in both the objective and subjective conditions of social life. Since 
2010, Greece has frequently been the object of European and global attention, due to 
the severity and longevity of the economic and political crisis, and  the  social turmoil 
that has accompanied it. It was one of the first three countries, together with Portugal 
and Ireland, to enter the mechanisms of the so-called “bailouts” promoted by the EU 
with the collaboration  of  the IMF. This  entry  was immediately  met  by a huge anti-
austerity movement in May 2010. During the next two years this movement intensified 
and peaked in several massive mobilizations, while the crisis deepened on all levels, 
despite, and to an extent because of, the measures prescribed. The nature of this crisis 
will be studied in detail in this thesis, based on the Gramscian analysis of the crisis of  
hegemony1.  Looking at the specific characteristics of the crisis itself,  starting with a 
concrete  analysis  of  the  social  formation  in  which  it  is  manifested,  is  a  necessary 
moment for such an approach.
However, Greece did not attract that level of international attention just because of 
the magnitude of the crisis and the intensity of social protests in the country, but also 
because those movements were part of a broader wave of movements that emerged in 
many different  places  in  that  exceptional  year  2011,  from the  “Arab spring”  to  the 
“Indignados” and the “Occupy movements”. What sparked an enormous debate, both 
in the public sphere and among social movement scholars, are the new forms taken by 
these  movements,  more  particularly  their  spatial  dimension,  the  role  of  “direct 
democracy”, the fact that they developed outside all the existing organizational forms 
and the broad and difficult to pin down character of their social composition. All this 
opened up another series of questions about the understanding of mass politics, the 
role of parties and organizations, the issue of strategy and of state power. This thesis 
aims at contributing to these debates by proposing a specific approach and focusing on 
the specific characteristics they have taken in the Greek case.
1 “In every country the process is different, although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis 
of the ruling class’s hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major 
political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses 
(war, for example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petty-bourgeois intellectuals) 
have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands 
which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution. A “crisis of authority” is 
spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the state.” (Gramsci 1971: 210).
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The last main reason these movements attracted such an attention is that they 
contributed decisively in the biggest upheaval any political system has experienced in 
post-war Western Europe, with a small party of the Left accessing office in barely more 
than two years. The object of this thesis is neither partisan representations nor the rise 
of SYRIZA in particular, but the movements erupting in a period of enormous fluidity of 
the political system, predating this rise strictly speaking. This broader sequence means 
nevertheless that the Greek case is of central importance for understanding the way 
social movements relate to political developments in contemporary societies and how 
this  process  unfolds  at  all  levels,  from  street  politics  to  the  structure  of  the  party 
system. Besides, this is exactly what the notion of “crisis of hegemony” leads to: those 
movements were not just sectoral mobilizations, they changed the whole social and 
political landscape of the country, creating a new situation from which the current one 
derives.
Obviously, studying social movements amid a crisis requires directly encountering 
and experiencing the environment nurturing the emergence of movements. Structural 
determinants determine the framework within which collective action occurs and actors 
are situated. Crisis phenomena are motivational for action, but insufficient as such; to 
explain  mobilizations,  political  factors  (opportunities  and  alliances,  resources  and 
organization,  constraints,  etc.)  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  along  with  the 
historical background. Lumley's approach on the social movements in Italy from 1968 
to 1978 is a good example of this approach. The author examines the origins of the 
crisis of 1968-69 in Italian society2 before discussing the emergence and development 
of the movements he has chosen to study. The latter are analyzed in relation to the 
broader  environment  and  the  specific  circumstances  of  their  emergence,  without 
neglecting the role of visible and latent struggles and of culture (Lumley 1990). This 
thesis  will  follow  a  similar  approach.  Thus,  the  second  chapter  of  the  thesis,  will 
examine  the  social,  economic  and  political  background  of  the  crisis,  the  concrete 
environment in which it emerged and its effects on Greek society.
2 His investigation includes the distrust of the state, the constitution of civil society and its discontents, as 
well as the role of political vanguards.
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This approach also requires a framework providing a class analysis, since I argue 
that conflict must be interpreted in terms of class struggle. This class analysis includes 
investigating both its significance and the structural and conjunctural transformations of 
labour.  Recent  decades  have  seen fundamental  transformations  in  productive 
processes, and changes in the world of labour have acted as a catalyst in changing the 
class structure of Greek society and the characteristics of the working class. The main 
elements of these new conditions have been a dramatic shift of the balance of forces 
against  labour  and  important  changes  in  the  nature  and  structure  of  employment, 
leading  to  new patterns  in  the  division  of  the  work  force  and  undermining  labour 
solidarity and social cohesion. This new reality has reinstated a theoretical approach 
envisaging a supposed “end of work”, tending to define classes strictly sociologically 
and empirically, rather than as conceptualizations; and defining the working class too 
narrowly precisely in order to deny its existence. This analysis was engendered by a 
period characterized by special circumstances combined with growth and prosperity, 
resulting in a relative preservation or/and increase of  petty-bourgeois strata.  It  is  in 
those  years  that  the  Marxian  doctrine  of  immiseration  “was  the  object  of  much 
mockery” (Jameson 2011: 71). As Jameson aptly notes, “It is today no longer a joking 
matter.”  (Ibid.).  Exploitation  remains  fully  integrated  and  dominant  in  the  social 
structure, and is the basis of the formulation of objective interests, while changes in 
labour  and  the  social  structure  are  continuing,  leading  to  the  intensification  of 
exploitation and inequalities: tendencies exacerbated by the crisis. Thus, in chapter III 
of  the thesis,  I  will  elaborate on the particularities of  the class structure in Greece, 
detailing its historical background and the transformations it has undergone during the 
crisis. Emphasis will be given to the qualitative and quantitative specifics of labour, in 
comparison with the traditional forms and features of the labour and social movement.
Methodologically, what is of primary importance here is the “return to the concrete”, 
through  identifying  intermediate  steps  and  the  various  mediations  between  the 
concrete and the abstract. This requires recognizing both the significance and the limits 
of  the  adequate  general,  “abstract”  concepts,  in  accounting  for  the  real  world  and 
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illuminating the study of the everyday (Barker 2007: 13). In our perspective, emphasis 
must  be  laid  on  the  “concrete  analysis  of  the  concrete  situation”  and  the  active 
intervention in the conjuncture. The concept of conjuncture is actually crucial in relation 
to its class determinants and the relation of forces, and must be perceived as a double 
constraint,  both  posing  limits  and  defining  the  terrain  of  a  strategic  perspective. 
Following  on  this  approach,  I  will  move,  in  chapter  IV,  from  the  historical,  socio-
economic and political background to the social movement in Greece in the first period 
of crisis, with emphasis on its two fundamental forms: the wave of strikes of the two-
year period 2010-2011, and the “movement of the squares” of the summer 2011. I will  
thus describe the overall perspective of these protests in relation to their potential for 
expressing a different form and conception of politicization. I will argue that one of the 
main innovations of these movements was the expression of a people's need for a 
“move  to  the  political”,  in  the  sense  of  a  re-appropriation  of  politics  outside  the 
boundaries of official politics. This challenge presupposes a discussion of the notion of 
politics itself, which will be a recurrent theme throughout this research.
In  chapter  V,  I  will  present  the  results  of  my  field  work,  based  on  in-depth 
interviews with participants of the 2010-2011 movements in Greece3. The main aim of 
this fieldwork was to investigate the forms and the effects of political participation and 
the  transformation  of  people's  consciousness  through  their  participation.  I  was 
specifically interested in the relationship between movements and different forms of 
political representation and the consequent development of new relationships between 
people  and  politics.  Therefore,  I  interviewed  participants  with  reference  to  their 
previous  participation  and  engagement,  focusing  on  people  with  little  or  no  prior 
relationship to politics and activism. I chose a qualitative methodology as more capable 
of producing findings illuminating the main imperatives of this research. At the same 
time,  my  approach  will  be  differentiated  from  the  firmly  empirical  tradition  often 
3 At  this  point,  I  should  explain  that,  throughout  this  thesis,  I  will  often  refer  to  quotes  from  the 
interviewees. These quotes will be presented in quotation marks and italics. To comply with anonymity 
rules, I  will  refer to each quote with the letter (I) [interviewee],  accompanied by the number of the 
participant, according to the chronological series of the interviews, quoted in brackets. Thus, (I1) will be 
interviewee number  1 etc.  A table with  the most  important  data on the sample is  included in  the 
Appendix.
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accompanying  qualitative  research  which  accepts  as  input  only  the  observed  or 
collected data. The views of the subjects will be evaluated in relation to the specific 
reality and context in which they are posited, which is on a certain level independent of 
them. Thus, to study collective action I  will  follow an analytical  approach based on 
empirical generalization.
Finally,  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  thesis,  I  will  engage  in  a  more  extensive 
discussion of the results of this fieldwork and their implications. The assumption here is 
that of a dialectical relationship between  the objective circumstances and the socio-
political and economic reality on the one hand, and the subjective factor and  class 
struggle  on  the  other  hand.  I  will  thus  elaborate  on  consciousness  formation  and 
transformation, based on a combination of primary and secondary sources (including 
the empirical material from my research and bibliographical references). The key point 
is actually to comprehend the ways in which social groups become acting forces and 
how they can, or cannot, acquire an autonomous and leading position in the social 
formation and achieve a capacity to exercise political power. Our aim is to comprehend 
how these groups became a factor in shaping the conjuncture from which they emerge, 
by  transforming  themselves,  in  a  process  of  collective  praxis  crystallizing  “the 
coincidence between the transformation of  circumstances and the transformation of 
human activity”, according to the Marxian third thesis on Feuerbach (Marx 2010b: 4).
I  would like at this point  to make one final  remark regarding the choice of this 
subject and my perspective on it. It is, of course, clear that the choice of the case to be 
studied itself reveals the perspective adopted by the researcher regarding the object of 
the  investigation.  As  Bourdieu  has  commented  regarding  classification,  research 
usually implies some pre-constructed criteria on pre-constructed populations, without 
examining the procedure of classification and prioritization of criteria and populations 
itself (Bourdieu 1994: 66). I have tried to avoid such a pitfall by trying to constantly 
maintain  an  open  perspective,  which  would  foster  a  constant  questioning  of  the 
viewpoint  and the outcomes of  each research phase.  In  this  sense,  and since the 
subject of this research carries heavy political and ideological connotations, I have, as 
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far as possible, tried to avoid, the imposition of my own ideological and political views 
on all levels of study. Having said that, a fundamental aspect of my perspective, as will 
be analyzed throughout this thesis, is that there is no such thing as an “objective” or 
“neutral”  approach. A researcher is a person of her own times, living,  experiencing, 
investigating  and being part  of  the  broader  socio-political  environment;  she is  thus 
inevitably involved in history as an actor. This is even more evident when researching a 
topic such as that of this thesis. This is a rigorous methodological remark, to be taken 
into account4. Gramsci has accordingly defined the “philosophy of praxis”, when noting 
that: “We arrive also at the equality of, or equation between, 'philosophy and politics', 
thought  and  action,  that  is,  at  a  philosophy  of  praxis.  Everything  is  political,  even 
philosophy or philosophies and the only 'philosophy'  is history in action, that is,  life 
itself.”  (1971:  356-57).  Therefore,  the very formulation of  the problem a researcher 
chooses to deal with, the invention of new ways of posing it, the identification of its 
limits,  of  its  internal  contradictions,  and of  the openness of  its outcomes;  all  these 
elements are connotative to some extent of the researcher's perspective. With all this 
in mind, and being constantly aware that it is precisely in the most difficult problems 
with  which  we  must  further  and  persistently  contend,  I  will  now  pass  on  the 
investigation of the forms and features of the social movement in Greece in the first 
period of the crisis.
4 For Hobsbawm, “we are talking as men and women of a particular time and place, involved, in various 
ways, in its history as actors in its dramas – however insignificant our parts – as observers of our times 
and, not least, as people whose views of the century have been formed by what we have come to see 
as its crucial events.” (Hobsbawm 2006: 3-4). In a similar vein, Touraine has elaborated on “sociology 
of action”, being at the centre of the apprehension of social change, in which the scientist is not neutral 
but  the carrier  and producer of  a knowledge of  action.  For Tilly,  “every  position one takes on the 
desirability, feasibility, or effectiveness of collective action is a political position” (Tilly 1978: 6).
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CHAPTER I: SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND RESEARCH
I have described in the Introduction the main perspective under which I intend to 
examine the social movements that have emerged in Greece in the first period of the 
crisis.  In  the  first  chapter,  I  will  start  by  evaluating  critically  the  key  points  of  the 
dominant  theoretical  frameworks  in  social  movement  study. This  approach  aims at 
highlighting the key insights of these theories, as a starting point for a social movement 
research, so as to describe and justify the theoretical framework to be used in this 
thesis. I will thus highlight the points to retain and the critique that seems appropriate 
from  two  perspectives:  at  the  empirical  level,  based  on  the  Greek  case  of  social 
movements  emerging  in  times  of  crisis;  and  at  the  theoretical  level,  based  on  a 
theoretical framework drawing on a diverse, and often contradictory, Marxist tradition. 
The main points of my derived framework will be further clarified in the last chapter of  
this thesis as the conclusions of the current study and the related fieldwork. Given the 
scope and focus of the current thesis, it is, of course, irrelevant to encompass all the 
aspects of the social movement theories in their entirety; I have refined my choice to 
those which are directly relevant to the key points arising in this thesis.
Thus, in the first section of the chapter, I will review the general configurations of 
the two main traditions in the study of social movements. The first one emerged in the 
US and the other in Europe, their specific perspectives reflecting the different traditions 
of the two continents regarding social movement literature. I shall begin by referring to 
the  re-occurring  feature  of  these  theories  distinguishing  them  from  previous 
approaches to collective action and social movements: their perception of movements 
as rational, non-pathological acts. The role of resources, of economic deprivation and 
of systemic crisis in fostering mobilization will be discussed eventually. In the second 
section,  I  will  review the basic  tenets of  these theories,  and particularly  of  the US 
tradition which has focused more on concrete and empirical articulations of concepts 
related to movements. I will specifically present the concepts of “repertoires of action”, 
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“protest  cycles”,  and  “political  opportunities”,  insisting  on  their  consecutive 
transformations, concluding with more dynamic formulations.
This  debate  helps  us  comprehend  how  different  theories  conceptualize  social 
movements  and  the  main  differences  among  them,  particularly  the  inherent 
implications for how movements are treated and studied. Section c of the chapter will 
explore the different perceptions concerning whether movements' actions and scope 
are thought to move inside the sphere of politics, and their relationship with the state 
and the institutions. This section is of great importance for my research, since a crucial 
part of it refers to how the people conceptualize what can be called “the political”, which 
in my perspective, refers mainly to its conception as an active determination and a self-
transformative process, as distinguished to its confinement to the official recognized 
ways of  exercising politics.  In  the  section that  follows,  I  will  deal  with  another  key 
debate on the emergence of social movements in relation to the questions posited in 
this  thesis:  the  “why”  of  mobilization,  or  the  relationship  between  the  objective 
parameters  and  the  subjective  factor.  The  role  of  structural  determinants  in  the 
orientation  of  action  will  be  investigated,  followed  by  an  examination  of  various 
approaches of the processes of identity-making and framing. 
In the last section of the chapter, I will present a more critical overview of the main 
tenets of social movement theories,  focusing on their weaknesses and deficiencies. I 
will  argue  that,  in  reality,  the  broader  framework  engendering  the  development  of 
movements is neoliberalism and its crisis; these, in this thesis, constitute the specific 
conditions in which movements emerge. I will,  thus, describe my basic view on the 
recent  social  movement  in  Greece  in  the  period  of  crisis  emphasizing  a  unifying 
approach while contesting the ostensible “End of History”, with all its implications, and 
positing a framework that deals with movements in their transformative perspective, in 
terms of both their social and consciousness dimensions.
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a. Theoretical framework of the main theories.
Examining the basic tenets of the social movement theories; the first of these is 
Resource Mobilization Theory (hereafter RMT). This was first proposed by McCarthy 
and  Zald,  drawing  heavily  on  economic  models  (and  partially  on  Olson’s  Rational 
Choice Theory -  RCT) and utilizing market-derived analogies and vocabulary. Later 
elaborations, such as the Political Process Theory (hereafter PPT), deviated from this 
approach by emphasizing the primacy of political processes in mobilizations. Given the 
relative  newness  and  dynamism of  the  field,  both  of  these  approaches  are  being 
constantly revised and re-elaborated5. In Europe, the New Social Movement Theory 
(hereafter  NSMT)  emerged  during  the  three  first  postwar  decades  of  growth  and 
welfare-state  building  called  by  the  French  “les  trente  glorieuses”. It  might  seem 
misleading to refer to NSMT as a single monolithic theory, since it is really a whole set 
of  theoretical  currents  explicitly  involving  concepts  of  the  multiplicity,  plurality  and 
variability of new social movements. However, many scholars have noted that, despite 
these aspirations, it is actually a rather uniform theory, though differentiations do exist 
(e.g. Psimitis 2006: 163-4). Of course, the distinction between these two main currents 
of thought is neither absolute nor strictly defined by their origin; various scholars have 
attempted to synthesize them and others have incorporated PPT into their thinking. 
Traditional approaches, especially Marxism, remain pervasive in the relevant studies: 
the influential work of Piven and Cloward, and also of Colin Barker and his colleagues, 
are indicative.
The  US  tradition,  particularly  RMT,  mostly  examines  the  “how”  of  social 
movements, while NSMT is interested in the “why” (Melucci 1989: 3, 22). Despite the 
distinct  emphases  and  analyses  on  either  side  of  this  divide,  an  important  and 
innovative  commonality  remains:  compared  to  social  theories  of  the  past,  both 
perspectives  view  movements  as  rational,  rather  than  irrational  and  pathological 
5 Although there is no unified “US school”, since different currents have emerged from the initial theory, I 
argue that there is a certain tradition that can be referred to as “US”.
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phenomena.  Indeed,  prior  to  the  development  of  the  social  movement  field,  most 
sociological  approaches dealt  with collective action as an irrational  phenomenon, a 
pathology arising from crisis6. The Chicago School of sociology was one of the first to 
focus on the creative, rather than destructive, force of social movements, with Gusfield 
defining them as “socially shared activities and beliefs directed towards the demand for 
change in some aspect for the social order” (Gusfield 1970: 2). RCT has also stressed 
the  rational  character  of  action.  For  Olson  (1965),  people  mobilize  after  a  strict 
calculation of the potential costs and benefits of their action, while also taking the “free-
rider”  phenomenon into account  (thus the need for  selective incentives to motivate 
people’s  participation)7.  RMT  views  movements  as  resulting  from  strictly  rational 
choices,  made  only  after  a  careful  calculation  of  effectiveness  and  of  costs  and 
benefits,  and  thus  characterized  by  “strategism”  (Neveu  2010:  173).  As  McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly have noted (2001: 15), “early resource mobilization models exaggerate 
the centrality of deliberate strategic decisions to social movements. They downplay the 
contingency, emotionality, plasticity, and interactive character of movement politics.”
Later elaborations have focused more on the interaction between different actors 
as well as on the role of causal mechanisms in the emergence of movements. NSMT 
does not conceive of rationality in the sense of strict deliberate calculation; for Melucci, 
collective action “is never a purely irrational phenomenon”, but “to a degree socially 
constructed and meaningful to its participants” (Melucci 1989: 191). It could be claimed 
that  scholars  of  this  tradition  have  adopted  Bourdieu’s  idea  that  a  new  sense  of 
rationality needs to be introduced, where actions “are reasonable without being the 
product of a reasoned design or, even more so, of a rational calculation; [they are] 
inhabited by a sort of objective purpose without being consciously organized in relation 
to an explicitly formed end” (Bourdieu 1980: 86). Bourdieu has aptly contrasted the 
6 LeBon (1896) is a classic example of this view, describing crowd comportment as the pathological 
symptom of a sick organization and influencing both psychological-deriving as well as mass society 
theories (e.g. the work of Arendt and Kornhauser). As Melucci puts it, in these approaches, collective 
action is “a form of social pathology which is produced by the disequilibrium within a social order”, 
which expresses “the normal state of affairs” (1989: 191).
7 RCT, although highlighting the rationality of collective action, proposes an individualistic concept which 
ignores crucial aspects of collective action.
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philosophy of action to theories of irrational action, as well as to structuralism (1998: 
viii).
The identification of movements as the product of rational acts is related to the 
importance given by  social  movement  theories  to  the availability  of  resources and 
political opportunities as being crucial for the development of a movement. The concept 
of  “resources”  embraces  everything  that  is  deemed  necessary  for  acting:  either 
material (work, money, benefits, services) or immaterial (authority, moral engagement, 
faith, friendship). According to Tilly (1978: 78), “mobilization refers to the acquisition of 
collective control over resources, rather than the simple accretion of resources”. More 
conventional  groups  have  normally  more  resources  at  their  disposal;  however, 
collective action is also itself a resource that organizers can use in place of incentives 
available  to  more  conventional  groups  (Tarrow  1989:  17).  The  role  of  resources 
receives more emphasis in the US tradition, although to differing degrees among the 
various  strands.  As  Duyvendak  and  Koopmans  note,  PPT  “emphasizes  external 
political opportunities for mobilization rather than the internal resources that are central 
to the resource mobilization approach” (Kriesi et al. 1995: 145). NSMT, on the other 
hand, while accepting access to resources as a parameter for the development of a 
movement, focuses more on the “post-material” ones (information, access to networks, 
professional and communicative skills) (Melucci 1989: 35, 216).
Organization is considered one of the most important resources in the US tradition, 
while NSMT contests it being allocated a key role. In RMT and PPT, Social Movements 
Organizations (SMO) constitute a key concept8. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald underline 
that “the greater the density of social organization, the more likely that social movement 
activity will  develop” (1988:  703).  For Tilly  (1978:  63),  organization results from the 
multiplication of “catness” (categories of people with a common identity) and “netness” 
(networks  of  people  linked  to  each  other),  forming  “catnet”  (the  term proposed  by 
Harrison White indicating a set of individuals who form both a common category and a 
8 According to McCarthy and Zald (1987: 1218), an SMO is “a complex, or formal, organization which 
identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or counter-movement and attempts to 
implement those goals”.
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network). Thus, the importance of organization is connected to the networks crucial for 
recruiting activists, the development of a vision for the movement and the acquisition of 
knowledge  and  competences  (Della  Porta  and  Diani  1999:  113-4).  In  NSMT,  in 
contrast, movements are seen as informal networks, loosely structured and organized 
(or even relatively disorganized); as “segmented, reticular, polychephalous networks” 
(Melucci  1996:  344);  thus  diminishing  the  essential  character  of  organization  as  a 
necessary resource. This debate is profound, relating to the role and importance of 
leadership, the contribution of political organizations to the emergence, development 
and  perspective  of  movements,  and  their  decline  towards  institutionalization, 
bureaucratization  or,  on  the  other  hand,  towards  radicalization,  and  will  be  further 
examined.
In our view, organization in the broader sense is one of the most crucial elements 
in  the  emergence  of  movements.  It  is  constitutive  of  them,  in  the  sense  that 
“organization  is  not  a  simple  question  of  delegation  forms  or  decision-making 
processes; it is inseparable from the orientation and political perspective of struggles” 
(Kouvelakis 2007: 195).  Apart from contributing to the effectiveness of coordination, 
perspectives and practical actions of movements, organization helps the movement in 
establishing a position of strategic independence vis-a-vis its adversaries and realizing 
the irreconcilability of its interests with the dominant politico-social system organized 
around the dominance of bourgeois interests (Shandro 1995: 285). Of course, major 
questions arise concerning the relation between organization and spontaneity, the self-
organization  in  movements  and  the  transformative  effects  of  such  experience  on 
participants, which will form a theme throughout this thesis, and feature in the specific 
theoretical conclusion. This will be explored in chapter VI, along with overviewing more 
specifically the approach of organization by the various social movement scholars.
Finally, the identification of the role of resources contradicts social dislocation or 
social deprivation theories. Social dislocation theories (following Parsons and Smelser), 
view collective action as a side effect of rapid social transformation, arguing that the 
dispossessed, disorganized and disenfranchized strata have a propensity to form and 
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join movements as a result of serious crises or social dislocations (eg. mass society 
theory).  In  social  deprivation  theories,  mechanisms  of  relative  deprivation  and 
frustration  are  used  in  order  to  understand  social  deviance  and  mobilization,  as 
influenced by the Durkheimian concept  of  anomie (eg.  Gurr  1970).  Many scholars, 
including members of the US tradition and Melucci as the most eminent representative 
of NSMT, have criticized such theories as inadequate and insufficient. Embracing their 
argumentation, resources should be perceived in the broad sense, and not as simply 
concrete and material,  otherwise we would not be able to explain the ability of  the 
“poor” to mobilize, or the role of the crisis in the emergence of mobilization (Piven and 
Cloward 1991: 448, 455).
According to this broader definition, the poor may compensate for  their lack of 
concrete material resources (capital, access, benefits) by making use of others, either 
material or immaterial (organization, solidarity, etc.). As Tarrow underlines, “contention 
may  be  the  only  resource  movements  control”  (1998:  5).  Furthermore,  in  the 
Gramscian sense of a political, social, economic crisis or crisis of hegemony (1971: 
210), crisis plays a crucial role in the emergence of protest. Thus, as Kriesi and Wisler 
note,  “Goldstone's  reanalysis  (1980)  of  Gamson's  classical  study (1975) found that 
social movement success is more likely in periods of crisis (e.g., major wars, economic 
or  political  crises)…  According  to  Siegenthaler,  the  core  of  an  economic  crisis  is 
constituted by a loss of faith in the established set of rules (1993: 178). This loss of  
faith  in  the basic  institutions  of  society  does not  bring  about  a  crisis,  but  it  is  the 
characteristic feature of a crisis... institutional change is most likely to take place during 
periods of economic crisis” (1999: 45). According to Melucci, “A conflict... within a social 
system may be brought to the surface by particular situations of crisis internal to the 
system itself”, without the conflict being a simple reaction to the crisis (1996: 22). The 
author defines a critical threshold regarding the link between expectations and reward, 
beyond  which  conflict  appears  (Ibid.:  55,  60).  Shorter  and  Tilly  also  note  that 
deprivation can be a catalyst under certain conditions9.
9 Of course they still speak of such phenomena in times of prosperity: thus, they invoke the example of a 
threat to the survival of a well organized segment of a labour force, or a sudden short term economic 
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Piven and Cloward relate economic deprivation to structural dislocation (Ibid.: 9-
18).  The  breakdown  of  the  regulatory  capacity  of  a  society,  in  conjunction  with  a 
weakening in the structures of daily life, in the sense of a breakdown of its routines and 
a constant re-establishment of its relations, facilitate mobilization, as they alter the way 
people  perceive  and frame their  grievances.  Deprivation  and social  dislocation  are 
treated  here  as  symptoms of  historically  specific  contradictions  in  capitalist  society 
(1977:  8).  This  is  in  opposition  to  expectation-derived  psychological  theories  and 
theories of irrationality, as well as the social dislocation versions proposed by Parsons 
or Smelser, whom Piven and Cloward accuse of treating economic or structural crises 
as  extraordinary  phenomena  (Ibid.:  9).  In  the  context  of  this  thesis,  economic 
deprivation and systemic breakdown, and most importantly, their interconnection, are 
the  substrate,  thus  the  starting  point,  in  which  the  social  movement  in  Greece 
developed. However, economic deprivation and systemic breakdown never constitute 
sufficient  conditions  on their  own,  their  consequences being more important  in  the 
collective rather than the individual level. Besides, systemic dislocation is not simply a 
cause of action, but also one of its consequences. In the Greek case, these remarks 
are quite evident, and are to be examined further. The almost immediate transformation 
of the economic crisis into a political one, and its intensification after the emergence of 
the social movement, exemplify the potential of that movement to further destabilize the 
political conjuncture, leading to further consequences and transformations.
b. Key concepts of the main social movement theories and debate.
As mentioned, the US tradition is more interested in the “how” of movements, while 
NSMT focuses on the “why”. This difference is reflected in the concrete analyses and 
targets of each theory. RMT and PPT focus more on more empirical studies, data and 
more concrete articulations of movements. NSMT, in contrast, concentrates more on an 
analytical,  theoretical  approach,  often to the detriment  of  examining their  particular 
change in a period of prosperity (Ibid.: 10).
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articulations. Thus, the US tradition has developed a series of key concepts related to 
forms of action, protest cycles and diffusion of protest. In this section, such concepts 
will be analyzed in relation to the implicit or explicit debate they have engendered, with 
particular regard to aspects relevant to the research of the present study.
The US tradition puts emphasis on the forms of actions employed by activists. The 
concept of “repertoires of action” was first presented by Tilly, who defines a repertoire 
as  “the  whole  set  of  means [a  group]  has  for  making  claims of  different  kinds  on 
different individuals or  groups” (1986:  4).  According to this concept,  “we can speak 
more loosely of a general repertoire that is available for contention to the population of 
a time and place” (Ibid.), while, “at any point in time, the repertoire of collective actions 
available  to  a  population  is  surprisingly  limited”  (Tilly  1978:  151).  Tilly  associates 
different repertoires with different points in time and so presents a coherent analysis of 
movements in historical terms (Neveu 2010: 77). The choice of each form is related to 
the resources available and the objectives of a movement. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 
173-81) relate the forms chosen to their ability to express the power of a movement in 
numbers, to cause material damage and to bear witness. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
(2001:  141)  categorize  forms  of  action  according  to  their  particularism,  scale  and 
mediation.  These repertoires are thought  to change slowly (Tilly  1978:  156;  Tarrow 
1989: 20), and reflect the historical background of actors10. At the same time, as Tarrow 
underlines,  protest  waves are precisely “the crucibles within which the repertoire of 
collective action expands” (Tarrow 1989: 20).
The above analysis, though very pertinent up to a certain point, may lead to a rigid 
categorization of movements and to the underestimation of their innovative capacity. 
Tilly claims  that  the  chosen  repertoire  appears  either  as  largely  familiar  to  actors 
(“flexible repertoire”) without being completely closed to innovation (which is more often 
the case for  organized groups),  or  as allowing a high degree of  innovation without 
ignoring  familiarity  (“advantage-of-familiarity  repertoire”,  more  accessible  to 
disorganized groups) (1978: 154-5). He emphasizes, though, the rarity of protesters 
10 For Tarrow, “Particular groups have a particular history – and memory – of contentious forms” (1998: 
21).
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being  highly  innovative.  Thus,  the  “advantage-of-familiarity  repertoire”,  or  even  the 
“rigid  repertoire  model”  (more  closed  to  innovation),  are  more  usual  (Ibid.).  This 
inhibition  towards  innovation  is  addressed  by  several  RMT  and  PPT  scholars, 
specifically  in  approaching the continuum between institutional  and non-institutional 
action. Participants are not thought as capable of employing radically new forms of 
action since any form of action is considered as resulting from a previous, more familiar 
one  (e.g.  Della  Porta  and  Diani  1999:  185-86).  Tilly  has  characteristically  stated: 
“Innovation is rarer, and harder to explain”. He considers that one of the main forms 
taken by innovation is “the stretching of the boundaries of forms of action which already 
belong to the repertoire” (1978: 155).
Tarrow lays more stress on the possibility of innovative forms of action, suggesting 
that  competition  among  groups  forces  them  to  use  innovation  (1989:  221), 
distinguishing between “early-riders” and “late-comers” (Ibid.:  60, and identifying the 
emergence  of  spontaneous  action  outside  movement  organizations,  Ibid.:  18). 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, in their latest work, emphasize the need for a certain degree 
of  innovation  by  social  actors  in  order  to  characterize  contention  as  transgressive 
(2001: 7-8). They define innovation as the action which “incorporates claims, selects 
objects of claims, includes collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that 
are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question” (Ibid.). The most 
innovative  forms of  action  are perceived as creative modifications  or  extensions of 
familiar routines, and not inventions of truly new forms (2001: 49, 140). This approach, 
although it correctly grasps that unconventional action does not appear “like isolated 
volcanoes of social action from a plain of consent” (Tarrow 1989: 61),  often fails to 
acknowledge both the radicalism and the innovative features of the movements studied 
in the current period of crisis. The NSM approach on the other hand, puts more stress 
on the innovative character of action since it views non-institutional action as a rupture 
from  institutional  action,  and  not  as  a  continuum  (e.g.  Melucci  1996:  341-44). 
Innovation  in  NSMT  is  linked,  however,  to  a  vision  of  a  supposed  structural 
transformation of capitalism, which will be examined later.
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Another key concept for both RMT and PPT is that of the “protest cycle” (Tarrow 
1989). This concept addresses the need to describe the mechanisms under which a 
protest  begins,  develops,  is  diffused and  ends,  or,  in  other  words,  the  need  for  a 
dynamic analysis of mobilization over time. Pizzorno was the first to lay stress on the 
cyclicity of the protest. According to his view, if we do not accept the cyclical character 
of mobilizations, “at every new upstart of a wave of conflict we shall be induced to think 
that we are at the verge of a revolution; and when the downswing appears, we shall 
predict the end of class conflict” (1978: 291). Tarrow has developed this concept of 
protest  cycles further, arguing that  movements appear  periodically, arising from the 
conflicts that are inherent to capitalist society (1989: 3). The course of the movement 
within a cycle follows more or less the same logic of emergence, development and 
demobilization (Ibid.: 8-9). Each cycle has a peak, when collective enthusiasm, tactical 
creativity and attempts to gain popular participation in institutions and organizations 
rise (Ibid.: 79).
Della Porta and Diani underline two tendencies: firstly, each successive protest 
cycle broadens the repertoire of collective action, and secondly, the more radical forms 
of action are gradually on the decline (1999: 191). The concept of cycles has been 
variously criticized, mainly concerning its claims of periodicity, and hence it  has not 
been widely adopted. This periodicity is compared to economic or  business cycles, 
implying that movements follow some kind of economic trajectory, an approach ending 
up in economic determinism (Barker 2012: 4). Koopmans has instead suggested the 
concept of “protest waves” (Kriesi et al. 1995: 113)11. In this concept, the influence of 
both external constraints and activists' choices about the movement’s development is 
incorporated.  Koopmans and Duyvendak underline that  changes in  the structure of 
political  opportunities  in  a  country  may  initiate  a  protest  wave,  whose  further 
development,  however, has its  own dynamics (Ibid.:  244).  Other  models have also 
11 “Protest waves 1. are characterized by a strong expansion and contraction of the magnitude of protest; 
2. extend over a longer period of time; 3. encompass large parts of the social movement sector; and 4. 
affect most of the national territory.” (Ibid.), the term used to describe more the magnitude and scope of 
the movement, and less its periodicity.
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been  proposed,  although  they  also  tend  to  prescribe  a  specific  course  for  the 
movement, implying a rather deterministic perspective12.
These models seem quite static, following the tendency to normalize movements' 
emergence and course. Thus, Tarrow has broadened their meaning, by suggesting the 
concept of the “cycle of contention”, defined as “a phase of heightened conflict across 
the social system” characterized by “a rapid diffusion of collective action from more 
mobilized  to  less  mobilized  sectors;  a  rapid  pace  of  innovation  in  the  forms  of 
contention; the creation of new or transformed collective action frames; a combination 
of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified information 
flow and interaction between challengers and authorities” (1998: 142). This definition 
puts less emphasis on periodicity and regularity, and more on the diffusion processes, 
akin  to  McAdam's  “movement  society”,  expressing  a  more  holistic  way  of 
conceptualizing movements.
Further, the relational approach of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly seeks to identify the 
exact mechanisms and processes that initiate and continue to influence an episode of 
contention. In their respect, regularities do exist, but these lie in the mechanisms rather 
than in standard sequences (Ibid.:  66-7).  As the authors specifically note,  “What is 
important here is not to posit deductively linear trajectories and predictable outcomes 
but to identify the processes and their constituent mechanisms that constitute different 
dynamics of contention” (Ibid.:  70). In an effort  to avoid linear interpretations, these 
authors  also  underline  that  similar  causal  mechanisms  may  produce  very  different 
outcomes, according to the settings in which they operate, the sequence of activation, 
the combination in which they occur, and the interaction among them (Ibid.: 187). This 
is why placing similar mechanisms within different specific contexts may explain why 
some episodes end in civil war and others resemble a protest cycle (Ibid.: 186). This 
approach  seems  more  appropriate  to  the  dynamics  of  movements  such  as  those 
studied here than the initial static model of protest cycles. However, as discussed later, 
this  multi-factor  model,  although  interactive,  is  not  dialectical,  ending  at  simply 
12 For example, the Karstedt-Henke model, which emphasizes the influence of external factors (cited in 
Kriesi et al. 1995: 117-8).
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identifying  in  a  cumulative  manner  the  different  mechanisms  acting  upon  social 
movements.  I  will  use  a  formulation  respective  to  that  of  a  contentious  cycle  to 
characterize the period of 2010-2011 under examination in this thesis, as a “rebellious 
cycle” (in chapter IV), bearing in mind this critique.
All the points discussed above relate to the transformation of protest movements 
over time. The same factors also play a role in the diffusion of protest over space. This 
debate is interesting especially in relation to the 2011 movements in many parts of the 
world  (“indignados/squares  movements”,  “Arab  spring”,  “Occupy  movements”  etc.). 
Giugni has identified the role of the mechanisms through which diffusion occurs. The 
author argues that the movements' “actions are subject to external influences and... the 
external environment is subject to their actions” (Kriesi et al. 1995: 181). Cross-national 
diffusion may occur when the issues at stake transcend national borders, and only 
when political opportunities in the countries involved are favourable (Ibid.: 182, 190). 
The challenge is to examine the conditions under, and the means by which diffusion 
can occur, rather than simply demonstrate it as a fact, or to model its rate (Ibid.: 184). 
The diffusion may be facilitated by organizational,  cultural  or  political  factors (Ibid.: 
188).
We can identify two main approaches regarding the diffusion of protest: in the first, 
diffusion  helps  to  transcend  the  specific  problems  hindering  the  development  of 
mobilization in a country (Tarrow 1989). In the second, which seems more empirically 
confirmed and analytically correct, its realization is conditional on the existence of a 
favourable context in the country as far as political opportunities are concerned (Kriesi 
et al. 1995). Further, contrary to scholars who lay stress on globalization as a process 
ushering in  a  decline  in  the  importance of  national  contexts  (more typical  of  NSM 
theorists, for example, Melucci 1989: 86-7; Castells 1996), attention must be paid to 
the national contexts in which mobilization occurs (Kriesi et al. 1995; Fillieule et Della 
Porta 2006; Tilly 2004). According to our approach, it is more appropriate to study each 
movement in its specificity, as posited in a particular political environment, though, at 
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the same time, taking into account both the context of the global economic crisis and its 
consequences, and specific diffusion processes among movements.
Finally, one of  the main components of  the early elaborations of  PPT was the 
“political  opportunity  structure”  (POS)13.  The  POS  includes  all  the  structural  and 
conjunctural determinants of the field of action and the political system that affect the 
development of a movement. Different scholars have proposed or focused on different 
factors constituting it. McAdam has summarized four main factors, which refer to the 
openness of the political system, the stability of the elite alignment, the presence of 
elite alliances and the degree of state repression (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 
27).  He  has  suggested  that  “any event  or  broad  social  process  that  serves  to 
undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political  establishment is 
structured occasions a shift in political opportunities” (McAdam 1982:41). Della Porta 
and Diani have added the political culture of the system in which a social movement 
develops as a necessary factor of POS (1999: 202-07).  Tarrow has proposed eight 
conditions of access to opportunity, five changeable and three structural ones. In the 
first category we find “(1) the opening of access to participation for new actors; (2) the 
evidence  of  political  realignment  within  the polity;  (3)  the  appearance of  influential 
allies; (4) emerging splits within the elite; and (5) a decline in the state's capacity or will  
to repress dissent” (1998: 76). He defines the three structural features as: “one set of 
the factors revolves around the concept of 'state strength'; a second deals with states' 
prevailing  strategies  toward  challengers;  while  a  third  relates  to  the  problem  of 
repression and social control” (Ibid.: 81). Kriesi et al. speak of four factors, including 
national cleavage structures, institutional structures, prevailing strategies and alliance 
structures (1995: 3-81, chapters I-III).
POS is a very interesting concept as it identifies crucial political factors influencing 
collective  action,  breaking  with  traditional  approaches  that  only  take  into  account 
macro-structural factors in the emergence of mobilizations. It presents, though, certain 
13 Eisinger was the first to suggest the term (1973), adopted by McAdam (1982) and later elaborated by 
Tarrow (1989),  who has  defined  it  as  the  “consistent  –  but  not  necessarily  formal,  permanent  or 
national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” 
(Tarrow 1998: 19-20).
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risks: the potential of repeating a strict, even schematic typology, and of a static model, 
the identification of superficial results and the neglect of the causes and deeper political 
reasons for mobilization14. In response to all these critiques, recent elaborations have 
abandoned  the  term  “political  opportunity  structure”,  and  use  instead  “political 
opportunities”,  in  order  to  imply  a  more  dynamic  model,  which  also  includes  the 
concept  of  “threat”  (Tarrow  1998:  71;  Goldstone  and  Tilly  2001:  181),  and gives 
significance to the way actors view the meaning of their action (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001). Under those conditions, the examination of political opportunities as the 
concrete political, social and economic background of the emergence of movements is 
a key concept in the approach adopted in this thesis. This is the reason for dedicating a 
chapter (chapter II) to the study of this concrete environment in which the movements 
of 2010-2011 in Greece developed.
c. Conceptualizing the political.
One of  the most  important  debates regarding social  movements refers to their 
political character. Both RMT and PPT, as well as their later elaborations, focus on the 
political factors that influence collective action. According to these approaches, social 
movements are political  actors with demands that  are addressed to the state,  and 
extend the boundaries of mass politics (Tarrow 1989: 1; Shorter and Tilly 1974). These 
theories emphasize the process of democratization that follows a social  movement, 
and  the extension  of  political  participation  resulting  from it,  both  quantitatively  and 
14 Kriesi and Giugni have suggested that POS should not be seen as “a funnel of causality”, as several 
factors limit its impact: the degree to which a movement is acting instrumentally, the feedback effects 
on the strategies of authorities, the modification of POS by the movement itself (Kriesi et al. 1995: xiv-
xv). Psimitis has criticized its lack of interactive force as a concept, the weakness to specifically identify 
which factor determines what, its conjunctural character and its limited scope in a globalized era (2006: 
277-81). Della Porta and Diani have commented on the limited ability to correlate causes and effects 
because of the many variables that interfere with the comprehension of the causal dynamics of protest 
and the relatively minor importance given to subjective factors (1999: 223-24). For Gamson and Meyer, 
the concept of POS “used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all”,  as it  is “in  
danger  of  becoming  a  sponge  that  soaks  up  virtually  every  aspect  of  the  social  movement 
environment”  (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 275).  In what seems an even more appropriate 
critique, the POS concept often reproduces simple and variable dichotomies, ignoring the complexity of 
several factors (Fillieule and Della Porta 2006: 18). Further, it may be seen as a structural and static  
model, suggesting a rather linear perception of the way that mobilizations emerge (Seferiades 2006: 
15). Finally, it may give the impression that political opportunities create mobilization, while, in reality, 
they facilitate it (Ibid. :14).
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qualitatively15. Here, movements are thought of as forms of political participation that 
broaden the limits of contemporary democracy by allowing people with no access to 
political power to participate and confront their adversaries (Tarrow 1989; 1998).
NSMT,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  against  the  political  character  of  social 
movements.  This  is  linked  to  its  perception  that  movements  do  not  develop 
instrumentally towards a certain goal and address the authorities in order to achieve it, 
but  have  a  more  expressive  and  internal  dimension.  According  to  Melucci,  social 
movements have “shifted towards a non-political terrain. The need for self-realization in 
everyday life challenges the logic of complex systems on cultural grounds” (1989: 23). 
According to Habermas, movements develop their action in the socio-cultural sphere, 
protecting  the “life-worlds”  and the autonomous  production  of  meaning  against  the 
processes of  intervention and control  exercised by politics  and the economy – the 
“colonization of everyday life” (Habermas 1984-7). Societies regulated by discipline are 
replaced by societies regulated by social control, leading to what Touraine has called 
“the  disappearance  of  the  idea  of  society”  (2002:  389).  Thus,  participants  in 
movements aim to re-assert the control of various social aspects of their lives – identity, 
lifestyle, culture – in lieu of, and against, political or economic aspects. This need is 
amplified by a further decline in existing democracy necessitating the appearance of 
new  forms  of  democracy  and  participation  (Psimitis  2006).  According  to  Melucci, 
democracy in everyday life undermines politics and opposes representative democracy 
rather  than  expanding  it  (1989:  172).  His  very  definition  of  the  political  demand 
excludes  the actors  who,  in  situations  of  antagonistic  conflict,  seek  to  change  the 
system, and do not accept its rules. These are not seen as legitimate political actors, 
whose demands refer to the mode of production and distribution of social resources 
(Melucci 1996: 234-35).
This difference of approach affects various levels of social movement analysis. In 
the US tradition, action is posited inside and in relation to the state and political power, 
15 As Tarrow writes,  “Historically, disorder  has  sometimes  accompanied  the  fall  of  democracy, as  in 
Weimar Germany and pre-Fascist Italy. But it has far more often accompanied its establishment, as in 
France in 1871, or its expansion, as in the United States in the 1930s.” (1989: 347).
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often over-stressing their importance. Movements have specific outcomes, which are, 
in most cases, measurable in terms of efficacy. Such an interaction with the state and 
the institutions has an impact  on movements themselves.  Thus,  for  many of  these 
theories,  the natural  course of  a movement entails  either its  institutionalization and 
integration into the political system or its evanescence through its repression16. Such a 
“determinism  of  institutionalization”  is  often  linked  to  a  supposed  continuous 
democratization  of  contemporary  representative  democracies  (e.g.  Tarrow  1989; 
Fillieule et Della Porta 2006: 85-112).
This  approach  presents  several  problems,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  last 
section  of  this  chapter.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  it  idealizes  a  process  of 
democratization  in  modern societies,  which,  especially  in  the  light  of  the events of 
recent  years,  has  to  be  contested.  It presents  a  rather  linear  perception  of  the 
development  of  movements  and  is  restricted  to  certain  areas  of  collective  action, 
excluding certain movements or revolts that do not present the same features (riots par 
excellence). The definition of a revolution by Charles Tilly is typical of this tendency: ”A 
revolutionary outcome is the displacement of  one set  of power holders by another” 
(1978:  193)17.  This  definition  ignores  a  series  of  other  parameters  important  in  a 
revolution (change of social relations, of the processes of production and distribution, 
etc.), while, even in a strictly political revolution, the stake is not simply the replacement 
of an elite by a new one but a challenge to the very form of political power itself. Finally, 
this concept of mere “displacement” of power holders misinterprets the role of the state 
in capitalism. Every specific political form (in the sense of the state) is a reflection of the 
dominant social relations. The state expresses, in Marxist terms, the collective strategic 
interests of the dominant class (whereas it maintains its relative autonomy in relation to 
this dominant class in order to satisfy its role in the long-term). Thus, it is not a neutral 
16 See the work of Tarrow on Italy (1989: 288). Groux and Pernot when discussing the strikes in France 
detect  the  “metamorphosis  of  the  revolutionary  strike  into  a  creative  strike  of  rights”,  increasingly 
institutionalized in  modern societies (2008:  39),  the strike being transformed into an instrument  of 
social and historical compromise (2008: 39-43).
17 Tilly's  definition  of  revolution  is  also  accepted  by  Melucci,  who  rejects  the  “historicist  idea  of 
revolutions”, fading, according to him, in contemporary societies (1996: 362, 366).
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mechanism  where  the  holders  of  power  may  simply  alternate  irrespective  of  the 
interests they express.
In the NSM approach, movements do not primarily have a “political” dimension, as 
mentioned. They are constituted not just by a burst of mobilizations but also latently, by 
the interplay of submerged networks.  “Movements live in another dimension: in the 
everyday network of social relations, in the capacity and will to re-appropriate space 
and  time  and  in  the  attempt  to  practice  alternative  life-styles”  (Melucci  1989:  71). 
Melucci  claims  that  these  latent  forms  of  action  are  both  pre-political  (rooted  in 
everyday  life  experiences)  and  meta-political  (in  that  they  cannot  be  completely 
represented by political forces) (Ibid: 72). The cultural and moral dimension of action is 
far more important than the instrumental or political one (Touraine 1984)18. Movements 
address  cultural  and  not  just  political  issues.  They  are  supposed  to  be  “action 
systems”, and actors are not subjects acting in a unity of purposes; their objectives are 
plural and contradictory (Touraine 1996: 78).
As  a  result,  movements  do  not  turn  instrumentally  towards  the  state  and 
institutions, but, in a sense, they bypass them. They do not refer to political power in 
order to satisfy certain demands, and similarly, they do not wish to negotiate with it 
(Melucci 1989: 3). They are more “local” and issue-oriented. Thus, neither their efficacy 
nor  their  success  is  very  important,  though  they  may  end  up  producing  certain 
outcomes (institutional change, selection of new elites, cultural innovation etc.) (Ibid: 
75). Melucci criticizes approaches that only take into account the political dimension of 
movements as having a tendency to falsely  politicize demands,  to undermine non-
visible forms of action and to reduce all spheres to the political (1996: 99; 1989: 44). He 
underlines that today the distinction between production and reproduction tends to be 
blurred. Demands are thus no longer restricted to the productive process but address 
many other issues referring to the reproduction sphere (time, space, personal relations, 
individual self-hood, life, health, nature, sexuality, communication, etc.) (1996: 100-01). 
Consequently, movement actors are thought to be indifferent to capturing state power 
18 As the author characteristically states later: “The world of rational instrumental action... is dissolving in 
the instability of the market and the unpredictable nature of many processes of change” (2002: 389).
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and  are  specifically  opposed  to  Leninist  organizations;  they  simply  ask  for  public 
spaces not dominated by political parties and political power (Melucci 1989: 79, 173). 
Melucci's approach concerning the importance of the reproduction sphere and of the 
everyday network of social relations is an important contribution. I will however argue 
that, based on a different definition of the political which will be later suggested, these 
spheres are deeply political and intensify rather than diminish the political character of 
movements.
Furthermore, social movements, according to NSMT, are no longer instrumental, 
but identity-oriented and constitute themselves the goal. With their participants seeking 
personal transformation, they serve to build an identity. These theories go even further 
by positing that movements are not forces oriented towards radical social change but 
“nomads of the present”19. This “presentism” is aptly commented on by Kouvelakis as 
incorporating the premise of the “End of History”; the present is disconnected from both 
the  past  and  future,  appearing  eternal  and  precluding  the  possibility  of  a  credible 
horizon of emancipation (2007: 169). Collective action often seems to have a value 
only  per  se,  ostensibly  having  as  a  sole  objective  influencing  the  formation  of 
subjectivity. I  can only  agree with  Melucci's  own critique at  this  point,  that  such a 
perception contains within it the risk of atomization, the fragmentation of conflicts and 
of capacities for struggle, a particularism and conservation of the existent, an “escapist 
withdrawal  into  the illusion of  an individual  and a  Nature  magically  freed from the 
constraints of social behaviour” (Melucci 1996: 111). As Ross argues, a perception that 
views movements as the expression of “a conquest of autonomy”, a return to “private 
life”, can be more compatible with, or harnessed by, political power or those aiming to 
defuse and depoliticize protest20. Contrarily, “expressive struggles”, such as those of 
women  or  gay  individuals,  became  mass  struggles  only  to  the  extent  that  they 
succeeded in rendering “political” questions that had previously been held to be private 
19 Characteristically,  if,  for  Melucci,  the  Left  refers  to  the  future  and  the  Right  to  the  past,  social  
movements refer simply to the present (1989:168).
20 This  attestation  does  not  at  all  aim  to  ignore,  or  even  underestimate,  the  long  term  effect  of 
participation on the individual, and the profound impact this experience can have on the way individuals 
concerned “see the world” and thus their propensity for future action. This is besides the main focus of 
this thesis, under a collective, political perspective.
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(Ross 2002: 156). In RMT and PPT, on the other hand, movements are mainly seen as 
the result of instrumental and strategy-oriented actions, with an expressive aspect21. 
The  concrete  outcomes  of  movements  and  their  success,  either  referring  to  the 
accomplishment of their concrete goals, or to the political system and the institutions, 
or to the distribution of power, are thoroughly studied in these approaches.
Another important consequence of the debate concerning the political character of 
movements is the different approaches towards the distinction between conventional 
and unconventional action. For RMT and PPT, there is no clear boundary between 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized action (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 6, 41; 
Kriesi  et  al.  1995:  xii).  The  main  difference  between the  two  is  that  in  “contained 
contention”, all parties to the conflict were previously established as constituted political 
actors,  whereas in  “transgressive contention”,  at  least  some parties are newly self-
identified political actors and employ innovative collective action techniques (Ibid.: 7-8). 
This  definition  contains  an  analytical  distinction  between  conventional  and 
unconventional forms, leading even to contention about the categorization of specific 
forms22.  This  strict  typology,  often  classical  in  RMT  and  PPT, underestimates  the 
dynamics of forms of action used by movements, and the fact that, in contemporary 
parliamentary regimes, many of these forms are neither unconventional nor completely 
conventional. There are of course differences among scholars regarding this distinction 
between institutional  and non-institutional  politics.  McAdam stresses the position of 
movements  outside  the  core  of  the  institutional  political  system,  implying  that,  if 
institutional politics were open enough to include movements, the latter would not need 
to exist (1982: 6, 20). Yet, while properly noting the weakness of the political system to 
fully assimilate movements23, he underestimates the opposite case – that movements 
themselves are not simply reducible to institutional politics. For Tilly, there is “a great 
continuity between open conflict and routine contention for power” and not “a separate 
21 Often resulting to a strict typology of demands according to their character (Kriesi et al. 1995: 83-92; 
Tarrow 1989: 123-26).
22 For example, Kriesi and Duyvendak think of strikes as unconventional forms (Kriesi et al. 1995: 24), 
whilst for Tarrow, they are entirely conventional (1989: 68).
23 When, for example, he states that movements are “a tactical response to the harsh realities of a closed 
and coercive political system” (Ibid.: 20).
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realm of contentious, extra-ordinary collective action which requires a separate mode 
of explanation” (1978: 50). In such approaches, the action of movements is generally 
integrated  into  the  principal  ways  of  “making  politics”.  The  notion  of  “conflict”  is 
trivialized (or, even worse, its trivialization is attributed to participants themselves), as it 
is emptied of any properly antagonistic dimension. Further, this whole tradition seems 
to underestimate the material, socioeconomic bases (and objectives) of protest, and to 
overly focus on institutional variables24. 
Sommier aptly underlines the reluctance of militants in movements to accept an 
exclusivity between “conventional” and “heterodox” political participation, recognizing 
themselves  as  citizens  who  are  active  actors  and  expressing  a  need  for  “another 
politics”  (2008:  110-11).  Piven  and  Cloward  have  also  criticized  this  focus  on  the 
continuity  between  conventional  and  protest  behaviour  as  leading  to  an 
understatement  of  the  clear  differences  between  them,  and  the  normalization  of 
collective  protest  (1991:  435).  For  them,  subsuming  protest  under  normal  politics 
ignores “the powerful role of norms in the regulation of all social life, including relations 
of domination and subordination” (Ibid.: 436). Thus, protest is not normal politics but 
outside it,  and against  it,  as people transcend the limits of  political  action deemed 
permissible  (Ibid.:  437).  Indeed,  this  “normalization”  of  disruptive  action  seems  to 
undermine its radicalism in both form of action and demands, as well as its potential. 
Certain PPT scholars have tried to respond to those criticisms by broadening their 
perspective on the character of movements. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly for example, in 
their influential  Dynamics of Contention, re-examine various aspects of their previous 
analyses and, consequently “see no reason ultimately to restrict the application of our 
approach to the political realm, narrowly defined” (2001: 343).
In NSMT, extra-institutional forms of action are studied in detail. For Melucci, “the 
interests of the subordinate groups, by definition, cannot be entirely represented and 
become full participants in the political system; they are always, to a greater or lesser 
24 It should however be noted that, as Seferiades underlines (2010: 14), the objective of the tradition was 
to prioritize political explanations over psychological ones, not over social ones. As McAdam notes, 
“The social movement is considered beyond all a political, not a psychological phenomenon” (1982: 
36).
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extent,  excluded  from  participation  and  manifest  themselves  through  the  non-
institutional forms of collective action” (1996: 307). Here, conflict and its antagonistic 
character has a more central position in the analysis of movements. Melucci claims that 
approaches  which  resort  strictly  to  the  political  market  do  not  recognize  this 
antagonistic  dimension of  conflicts,  as they view them solely  as articulating simple 
demands for a different distribution of resources or new rules (1996: 6-7; 1989: 39). For 
him, “the notion of a social movement is an analytical category. It designates that form 
of collective action which (i) invokes solidarity, (ii) makes manifest a conflict, and (iii) 
entails a breach of the limits of compatibility of the system within which the action takes 
place” (1996: 28). No collective actor can be totally antagonistic in the sense of being in 
absolute conflict with the political system; since, although the dominant groups deny 
the existence of conflicts involving the production and appropriation of social resources, 
movements with antagonistic demands cannot be integrated into the political system 
(Ibid.:  35).  However,  the  conflictual  nature  of  movements,  especially  in  its 
consequences, is still underestimated since the terrain of contention is considered to 
be that of culture. By restraining this terrain to merely “cultural” and not political aims, 
activists are led simply to a (futile) effort to create spheres of living outside the control 
of power but inside the limits of the system, which is considered to be universal and 
incontestable as such.
In conclusion,  these conceptions of  the political  character  of  social  movements 
raise the issue of defining the “political”. Indeed, both NSMT and RMT/PPT scholars 
seem to define the “political”  in a narrow sense – in terms of state institutions and 
movements'  relation  to  them.  Hence  the  “political”  is  perceived  as  contrasting  the 
“cultural”  or the “economic”,  and each sphere is considered a specialized, separate 
level.  On  the contrary, I  endorse  Ross'  distinction  between  political  action  and  “la 
politique des politiciens”  (2002:  15).  Here,  political  activity  appears  no longer  as  a 
distinct  and separate sphere isolated from social  life (Ibid.:  145-46),  Ross adopting 
Rancière’s view of politics as the disruption of normalization and of the dominant logic 
of the social (Ibid.: 23-4). Therefore, several forms of protest have political meaning, 
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even if they do not have articulated social change goals (Piven and Cloward 1977: 4). 
Duyvendak perceptively notes that this is evident even in cases of movements which 
are thought to be more identity-oriented (Kriesi et al. 1995: 169-78). According to such 
a  definition  of  the  political,  the  collective  subjects  themselves  are  not  essentialist 
categories  in  the context  of  a static  view;  they are approached in a relational  and 
dynamic  way,  in  their  unending  interaction  with  the  socio-economic,  politico-
institutional,  cultural-symbolic  environment  (Seferiades  2004:  628).  Adopting  this 
definition  would  include  many  of  the  aspects  of  social  life  that  the  approaches 
examined  above  would  define  as  non-political. Ultimately,  the  political  character  of 
movements  derives  from  their  ability  to  overcome  the  fragmentation  of  separate 
spheres,  to  transcend  their  particularity  and  to  reveal  a  certain  unifying  potential, 
without  repressing their  specific  characteristics.  Politics  is  perceived exactly  in  that 
sense: not as a sphere like the other ones, but as the expression of the surmounting of 
fragmentation into separate spheres and of the possibility of an hegemonic dimension 
that  enables  the  reestablishment  of  the  whole  over  the  partial,  in  their  internal 
articulation.  In this  definition,  politics is  not  simply instrumental  but  an art  of  life,  a 
process  of  constant  self-transformation,  democratization  and  learning,  of  the 
constitution of the people as a collective subject.
The political is thus far from being simply limited to the established dominant form 
of politics, as a separate exercise of power by a body of experts and bureaucrats, and 
as a privilege, as an expression and satisfaction of the partial interest, falsely projected 
as universal.  Such an approach, to be further explored in the following chapters, can 
certainly be detected in contemporary movements, such as those of this case study i.e. 
the movement in Greece in times of crisis. I will argue, after a thorough exploration of  
the movements of 2010-2011, that both the wave of strikes and the “movement of the 
squares” have proven such a political  character. At  the same time,  despite  having 
concrete demands, these are not movements constituted solely around and in dialogue 
with state institutions. Instead, they have tried to respond to the need for a different 
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social  and  political  organization  (evident  but  not  exhausted  in  the  efforts  of  self-
organization), and thus have actually intensified their political character.
d.  Why  Wo/Men  Rebel?  Collective  action  as  a  cognitive  praxis.  Framing 
processes and ideology.
“Moments of madness – seldom widely shared, usually  
rapidly suppressed, and soon condemned even by their  
participants – appear as sharp peaks on the long curve of  
history. New forms of  contention  flare  up briefly  within  
them and disappear, and their rate of absorption into the 
ongoing repertoire is slow and partial. But the cycles they  
trigger last much longer and have broader influence than 
the  moments  of  madness  themselves;  they  are,  in  
Zolberg's words, 'like a flood tide, which loosens up much  
of the soil but leaves alluvial deposits in its wake'” (Tarrow 
1993: 302-3)
Having examined the main concepts of social movement theories, as articulated 
around the question of  the political,  it  is  important  to equally  examine the “why” of 
people's mobilization. This point is also nodal to this research, and in chapter VI, I will 
argue in  favour  of  a dialectical  approach between the objective  and the subjective 
factors which trigger mobilization. Among social movement theorists, NSMT scholars 
attribute great importance to the structural context in which people mobilize. Thus, they 
often  analyze  conflict  as  originating  from  structural  contradictions  of  the  political 
system: conflict has a structural basis. This is tied to a supposed transition of capitalism 
to a “post-industrial  era”25 which provides the fundamental  framework of  the whole 
25 “Société programmée” and later postindustrial for Touraine, information era or complex societies for 
Melucci etc.
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theory. Power in this era is omnipresent and social control extends to every field of life. 
Hence,  social  struggle  takes  the  form  of  individualistic  resistance  to  manipulation 
(Melucci 1996: 91-2). Society is determined by consumption and not by class conflict, 
and social status is determined in terms of integration/exclusion and not in terms of 
hierarchy  (Touraine  1991;  1984:  106,  110).  Inglehart  claims  that,  in  postindustrial 
societies, the basic needs of the population have been satisfied and thus the latter 
turns  towards  more  “qualitative”  demands  (1977).  I  refuse  such  a  structural 
transformation of  capitalism suggested by  NSMT, a  point  to  be further  explored in 
chapter II.
The structural  dimension in NSMT, however, is neither limited to this  structural 
transition  of  capitalism,  nor  does  it  have  the  place  attributed  by  social  dislocation 
theories:  the  structural  context  of  mobilization  determines  the  conditions  in  which 
subjectivity is actually formed. Melucci emphasizes that mobilization is neither a simple 
reaction to an existing crisis  nor a deviant  behaviour, but  an action determined by 
solidarity  and  by  the presence  of  a  conflict  (Melucci  1996:  28-32).  Aside  from the 
structural context in which action develops, collective identity formulated by interaction, 
self-identification and available opportunities and constraints are crucial for mobilization 
to  take  place  (Melucci  1989:  34).  Mobilization  is  not  simply  structure-led,  but 
presupposes the existence of a social problem, a shared sense of common interests 
and collective action itself (Ibid.: 193). Melucci generally emphasizes the way actors 
perceive  reality  and  their  action,  something  merely  structural  explanations  neglect, 
tending to homogenize actors26. The experiential and subjective apprehension of crisis 
is also overstressed by Habermas (1984-7) and by Touraine (2002)27.
Further, the concept of collective identity and its interactive character is of great 
importance  for  Melucci.  In  his  approach,  the  process  of  identity-making  and  the 
defense of one's individual identity are key concepts for participation in a movement. In 
26 His approach is however phenomenological, as when emphasizing the act of naming as a factor that 
constitutes social life, or stating that “it is enough to structure reality using different words for the power 
monopoly over reality to crumble.” (1996: 358).
27 “The Subject must therefore be sought… not above social organization, in a transcended world, but, on 
the contrary, below it and in the  individuality  and  singularity  of each human being” (Touraine 2002: 
391).
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contrast with Touraine, whom he accuses of considering identity as a given, and with 
Pizzorno,  who adopts the idea of  an identity  strictly  defined by objective  interests, 
Melucci views identity as “an interactive process through which several individuals or 
groups define the meaning of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints 
for such an action” (Melucci 1996: 69-70). Identity is no more an essentialist, given 
situation, but a relational, interactive and controversial process (see Psimitis 2006: 157-
8;  and  also,  in  a  different  vein,  McAdam,  Tarrow  and  Tilly  2001:  56,  133).  The 
production of collective identity is directly connected to the interaction of individuals and 
groups, according to subjective (“orientation of action”) and objective (“conditions of 
action”)  factors  (Melucci  1996:70).  In  Tarrow's  more  adequate  analysis,  collective 
identity is not the result of structural change but the product of conflict (1989: 331).
Many scholars accept  aspects  of  the  aforementioned analysis  of  the so-called 
“post-industrial” society (indicatively, Kriesi et al.  1995: xix-xx; Della Porta and Diani 
1999:  24-57).  Nevertheless,  they  challenge  the  view  that  conflicts  have  a  more 
structural and static character directly derived from structural determinants (Kriesi et al. 
1995: 242). RMT and PPT theorists have been accused of completely neglecting the 
structural  substrate  of  collective  action,  by  claiming  that  structural  reasons  are 
ubiquitous and hence of little importance. The work of Charles Tilly (Shorter and Tilly 
1974; Tilly 1978) and others (eg. Tarrow 1989) goes some way to contesting this claim. 
PPT has actually been an attempt to serve as a bridge linking broad social-structural 
changes  to  concrete  mobilization  processes  (Kriesi  et  al.  1995:  239).  Tilly  has 
thoroughly  worked  through  the  macro-structural  conditions  of  collective  action,  by 
introducing an analysis of the changes brought about by modernity and the ways action 
is affected by them. He has also stressed the danger of generalizing tendencies that 
are not universal or structural28. Tilly has underlined that “the alterations in the forms of 
collective action result from changes in its determinants” (1978: 97). He has proposed 
a model according to which systemic factors can predict  which interests people will 
pursue in the long-run, but the explanation of their behaviour in the short-run depends 
28 For example, arguing against technological determinism which could lead to the devaluation of politics 
(2004: 98).
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on their own articulation of these interests (Ibid.: 61). Tarrow has stated that protest 
begins where structural conflict is greater and can be generalized before being diffused 
(1989: 10). The political, cultural and historical background in the country where action 
emerges  is  also  considered  as  being  highly  relevant  (Tarrow  1989:  37;  McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 14).
Therefore,  in  contrast  to  assuming  any  direct  linkage  between  structural 
determinants and collective action, structural change is deemed to create the objective 
potential for movements, but it can neither overcome the inertia of personal inactivity 
nor  develop the necessary networks and solidarity for  effective action.  This  protest 
potential  must  be identified and translated into action,  a process for  which political 
opportunities are of great importance (Tarrow 1989: 21-3, 8). For Tarrow, differences 
among countries also put in question holistic structural models unless they are able to 
take political processes into account (Ibid.: 4). According to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 
“environmental changes start our story, but by no means explain it” (2001: 63). Such 
recent  elaborations  have  emphasized  taking  into  account  “strategic  interaction, 
consciousness and historically accumulated culture” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 
22). Here, “the crucial arena for causal mechanisms lies not in individual minds but in 
social interaction” (Ibid.: 56). This examination of the causal mechanisms of collective 
action  brings  indeed  back  a  more  structural  approach,  although,  as  before,  it 
sometimes  runs  the  risk  of  lapsing  into  a  strict  typology.  In  order  to  systematize 
movements in relation to causal mechanisms, it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
effects of several explanatory factors can vary radically with the social, political and 
cultural conjuncture (hence the need for historical grounding) (Seferiades 2006: 9).
Other authors have emphasized the structural determinants of collective action, 
without, however, accepting the aforementioned argument on the transition to “post-
industrial” society. For Piven and Cloward, the evolution of specific institutional patterns 
under  modern  capitalism and  their  effects  on  the  working  class  (increase  in  living 
standards, fractionalization, assurance of capitalist hegemony) have affected struggles 
(1977: xi). “Mass defiance” may not be simply freely chosen or determined since “the 
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opportunities  for  defiance  are  structured by  features  of  institutional  life”  (Ibid.:  23). 
Patterns of daily life and the institutional context shape the behaviour of people when 
they mobilize, yet “within those patterns, their actions are to some extent deliberate and 
purposeful”  (Ibid.:  18-23).  Deterioration in  economic conditions,  together  with social 
dislocation are thought of in these approaches as important factors for action;  both 
perceived  by  the  actors  as  such,  provoking  a  challenge  to,  or  even  collapse  of 
elements of the dominant hegemony (materially as well as ideologically). Piven and 
Cloward have introduced the “problem of indeterminacy”: “given objective conditions, 
such  as  structural  opportunity,  do  not  necessarily  determine  given  behavioural 
outcomes” (1991: 445).
In a critical overview, NSMT scholars have the tendency to present as universal 
and general tendencies that are not necessarily structural, but correspond to a specific 
conjuncture.  Scholars  from  the  US  tradition,  although  correctly  noting  the  role  of 
political processes and the availability of resources and organization, sometimes seem 
to  overstate  their  role  and  undervalue  structural  determinations.  Serdedakis  has 
pertinently noted that “analysis is restrained into certain areas of collective action, while 
the stakes of social struggles, the mobilized people's social position and the structural 
causes of collective action are put on the back burner” (2007: 390). Finally, both over-
structural  and subjective or  phenomenological theories devoted to the reasons why 
people mobilize seem inadequate as a whole, though having much to offer. We are in 
need  of  a  theory  which  comprehends  dialectically  structural  determinants,  crisis 
phenomena and the political framework, analyzing them under the criterion of  praxis. 
Such a theory attributes a central role to the transformation of people's consciousness 
through political participation, in other terms to the subjective factor, which becomes 
decisive at  certain moments in  history. This is  the “philosophy of  praxis”  approach, 
which will be employed in this thesis. Following the fieldwork of this research, certain 
theoretical remarks on such an approach will be further elaborated in chapter VI.
“Frame theories” have contributed to comprehending such processes. The more 
recent  elaborations  stemming  from PPT emphasize  the  role  of  framing  processes. 
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Previous models have suffered from being static, failing to examine both the interactive 
processes within a movement and the frames under which actors perceive their action. 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly  (2001),  as well  as NSMT and especially  Melucci29 have 
focused  on  the  crucial  significance  of  interaction.  However,  in  the  latter,  the  re-
interpretation of the environment by the actor is posited in terms of mental perception, 
ending up in being phenomenological. The transformative character of collective action 
and protest is also underlined by other authors, such as Piven and Cloward who claim 
that, apart from external interaction, the emergence of a protest movement transforms 
the actors'  consciousness (by undermining the legitimacy of  certain  aspects  of  the 
system, and by making people believe in their own potency and potential to change 
things) and behaviour (through collectively acted out defiance) (1977: 4). Tarrow has 
also  emphasized  the  transformative  effects  of  movements  on  the  activists,  mostly 
regarding their  motivation to participate in political  life (1998:  165-69).  However the 
transformative effect  of  action on the actors is,  overall,  relatively  under-appreciated 
(Barker 2011: 8), despite being a crucial aspect of human action.
Therefore, the important elements are not only the objective factors that lead to the 
emergence of mobilizations but also how people  perceive them – or, even more, not 
simply how they mentally perceive them, but how they they  experience them (Barker 
being the scholar to suggest experience instead of the more commonly used perceive, 
in 2011: 5). Michèle Perot, in studying strikes in France, has emphasized that, even 
when the economic  conjuncture  is  favourable  for  the  emergence  of  a  strike,  what 
matters is  “the conscience of the conjuncture” as well  (Groux and Pernot 2008: 52). 
Thus, the objective conditions must be experienced and interpreted as such in order for 
action to take place (Sommier, Fillieule et Agrikoliansky 2008: 29). The political context 
is important for this framing process to be effective: “Social movements are sometimes 
victorious in their efforts to frame situations as problematic, but only when they operate 
in a political context that offers them the opportunities to do so.” (Kriesi et al. 1995: 
164).  This  is  what  McAdam  has  called  “cognitive  liberation”:  the  definition  of  the 
29 Melucci argues that human behaviour is purposive and capable of reflexion, but is also defined by the 
interdependence and symbolic exchanges between people (1996: 45-6).
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situation by potential actors as “both unjust and  subject to change” (1982: 36). This 
process  through  which  people  perceive  and  frame the  objective  parameters  is  an 
active,  creative  and  constitutive  process,  which  mediates  between  opportunity  and 
action (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 16, 41). For Tarrow, the interpretative themes 
that inspire people to frame their grievances in a way that spurs them to collective 
action unify the movement sector. During the course of a movement, new interpretative 
frames are produced, while extending existing frames form a primary mechanism for 
diffusing  protest  (1989:  24).  Obviously,  in  periods  of  a  crisis  of  hegemony  of  the 
dominant frames and ideologies, alternative frames are easier to be imposed through 
collective action. The Gramscian analysis on the way to challenge the hegemony of the 
dominant  forces  (through  the  combination  of  a  war  of  maneuver  and  of  a  war  of 
positions) is relevant at this point, in the sense of leading to a counter-hegemonic bloc, 
with a determining strategic perspective (Thomas 2009a: 220).
Hence,  “people  cannot  for  long  sustain  campaigns on behalf  of  their  rights  or 
interests without identifying them with generally-held values and reaching out to others 
through  a  framework  of  common  interpretation”  (Tarrow  1989:  128).  According  to 
Seferiades (2006: 26), these propositional, strategic attributions of meaning to reality 
and to active participants lead to the instigation of collective action, the affiliation of 
actors and the deactivation  of  their  opponents.  Della  Porta  and Diani  suggest  that 
interpretative frames allow people to identify the problem as a social and political one; 
to find solutions, new patterns, articulations, relationships and, finally, motivation for 
action  (1999:  69-73).  Snow  and  Benford  have  drawn  on  the  concept  of  framing 
suggested by Goffman in order to propose a frame analysis30. What is important here is 
frame alignment, namely “the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, 
such that  some sets of  individual  interests,  values  and beliefs  and SMO activities, 
goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (Snow et al. 1986: 464). Frame 
alignment  is  conducted through four  different  processes:  frame amplification,  frame 
bridging,  frame  extension  and  frame  transformation  (Snow et  al.  1986;  Snow and 
30 According  to  Goffman,  frames  are  “schemata  of  interpretation”  that  enable  individuals  to  “locate, 
perceive, identify, and label” occurrences in their life and the world (1974: 21).
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Benford 1988), and should not be presumed simply on the basis of the existence of 
objective parameters, nor should it be perceived as conducted once and for all: “it is 
temporally variable and subject to reassessment and renegotiation” (Snow et al. 1986: 
476).
The contribution of this approach is important since many previous models tend to 
consider only the objective reality and not its interpretation by actors, thus promoting a 
rather static model of participation as a teleological decision. PPT scholars have fairly 
criticized frame analysis as being constructionist and focusing too much on discourse 
and meaning to the detriment of the political conditions under which certain discourses 
become imaginable (Kriesi et al. 1995: 163). For Melucci, what this approach implies, 
but actually tends to forget, is the ideological aspects of such a definition of the action 
by the actors (1996: 348), since “ideology is a key analytical level for the understanding 
of  social  movements  and  should  include  the  framing  activities  as  part  of  the 
representational system of the actor” (Ibid.). Melucci is one of the few scholars who 
emphasize the role of ideology. He draws on Gramsci's analysis of cultural hegemony 
and Althusser's analysis of ideological apparatuses, emphasizing more their symbolic 
aspect31 (1996: 181-2).  He claims however that  there is a tendency for ideology to 
become “the principal channel of consensual manipulation” in contemporary societies, 
in which the subordinate classes cannot produce their own counter-ideology, due to the 
diffusion of social control in all aspects of social life and to the disappearance of the 
rigid distinction between cultures and ways of life (Ibid.: 224; for a similar approach, 
1989:  97);  acknowledging at  the same time the necessity  for  frame analysis  to  be 
connected to the “deconstruction of the ideological dimensions of the frames produced 
by collective actors” (Melucci 1996 : 349). We cannot endorse his overall approach, 
which actually leaves very little space for the subjective factor, and fails to acknowledge 
the contradictory nature of such processes. Further, Melucci adopts a rather idealistic 
view of ideology, which deprives it of its materiality.
31 Psimitis also lays stress on the contribution of Gramsci to the concept of hegemony (Psimitis 2006: 
282-87).
49
At  this  point,  certain  elements  related  to  the  constitution  of  subjectivity  and 
consciousness need to be clarified from the standpoint of our theoretical framework32: 
First,  the  theory  of  ideology must  be founded in  relation  to  the  class  character  of 
societies.  Second,  ideology  is  to  be  treated  dialectically,  not  simply  as  the  false 
consciousness of the working class (this being a real aspect of ideology), but also as 
the mediated relationship of the subject to its material conditions of being, which also 
has  a  material  dimension33.  Besides,  as  Zizek  emphasizes,  “It  is  not  sufficient  to 
oppose the way things 'objectively are' to the way they 'merely appear to us': the way 
they appear  (to  the observer)  affects  their  very 'objective being'”  (2002:  173).  This 
assumption allows the possibility of formulating a critique of ideology (in line with the 
nature of the proletariat as simultaneously a class and a potentially classless subject - 
thus  a subject  carrying within  the potential  of  expressing the universal  interests  of 
society and not merely its own, partial interests). In this sense, the Althusserian view on 
subjectivation as resulting only from ideological interpellation also fails to respond to 
the complexity of  the very subjectivation process34.  Third,  ideology has a concrete, 
material character, and is not simply a mental conception35. And finally, the question of 
ideology is bounded to that of human alienation, which is, however, to be perceived in a 
historical and not an essentialist manner, as inherent to exploitation36. In other words, 
32 Starting  from the  Marxian  formulation  in  the  Preface  to  A Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Political  
Economy  that  “a  distinction  should  always  be  made  between  the  material  transformation  of  the 
economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and 
the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become 
conscious of this conflict and fight it out.”. At the same time, “men become conscious (of the conflict 
between the material  forces of  production)  on  the ideological  level”  of  juridical,  political,  religious, 
artistic and philosophical forms (Marx 1904: 12). As Gramsci has pertinently emphasized, this conflict 
refers to all conscious knowledge, and not only to the conflict between the material forces of production 
and the relations of production (1971: 372).
33 Viewing ideology as simply false consciousness underestimates both the internal  contradictions of 
ideology and the ability of social subjects, of the people, to encounter their actual living conditions, to 
critically engage with their environment and thus to develop action as agents.
34 Callinicos argues against such an approach, by stressing that, on the one hand, the ideological field is 
internally  contradictory  (consisting  by  more  than  one  ideological  schemata  and  expressing  the 
conflicting interests of various social groups), and on the other hand, individuals are confronted by a 
multiplicity of social identities, drawing, thus, our attention to the centrality of social identities in the 
analysis of ideological phenomena (2004: 178-9).
35 “Furthermore, another proposition of the philosophy of praxis is also forgotten: that “popular beliefs” 
and similar ideas are themselves material forces.” (Gramsci 1971: 165).
36 “But the human essence is no abstraction inherent  in each single individual.  In its reality it  is  the 
ensemble of the social  relations.” according to the 6th Thesis on Feuerbach (Marx 2010b: 4).  Two 
preconditions are necessary in order for the category of alienation to be useful: (1) to be cut off from 
any  philosophy  of  reification  (or  fetishism  or  objectification  of  self),  what  would  lead  us  to  an 
anthropological variation of idealism; and (2) to be thought strictly under the concept of exploitation 
(Althusser 1977: 89).
50
social  representations  from the  broader  environment,  conceptualized  in  the  widest 
sense  as  the  socio-historical  and  political  context  (thus  including  the  objective 
parameters  of  such an  environment)  contribute  decisively  to  both  the  formation  of 
people's self and their perception of reality37.  These concepts will be dealt with in the 
course of the current thesis.
e. What is really happening today is neoliberalism.
In this chapter, I  have examined the basic tenets of the currents of thought on 
social movements that have been developed since the 1970s. NSMT as mentioned, is 
based  on  a  western-centred  discourse  and  reading  of  the  present  postulating  a 
“postindustrial”  phase  of  capitalism  as  the  primary  determinant  of  emergent 
movements. Class conflict is over, prosperity is here to stay forever (and for everyone), 
material demands are obsolete, and people struggle to constantly enhance their quality 
of life. This analysis has always been intensely partial, nowadays, provocatively so, as 
large strata of the population even in the most developed countries are proletarianized, 
subjected to a violent decline in their living standards and marginalized. Thus, NSMT 
tends to “structuralize” tendencies that have little structural about them. This dispute 
over whether a change is conjunctural or structural is not simply a matter of typology; in 
reality, this tendency to structuralize the conjunctural reveals a different approach to 
defining and conceptualizing the structural. It has also been argued that this approach 
studies and theorizes movements “in a selective and biased way” (Kouvelakis 2007: 
223).  Melucci  is  representative  of  this  view:  movements  are  considered  as 
“heterogeneous and fragmented phenomena” (1996: 13). According to him, no vision of 
politics can be totalizing, as “the system has no centre” (Ibid.: 208). Thus, movements 
are classified into categories (referring to feminism, ecology, youth, etc.) and studied as 
dissociated  from  one  another;  besides,  the  “grandiose  political  programs”,  have 
37 Perceived  in  discussion  to  Gramsci's  distinction  between  “good  sense”  as  stemming  from  daily 
experience, and “common sense”, stemming from the broader social environment, but being incoherent 
and  contradictory, thus  open  to  new hegemonic  articulations.  For  Rehmann,  common sense is  a 
“battlefield of contradicting tendencies” (Rehmann 2013: 127).
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resulted for Melucci in nothing but totalitarianism and violence (1989: 189; this is what 
he latter calls characteristically “end of historicism”, 1996: 190). We are simply “left with 
only different ways of organizing, managing, and politically defining the existing world 
system from the inside” (1996: 190)38. A similar argument is implied by Touraine in his 
concept of “cultural field”, when he underlines that the various actors as adversaries 
who constitute the social  relation must  necessarily coexist  and act  within the same 
cultural field, or else class relationships would be defined as relations of social war 
(1978: 50). Such a thesis leads to an underestimation of movements' radicalism, and of 
their ability to question the dominant hegemony as a whole39. However, it should be 
underlined  at  this  point,  that  the  emergence  of  NSMT  must  be  examined  in  a 
historicised account, one that actually takes into account the reality of the retreat of the 
labour movement and the emergence of other movements at the time.
I  argue in favour of an examination of social  movements as being part  of  “the 
social  movement  in  general”  instead  of  simply  attesting  their  plurality40.  As  Barker 
underlines, McAdam's “movement family” concept (and in a sense, the same goes for 
Tarrow's “cycles of  contention”,  1998:  142-43) implies a much more holistic  way of 
conceptualizing social movements, even though the author insists on the need to also 
treat movements distinctly (McAdam 1995; Barker 2012: 2). Of course, the perception 
of social movements as an entity (which seems even more appropriate when studying 
social  and  political  struggles  in  times  of  crisis  since  they  can  all  be  more  easily 
embraced  within  a  single,  coherent  narrative),  should  not  reduce  their  complexity. 
Furthermore, and despite the reservations voiced above, Melucci's approach is useful 
38 Indicatively, Melucci  views precariousness as freedom (1996:  120).  Choice is  glorified:  people are 
presented as mobilizing in reaction to the too many choices they have (Ibid.: 128; also Psimitis 2006: 
299). This argument is dubious in times of extreme prosperity; in times of crisis, it is fallacious. Further, 
this view of  power as omnipresent  leaves little room for movements,  at  least  those that  would go 
beyond mere resistance in a very specific field.
39 Eagleton's critique is relevant here: “For radicals to discard the idea of totality in a rush of holophobia 
is, among other more positive things, to furnish themselves with some much-needed consolation. For 
in  a  period  when  no  very  far-reaching  political  action  seems  really  feasible,  when  so-called 
micropolitics seems the order  of  the day, it  is  relieving to convert  this necessity into  a virtue – to 
persuade oneself that one’s political limits have, as it were, a solid onto-logical grounding, in the fact  
that social totality is in any case a chimera. It doesn’t matter if there is no political agent on hand to 
transform the whole, since there is in fact no whole to be transformed. It is as though, having mislaid 
the breadknife, one declares the loaf to be already sliced.” (Eagleton 1996: 9).
40 The  term  is  Marxian,  as  approached  in  (Barker  2012:  1);  Kouvelakis  also  perceives  the  term 
(emphasizing its use in the singular) as “corresponding to a certain configuration of social struggles 
and the labour movement itself” (Kouvelakis 2007: 213).
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because of its emphasis on at least three dimensions: the ideological dimensions of the 
articulation of both political power and social movements; the fact that actors address 
issues that refer to the reproduction sphere, and not only to the productive process; 
and  finally,  the  importance  of  the  concept  of  collective  identity  engendered  in  a 
movement.
RMT and PPT, and their further elaborations, seem a more adequate starting point 
to  study  a  social  movement,  especially  since,  over  time, more  attention  has  been 
focused on interactive processes and causal mechanisms. However, this perspective 
also  views  movements  in  a  partial  way,  exacerbated  by  its  frequently  heavily 
descriptive and empiricist  approach.  Furthermore,  scholars attached to this tradition 
tend  to  adopt  a  cumulative,  multifactor  causal  model,  in  which  the  aggregation  of 
different mechanisms and factors produces the outcome. Thus, research often consists 
in  breaking the whole  into  simple  pieces and studying them (and their  interaction) 
separately. As Hogan notes, this is an interactive but not dialectical model (Kousi and 
Tilly  2008:  288).  A holistic  dialectical  model,  the  components  of  which  would  be 
inseparable and antithetical (Ibid.:  289-90),  is more appropriate for the study of the 
contradictory nature of social movements, while overemphasis on the political aspects 
of mobilization must not lead to underestimating cultural identities and dimensions, and 
the role of subjectivity.
Finally,  RMT  and  PPT's  progressive  view  of  movements  as  promoters  of 
democracy  often  leads  to  a  certain  determinism  regarding  their  emergence  and 
outcomes. There are three major flaws in the “protest cycle” concept and its corollary, 
namely  the  almost  inevitable  institutionalization  which  is  supposed  to  follow  each 
movement, including the schema of integration as opposed to exclusion: Firstly, such 
an approach actually embraces an idea of the “End of History”. If  the ultimate goal 
(conscious  or  unconscious)  of  movement  actors  is  to  deepen  and  expand 
contemporary democracies, no alternative visions of society are conceivable. Besides, 
in  these  studies,  contemporary  democracies  are  all  too  often  considered  more 
democratic than they truly are. Instead of affirming an inevitable institutionalization of 
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movements, it seems more appropriate to dialectically analyze the constant struggle 
between  institutionalization  and  radicalization,  tendencies  which  at  the  same  time 
remain  internally  articulated.  As  Barker  notes,  “a  rising  protest  wave  needs  to  be 
understood,  from its  beginning  to  its  conclusions,  as  containing quite  contradictory 
impulses  and  forces,  to  both  radicalism  and  moderation”  (2012:  8).  Attribution  of 
“normality” to every form of action (including violent ones), while progressively aiming 
to legitimize movements as modes of collective action underestimates their radicalism 
(Serdedakis  2009:  3;  Seferiades  2010:  11).  This  explains  the  weakness  of  such 
approaches in studying movements that embody a strong radical content and practices 
(Ibid.). Thus, movements must be examined also as an “interruption of the established 
order” and not as merely an extension of that order (Ross 2002: 213).
Secondly, these movements tend to be perceived in these approaches in a linear 
way; indeterminacy is rather absent. On the contrary, as Melucci has stated, “the future 
depends solely on our action purged of all  teleological connotations” (Melucci 1996: 
196).  Melucci views, however, the future as the result of  people's own choices and 
decisions, the outcomes of which cannot be fully predicted. Here, conflict is valorized 
as such, independent of and opposed to any concrete strategy, and the outcomes of 
conflict remain unknown, in a way leaning towards a particular agnosticism. From our 
perspective, conflict is interpreted in terms of class struggle, in opposition both to linear 
and over-subjective approaches. I endorse an approach which distinguishes reality and 
existence, identifying different potentials in reality, contradictory tendencies, and with 
temporality playing a crucial role41.  As Barker emphasizes, the course of a movement 
involves  “complex  sequences  of  advances  and  retreats,  leaps  and  moments  of 
apparent  stasis,  expansions and contractions,  peaks and downward slides” (Barker 
2012: 10).  In this new perception of temporality, time is no longer thought as simply 
linear, or predictable. Even more, “the present is necessarily non-identical with itself, 
41 According to Althusser, we have to think necessity “in terms of a dialectic of the tendency, necessarily 
entangled 'with countervailing causes' (spawned, first and foremost, by the tendency itself), in which it 
is both possible and necessary to intervene politically in order to make possible the realization of this 
tendency. Without this intervention, the tendency will never be automatically realized. If this intervention 
is inept, the worst is to be feared: the mediocrity of a 'historical compromise' whose variants can be 
infinite, and which can culminate in horrors” (Althusser 2006: 94).
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composed of  numerous 'times'  that  do not  coincide but  encounter  each other  with 
mutual incomprehension” (Thomas 2009a: 281). The present is, therefore, only one of 
the  feasible  outcomes  of  the  struggles  of  the  past,  even  though,  in  the  dominant 
philosophy of history, “the past exists only to better justify and magnify the present”42 
(Ross 2002: 183).
Thirdly,  emphasizing  political  participation  yields  a  schema  of  exclusion,  also 
evident in NSMT, in which the main problem is the “in and out” and not the “up and 
down”;  the concept of  exploitation is substituted by that of inequalities,  and vertical 
societies  by  horizontal  ones  (Touraine  1991).  This  definition  disregards  the  main 
objective of this process of marginalization: the deepening of the exploitation of both 
the marginalized and the “included” strata (Kouvelakis 2007: 45-6). Nowadays, with an 
ongoing authoritarian turn of political systems in certain countries (such as Greece), 
resulting in  a more extensive social  and political  marginalization,  an approach that 
views actors as simply integrated into the political  sphere ends up excluding large 
strata from its analysis. 
Finally, in respect to the social actors who lead social movements, NSMT suggests 
that they are not to be found within the working class. In its analyses, classes are not at 
the centre of the conflict; new social conflicts arise43. Having said that, their challenge 
of  a  narrowly  defined  working  class  followed by  a  certain  Marxist  tradition,  as  an 
industrial working class engaged only in manual productive labour, has a lot to offer. 
This  conception of  the working class is  in  consistency to the one operative in  this 
thesis, as will be examined in chapter III.
42 And “capitalism lives itself in a perpetual present” (Jameson 2005: 12).
43 Yet, social classes remain selectively present in these approaches, since, even if not described as a 
revolutionary subject in the sense that the working class is in Marxism, the “new middle classes” are 
placed at the centre of the stage (Offe 1987: 77-8; Melucci 1989: 52-3). Thus, their actual tendency is 
the marginalization of the working class and the lower strata. Of course, differentiations among NSMT 
theorists do exist. Touraine, for example, argues that the whole function of society is a reflection of the  
struggle between two specific antagonistic actors who fight for the control of cultural concerns (1978: 
113-4). For him, there still exist “historical struggles” (1978: 138-81), and thus a core movement that 
brings change  (Ibid.: 170), though he claims being in search of it, since for him it is no longer the 
working-class movement (1978: 168-73; 1984). Melucci, on the other hand, claims that there is no 
“central movement” because there is no “central conflict”,  no particular actor that will  bring change 
(Melucci 1989: 188, 200).
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This primacy of the middle class in mobilizations has been partly adopted by other 
scholars,  without,  however,  them  emphasizing  these  ostensible  structural 
transformations (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 48-56). Kriesi and Giugni, while accepting 
the dominance of the new middle class in the new social movements, suggest that its 
presence is not decisive (Kriesi et al 1995: xix). According to other scholars of RMT 
and PPT, on the other hand, movements go beyond, but are not separate from class. 
For the most part, these approaches still view the most oppressed and exploited, as 
the protagonists of movements. The primary problem in these analyses of class seems 
to be, among others, a problem of definition. Class conflicts are defined very narrowly 
in order to be rejected; they are defined as conflicts only happening in the sphere of 
production – and basically inside factories. Moreover, the way that this “new middle 
class” is defined does little to differentiate it from the working class  (Della Porta and 
Diani 1999: 53). There is still an effort to generalize tendencies that have not been 
universal: in times of economic crisis, realities that once seemed evident are evidently 
reversed;  large  strata  of  the  population  are  being  proletarianized,  and  the  most 
oppressed and exploited strata are at the centre of mobilizations. There are three main 
tendencies  which  make  this  argument  clear:  class  polarization,  the  weakening  of 
intermediate classes, and the renewed permanence of labour and popular struggles 
(Kouvelakis 2007:  24).  All  three of these are easy to detect in the Greek case.  As 
Kouvelakis  posits  (Ibid.:  23),  this  “return”  of  social  classes at  the  forefront  can  be 
assimilated to the “return of the repressed”, in the sense that what “returns” has always 
been there. Thus, what really happens is not that classes now re-exist, but that they 
become, once again, visible (Ibid.: 23-4). I intend to apply such a class analysis in my 
view of the social movements emerging in Greece in the first period of the crisis.
To conclude, I will support an approach advocating that what is really happening 
today is  neoliberalism, and in fact, in crisis. This is a term that permits us “to speak 
concretely of contemporary capitalism, discerning the specificity of its transformations 
as well as the permanence of its more fundamental traits in the recent history of social 
formations” (Kouvelakis 2007: 14). Recourse to the past, and to the political, cultural 
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and ideological background of the given society, must be a necessary and integral part 
of research on current social movements (Tarrow 1989: 37; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
2001; Tilly 1978: 231-35; Kouvelakis 2007: 13).  Representations of collective action 
and organization of the past do influence potential actors. Besides, as Ross underlines, 
“by asserting a teleology of the present, the official story erases those memories of 
past alternatives that sought or envisioned other outcomes than the one that came to 
pass” (Ross 2002: 6). Or, as Hobsbawm suggests, the death of historical memory and 
the destruction of the past, that feeling of a constant present, is another way to speak 
of the end of ideologies: if there is no alternative future, no differentiated past could 
ever have existed (Hobsbawm 2006: 17). Cultures and countercultures in society are 
also an important element to be taken into account. When no “End of History” is near, 
what appears more interesting is not to study movements in their particularity, but to 
reinsert  them  into  a  grand  narrative  (Barker  2012).  This  more  unified  study  of 
movements  should  not  be  conducted  at  the  expense  of  recognizing  their  relative 
autonomy and distinctive features, nor should these movements be directly reduced to 
working-class struggle.  A coherent analysis has to start from the particular as if  the 
latter contains the whole, to study their internal articulation and perspective. This is the 
perspective to be followed in this thesis. But first, I shall examine, in the next chapter, 
the specific features of the political crisis in Greece, the environment in which it has 
emerged, and the formulated framework in which the social movements of 2010-2011 
have evolved.
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CHAPTER II: POLITICAL CRISIS IN GREECE
I have already examined, in the previous chapter, the basic tenets of the social 
movement theories and have articulated the theoretical framework for the study of the 
social movement in Greece in the first period of the crisis. In this second chapter of the 
thesis, I will examine the social, economic and political background of the crisis, the 
concrete environment in which it emerged and the main features of the Greek society. 
This  investigation  includes  an  overview  of  both  the  deepest  roots  of  the  crisis  in 
Greece, and the multiple effects of the policies followed in the current period. McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly have laid stress on the importance of the broader historical, cultural 
and political background of the country where protest develops, in relation to cognitive, 
relational  and  environmental  mechanisms,  and  emphasizing  “strategic  interaction, 
consciousness and historically accumulated culture” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 
22, 14, 345). Starting from this line of thought for the analysis of the social movement in 
Greece, I need to first study this structural base combined with the specific conditions 
of emergence and development of movements, in relation to the political opportunities 
and constraints (in the broader sense).
It is well known that the international crisis first emerging in the USA in 2008, a 
crisis of a structural and historical character, affected Greece in a very particular and 
intense form. The crisis was not limited to the economic sphere but spilled over all 
aspects of the socio-political spectrum, exacerbating an existing deep social crisis, a 
crisis of political representation and of legitimation of the state and its apparatuses, 
finally  leading  to  a  nascent  organic  crisis  of  the  state44 (Kouvelakis  2011d). The 
dominant  strategy of  the  ruling  class  since  May  2010  has  been  the  neoliberal 
management of the crisis. The measures taken, under constant revision, have aimed 
rescuing  European  capital  and,  in  addition,  using  Greece  as  a  guinea  pig  in 
determining the specific  form of  neoliberalism most  appropriate in  the new era.  As 
44 This definition is in line with the Gramscian analysis on the crisis of hegemony, as presented in the 
Introduction of this thesis (Gramsci 1971: 210).
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Lanara aptly noted in 2012 (2012: 4), “The programme has trapped Greece in a vicious 
circle in which austerity generates recession, followed by more austerity, new taxes 
and deeper recession, strangling economic growth, stifling job creation and putting a 
strain on social cohesion... After five years of recession, the policy mix imposed on 
Greece may well have set an undesirable 'record for one of the deepest economic 
slumps of modern times' (Reuters 2012)”.
These measures have caused a dramatic reduction in living standards for large 
sectors  of  society  and  an  intensification  of  class  polarization.  These  have  been 
accompanied by an authoritarian turn in the political system and the state. Mobilization 
has also escalated in these years, starting with the youth revolt of December 2008, and 
a  deep  rupture  in  society  clearly  happened.  The  period  under  examination  in  this 
thesis, from April 2010 and up to the end of 2011, has been filled with popular protests, 
constituting  what  has  been  broadly  termed  a  “rebellious  cycle”.  It  is  necessary  to 
examine initially the context in which the current crisis has evolved in order to study 
afterwards the specific features of this rebellious cycle, and correlate them with the 
crisis  in  existing  forms  of  political  representation,  alternative  forms  of  political 
participation  and  the  transformation  of  people's  consciousness  related  to  this 
participation and experience. 
Therefore,  I  shall  start  this  chapter  by  analyzing  the  broader  socio-economic 
environment  and  the  causes  of  the  crisis,  followed  by  an  examination  of  the 
restructuring process of the last two decades in the next section. In the third section of 
this chapter I will include a brief presentation of the basic mechanisms and structures 
of political representation, the transformation of their dynamics prior to the crisis and 
the looming collapse of their legitimation. Finally, in the last section, special emphasis 
will  be  given  to  the  transformation  of  the  state  and  the  hegemony  processes, 
culminating in an overall crisis of hegemony of neoliberalism. 
a. The socio-economic environment.
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The rapid economic growth of the previous decade, sometimes referred to as the 
“second  Greek  miracle”  (the  first  one  being  in  the  1950-1960s'),  has  precipitously 
collapsed since the start of the  global crisis. In 2008, the Greek economy went into 
recession  (Bank  of  Greece  2009),  while  the  first  signs  of  an  impending  disaster 
became evident: in 2008, the sovereign debt was at 95.4% of GDP (Sakellaropoulos 
2012), unemployment was growing, already reaching 28% for the youth, the poverty 
level had touched 21% (INE-GSEE 2010: 210-11), whilst wages were only 68% of real 
wages in the EU15 (despite labour productivity being 92% of that in the EU15, Ibid.: 
220).  The  claim  of  “Greece  being  prepared  to  face  the  crisis”  (Karamanlis  2008) 
immediately  and calamitously  collapsed.  The December  2008 youth revolt  was the 
harbinger of a broader social reaction to the socio-political situation. Less than a year 
later the ND government fell to be replaced by a social-democratic PASOK government 
elected under the banner of “there is money”, a catch-phrase which was understood as 
a promise to avoid austerity (Papandreou 2009). This government then led the country 
into entering the “Troika mechanism” for financial support on 23 April 201045.
The main pillars of the policies that followed consisted of the fiscal adjustment of 
the economy, the privatization of  assets of  the country and the deregulation of  the 
labour market (Michopoulou 2012: 47). The letter of intent accompanying the entry in 
the  mechanisms  (3  May  2010),  included  three  memoranda:  the  Memorandum  of 
Economic and Financial  Policies, the Technical Memorandum of Understanding and 
the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality. Their 
terms were fully binding for the Greek government, with no room for negotiation (IMF 
2010).  A stand-by  loan  agreement  was  to  follow  in  9  May  2010.  The  series  of 
consecutive  memoranda  afterwards  included  measures  consistent  with  the  same 
45 The “Troika” consists of a decision group formed by the EC, the ECB and the IMF. This is part of a  
broader  mechanism,  the  ESM.  The ESM is  an  intergovernmental  organization,  established on  27 
September 2012 as a permanent firewall for the eurozone. It operates under public international law 
and has been established after a special ESM intergovernmental treaty. Its field of action consists of 
providing instant access to financial assistance programs for member states of the EMU in financial 
difficulty, with a maximum lending capacity of €500 billion. It has replaced two earlier temporary EU 
funding programs: the EFSF and the EFSM. The EFSF was created as a temporary crisis resolution 
mechanism by the EMU states in June 2010, and Greece was one of the three first countries in which it  
intervened (along with Portugal and Ireland).
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logic46. As Sakellaropoulos notes (2014a: 72), “the target has been a massive reduction 
in living standards for the majority of the population, the retreat of the non-monopolist 
portions  of  capital,  the  shift  of  the,  until  recently,  new  petty-bourgeois  strata 
(independent professions, small businesses, farmers) to wage labour, and an extreme 
version of state authoritarianism which will drastically enervate whatever potential of 
social resistance remains”.
Undoubtedly, memoranda  strategies  were linked  to  what  has  been  called  “the 
shock doctrine”. This originated with the Chicago school economist Milton Friedman, 
initially  in  relation  to  the  case  of  Chile;  predicting  that  the  rapidity,  amplitude  and 
surprise of the imposition of economic changes would cause a psychological reaction 
in  the  mass  of  the  population  which  would  facilitate  adjustment  (Friedman  and 
Friedman 1998: 592). Naomi Klein has shown in her analytical research how crises and 
disasters have been exploited to impose economic and political changes which would 
have  been  unacceptable  and  impossible  for  the  population  to  handle  in  normal 
situations.  Such  a  crisis  atmosphere  has  often  been  the  necessary  pretext  for 
overriding  democratic  processes  and  putting  economic  technocrats  in  charge  of 
political governance (Klein 2007: 25). If confusion, disorientation and surprise are the 
three core elements of the shock doctrine (Ibid.: 616), the Greek case after entry into 
the “Troika mechanism” has been a showcase for all three. In parallel, the democratic 
processes of government have been bypassed and ministers authorized to proceed 
with any agreements in the spirit of the memoranda by simply informing parliament in 
retrospect. The majority of the measures taken have been enacted through legislative 
decrees rather than laws approved by parliament. The supervisory mechanisms which 
have  been  put  in  place  by  the  memoranda  included  rigid  and  extremely  detailed 
“conditionalities”, and  procedures  of  constant  evaluation  of  the  “performance”  in 
achieving the agreed “targets” (the so-called “reviews”). Only if these processes were 
conducted successfully were financial payments approved, to make debt repayment 
and public expenditure sustainable.
46 From  2010  to  2014,  7  different  packages  of  measures  have  been  imposed,  including  the 
memorandums and their revisions, analytically reviewed in (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 75-83).
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The Greek crisis, in contrast to the dominant public discourse, has not resulted 
from purely “Greek specificities”, but is an expression of the global capitalist crisis. This 
global  crisis  has  indeed  been  exacerbated  in  Greece,  due  to  both  the  particular 
formation  and  development  of  Greek  capitalism,  and  the  entry  into  the  EMU 
(Papakonstantinou  2013:  44)47.  The  role  of  the  EMU  has  been  significant  in  this 
exacerbation  of  the  crisis:  Lapavitsas  defining  it  as  a  “crisis  of  the  eurozone” 
(Lapavitsas 2014d: 137)48.  According to Lapavitsas et al.,  the result  of  this crisis of 
financialization in the eurozone was, among other aspects, “a sovereign debt crisis, 
exacerbated by the structural weaknesses of monetary union” (Lapavitsas et al. 2012: 
1). Financialization in the periphery, within the framework of the monetary union and 
with Germany ruling, with countries having entrenched current account deficits and a 
very particular accumulation and growth model, was combined with a general rise of 
indebtedness. The single monetary policy applied across the eurozone, the deficient 
function of the ECB49 and the placement of fiscal policy under the tight constraints of 
the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  made national  competitiveness  within  the eurozone 
dependent on the conditions of work and the performance of labour markets (Ibid.: 2-
3). The countries of the periphery and particularly Greece, have been extremely weak 
in this field, as will be examined below. The problem in improving competitiveness by 
applying pressure on the workers has been twofold: on the one hand, real wages and 
welfare states are severely worse in the periphery, and on the other hand, Germany 
has  squeezed  its  own  workers  throughout  this  period,  thus  increasing  its  own 
competitiveness (Ibid.: 4).
Of course, this has been materialized in different frameworks,  according to the 
social,  economic  and  political  environment  of  each  country  of  the  eurozone,  and 
47 On the  systemic  character  of  the  crisis  in  opposition  to  the  argumentation  on  exclusively  “Greek 
specificities”, see also (Varoufakis et al. 2011a: 50).
48 Mainly due to the widening of the gap in competitiveness between the countries of the periphery and 
those  of  the  core,  and  Germany  in  particular  (see  also  Lapavitsas  et  al.  2012).  As  Lapavitsas 
underlines: “The eurozone was turned into a trap for the countries of the periphery: they have huge 
debts, they cannot compete the core, austerity is imposed to them and they suffer from long-term 
economic stagnation” (Lapavitsas 2012b: 28).
49 The ECB was  not  allowed  to  acquire  and manage  state  debt  and  was  not  opposed  to  financial 
speculation.  It  mainly  focused  on  protecting  financial  interests  and  guaranteeing  the  process  of 
financialization.
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particularly of its periphery. The Greek crisis has actually been the crisis of a specific 
accumulation model chosen by the Greek ruling class (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 34). 
According  to  Lapavitsas,  “this  is  an  overall  failure  of  the  society  and  its  political 
mechanisms”, while the crisis was manifested through the collapse of demand and the 
restriction of bank credits (Lapavitsas 2014a: 19). In the last instance, the problem is 
due to the weakness of the Greek economy to meet the requirements posited by the 
EMU, since it restricted the exercise of an autonomous monetary policy and transferred 
all  adjustment  weights  in  the  production  section  (itself  incapable  of  bearing them). 
Thus,  competitiveness fell  and austerity rose (Ibid.:  20).  Moreover, the country was 
forced to resort to domestic and international borrowing, in order to cope with its huge 
external deficits (Lapavitsas 2012e: 144). Of course, the problem goes way back; a key 
point being the de-industrialization of the country that followed the entry in the EU, 
towards an increase of the services, which are characterized by low productivity levels 
and weak export activity (Lapavitsas 2014c: 106).  However, the dominant narrative, 
especially at the start, attributed the crisis to over-indebtedness and over-consumption 
by  the  public  sector,  respectively  affecting  both  the  private  sector  and  individual 
behaviour (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 33). This narrative aimed at inducing a sense of 
collective  guilt  in  the  society,  in  order  to  suppress  mobilization  and  to  create  a 
framework for the imposition of memorandum policies. 
As for over-indebtedness, which is an objective fact for the Greek state, the above 
narrative failed to focus on its actual reasons, which will be examined below. Over-
consumption on the other hand is essentially a myth. The causes of the fiscal problems 
in Greece are not due to excessive public expenditure, but to limited public revenues 
(42.3%  versus  an  average  of  45.2%  in  EU15)  (INE-GSEE  n.d.),  and  to  tax  and 
contribution evasion (Varoufakis et  al  2011a:  55-6;  Argeitis  et  al.  2011:  17).  This is 
directly related to the inequalities of the tax system50. Rising budget deficits have been 
due 50% to tax evasion and interest payouts, and less than 10% to public expenditure 
increases (Mpogiopoulos 2011: 339). Repayments on pre-existing high interest loans 
50 Such inequalities affect the lowest incomes the most and include low taxation rates on capital.
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have constituted a major cause of the excessive burden on public expenditure levels, 
compounded  by  incompetent  management  (Argeitis  et  al.  2011:  18).  Private 
indebtedness  remained  low:  49.7%  of  GDP  in  2010,  while  the  EU14  average 
(excepting Luxemburg),  was at  76.4%. At  the same time, tax policy remained very 
inequitable; capital taxation is indeed very low (Varoufakis et al. 2011b: 9). Direct taxes 
are also low (20.6% versus 29.7% in the EU15 in 1995-2009), in contrast to indirect 
taxation; an indication of lack of progressiveness in the tax system (Argeitis et al. 2011: 
14-6).  This  has  actually  been  a  political  choice:  prioritizing  low  taxation  of  high 
incomes. According to an OECD study in 2007,  the real tax burden on profits was 
15.9%, whilst for labour it was 35.1%. The tax rate on business profits was reduced 
from  45%  (in  1990)  to  20%.  Moreover,  in  2000,  52%  of  direct  taxes  came  from 
individuals, whilst in 2008 the respective rate was 70% (Mpogiopoulos 2011: 352). In 
the  first years of the twenty-first century, real taxation of labour was on line with the 
EU15 average, whilst that of big corporations was one third lower (INE-GSEE 2010: 
93).  However,  austerity  policies  aimed  exclusively  at  labour  cost  reduction, 
disproportionately affecting the working and petty-bourgeois classes.
The deepest roots of the Greek crisis are related to the specific way capitalism has 
developed in Greece. This includes (1) the liberalization of the banking system; (2) a 
constant tendency for increased profitability of capital; (3) growth rates bolstered by 
over-indebtedness rather than real  investment;  and (4)  exploitation of  cheap labour 
(INE-GSEE 2012: 156-57). Public debt is mainly due to: (1) benefits granted to big 
capital;  (2)  the  cost  of  integration  into  the  EU;  (3)  the  consequences  of  market 
liberalization; (4) increased military expenditure; (5) the cost of the Olympic Games in 
2004; and (6) policies of undermining and corruption of public enterprises. In addition, 
the  increase  in  debt  has  been  out  of  proportion  to  increases  in  GDP, leading  to 
disproportionate amounts of  GDP going to debt  interest  payments (Sakellaropoulos 
2014a: 61). Entry into the EMU was a political choice which, as it transpired, acted as a 
catalyst in the broader process culminating in the crisis. According to Sakellaropoulos 
and Sotiris  (2014a:  4),  “the introduction  of  a  common currency  without  a  common 
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authority and mechanisms of redistribution was intensifying regional imbalances and 
was at the same time to the benefit of ‘European Centre’ capital, and to the detriment of 
workers in both core and periphery countries.” Such a strategy could be tolerated or 
actively embraced by the dominant class in times of relative growth, offering a vehicle 
for  imposing  capitalist  restructuring.  However,  in  times  of  crisis,  the  contradictions 
implicit in this strategy have been exacerbated (Ibid.). As mentioned, and in Lapavitsas 
et al.'s terms (2010: 16), “external indebtedness reflects the biased integration of the 
periphery into the eurozone. Generalized pressure on wages has allowed the core to 
gain competitiveness, thus leading to rising indebtedness of the periphery to the core. 
Far from promoting convergence among member states, EMU has been a source of 
unrelenting pressure on workers that has resulted in systematic disparities between 
core and periphery.”
The role and extent of corruption in the public sector merits further examination, 
since one of the dominant ideological doctrines on the causes of the crisis refers to a 
supposed  “spendthrift  public  sector”  and  extended  corruption.  The  myth  of  over-
expenditure is difficult to reconcile with the fact that total public expenditure in Greece 
is one of the lowest in the EU in GDP rate terms. Primary budgetary expenditure has 
been further reduced from a base that was already lower than the average in the EU15 
(44.6% versus 46.7% in 2001)51 (Varoufakis et al. 2011b: 5). There are of course long 
standing weaknesses in the public sector related on the one hand to income problems 
(ie. shortfall in revenue from direct taxation), and on the other hand, to expenditure 
problems (ie.  restricted expenditure  on health,  education  and social  protection  and 
excessive  spending  on  defense  and  interest  repayments  coupled  with  lack  of 
expenditure on investment)52. The fragile financial state of the public sector deteriorated 
51 According to OECD data, in 2000 Greece had the narrowest public sector in terms of employment in  
general government and public corporations and in 2008 the second narrowest after Japan, out of 
those countries included (OECD 2011).  In another relative OECD study (2003),  the percentage of 
public servants from the whole workforce is 11.4% in 2003 (thus one of the four lowest in the EU, of 
which the average is 16.4%).
52 The share of social transfers in Greece represented for the period 1995-2009 35.4% of GDP, while in 
the EU15 the average was 42.1% (environment 0.5% against 0.7%, residence infrastructures 0.4% 
against 1%, health 4.6% against 6.4%, culture 0.4% against 1.1%, social protection 16.5% against 
18.9%. At the same time, defense expenditure amounted to 2.9% against 1.6% and general public 
expenditure including interest payment 11% against 7.1% (Argeitis et al. 2011: 22).
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after  entry  into  the EMU. Entry  created an increase in  borrowing needs.  This  was 
exacerbated  by  access  to  cheaper  money  in  parallel  with  greater  dependence  on 
foreign investors.  The unstable architecture of the EMU both encouraged, and was 
vulnerable  to  the  development  of  financial  speculation.  The  membership  of  the 
common currency zone ruled out using currency depreciation as a means of restoring 
the balance.  Meanwhile,  differences in productivity rates continued to function as a 
mechanism for accumulating imbalances and undermining national economies (Argeitis 
et  al.  2011:  61;  Papakonstantinou  2013:  28-9.;  Varoufakis  et  al.  2011a:  96-7; 
Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 31).
In addition, when examining corruption and clientelism, we have to bear in mind 
that  such phenomena also exist  in  the most  modern forms of  government  (Gizelis 
2009:  14-5).  Thus,  these are not “distortions of capitalism”, since the law itself  has 
been, by its nature, formulated to serve the interests of particular social groups against 
and unbeknown to the majority of citizens (Ibid.: 19). In the particular case of Greece, 
clientelism has been a structural element of its social formation. It  has enabled the 
dominant class to form a pattern of social alliances with factions of the people, while for 
the lower strata it represented a strategy for survival and relative assurance. According 
to Kouvelakis,  the development of clientelism is correlated to the relatively reduced 
autonomy of the state from the ruling class and to the absence of institutionalized forms 
of  class  compromise  as  a  consequence  of  the  scars  left  by  the  civil  war  and  the 
ensuing lack of a welfare state (Kouvelakis 2010: 304). In terms of recruitment into the 
public sector, clientelism was at first an interpersonal relation, later transformed into a 
partisan strategy after PASOK's election in 1981 (Gizelis 2009: 63, referring to the two 
periods as “deputism” and “partisanism” respectively).
 As for inequality and poverty, parameters which will be examined further in chapter 
III, these have been high even in periods of relative economic growth53 (Antonopoulou 
53 Indeed, from 1996 to 2004, the economy was in growth, due to the conduct of the Olympic Games in 
Greece, the decline in real interest rates, the inflows from the EU, the real wage increases and the 
consequent rise in private consumption, the high profitability of productive enterprises and the increase 
of investments. This period was characterized by high equipment investments and an increase in the 
utilization rates of  the productive capacities of  the country, favouring the rise in labour productivity 
(+30% in this period) (Ioakeimoglou 2013: 29). 
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et al. 2011: 29). Economic growth has not only failed to reduce inequality and poverty, 
but such growth has been achieved by means based on inequality and poverty. In the 
1990’s and the 2000’s, Greece ranked second in the world in terms of the increase of 
corporate profit per worker. Indicatively, the income gap between the richest 10% of 
Greek citizens and the poorest 10% has increased 6.5 times (Mpogiopoulos 2011: 310-
11). In 1997, Greece was third globally in the OECD classification on inequalities, after 
Mexico  and  New  Zealand  (Kouvelakis  2008).  At  the  same  time,  employers'  profit 
margins were the second highest in the EU15 in 1995-2009 (Antonopoulou et al. 2011: 
34). The share of GDP attributable to wages has fallen since 1980, declining to under 
55% in the mid 2000’s (Kouvelakis 2008). That type of growth was not accompanied by 
investments, by  an  increase  of  industrial  production  or  by  lower  rates  of  prices 
variation: on the contrary, it boosted capitalist profits (Varoufakis et al. 2011a: 77). This 
growth was unsustainable, as proven, and resulted in “bubbles” in certain sectors of the 
economy (construction, real estate, consumption etc.) but also produced some very 
real effects for  the ruling class and parts of  its class alliances54.  At  the same time, 
labour productivity constantly improved during this whole period: it increased by 21% in 
2000-2007, with an average annual rate of 2.7% (Eustratoglou et al. 2011: 71-2). The 
household  saving  rate  reduced  from  14.1%  in  1996  to  8.9%  in  2004,  leading  to 
increase in lending and bank indebtedness55 (Sakellaropoulos 2010: 325).
The  labour  market  was  characterized  by  relatively  low  participation  rates  in 
employment,  high rates of unemployment,  higher working hours than the European 
average56 and workers remaining in  the same job position for  longer (OECD 2010; 
Antonopoulou et al. 2011: 29). Whilst Greece had the highest unemployment rates in 
the EMU57, expenditure on unemployment benefits has been very low: 0.6% of GDP in 
54 These points will be further examined in chapter III.
55 The level of household debt of families to the banks rose from 34.7% of GDP in 2005 to 50% of GDP in 
2009 (Sakellaropoulos 2010: 325).
56 According to a study by VPRC for the  Athens  Centre of  Labour Unions in 2008, in the Attica region 
working hours were: in main employment: 41.33 hours; in the public sector 38.99 hours; in the private 
sector 41.97 hours. 53% reported working at weekends (often and sometimes) for an average of 9.63 
hours (EKA/VPRC 2008).
57 Karantinos' research has shown its spectacular rise of 70.8% between 1990 and 1998, meaning that 
the number of the registered unemployed rose from 280,171 people in 1990 to 478,535 in 1998 (2001: 
140).
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1980s'  and  0.8% in  1990s'  (in  the  EU15 rates  were  respectively  1.9% and  2.5%) 
(OECD 2003). The precarious nature of employment and high unemployment created 
pressures for greater state intervention. This intervention never took place, for political 
reasons. Actually, the state did act as a driving force, but its interventions promoted the 
reduction of labour costs and the shift of the balance of forces in favour of capital as 
well as the increase of the expenditure devoted to “law and order” and to the protection 
of private property (Palaiologos 2006: 115).
Finally, the position  of  the youth (as a cross-class  social  category with certain 
unifying  features,  Poulantzas  1972;  Milios  1993:  121-22;  Gaitanou  2011)  needs  a 
closer look, since radical rearrangements in the conditions of social integration affected 
the most active parts of society, particularly the youth. Aside from the political changes 
to be discussed later in this chapter, transformations at the economic level led to a 
structural mutation in the nature of labour (to be further examined in chapter III). This 
process largely concerned the youth, who had had to enter the labour market under 
egregious conditions. This strategy aimed at increasing profit margins, reducing social 
mobilization and creating divisions among workers. Youth employment is often used 
(along with the unemployed) as a laboratory for  abolishing fundamental labour rights. 
Low wages are part of this process, allowing arbitrariness in recruitment, dismissal and 
setting working conditions, flexible, part-time and temporary work; and black labour. 
Unemployment has been explosive (38.5% in the 18-24 year old layer in July 2011 
(Eurostat), climbing to 60% in the following years).
For a political system such as neoliberalism, which rose to popularity on promises 
of personal security and a guaranteed future under conditions of hard work, personal 
sacrifice and compliance with the dominant norms, the realization that today’s youth 
will  be  the  first  post-war  generation  to  enjoy  a  lower  standard  of  living  than  its 
predecessor is deeply destabilizing. This scenario of austerity includes other socially 
regressive dimensions: The youth are dependent on their parents for longer and this 
dependence is heavier, while life rhythms are often unbearably stressful leading to a 
vicious cycle of constant accumulation of qualifications; failing in their turn to provide 
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protection from the increasing insecurity. This reality prefigures two possible outcomes: 
on  the  one  hand,  the  emergence  of  the  “deceived  generation”  (Bourdieu  1978), 
following dominant norms and forming expectations that will never be realized. This 
ends  up  in  a  situation  in  which  the  youth  is  oppressed  and  gets  finally  a  life 
experienced  devoid  of  any  real  motivation  and  meaning.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
emergence of the “lost generation” (Davis 2008), refusing to accept this reality, but 
lacking any organizational resources for collective action and thus ending up in forms 
of social marginalization.
We  have,  thus,  examined  the  roots  of  the  Greek  crisis,  the  socio-economic 
environment  that  has  been  formulated  and  the  position  of  the  youth  as  a  social 
category with particular significance in the emergence of social protest. We will return 
in certain of these points when examining the social structure of the Greek society, in 
chapter III. In the meantime, we will investigate the basic points of the transformations 
that have occurred in the socio-political system during the last decades, in parallel to 
the implementation of modernization. This will permit our understanding of the political 
representations that prevailed, their stability, their weaknesses and contradictions, as 
correlated to the emergence of social protest in the period of the crisis.
b. Restructuring and modernization processes of the two last decades of the 20th 
century.
The emergence of the crisis in 2008 was a key development, and the memoranda 
policies constituted a severe break in the social, economic and political course of the 
country.  However,  studying  the  transformations  the  Greek  social  formation  has 
undergone over the last thirty years highlights important aspects of the current crisis. In 
the last two decades of the 20th century, a radical rearrangement of the institutional 
framework of capitalism took place in Greece which aimed at revoking acquired rights, 
and also at disempowering every form of collective organization and bargaining. The 
route out of the 1970s' crisis involved a commitment to neoliberal management. This 
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orientation amounted to a continuous effort to shift the correlation of forces in favour of 
capital  and  against  labour.  As  a  result,  austerity  prevailed,  in  parallel  with  the 
dismantling  of  social  security  provisions,  the  reduction  of  pensions and the rise  of 
taxation. Public sector enterprises were privatized (although this privatization project 
was not  yet  generalized),  the financial  system was liberalized,  and new production 
systems  were  introduced.  At  the  political  level,  repressive  mechanisms  and  the 
hardening of  state authority were promoted.  At  the same time, a transfer  of  power 
towards  administrative  functions  was pursued,  accompanied by the attribution  of  a 
political role to technocrats and the media, and the collusion of political parties with 
private capital (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 12-3). 
On the terrain of economic policy, this period saw the implementation of austerity 
policies and the privatization of state assets and enterprises. Important changes in the 
productive process and in labour relations were introduced. This process included an 
aggressive neoliberal management of the unemployment and social insurance systems 
which entailed  crucial  consequences in  all  aspects of  the reproduction sphere:  the 
education system was transformed to become responsive to market imperatives, whilst 
the management of public space was adapted to the generalized commodification of 
daily  life.  During  the build-up  to  the  EMU entry, neoliberal  internationalization  was 
intensified;  the  policies  that  were  implemented  were  designed  to  facilitate the 
convergence  with  the  EMU,  under  the  overarching  objective  of  increasing 
competitiveness.  Concerning wages,  the dominant  imperative was to reduce labour 
costs in order to contain inflation and strengthen competitiveness; the result being a 
significant  increase  in  the  amount  of  overtime  worked  (Kouzis  2001:  270).  Wage 
inequalities widened, and the difference between the minimum and maximum wage 
increased by 15% between 1994 and 1997, resulting in Greece ranking second in the 
EU in terms of wage inequality58 (Kouzis 2001: 271). Actually a huge transfer of wealth 
from the popular strata to the dominant class took place during the period, especially 
after 1990 (as also shown by inequality indicators in the previous section). Thus, while 
58 The relationship between maximum and minimum wage was 6.7.
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GDP rose by a factor of 5.5 from 1990 to 2007 (from 38 billion euros to 208 billion), the 
minimum wage only doubled (from 15 to 30 euros per day) while, in stark contrast, 
corporate profits rose by a factor of 28 (from 575 million to 16 billion) (Sakellaropoulos 
2014a: 39).  Among  the most developed EU countries, Greece has been in the last 
rankings in terms of gross wages per employee (Ioakeimoglou 2011: 15). In 2009, the 
real  labour  cost  remained  significantly  lower  than  the  most  advanced  European 
countries (approximately per 35% from the smaller countries of northern Europe, per 
25% in comparison to France and Britain,  and per 20% in comparison to Italy and 
Spain) (Ibid.: 17). At the same time, the margins of profit have been very high, mainly 
due to the increases in productivity of labour. Labour productivity in 1995-2004 has 
increased  by  30%,  (the  second  largest  increase  among  the  18  most  developed 
European countries, Ireland being the first in the ranking) (Ibid.: 13). Until before the 
period of the crisis, the margins of profit have reached 40%; being the highest average 
in the EU15, except for Ireland, during 1995-2009 (Ibid.: 69). Moreover, in 1995-2009, 
the prices of domestically produced goods and services rose cumulatively by about 
30%  compared  to  the  EMU,  and  by  23%  compared  to  the  EU  (Ibid.:  15). The 
deterioration in price competitiveness during the last fifteen years is due to the nominal 
exchange rate of the euro and not to changes in the average profit margin or in labour 
costs per unit of product. The euro currency revaluation made Greek products (goods 
and services) more expensive and undermined their competitiveness (Ibid.: 80-81). 
In  terms  of  employment  relationships,  labour  rights  were  ignored,  while  the 
conflictual  character  of  trade-unions  was  stifled.  Labour  legislation  was  routinely 
breached, and industrial accidents increased (reaching 20,000 recorded accidents per 
year) (Kouzis 2001: 271-77). Flexibility in the labour market also grew, both in illegal 
and legal employment, mainly after 199659 (Kouzis 2004: 658). The informal economy 
flourished  and  reached,  according  to  the  OECD,  30%  of  GDP, with  25%  of  the 
workforce being deprived of any insurance according to Labour Ministry data for 2000 
(Kouzis  2001:  279).  Illegal  employment  grew  significantly,  mainly  through  the 
59 Illegal  flexibility  refers  either  to  black/fully  undeclared  work,  or  to  violation  of  aspects  of  legal 
employment (Kouzis 2004: 650-51).
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exploitation of immigrant workers, but also through the weakening of controls regarding 
compliance  with  the  labour  legislation  (Karakioulafi  2005:  197-98).  Unemployment 
benefits were minimal in amount and duration, putting Greece last in the EU in this 
respect (Ibid.: 282). Higher rates of non-voluntary part-time employment were recorded 
(Ibid.: 286). Working hours rose, whilst shift-work, and overtime in particular, expanded 
(Ibid.: 296-300). Radical transformations in labour relations had a fourfold target: (1) 
the degradation of full and stable employment and its replacement by flexible forms of 
employment with low wages and rights; (2) the dismantling of the pattern of collective 
bargaining  and  wage-setting;  (3)  imposing  flexibility  of  working  hours;  and  (4)  the 
facilitation of redundancies (INE-GSEE 2012: 27). 
Regarding the participation of the state, its role, rather than contracting, expanded 
but in the sense of acting as the guarantor of the long-term interests of the dominant 
class and the promoter of business profitability (Vergopoulos 1996: 326-28). If the state 
intervention in the 1980s' consisted indeed in a policy of crisis management (Gravaris 
2004:  41),  the  period  that  followed  was  marked  by  a  process  of  shifting  from an 
interventionist  state  to  a  “strategic-state”.  This  included  a  significant  delegation  of 
functions to the private sector (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 101). Thus, in no 
sense can we talk of a restriction of the role of the state. As Harvey emphasizes (2005: 
4-5), “This [the neoliberal process] by no case means that the state, based on that 
doctrine, does not play any role in developments. On the contrary, it is the state that 
formulates  the  institutional  framework  required  by  the markets,  that  will  use  all  its 
mechanisms (ideological  and  repressive  ones)  in  order  to  ensure  their  unhindered 
operation,  and,  moreover, will  create new markets,  wherever  they do not  exist,  for 
example in areas such as provision or the environment”. Welfare policies were vitiated 
and expenditure  further  reduced,  while  a  kind of  state  policy-substitute  took place: 
benefits were substituted by active policies of re-training and transferring the burden 
onto  workers  (Gravaris  2004:  50).  In  this  context,  the  separation  of  powers  was 
challenged and the role of the judicial mechanism enhanced and transformed into an 
means for normalizing the restructuring process and for implementing authoritarianism 
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(Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 51, 149-50). The transfer of power to supranational 
organizations  contributed  to  consigning  the  social  alliances  and  compromises 
developed in former periods to irrelevance. At the same time, the dominant concept of 
national sovereignty basically assumed the role of shielding the state apparatus and 
aiding in the destruction of the “enemy within” (i.e. the popular movements) (Ibid: 52-3).
In  terms  of  political  representation,  the  period  following  the  mid-1980s'  was 
characterized  by  the  professionalization  of  politics  and  by  popular  passivity.  The 
political system itself remained relatively, if only precariously, stable. This was largely 
the result of power alternating between two main parties (PASOK and ND), which, from 
the 1980’s until the early 2000s' represented 85% of the electorate. The character of 
the systemic political parties became progressively transformed by the convergence of 
their political programs and the mutual development of strong links with private capital. 
According to Sakellaropoulos, neither could legitimately claim to represent the interests 
of  the  dominated  classes,  but  both  were  involved  in  a  form  of  intra-bourgeois 
negotiation (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 114). However, I would argue that this negotiation 
was never purely intra-bourgeois, in the sense that the popular interests were taken 
into account both by PASOK and ND but in a limited and non-coherent way, which is 
qualitatively  different  from  the  type  of  social  compromise  PASOK  was  able  to 
implement in the immediate post-1981 years. There were certain concessions towards 
the popular  strata,  even partial  and fragmentary, which explain the level of  popular 
support enjoyed by both systemic parties before the Memoranda period. This support is 
essentially related to the economic boom that followed in the twenty years after the 
Metapolitefsi60, which tied broad social layers to the dominant economic and political 
strategy, as will be further examined in the following chapter. This has produced the 
broad  consensus  based in  the  great  social  and political  compromise of  the  Greek 
Metapolitefsi (consisting of the economic and political modernization under the aegis of 
Europeanization).
60 “Metapolitefsi” is a Greek term, suggesting the period after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, when the 
regime was changed into parliamentary democracy. This is term that  has a particular connotation, 
resists any translation and it will be used as such hereafter in this thesis.
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Overall,  if  the  mass-party  pattern  represented  a  mechanism  only  indirectly 
reflecting class struggle and representing popular interests, both parties now had to 
fulfill a quite different role: hardening the political system and guaranteeing the stability 
of neoliberal policies. Unsurprisingly, the new course led to significant contradictions 
which  became  intrinsic  to  the  nature  of  the  parties  themselves  at  the  political, 
organizational and functional levels. The 1990s' saw the final demise of the model of 
the mass labour party, which, if it ever existed in Greece in the form of the idiosyncratic 
social-democracy of PASOK, did so with its own peculiarities. The consequences of 
this transformation were an important retreat of party activities and their almost total 
absorption in a succession of electoral battles, an increase of party expenditure and an 
orientation towards technocratic, managerial and communicative functions. This also 
reflected the rise of the role of political leaders, combined with restrictions in actual 
participation by ordinary members (see also Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004b: 100-
02).
According to Gravaris (2002: 110), a transition from a mass-party to a “network-
party  form”  took  place,  in  which  internal  functions  were organized  around  a  loose 
organizational  tissue.  At  the  same time membership  participation  was minimal  and 
lacked  serious  obligations,  while  internal  democracy  was  circumvented.  At  the 
ideological level, this transformation resulted in a general decline of ideological debates 
within and between parties. The class reference of parties was declining, and so was 
the Left-Right polarization. Political messages were neutered and “centrism” came to 
dominate as a political identity (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004b: 101). The impact of 
this  new reality  was  reflected in  the  loss  of  respect  for  parties  in  the  eyes of  the 
electorate: according to an MRB poll in 1991, only 20.3% stated that parties responded 
positively or quite positively to the needs of the times (“fully”: 4.1%; “largely”: 16,1%); 
35.3% stated that parties only partially responded; while 21.4% stated they responded 
minimally and 16.3% not at all (Loulis 1995: 336). The years that followed saw a further 
decline of respect for institutionalized parties (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004b: 104-
06).
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While respect for established political parties declined, the role of technocrats and 
of  the media  grew in  the public  sphere.  The media  functioned as “mechanisms of 
diffusion of the main ideological tendencies” (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 58). 
Clientelism between citizens and the state prevailed,  in the sense examined above 
(and often as the only viable survival strategy for the popular strata). This relative, but 
potentially fragile,  political  stabilization was also reinforced by an increased level of 
public  sector  employment,  wider  access  to  higher  education  and  the  existence  of 
intermediary channels between citizens and political power (including local power and 
trade-unionism). In the same period, employers' organizations acquired an important 
role extending beyond political processes to cover the whole spectrum of economic, 
social and political life. They became a mouthpiece for employers' opinions on many 
issues concerning Greek society, contributing as key players in the Greek economy. 
This process peaked in the lead-up to the EMU entry. Employers participated both in 
institutional and non-institutional social dialogues (Aranitou 2004: 259-60; the author 
provides a detailed empirical examination of the role of employers' organizations in the 
period 1981-2002).
During this  time,  ideologies lauding concepts of  technocracy and productivism, 
along  with  liberal  individualism,  became  pervasive  under  the  broad  banner  of 
modernization (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 153). The elections of 1996, labeled 
as “the sofa elections” (Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos 2009: 23), were a clear example 
of the ongoing depoliticization and decline of popular  interest in the campaign. The 
significance of this depoliticization was contradictory: it  expressed on one hand, the 
transformation of political parties and of official politics, and on the other hand, their 
delegitimation as possible vehicles for a different way of exercising politics. This was 
evident only later, when politics came back to the foreground for the majority of the 
people (it  was in 2008 when public passivity towards political issues began to fade; 
Konstantinidis  and  Tsakatika  2011:  72)  However,  in  the  period  presently  under 
discussion, the prevailing mood was oriented towards isolation and individualization. 
The dominant pattern of ideological and political positioning also shifted. As individuals 
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moved towards the political centre the feeling of political detachment rose, with cross-
class  voting becoming common and traditional  opinions  on issues like imperialism, 
socialism or the market economy undergoing realignments (Loulis 2001: 57-9). Finally, 
during this period, as Tsoukalas aptly notes (2013: 59), the “East-West distinction” of a 
former period61, was replaced by the “North-South” one, with important ideological and 
political  implications62.  This  reality  has  induced  a  certain  political  stabilization,  the 
positive  engagement  of  broad  social  layers  in  the  modernization  project  and 
Europeanism (combined with the consequences of the collapse of the USSR for the 
Left), and ultimately a strong consensus employed by the social system. These political 
and ideological transformations remained contradictory; however, their prevalence had 
specific material and ideological consequences, facilitated by the failure of the Left to 
articulate a coherent and persuasive alternative approach63.
c. The end of the “End of History”.
“Contrary to the ascent of neoliberalism, which coincided  
with a long period of defeat for the working class and the  
political left, now we face an open crisis of neoliberalism  
as hegemonic ideology. References to the market and its  
inherent rationality do not have today the same appeal  
they  had  back in  the  early  1980s.  Moreover,  both  the  
crisis of neoliberalism and the alienation of large strata,  
both middle class and working class,  from the political  
scene, as the result  of  the consequences of the crisis,  
61 The  landmark  of  such  an  orientation  was  the  famous  statement  by  Prime  Minister  Konstantinos 
Karamanlis in 1974: “We belong to the West”.
62 According  to  the  author,  the  East-West  distinction  represents  an  expression  of  the  geopolitical 
supremacy  of  the  West  against  “the  others”,  while  the  new  distinction  represents  a  technocratic 
division, a conjunctural authoritarian mentality.
63 At this point, it must be clarified that in Greece, due to historical reasons (as will be examined in the 
next chapter, basically the lack on any significant socialist or social-democratic force before 1974), the 
term “Left” is restricted to the left of social-democracy, unlike the rest of Europe. Therefore, in terms of 
partisan representations, when we refer to the Left in the context of this thesis, we include the KKE, the 
SYRIZA as well as the forces of the Anticapitalist Left (but not PASOK, which is of social-democratic 
origin).
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mark a growing crisis of hegemony. This is an element of  
instability  in  the  conjuncture.”  (Sakellaropoulos  and  
Sotiris 2014a: 12)
The political and economic landscape was in a process of deep transformation as 
the crisis in 2008 broke out.  At the political level, the passivity of the previous period 
was shaken up by dramatic new developments. The social contract previously founded 
on expectations of social mobility, clientelism, the extensive increase in public sector 
jobs, and relatively free access to higher education were on the verge of collapse. The 
representative channels and institutions (including political  parties,  trade-unions and 
local political power) formerly functioning as links between ordinary citizens and the 
establishment suffered from increasing sclerosis. This process was intensified as they 
became increasingly bureaucratized and tied to the state acting as the servants of 
central political power. Their value and utility was damaged in the public eye, especially 
after a series of scandals involving their leaders and cadres. The elimination of the 
possibility of securing personal progress through individual negotiation (of any type) 
questioned the fundamental terms of the relationship between the political system and 
the  citizenry.  The  collapse  of  social-democracy  and  its  transformation  towards 
neoliberal  management intensified its inability to foster  the collaboration of  different 
social  interests in  an alternative political  plan.  Thus,  nearly all  the institutions were 
facing a deep crisis of legitimation, in parallel to a crisis of political representation. 
The feeling of political deadlock was intensified by the authoritarian hardening of 
governance and the rigidity it displayed when faced with popular and social demands. 
The power structures had become unable to maintain the bonds between the citizens 
and the political system and to produce new fields of hegemony (both material and 
symbolic ones). Furthermore, public spaces open to political debate leading to socio-
political changes seemed to be entirely missing. Any approach of politics was entirely 
restricted to the official forms and channels of exercising political activity. No legitimacy 
was granted to the popular factor, thus marginalizing the broader strata and excluding 
77
every form of conflict outside the officially recognized repertoire. The social contract 
that had previously assured popular acceptance of the dominant forms of governance 
was broken, resulting in the increasing need of the government to rely on conservative 
and  authoritarian  measures.  These  measures  were  necessarily  accompanied  by  a 
rising level of physical repression, surveillance and public discipline. The scope for any 
negotiation between the social  groups and the state was shrinking,  as the political 
system was massively distrusted and, in its turn, disinclined any negotiation. Citizens 
therefore felt they had minimal opportunities for representation and political expression. 
This feeling was intensified by the disdain and rigidity with which the state treated their 
demands64.
It is quite telling that in the autumn 2008, immediately before the eruption of the 
December  2008  youth  revolt,  77%  of  the  participants  in  a  Eurobarometer  survey 
claimed not trusting the government (the respective rate in spring 2007 was 66%, while 
the  respective  rate  in  the  EU  at  the  time  was  61%),  with  68%  not  trusting  the 
parliament, 86% the political parties and 56% the judicial system. The same survey 
displayed a strong sense of general dissatisfaction. Only 53% felt relatively satisfied 
with their  daily  life  (65% in  spring 2007 and an average of  76% in  the EU),  66% 
predicted that their economic situation would worsen in the following year, and 64% 
predicted that the employment situation would worsen in the same period. Additionally, 
64% stated that their purchasing power had declined over the past 5 years, while 63% 
faced difficulties in paying bills (Eurobarometer 2008). Similar, or worse, findings are to 
be found in dozens of surveys in the same period.
This perception of state institutions was part of the broader decline of respect for 
civic institutions. Local government structures progressively lost their autonomy and 
became more subordinate to central political power. They lost their powers in certain 
areas,  while  funding  restrictions  further  complicated  their  ability  for  autonomous 
functioning. These changes were enshrined in legislation. The implementation of the 
Kallikratis project, voted in 2011, is a landmark in this process. It reduced the number 
64 On these points, see also (Gaitanou 2011a).
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of municipalities by approximately  two thirds,  while  simultaneously replacing the 57 
prefectures by 13 regions. The project also increased the period of tenure for local and 
regional bodies from 4 to 5 years, broadly redistributed responsibilities and aimed at 
important cuts in costs. The number of Municipal bodies was drastically reduced (from 
6,000 to 1,500), while decentralized managerial bodies directly appointed by the central 
government were established. The primary thrust of this ongoing restructuring was to 
marginalize  local  participation  and  to  leave  little  potential  for  autonomous  action, 
diminishing representativeness, and thus control by, and responsiveness to pressure 
by citizens. Therefore, from a field in which citizens felt they could be heard, particularly 
concerning  issues  of  daily  life  (public  space,  education,  transportation  etc.)  local 
government was transformed into another closed field of decision-making. However, 
the impact of such transformations was gradual and the representational function of 
local government structures was eroded at a slower pace than in the national political 
scene65. This gap can be attributed to their alleged autonomy and to their more directly 
related to people's daily lives, impact in administration. However, in the local elections 
in autumn 2010, when the first mobilizations had already emerged, “the party system 
as created since 1977 was in  its  twilight.  The two parties of  the bipartisan system 
suffered a major blow and the electorate was either looking for a solution from the Left, 
or  totally  rejecting the electoral  process,  resorting to abstention  or  to  spoiled/blank 
ballots.  In  any case,  it  became evident  that  deep transformations were under  way. 
Whether they would be completed depended on the degree of  exacerbation of  the 
crisis and its consequences” (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 148).
Similar processes were involved in the demotion and weakening of trade-unionism 
and the transformation of its role, something to be further examined in chapter III. As 
for political parties, their function was also transformed, both reflecting and aggravating 
the sense  of  political  deadlock.  The  political  programs of  ND and  PASOK,  though 
originating from different political traditions, converged. This convergence ended up in 
65 In the 2010 local elections, out of the 713 municipalities, a candidate supported by PASOK was elected 
in 342 cases, and by ND in 260 cases. A KKE candidate was elected in 41 municipalities, while a 
candidate supported by SYRIZA was elected in 17 cases. Out of the 13 regions, a candidate supported 
by PASOK was elected in 8 regions, and by ND in 5 regions.
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the pursuit of similar policies, further weakening the ability of the popular classes to put 
forward their demands in any meaningful political way (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 114). 
Thus,  almost  thirty-years  of  bipartisanship  ended  with  parties  simply  alternating  in 
power deprived of any real political project. Parties became increasingly identified with 
the state;  their  autonomy vis-a-vis  its  executive  mechanism being eliminated.  Thus 
governments simply expressed the interests of the dominant political bloc, with little 
concern for actual representation or electoral legitimacy, though such functions were 
usually not formally abolished (Kouvelakis 2011c). The parliament, as the legislative 
expression of people's will,  lost its significance in relation to the executive power. It 
increasingly  became  a  locus  for  imposing  social  consent,  rather  than  a  locus  of 
meaningful decision-making (Agnoli 1972: 69; 73). Konstantinidis and Tsakatika argue 
that this introduced a sense of “anti-bipartisanship” and a general “anti-party” mood 
among  the  electorate.  According  to  these  authors,  these  feelings  centred  on  the 
parties' ineffectiveness in dealing with people's real problems in conjunction with their 
convergence  and  the  broader  crisis  of  political  representation  (Konstantinidis  and 
Tsakatika  2011:  69-70).  Their  thorough  quantitative  research  has  shown  that 
immediately prior to the crisis, specific anti-party feelings, directed at the pillars of the 
bipartisan  system,  were  stronger  than  indiscriminate  ones,  rejecting  political 
representation in a generic way66 (Ibid.: 92). Such feelings were not located in specific 
social groups but were diffused across the population (while being more intense in the 
youth) (Ibid.: 93). This argument about the youth is to be found in several pieces of 
research,  with  Teperoglou  and  Tsatsanis  claiming  that  depoliticization  processes  in 
Greece  have  intense  generational  features  (Teperoglou  and  Tsatsanis  2014:  48). 
These findings will be strongly confirmed in our fieldwork.
66 Thus such feelings were directed at the two parties alternating in power, PASOK and ND, and not 
generally at all  parties.  This is a hypothesis strongly confirmed by our qualitative study conducting 
interviews with participants in the movements of 2010-2011. However, the deepening of the crisis and 
the weakness of  other  political  parties (including the Left)  in suggesting viable alternatives was to 
transform  this  tendency  into  a  more  general  anti-party  orientation  after  2015,  with  important 
implications. This point will be later further examined.
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Thus, the nature of this transformation in the party system was exacerbated during 
the  crisis.  Important  realignments  in  the  parliamentary  groups  of  parties  were  to 
follow67. According to Vernardakis, the parliamentary elections of 2007 already revealed 
a  party  and  political  system in  transition,  with  bipartisanship  put  into  question  and 
giving way to a multi-polar party system (Vernardakis 2011: 26). The cleavage between 
acceptance  and  opposition  to  Memorandum  policies  was  also  decisive  for  the 
recomposition of the political and the party system. This had several parallel effects, 
such  as  transforming  the  internal  operation  of  parties:  the  adoption  of  pro-
memorandum policies influenced their  function,  including an important  shrinkage of 
internal democracy (see also Spourdalakis 2013).  This is even more evident  in the 
parties which turned from opposing the memoranda in principle, to implementing them 
in practice (the prime example being SYRIZA gradually after its election in 2015). This 
is another resonant example of the structural transformation of political parties, from 
mass mechanisms reflecting class struggle and representation of popular interests to 
hard mechanisms for imposing neoliberal policies.
Furthermore, the judiciary, once thought as independent from political power, was 
gradually  but  relentlessly  bent  to the will  of  the latter, as were other  institutions.  A 
significant  example  is  the  Orthodox  Church,  which  along  with  the  decline  of  its 
ideological significance due to the broader transformations in Greek society, has been 
further denigrated after  a series of  scandals erupting in the 2000s.  Such scandals, 
implicating  both  parties  in  power  (PASOK and  ND)  indeed  dominated  the  political 
debate at the time. The most important were: (1) the “Vatopedi affair” in 2008, in which 
a monastery in Mount Athos had indulged in a frenzy of entrepreneurial activity, illegally 
recognized as  the owner  of  huge tracts  of  land by  the state,  while  the  abbot  had 
personal relationships with several members of the government,  including the State 
Minister of the time; (2) the abduction of immigrants from Pakistan by foreign secret 
services,  who  were  then  moved  to  a  village  and  interrogated  about  their  alleged 
implication in terrorism in 2005; (3) the investment of health insurance resources in 
67 Ending up with more than 60 deputies from the assembly elected in 2009 having left the party with 
which they were initially elected (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 150).
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unsecured  structured  bonds  by  several,  state  appointed,  management  boards  of 
insurance funds, with huge commissions and through an enterprise tied to ND in 2007; 
(4) the “Siemens affair”, in which party officials from both parties in power received 
huge commissions and secret  funds to facilitate the granting of  major public sector 
contracts to Siemens, in 2007. The succession of these scandals in such a relatively 
short  period significantly contributed to further public disillusionment with the official 
political scene and resulted in the exacerbation of the crisis of political representation68. 
Thus,  political  parties  and  other  intermediary  institutions  playing  a  mediating  role 
between  society,  the  economy  and  state  power  no  longer  functioned  adequately. 
According to Douzinas, this is simultaneously the strength and the  Achilles'  heel of 
neoliberalism (Douzinas 2011b: 139). This is even more valid since the success of any 
state-oriented strategy for social consent depends on the bonding between the objects 
of such a consent (thus of the population) and civic institutions. If in times of prosperity, 
the “parliamentarization” of conflict does not function properly to obtain the full consent 
of the population, then, in times of crisis, this failure puts in danger the social order as 
such (Agnoli 1972: 35).
In  this  context,  the  channels  for  integrating  citizens  into  the dominant  political 
strategy  (mainly  including  employment  in  the  public  sector  and  access  to  higher 
education)  became problematic.  We have  already  examined  the  features  of  public 
sector  employment  and  the  impact  of  the  restriction  of  public  expenditure  on  job 
prospects.  Regarding  education,  the  employment  situation  of  graduates  slowly  but 
inexorably worsened, to erode any guarantee of the prospect for a decent job. Despite 
this,  secondary  education  was  transformed  into  an  examination-centred  institution 
focused on preparing students for  highly competitive university entrance exams. As 
Gouvias  notes,  “educational  inequalities  are  linked  to  the  structure  of  the  labour 
market, the major factor influencing the potential aspirations of high school graduates 
68 In the December 2008 revolt of the youth, a giant banner had been hung across the façade of the 
building of the Town Hall in Agios Dimitrios, a district in Athens, which became one of the symbols of  
the revolt. The banner portrayed in the best way the delegitimation of the institutions described here. 
The slogan that written on it was: “We are sick of you! With the collusion between politicians, priests, 
the media,  journalists,  judges, top lawyers,  cops, snitches and drug dealers,  you have created an 
enormous pile of rubbish!”
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regarding  future  professional  prospects”  (Gouvias  2010:  101).  Possession  of  a 
university degree did not pave the way to better career prospects or a more respected 
social status. Gouvias' quantitative research on entrance flows in higher education has 
shown that in the period between 1993 and 2004, an impressive expansion of higher 
education was accompanied by reduced access for certain groups of the population, 
based on criteria  of  class,  professional  and educational  classification,  excluding an 
increasing  proportion  of  individuals  belonging  to  these  groups  from  those  higher 
education  and  professional  prospects  considered  potentially  as  the  most  lucrative 
(Ibid.:  134-35).  The  establishment  of  tutorial  schools  (“crammers”)  as  a  system to 
achieve entrance to tertiary education has intensified this class-based exclusion. Thus, 
access to those universities and faculties more likely to guarantee a better professional 
prospect  became  even  more  susceptible  to  class  criteria  (see  also  the  study 
Karamesini in 2008: 220). 
In the current crisis, this tendency has been amplified since even faculties formerly 
considered as being able to guarantee relatively good professional prospects, can no 
longer do so, while other faculties became no more than “mass receptors of the future 
unemployed” (Ibid.: 141).  For Karamesini, the growth of unemployment was the main 
mechanism leading to the differentiation of the absorption of graduates, resulting in the 
deterioration of the terms and in greater delays in their access to employment (2008: 
27-8).  A recently published research on the job prospects of the NTUA graduates is 
also indicative, since NTUA is considered to be the premier Greek university, with a 
high  proportion  of  its  graduates  supposedly  occupying  senior  positions  in  the 
professional hierarchy. Nominal unemployment exceeds 10% in certain sectors69. Long-
term unemployment  is  massive,  reaching  55.7% of  the  unemployed  (22.6% in  the 
previous decade, NTUA 2015: 30),  while unemployment rates increased by 1% per 
year (Ibid.: 31). Income levels have dramatically declined (Ibid.: 38-9), while only 3.6% 
of  the  graduates  work  in  the  public  sector,  confirming  that  this  path  no  longer 
constitutes a viable prospect  (Ibid.:  35).  “Flexible”  working arrangements have also 
69 Respective rates were 2.2% in 1991-1995 graduates and 2.3% in 1996-2001 graduates.
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radically increased (above 50% from 20% in the early 80s'), while various data reveal 
severe economic difficulties of engineering graduates (Ibid.: 14).
Furthermore, the transformations of the last few years have radically worsened the 
conditions  of  social  integration  for  broader  layers  of  society,  while  simultaneously 
creating the ground for new political alliances. This process has also resulted in certain 
social categories becoming much less visible, politically excluded, and non-existent as 
far as the official political scene is concerned. The most obvious social category of that 
type is the population of immigrant workers. Immigrant workers were actually never 
included in the political functioning of Greek society, despite the fact that they constitute 
a significant part of its social fabric (mostly originating from Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans).  They  have  been  deprived  of  basic  rights;  Greece does  not  grant  Greek 
nationality (and a birth certificate) to children born in Greece unless their parents have 
the Greek nationality as well (INE-GSEE 2008: 36). For immigrants permanently living 
in Greece acquiring Greek nationality is a very difficult procedure: it requires proof of 
seven years of permanent residency in the country and a series of other requirements 
quite difficult to achieve (Papastergiou and Takou 2015: 23). Immigrants are excluded 
from basic individual social and political rights, including health-care, education, right to 
practice  their  religion  etc),  but  they  are  also  subjected  to  violent  treatment  and 
repression. The granting of asylum is so difficult70 that the vast majority of immigrants 
remain without legal documents, in a limbo of underground life71. Furthermore, even 
legal immigrants have no political rights. They are not allowed to vote or participate in 
associations,  (systemic)  parties  and  in  the  majority  of  trade-unions  (Kalyvas  2010: 
358). Actually, as emphasized by Papastergiou and Takou (2015: 29) the immigration 
policy  followed  by  the  successive  Greek  governments  made  life  for  immigrants 
70 For many years, rates of asylum demands were very low with regard to the rest of the EU (1% when in  
the EU it  was 17% for the period 2004-2009) because of the degree of difficulty of the procedure 
(including the lack of independent authorities, delays, the repression by the police even where people 
went to seek for asylum) (Papastergiou and Takou 2015: 30).
71 481,505 residence permits were issued until the end of 2007, whilst the number of immigrants living in 
the country was far more than a million according to estimates (INE-GSEE 2008: 46). According to the 
Statistical Service data, in 2001, the number of foreigners living in Greece was 762,191 (this includes 
only legal residents), a number that during the crisis continually fell (Papastergiou and Takou 2015: 7-
8). According to data from the same foundation, the immigrants without papers were 172,250-209,402, 
but, in other estimates, reached 350,000 in 2008 (Ibid.: 9).
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unbearable, in order to deter them from entering the country72. Thus, social integration, 
nationality  acquisition  and  elementary  rights,  which  are  of  vital  importance  for 
immigrant workers, are far from guaranteed.
Immigrants are not the only social category affected by such political management. 
In  reality,  broader  social  groups  that  are  part  of  the  social  majority  affected  by 
neoliberal  policies,  have  been  marginalized  in  the  official  political  scene  and  its 
debates. All these groups provide a terrain favourable to unrest and “unconventional” 
forms  of  action.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  various  segments  of  the  youth. 
Serdedakis  (2015:  363),  argued  back in  2005  that  “there  is  a  feeling  of  crisis,  an 
accumulation  of  dissatisfaction,  which,  if  it  succeeds  finding  an  expression,  will 
resonate  widely  and  be  hard  to  control.  The  weakness  of  institutions  acting  as 
mediators, and of central institutions establishing channels of communication between 
individuals and groups, already contributes to an emerging dysfunctionality which takes 
the form of widespread forms of unconventional behaviour, especially in the youth”.
Finally, at  the ideological  level,  the hegemony of  neoliberalism of  the previous 
years  was  challenged  by  several  factors  discussed  previously,  such  as  draconian 
reforms in education and labour relations, the disillusionment of broader social strata 
and  the  gap  between  aspirations  and  reality  aggravated  by  a  social  environment 
overshadowed by the economic crisis, grinding austerity and the political deadlock. The 
market, ostensibly functioning as a social regulator, lost all credibility for the poorest 
groups as it  became clear that they had to pay the social cost.  The perspective of 
personal enrichment and consumerism faded from popular aspirations as it became an 
impossible dream for the majority of the population. Expectations for social mobility 
similarly collapsed, even among the majority of the middle classes. Besides, the social 
fabric itself was disintegrating, and the petty-bourgeois layers, a formerly vibrant terrain 
for  participation  in  political  and  social  life,  started  feeling  the  threat  of  social 
downgrading  and  proletarianization.  Finally,  the  prevailing  individualism  was 
72 This is evident in the policy pursued towards a rather different social group, the recent massive flux of 
refugees, or migrants strictly speaking, who do not aim at permanently staying in the country. The 
policies adopted by the EU, with the Dublin and Schengen agreements, as well as the activities of the 
European border police FRONTEX, have led to a further deterioration of the situation.
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challenged, and public protest and collective mobilization re-appeared on the political 
scene. Europeanism as an ideological doctrine was also questioned, assuming, for the 
first time, negative connotations in the popular perception, or becoming a scapegoat, at 
least in part, for the Greek crisis. Even if this did not extend to full blown euroscepticism 
or a to broader rejection of EU membership and of the EMU, this European integration 
appeared  as  a  “lesser  evil”,  a  reality  that  society  had  to  endure  due  to  a  lack  of 
alternative choice (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos 2014: 15).
The weakness of  the Left  in  articulating concrete alternatives and proposing a 
coherent  political  plan,  became  painfully  evident  during  this  period.  The  Left  had 
formerly been at the forefront of mobilizations against the implementation of neoliberal 
measures, which sometimes succeeded in blocking or delaying some of them. As Mike 
Davis  has  claimed,  “Portugal  and  Greece,  having  come  closest  to  actual  social 
revolutions  in  the  1970s,  preserve the most  hardcore  left-wing  cultures  in  Europe” 
(Davis 2011: 11). However, due to the specific historical background shaped by the 
experience of the defeat of the civil war73 but also by the worldwide realignments that 
followed the collapse of the USSR, the radical Left seemed to have retreated from the 
ambition  of  actually  claiming political  power, limiting  itself  to  defensive  tactics.  The 
rupture of 1989 is crucial in the process of dissolution of any consistent project of social 
transformation74 (Mpelantis 2014: 137). Part of the radical Left concentrated its efforts 
on  preserving  its  revolutionary  purity  and  rescuing  itself  from  integration  into  the 
dominant modernization project. Ironically, this retreat into an ideological ivory tower 
73 I mainly refer to the experience of the 1940-44 Resistance and to the civil war of 1946-49. The post-
civil war state was based on the victory of the ruling class and the defeat of the Left. The dominant 
socio-political strategy included the setting-up of a repressive state, the reconstruction of the economy, 
the constitution of a broad social alliance on the basis of material compensation, an official ideology 
based on nationalism and religion, and cultural and spiritual decline (Sakellaropoulos 1998: 153-54; 
Tsoukalas 1987: 28-44). The memory of  popular organization was repressed as was the idea that 
collective action could replace individual strategies (Tsoukalas 2013: 48). Politically, the post-war state 
was characterized by anti-communism in a broad sense, in which the “enemy within” was identified 
with the external one, thus way structuring the national identity (Charalampis 1985: 50). The state was 
staffed by former collaborators of the period of German occupation, members of the Resistance were 
marginalized and persecuted,  while  social  groups who had grown rich through activities  of  “black 
market”,  speculation,  collaboration  etc.  came to  dominate  (Meynaud  n.d.  b:  18-9;  Nikolakopoulos 
2001:44).  Persecution  at  a  mass scale,  exile  and executions of  communists  and members of  the 
Resistance were constitutive elements of the period.
74 This rupture was combined with the fall of the USSR and a tactics of collaboration between the KKE 
and the systemic parties. KKE for the first time entered a coalition government with ND, and later in the 
same year, in an all-party government with ND and PASOK. This has triggered a left-wing breakup of 
KKE and it has generally been a landmark for the Left in whole.
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neutralized  any  possibility  of  revolutionary  effectiveness  to  the  extent  that  tactics 
became disconnected from strategy. The ensuing isolation blocked any possibility of 
intervention directed to social transformation. The attitude of the KKE provides a clear 
case  of  this  tendency.  The  KKE  effectively  isolated  itself  from  the  main  mass 
mobilizations  of  the  period  under  examination  here  and  acted  as  a  divisive  and 
sectarian force, justifying its attitude with the argument that “people were not ready for 
broader political change”.
Another part of the Left constantly flirted with participation in state institutions and 
with the dominant bourgeois strategy. This approach functioned as an obstacle for any 
radically different initiative, and thus ended up being an integral part of the problem. 
This  tendency  can  be  seen  in  the  case  of  SYRIZA,  where  certain  factions  were 
incorporated into the dominant bourgeois and memorandum strategy (eg. DHMAR), 
before  the  whole  of  the  party  finally  capitulating  in  2015  (with  the  exception  of 
significant factions on the left-wing which left the party). The anti-capitalist Left, which is 
constituted in a relatively autonomous way, has not either been able to articulate a 
coherent  distinctive  alternative,  while,  at  times,  flirting  with  both  of  the  tendencies 
discussed  previously.  Overall,  the  radical  Left  as  a  whole,  with  some  significant 
exceptions,  has  proved  incapable  of  proposing  a  political  plan  able  to  inspire  and 
engage broader parts of society. Notwithstanding this decisive weakness, the radical 
Left  maintained  an  active  presence  in  the  social  and  political  mobilizations,  which 
allowed it to have a considerable impact, and to mobilize tens of thousands of activists, 
bringing some success into blocking aspects of neoliberal strategies. These points on 
the Left will be further discussed in chapters IV-VI, under the light of the fieldwork I 
have conducted.  In the following last  section,  I  will  investigate more concretely  the 
authoritarian turn of the Greek state, as the last point to explain the latent crisis of 
hegemony when social mobilizations emerged.
d. The rise of the authoritarian state and the crisis of hegemony.
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The process described above is one of a hardening of the state, of its function and 
its mechanisms. This has been a structural process transforming the very nature and 
functionality  of  the  state.  If,  following  Mpelantis  and  a  whole  tradition  of  political 
thought,  we  understand  the  state  “as  a  mechanism  which  unifies  and  condenses 
bourgeois political power (without though exhausting at it), as a mechanism endowed 
with  specific  features  aiming  at  dominating  the popular  classes and establishing  a 
hegemony  ensuring  their  subjection  to  the  capitalist  mode of  production  and  their 
exclusion from political power, as a mechanism which, in the last instance, guarantees 
such an isolation” (Mpelantis 2014: 22) , then the form of the state plays a key role in 
the unfolding of both the dominant class strategy and the configuration taken by the 
social  movement.  In this section,  we will  focus on this  transformation,  according to 
which the state is shaped by the effort  of  the ruling class to eliminate elements of 
political representation, by the emergence of unaccountable centres of decision and by 
the hardening of repressive practices (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 11).
Repression, in its broader sense, has been a constitutive element of the state in 
post-civil  war  Greece75.  However, the  “Metapolitefsi”  has  signaled  a  rupture  in  this 
process. This period brought a democratization of the state and of public life, which 
was extended in the early years of PASOK rule. In the mid-1980s, Greece had among 
the least repressive frameworks in Europe76, the most friendly to trade-unionism labour 
laws,  the  most  participatory  university  system  and  an  overall  left-wing  ideological 
atmosphere. These elements are due to concrete socio-political particularities and will 
be further examined in the next chapter, combined with the investigation of the Greek 
social structure. Gradually after the 1990s', physical repression became predominant, 
75 Characteristically, on top of the post-civil war state of violence noted in footnote 73, cadres of the army 
who participated in the 1967-1974 dictatorship have been incorporated into the state apparatus after its 
fall, the police was organized in paramilitary structures, while legal forms of violent repression have 
been implemented, both by the first right-wing government after the dictatorship, and by the PASOK 
governments afterwards (Charalampis 1985: 348-51).
76 In the early Metapolitefsi years, repressive legislative restrictions were imposed after moments of civil 
unrest, when there was also an unstable pattern of political representation and party system, in parallel  
with  increasing  radicalism  (Vernardakis  and  Mavris  1986;  Georgakopoulos  and  Seriatos  n.d.:  12; 
Mpelantis  2004:  164).  After  the  1980s',  this  framework  was  to  some  extent  altered  and  the 
management of social life was democratized. Repressive operations were targeted mainly against the 
most radical layers of the society (eg. “operation Areti” against the radical youth etc.)
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with  police  violence  and  impunity  constituting  its  characteristic  but  not  unique 
element77. Changes in the legal system and the top-down control of the judiciary and of 
administrative power have also been part of this strategy. A series of new laws aimed at 
restricting  the  right  to  protest  and  the  intensifying  surveillance.  Repression  was 
militarized and new Special Units were created within the police forces largely devoted 
to the repression of collective action. Paramilitary mechanisms and fascist groups have 
acted in direct or indirect collusion with the state and the police. Political trials, following 
the arrest of the urban guerrilla group 17N, were used as the Trojan horse to restrict – 
or  even  abolish  –  fundamental  individual  and  political  rights,  and  to  persecute 
systematically social movement activists, while social and political protest was treated 
as  the  “enemy  within”.  Physical  repression  and  massive  use  of  tear  gas  became 
routine  practices  directed  against  residents  of  “undisciplined  areas”,  the  mobilized 
workers,  immigrants  or  the  youth.  These  policies  aimed  directly  at  fighting  the 
emergence  of  social  movements  and  mobilizations.  Thus,  the  police  has  been 
conceived by the mass of the people as a repressive mechanism imposing social order 
rather than a mechanism of protecting citizens; a point to be made evident later in this 
thesis, in the examination of the outcomes of my field research.
Agnoli had described such transformations in his emphasis on the emergence of 
regressive tendencies moving towards an authoritarian state. This process reflected 
broader disciplinary patterns characterizing western societies, and was related to the 
mechanisms of parliamentary democracy themselves (Agnoli 1972: 10).  In his view, 
this tendency was inherent in the structural crisis of capitalism and in the effort of the 
ruling class to resolve the crisis in its own benefit. The coming of the crisis facilitates 
the interrelation between the tendency of the state to extend its jurisdiction and power, 
and  the  desire  for  a  complementary  “police-state”,  securing  the  established  social 
order, the will of politicians for power and the need for a forcible guarantee of existing 
privileges (Agnoli 1972: 61). This is a tendency we detect in the management of the 
77 Indicatively, in the 2003-2007 period, only one out of 238 police officers accused for practicing violence 
was fired, no one was convicted, and only one out of 99 officers having used their firearms (leading to 
12 deaths and 27 injuries) was convicted and dismissed (Sakellaropoulos 2012).
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current crisis. As Mpelantis, following Poulantzas' analysis, underlines, the structural 
crisis is seen, paradoxically, as a process of simultaneous weakening and enhancing of 
the power of the dominant class, pushing a transformation of the state along the lines 
of  authoritarian  statism (Mpelantis  2014:  118).  Poulantzas'  concept  of  authoritarian 
statism describes a process in which the established alliance of power no longer refers 
to different sections of capital supported by classes-bearers and the suborned leaders 
of the dominated classes (Poulantzas 1978). Social alliances are radically rearranged 
and  non-competitive  capital  is  eliminated,  leading  even  to  the  extinction  of  certain 
fractions of  capital.  State management  aims at  curbing social  resistance,  but  is  no 
longer  based on a  positive  project:  it  essentially  relies  on  the management  of  the 
“minimal  expectations”  of  the  affected social  majority  (Sakellaropoulos  2014a:  111). 
The  need  for  establishing  this  authoritarian  turn  is  associated  with  a  threat  to  the 
normal  functioning  of  the  state,  and  thus  is  directly  turned  against  demands  and 
protests coming from the most exploited and oppressed factions of the population. In 
times of crisis and of intensification of the neoliberal management, state functions do 
not aim primarily at ensuring consensus and the political integration of broad social 
strata, but at suppressing practices of resistance and protest and imposing “normality”. 
The questioning of neoliberal management is assimilated to the action of the “enemies 
of the interest of society”.  This approach paves the way for the repression and the 
marginalization of the more radical sectors of the social movement, those advocating 
social change (Mpelantis 2004: 64, 119).
After the implementation of the memoranda strategy, this tendency towards “post-
democratic”  and  “post-hegemonic”  conditions  has  exacerbated.  A  Gramscian 
“Caesarism without a Caesar” prevailed in the political system (Gramsci 1971: 220): 
the political scene tends to become autonomous from certain social representations 
and parliamentary rules, and the political system functions as if  social strife did not 
exist.  Electoral  legitimation  of  such  tendencies  is  bypassed  or  diluted  without 
necessarily  being abolished  (Sotiris  2011:  161).  These  transformations  refer  to  the 
multiple levels already examined to some degree: the hardening of the party system, 
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the  shift  of  the  state  towards  functions  of  a  “strategic-state”  promoting  neoliberal 
restructurings, the relation of the government to supranational organizations, and the 
hardening of repression (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 114-15). This temporal suspension of 
the constitutional order has not led to a proper break in the regime of the state form, 
signaling a more organic and irreversible transformation. However, the assimilation of 
such a temporal suspension inevitably produces structural consequences in the long-
term.
Furthermore, this whole process of authoritarianism is linked to a strategy of what 
has  been  called,  following  Foucault’s  analysis  of  modern  power,  the  “biopolitical 
management of the population”. “Biopower” is defined as the exercise of power over 
every aspect of life and aims at disciplining the individual and the social body through 
an integral control of all the processes of its “life”. It extends to institutions and targets 
specific social groups (Douzinas 2011b: 138). This power dynamic constitutes actually 
an  extra-economic  form  of  discipline  coming  to  the  forefront.  This  perspective  of 
biopolitics can be understood as being still class-based, in opposition to an a-historical 
and timeless view78 (Marias n.d.). Foucault himself emphasizes: “the two processes – 
the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital  – cannot be separated; it 
would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without 
the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using 
them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful 
accelerated the accumulation of capital” (Foucault 1995: 221).
Thus,  the  target  is  the  intensification  of  exploitation,  and  not  an  ostensible 
exclusion seen as independent from such an exploitation. Marginalization (in lieu of 
“exclusion”)  of  broad  social  strata  aims  at  deepening  the  exploitation  of  all  the 
oppressed, both the “included” and the “excluded” ones, producing at the same time 
another cleavage between the two. Moreover, it develops a sense of moral culpability 
of those considered as “included”, which accompanies the invisibility of those who are 
“excluded” (Kouvelakis 2007: 49). The management of “universal guilt syndromes” is 
78 Such are certain approaches on the “state of exception”, which seem unable to perceive the totality of 
the process. (eg. Agamben 2005; for a fair criticism, see Sotiris 2012a).
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one of the fundamental tactics of biopolitical discipline, producing the identity of the 
“innocent guilty” (Douzinas 2011a:  84-5).  This is directly reflected in the way public 
discourse on the debt and its causes has developed in Greece over the last years: one 
of the main slogans constantly reproduced by the ruling class during the first years of 
the crisis has been that “we have spent the money all together”, aiming at spreading 
precisely this feeling of collective guilt.
An  important  aspect  of  this  whole  process  refers  to  the  direct  intervention 
performed  by  supranational  organizations  and  by  the  Troika,  in  the  political  and 
economic functions of the state. It is no exaggeration to say that the presence of the 
Troika  has been fully  internalized by the Greek state.  Many examples confirm this 
phenomenon: (1) the creation of the Task Force, staffed by experts coming from other 
EU  countries,  aimed  at  supervising  the  function  of  the  public  sector  and  having 
extended  jurisdiction;  (2)  the  direct  intervention  in  four  major  ministries  by  the 
respective German ones; (3) the strong presence of the lenders within the TAIPED, the 
fund managing the privatization  and auction  of  the  country's  public  assets;  (4)  the 
installation of a committee of the lenders within the managing board of Greek banks; 
and (5)  the  creation,  by  the second memorandum, of  a special  fund for  all  public 
revenue, controlled by the lenders (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 127-29).
Such an intervention is so widespread that it constitutes a qualitative turning point, 
leading to the transformation of the country into what has been called a “debt colony”. 
Before easily adopting such a definition, certain elements must be borne in mind: firstly, 
the question of national sovereignty must be revised in a relational way, examining the 
overall articulation of all  countries in the imperialist chain79. Secondly, speaking of a 
colony  amounts  to  recognizing  the  existence  of  concrete  and  articulated  colonial 
empires;  and  such  entities  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  current  configuration  of  the 
international  capitalist  system  (Sakellaropoulos  2014a:  131).  Intergovernmental 
organizations  are  the  ones performing this  role.  Thirdly, the  concept  of  the  colony 
79 Therefore, the dominant issue is not if a state loses certain elements of national domination, but if this 
actually corresponds to a qualitative turn, and to what extent. In any case, such a turn seems to have 
indeed been effected nowadays in Greece (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 130).
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usually comprises exclusive relations of dependence, neglecting the fact that, as in the 
Greek case, the domestic dominant bloc of power (or, at least, the most important part 
of it) has emphatically tied its actual interests to those of the EU, and is not simply a 
vassal  independent  of  these  very  interests80.  In  the  Greek  case,  governance  is 
therefore conducted by an international alliance (and not by a single country-Empire). 
National  governments are the ones entrusted with the responsibility  of  governance 
(and not directly the international organizations). At the same time, no efforts are made 
towards extra-capitalist extraction of wealth going directly to a metropolis, and foreign 
intervention is still extensive, but centred around economic functions (Sakellaropoulos 
2014a: 132-3). The main aspect of this strategy is the overwhelming subjection of its 
popular  classes  into  the  dominant  political  and  economic  strategy.  This  has  the 
distinctive characteristic of including the destructuring of aspects of the sovereignty of 
the Greek state. This is strongly tied to the architecture of the eurozone and the effects 
of  the Stability  and Growth Pact.  As Lapavitsas et  al.  underline,  “The Stability  and 
Growth Pact represents a loss of sovereignty for eurozone states. However, not all 
states within the eurozone were created equal. The loss of sovereignty has been more 
severe for peripheral states” (Lapavitsas et al. 2012: 35). This is the reason why the 
national question has re-emerged in the forefront of mobilizations, especially during the 
movement of the squares. National symbols were employed by the protesters and the 
national  dimension  was  articulated  to  the  “anti-austerity”  and  the  “pro-democracy” 
discourse, as we will examine in chapter IV.
The reality described here culminates with the deeper hegemonic instability which 
is inherent to neoliberalism, leading, under certain conjuctural conditions, to a crisis of 
hegemony, an organic crisis (Gramsci 1971: 210). Neoliberalism is no longer able to 
80 As Sakellaropoulos  puts  it,  it  is  “an unbalanced alliance  having  as  a  cost  the  involvement  in  the 
function of the Greek state of foreign institutional factors as well, but having as a benefit, on the one 
hand the transfer of an important mass of surplus value towards the dominant monopoly capital, and 
on the other hand, the clearance of non-competitive capitals” (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 127). Of course, 
colonial situations always go together with local “compradore” elites collaborating, actively participating 
in the exploitation of the “natives” and linking deeply their interest to colonial rule. This usually refers to 
particular sections of the ruling class. However, in the Greek case the elite strategy is much more 
unified, insisting on the abidance of the country in the European project, and its internal contradictions 
are less acute. It is indicative that later (in 2015), when the question of exiting the EMU was posited 
realistically as a potential for the country, the dominant bloc coalesced almost automatically against it in 
various ways.
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produce a proper form of hegemony, based on a project which (partly) integrates the 
interest and the specific role of the subaltern classes: it is rather based on the passivity 
of “civil society”, tied to its inability to formulate alternatives, and is accompanied by the 
perspective of constantly deteriorating living conditions for the population. At this point, 
it  should  be  noted  that  hegemony  does  not  simply  refer  to  extracting  consent  as 
opposed to  coercion,  nor  to  the  ideological  or  cultural  dimensions of  social  life  as 
opposed  to  economic  or  political  ones.  The  concept  of  hegemony  refers  to  the 
complexity of the forms in which power is exercised, when a social class may be a 
dominant but also a leading force in society. The economic element is crucial here: in 
the Gramscian concept of hegemony, the latter is never simply political, but must be 
based on a strategy for the economy: “Though hegemony is ethical-political, it  must 
also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the 
leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci 1971: 161). It is in 
the  framework  of  this  crisis  of  hegemony that  the  movements of  2010-2011 under 
examination in this thesis emerge, develop and contribute on the transformation of both 
praxis and consciousness of the Greek people.
To  conclude,  in  this  chapter  I  have  overviewed  the  political  and  ideological 
landscape  in  which  the  society  has  been  transformed in  the last  decades  and  its 
destabilization.  This  investigation  will  permit  our  comprehension  of  basic  political 
tendencies,  which  explain  both  the  relative  political  stability  of  the  time  and  the 
contradictions that have led to the specific forms of social mobilization, to be explored 
in the next chapters. The collapse of the strong ideological hegemony of the version of 
neoliberalism that prevailed in the period prior to the crisis has been decisive in this 
emergence; and so has the impact of the dominant, though controversial, political and 
ideological tendencies of the Greek society. During the crisis, the political re-emerged 
in the forefront, combined with the weakness of the official political scene to fill this role, 
the collapse of the dominant channels for integrating citizens into the dominant political 
strategy and the delegitimation of the main political and state institutions. This has led 
to the deeper need of the participants in the movements of exploring alternative ways 
94
of conceiving the political.  However, before examining the specific characteristics of 
these movements, I will examine the class structure of Greek society, and the main 
features of the labour and trade-union movements in Greece before the period of the 
crisis. This study is necessary for the deepest comprehension of the class origin of the 
conflicts emerging, and will be conducted in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER III: THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF GREEK SOCIETY
In the previous chapters I established the grounds for the theoretical framework of 
my  thesis,  and  described  the  specific  socio-economic  and  political  environment  in 
which the social movements under examination emerged. I also argued in favour of a 
class analysis, avoiding both replicating mechanistic approaches vaguely reproducing 
abstract ideological tenets, and premature farewells to concepts of class, including the 
working class. Such approaches tend to neglect two necessities: firstly, dealing with 
each  concrete  case  in  its  particularity,  and  secondly,  identifying  the  indisputable 
changes in  labour  over  time.  Alberto  Toscano elaborated a  framework based on a 
dialectical approach, which takes into account the transformations in labour, and puts 
emphasis on questions of space and time, disciplinary processes, racial and gender 
discriminations (Toscano 2012). This is an approach I intend to adopt when studying 
the class  structure in  Greece.  An in-depth analysis  of  the Greek class  structure is 
indeed necessary if the organizational structures of the labour and social movements in 
Greece are to be effectively approached and fully understood. However, this task has 
often suffered from partial and superficial treatments, facilely reiterating simplicities and 
mechanistic replications from other social formations.
Therefore,  in  the  first  section  of  this  chapter,  I  will  first  present  certain 
methodological issues and theoretical foundations of class theory and subsequently 
employ them in an analysis of Greek class structure. Then,  I  intend to explore the 
particularities  of  this  structure,  arguing  that  these  differentiate  it  from  the  other 
developed capitalist countries of Europe. In the third section, I will present the evolution 
of this class structure up until the crisis, and examine how policies in the context of the 
crisis have exacerbated class polarization and reformulated the social landscape. This 
evolution has changed the class structure to a pattern closer to the one that dominates 
in other European countries. In the following section, I will analyze the specificities and 
qualitative features of the working class in Greece, moving beyond the issue of  its 
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relative weight, in order to provide a picture of its forms and its internal composition. 
The fifth  section  of  the  current  chapter  will  examine in  more depth  the forms and 
features of the labour and social movement in Greece in relation to the class structure 
putting emphasis on its historical and political trajectory. Finally, in the last section of 
this chapter, I will examine the specifics of the emergence of the social movement in 
Greece in broader terms. In this examination, I will take into account the difficulties that 
the traditional  labour  and trade-union movement  has faced,  the emergence of  new 
structures beyond traditional trade-unionism, and the fact that the social movement is 
not restricted to workplaces (emphasizing on the spatial dimension of mobilization).
a. Introductory elements: Methodological issues and class theory.
Before starting an analysis of the features of the class structure in the Greek social 
formation, I think it necessary to discuss certain methodological issues on class theory 
having a bearing on my particular field of research and the Greek situation. In terms of 
capitalist development, Greece is a country of average capitalist growth. The central 
issue  in  the  related  debate  on  its  class  structure  is  located  in  the  weight  of  the 
“traditional petty bourgeoisie” and the slow and limited growth of wage labour, which 
means that the expansion of capitalist relations in Greece took forms which included 
the  reproduction  of  simple  commodity  production  and  small-scale  capitalism.  This 
evolution is evidently linked to the place of Greece in the global chain of “combined and 
uneven development” of capitalism. The pattern that has dominated makes a case for 
positioning Greece in the “periphery” of European capitalism, alongside other countries 
of the European South. Petty bourgeois strata development has occurred not to the 
detriment of the expansion of capitalism, but in parallel with it, forming, to some degree, 
one of the triggers of that very development. As Lytras underlines (1993: 158): “The 
peculiarity of the Greek paradigm of the domination by capitalist relationships is related 
to the lack of essential and remarkable pro-capitalist remnants. Even more, those to 
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whom such classifications are most eminently attributed, namely small enterprises in 
industry and commerce and small rural properties (farms), are the ones that emerge 
and grow big exactly during this very period of capitalist domination” - or at least during 
its first period, in my view. Industrial development is associated with the formation of 
the small shop commercial sector based on low capital assets, small individual-family 
capital and restricted production. According to Moschonas: “The process of expanded 
capital reproduction, which grew stronger in Greece in the inter-war period and became 
dominant in the post-war period, under the effect of foreign capital as well, has mainly 
evolved not against, but in parallel to the process of simple reproduction, meaning the 
conservation  and  development  of  small-commodity  production”  (1986:  32;  other 
researchers endorse similar arguments, eg Mavris 1984: 2-3, Lytras 1993: 158). At the 
same time, there is a tendency for small enterprises to be involved in activities either 
complementary to big capital or unprofitable to it. This restricts them to a satellite role,  
directly  or  indirectly  dependent  on and manipulated by big capital.  Thus,  while  big 
capital dominates, small enterprises still survive (Lytras 1993: 155-56).
The dominance of the above pattern goes back to the formation of the Greek state 
in the 19th century. The main explanation for this dominance is economic, and is related 
to the prevalence of the particular model of capital accumulation and penetration of 
capitalist  relations  (as  examined  in  chapter  II).  The  political  turbulence  of  the  20th 
century,  and  specifically  the  construction  of  the  post-civil  war  state  based  on 
authoritarianism but in need of building a social basis, have intensified this pattern. In 
the relevant literature, in contrast, the development of capitalism is often portrayed as 
linked with the inevitable decline and dissolution of the middle socio-economic strata 
itself. Therefore, we can detect three dominant approaches for the interpretation of the 
specific  case of  Greece.  The first  approach identifies the broad existence of  petty-
bourgeois strata with the preservation of pre-capitalist relations, and attributes it to the 
underdevelopment  of  capitalism in  Greece (eg.  Mouzelis  1978).  Traditional  Marxist 
approaches (Papadopoulos 1987; Kotzias 1979; Sarlis 1987; Kappos 1987; KME 2000) 
tend to dismiss any idea of Greece forming a specific case; reflecting an anxiety to 
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establish the quantitative hegemony of the working class (Lytras 1993: 130). Finally, 
post-modern approaches tend to generalize by finding a supposed tendency of  the 
petty-bourgeois  strata to dominate,  until  they become overwhelming prevalent.  This 
leads them to an overall  depreciation of  any class reference (Rifkin 1995;  but  also 
Tsoukalas 1987, as examined in the next section).
All these approaches share a very narrow definition of the working class, using the 
criteria of surplus value production and productive labour as the foundation for that 
definition, and distinguishing between participation in the realization of surplus value 
and participation to its production (Mavris 1983). In our view, class definitions must 
avoid the trap of any classification based on a static process. Classes are not to be 
interpreted as categories existing separately and distinct from class struggle and simply 
based on an empirical sociology (Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 193; Palaiologos 2006: 352). 
The nature of the historical evolution of class struggle determines the very features of 
the classes involved. As Fytrou (2015: 10) underlines, “(1) social classes do exist, (2) 
they are defined in a complex way based on the historical, social and political stakes 
and the respective conflicts, (3) they change because of these conflicts”. The primary 
criterion for class identification is the phenomenon of exploitation (defining the terrain of 
class antagonism), and secondarily, the relations of domination and their articulation 
into the social structure (Sakellaropoulos 2014b: 3; 2014: 195)81. In the present thesis, 
Lenin's  criteria  for  defining  classes  will  be  adopted  as  a  starting  (though  not 
exhaustive) point: “Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the 
place they occupy in a historically determined system of social  production,  by their 
relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their  
role in the social organization of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the 
share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are 
groups of  people one of  which can appropriate the labour of  another owing to the 
different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.” (Lenin 1919: 421). 
Certain factors must be further borne in mind when approaching concepts of social 
81 Therefore,  our  approach is  evidently  in  contrast  to  Therborn's  dismissal  of  the  concept  of  (class) 
interest as a driving force for human behaviour (Therborn 1980).
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classes: (1) their relationality (identification to a class does not mean the insertion into 
a scalable social hierarchy but the correlation of the relationship of this specific social 
class to the other ones); (2) the conflictual nature of the relationship between classes 
(given their objectively different material interests); and (3) the objective substance of 
classes (belonging to a class is related to the concrete social relationships it embodies) 
(see Callinicos 1987).
Because of the Marxian distinction between productive labour in the general sense 
(production  of  use-values)  and  productive  labour  as  viewed  from  a  capitalist 
perspective (labour exchanged with capital rather than income and which returns profit 
to the capitalist) (Marx 1981: 150; Marx 1978: 194, 524)82, certain researchers have 
defined classes according to whether subjects produce surplus value in the narrow 
sense for capital (e.g. Poulantzas 2008). This definition is not adopted here, nor does it 
reflect Marxian analysis as we perceive it83. In order to include a worker in the working 
class, we must examine whether she is productive from the point of view of capitalist 
production. This is evidently the case if she produces surplus value. This is also the 
case if she does not produce surplus value but is subjected to surplus non-paid work 
which  contributes  to  an  increase  of  the  employer's  capital,  returns  profit  to  the 
employer  and  facilitates  the  realization  of  surplus  value  (Kotzias  1979:  46; 
Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 210). Thus, a worker can be considered as belonging to the 
working class if  she is an exploited wage labourer, without necessarily working in a 
sector  of  surplus  value  production.  According  to  Sakellaropoulos,  “the  form  of  the 
82 “Two conclusions necessarily follow from Marx's definitions: 1) every labour which a capitalist buys with 
his variable capital  in order to draw from it  a surplus value, is productive labour, independently of 
whether or not this labour is objectified in material objects, and whether or not this labour is objectively 
necessary or useful for the process of social production... 2) Every labour which the capitalist does not  
buy with his variable capital is not productive from the point of view of the capitalist economy, even 
though this labour might be objectively useful and might be objectified in material consumer goods 
which satisfy human subsistence needs. At first glance, these two conclusions are paradoxical and 
contradictory to the conventional  understanding of productive labour. However, they follow logically 
from Marx's definition. And Marx applies it boldly” (Rubin 2008: 260).
83 Poulantzas’  concept  of  class  includes  two aspects  that  have  raised  controversies:  the  first  is  the 
inclusion of a criterion of “productive” labour, which he actually assimilates to manual labour, and will 
be  contested  below.  The  second  is  that  he  gives  equal  weight  to  ideological  and  political 
determinations (eg. assuming functions of supervision) and to economic ones (that is to exploitation). 
Wright  (1978)  in  response,  gives  central  importance  to  exploitation  but  elaborates  the  notion  of 
“contradictory class location” to address the issue of a position in the social division of labour which 
combines subjection to exploitation and secondary functions of  domination of the workforce.  For a 
systematic  critique  of  Poulantzas’  thesis  from a  Marxian  perspective  that  reflects  our  views,  see 
(Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 201-20) and (Mpelantis 2014: 177-83).
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working class is firmly linked to both the production and the circulation of capital. This 
claim forces us to examine how capital transformation consists of one single process. 
This means that a distinction between the three spheres of pure capitalist production 
(industry,  commerce,  services),  as  a  criterion  for  insertion  into  a  social  class,  is 
mistaken”  (Sakellaropoulos  2014b:  2-3;  also  Kotzias  1979:  49).  The  production, 
distribution and circulation phases of capital are thus considered as different instances 
of a single process, aimed at the realization of surplus value. This comes in contrast to 
theories of the so-called “tertiarization” which tend to posit the disappearance of the 
working class and its replacement by the “middle strata”, neglecting thus the fact that 
services can also be capitalist commodities (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 106).
In my perspective (and contrary to the Poulantzian perspective), intellectual, rather 
than just manual workers, can also be categorized as working class: “each intellectual 
who works in the sphere of either material or intellectual production or in the capital 
circulation sphere belongs in the working class for as long as she is productive ‘in the 
capitalist production sense', meaning for as long as she contributes in the valorization 
of the capital and if she does not have a managerial role” (Kotzias 1979: 60). Alongside 
the  development  of  capitalism,  two  interrelated  tendencies  have  developed  on 
intellectual  labour:  on  the  one  hand,  intellectual  labour  has  entered  the  economic 
sphere and is not simply confined to the superstructure, and on the other hand, it is 
exercised by members of the working class as well, and not simply by members of the 
ruling  class  (Ibid.:  119).  The  antithesis  between  manual  and  intellectual  work  is 
integrally  subsumed into  the  capital  and  is  no longer  a  form of  expression  of  the 
dominant  class  antithesis  (Ibid.:  132).  Besides,  as  Balibar  claims,  the  concepts  of 
manual and intellectual labour do not  have a stable or  “natural”  content:  “labour in 
general,  as  a  social  and  collective  activity,  is  at  the  same  time  'manual'  and 
'intellectual'” (Balibar 2014: 140). Labour presupposes the knowledge of the object and 
of the conditions of labour. Thus, the mutual field between these two functions of social 
labour is in a state of constant transformation and can be defined only in retrospective, 
rather than in competition (Ibid.: 141-42). To conclude at this point, the limits of the 
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working class tend to be extended in conjunction with, and in a sense, complementary 
to,  capitalist  development.  Expansion  of  corporate  activities  leads  to  a  greater 
submission of labour to capital, thus to an increase in the size of the working class 
(Sakellaropoulos 2014a: 219). This is why, as Bensaid underlines, de-industrialization 
in the West has not engendered the disappearance of the proletariat (2009: 56).
This whole analysis should not lead to the idea that there are only two classes in 
capitalism: ostensibly the working class and the bourgeois class. Such a conclusion 
could be made only if analyzing the capitalist mode of production at a level of elevated 
abstraction. At the concrete level of actual societies and social formations there are 
more than two classes, not just because different modes of production exist in parallel 
in the historical evolution of each formation, but also because certain class functions of 
the  dominant  class  are  assigned  to  social  groups  who  are  not  members  of  the 
dominant  class  (Milios  2002:  64).  These  groups neither  realize  nor  extract  surplus 
value, but they do perform specific social functions and are reproduced by receiving the 
financial  compensation corresponding to the overwork of other workers, because of 
being  necessary  for  the  reproduction  of  existing  social  relations  (Sakellaropoulos 
2014a:  200).  Hence  the  existence  of  the  petty-bourgeois  class,  divided  into  two 
categories, old and new84. Craft owners, small family business proprietors and small 
commercial business owners belong in the “old” or “traditional” petty-bourgeois class. 
Such businesses only employ a few wage labourers, owners extract small amounts of 
surplus  value,  no  expanded  reproduction  of  capital  is  effected  and  living  labour 
dominates over dead labour (Ibid.: 227-8). 
The new petty-bourgeois class is differentiated from the old one by not possessing 
any  means  of  production,  not  benefiting  from  the  extraction  of  surplus-value,  and 
84 We choose this term instead of the term “middle class”, which would have the sense of an intermediate 
step. We also maintain the division of the petty-bourgeoisie into two sub-categories, though keeping a 
certain hesitancy. Indeed, the existence and rapid rise of a strata of wage-earners that are not part of 
the working class (professionals,  executives, upper layers of “white colars” etc) is one of the main 
evolutions of the social structure in Greece (as well as in any advanced or relatively advanced capitalist 
economy) and it refers to structural and historical developments of the capitalist economy, which are 
themselves quite diverse: growth of certain functions in capitalist production/reproduction but also “de-
industrialization”,  the  rise  of  certain  branches  situated  in  the  “service”  or  “tertiary”  sector  of  the 
economy,  which  itself  is  linked  to  processes  of  financialization  etc.  Therefore,  they  have  an 
autonomous dynamics, hence the hesitancy: they are not necessarily associated with the “traditional 
petty-bourgeoisie”, the weight of which remains quite significant in Greece.
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occupying an intermediate position in the productive process. On the one hand, this 
class is subjected politically and ideologically by the bourgeoisie but, on the other, its 
main role is in the activation and reproduction of the capitalist relations of exploitation 
and domination relations.  Those functions are fragmented and differentiated as the 
result of the concentration and centralization of capital. Thus, the new petty-bourgeois 
class  includes those responsible for  supervising and organizing the labour  system, 
realizing  surplus  value,  overseeing  the  coherence  of  capitalist  function  and  the 
legitimation of the reproduction of the existing social relations (Ibid.: 230-2). Finally, the 
class structure includes a number of cross-class social categories, such as farmers, 
public servants, intellectuals and the youth. 
b.  Particularities  of  the  social  structure  in  the  Greek  social 
formation.
We can  now  look  at  the  particularities  of  class  structure  in  the  Greek  social 
formation in more detail. Capitalist relations in Greece have historically supported and 
promoted the emergence of forms of small property and small production. In the post-
war period, Greek society was characterized by a relatively stable structure of small 
property  owners,  economically  active  in  small  commodity  production.  Low rates  of 
growth  of  wage  employment  (the  lowest  among  the  developed  countries)  and 
persisting  numbers  of  self-employed  and  assisting  family  members  have  been 
constitutive  elements  of  this  pattern  of  capitalist  development  (Lytras  2007:  37-9). 
Lytras (1993: 187-208) has provided an interesting “X ray” of the employment and of 
the  social  structure  up  until  the  end  of  the  20th century:  The  economically  active 
population was relatively limited. The share of wage labour was increasing, and self-
employment  declining,  but  both  these  processes  progressed  relatively  slowly,  with 
wage labour being relatively concentrated in services and in the public sector. Assisting 
family members was an important part of the structure of employment. The proportion 
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of employment in large industrial companies was falling, but it was increasing in crafts 
and small shops. In the rural economy small farmers and small scale crop production 
prevailed while the secondary sector, and especially in manufacturing, was dominated 
by small businesses. The working class remained relatively fragmented and the share 
of self-employment was significant, with two key features: firstly, it was dominated by 
individual independent capital and small production, and secondly, personal work was 
combined  with  the  functions  of  management.  There  was  thus  a  weakness  in 
reproducing  individual  capital  without  an  intense  involvement  of  personal  or  family 
employment. This reality has led to theoretical formulations based on the generalization 
of tendencies which were not actually structural but corresponded to a specific period 
of relative growth. The most characteristic case is Tsoukalas' analysis on the “multi-
valence” of the social subject85. Tsoukalas' notion was based on the assumption that 
Greek society was becoming increasingly petty-bourgeois, while the actual tendency 
was the opposite (Moschonas 1986: 272; Lytras 1993: 87-8), as I will argue below.
The  above  reality  largely  resulted  from  the  specific  nature  of  the  country's 
development course, which favoured in a systematic way the development of the petty-
bourgeoisie, combined with certain political particularities. This process had a twofold 
target:  firstly,  the  facilitation  of  the  extraction  of  profit  via  a  specific  accumulation 
model86; and secondly, the legitimation of bourgeois political dominance in the rather 
tumultuous post-war political scene (Moschonas 2004: 138; Moschonas 1986: 19, 31; 
Tsoukalas 1987: 31-2).  This is why the arrangements promoted by the Greek state 
offered the petty-bourgeoisie the material means for its productive and reproductive 
activities. These means came mainly from the domestic surplus and the surplus arising 
85 There is no room here for an analytical overview of Tsoukalas' thesis. Suffice to say that in his view, 
class position is no longer identifiable and stable (Tsoukalas 1987: 147-149), and the identification and 
allocation  of  the  agents  into  class  positions  is  structurally  hampered  (Ibid.:  150).  The  theoretical 
background for this claim goes as follows: exploitation is tempered, coercion into labour is less and 
more indirectly economic, economic operators are de-individualized and forms of family solidarity are 
developing (Ibid.: 158-62), the role of labour loses both its centrality and its uniqueness (Ibid.: 179), the 
time and the energy of the workers are liberated (Ibid.: 184-85), together with phenomena involving a 
deliberate choice to escape from wage labour (Ibid.: 244). Here, the labour position is not examined as 
a position and a role in the organization of production, but as its result, as an income simply added on 
to other incomes. Thus, class position is defined not based on the position in production, but based on 
the position in the distribution of wealth (Lytras 1993: 102-03).
86 In the last instance, the process of reinforcing petty-bourgeoisie aimed at facilitating the process of 
extracting social surplus and increasing capital accumulation.
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from  invisible  receipts  and  remittances  from  abroad  (Moschonas  2004:  138).  The 
increase of the layers working in small commodity production was a direct result of the 
capitalist division of labour and produced a situation where their economic and political 
autonomy was restricted. Their role remained basically complementary to that of big 
capital,  and  was  accompanied  by  certain  ideological  and  political  contradictions 
(creating both commonalities and divisions among them) (Moschonas 1986: 267). This 
constituted an anomalous  form of  exploitation,  since  the economic  status  of  these 
strata was constantly under attack while at the same time the need for them to increase 
both their  capital  and their  personal/family work was steadily growing (Lytras 1993: 
248). It should be underlined at this point that the growth of such strata is not mainly 
due  to  political  terms,  but  to  economic  factors:  the  development  of  services,  the 
changes  in  the  productive  structure,  the  development  of  mechanisms  of  social 
reproduction in education,  health etc.  Being an indication of capitalist  development, 
these tendencies do not refer  solely to Greece. The political  context in the country 
reinforced them.
To fully comprehend the complexity of these tendencies, the specific nature of the 
Greek model of capital accumulation needs to be borne in mind, as examined in the 
previous chapter. Specifically, high rates of  capital  accumulation went  together with 
capital-intensive  investments,  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  production  of  means  of 
production grew slowly. Major markets became dominated by monopolies or cartels, 
due to the competition and the internationalization, which, however, left gaps and niche 
markets providing opportunities for small businesses. These gaps emerged, partly from 
certain sectors proving unprofitable for monopolies, and partly from the intensification 
of labour exploitation (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 165). In all this, the role of 
the state remained central. It supported the petty-bourgeois strata in the post-civil war 
environment  by  providing  community  aid,  banking  credit,  and  customs,  tax  and 
financial protection. It also undertook major productive initiatives, participated in fixed 
capital  investment  through  public  investments,  and  intervened  economically  and 
institutionally in the economy (eg. in manufacturing and construction sectors) (Lytras 
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1993: 171-3). The state had actually contributed to facilitating and protecting intrinsic 
accumulation.  All  these interventions  have functioned as  “indirect  and controversial 
mechanisms of social assurance” (Ibid: 175).
These interventions underlined the engagement of the state in the economy, which 
however  did  not  extend  into  the  social  sphere.  Contrary  to  what  is  suggested  by 
simplistic  approaches,  welfare  state  structures  have  never  actually  developed  in 
Greece. In Southern Europe (with Greece and Portugal leading), a similar pattern in the 
path to prosperity emerged, “characterized by a delayed development of a social state, 
and limited universality of benefits combined with big gaps in social protection, in which 
traditional  networks  of  family  and friends remained essential.  This  model  was also 
characterized by the fragmentation and the significant polarization of the social security 
system, as it existed, combined with the important role of clientelism in the distribution 
of  resources and the provision of  social  protection”  (Papatheodorou and Dafermos 
2010: 13; see also Dafermos and Papatheodorou 2010: 40). Employment in the public 
sector  was often seen as  the only  safe  route to  job  security  and enhanced social 
status. Thus, resorting to political favours and clientelism has been not only a means of 
forming social alliances, but also an indirect mechanism for garnering the mass support 
needed  for  the  emergence  of  dominant  political  parties  (Alexatos  1997:  83; 
Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004a: 73; Lytras 1993: 194-95).
At this point, certain facts relating to employment in the public sector need to be 
clarified. Tsoukalas claims that, due to secure employment, work in this sector induces 
a process of de-proletarianization, which suggests that exploitation ceases to exist and 
that  class  differences  among workers  are  abolished,  based  on the  idea  of  secure 
employment  (1987:  119-26,  253).  I  would claim that,  on the contrary, civil  servants 
constitute a cross-class group, with its most significant part belonging to the working 
class. The majority of workers in public enterprises (manufacturing, energy and water 
supply,  communications,  transport)  are  exploited:  they  exchange  their  labour  with 
capital  and are paid less than the value of  the work they provide (Sakellaropoulos 
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2014b:  6-7)87.  Workers  in  education  and  the  administrative  staff  of  diverse 
organizations and ministries also belong to the working class, since they are exploited, 
do not  possess any means of  production and perform functions of  collective work. 
Furthermore, their income, determined by state income policies in correlation to those 
of the private sector, does not exceed the level necessary for the reproduction of their 
workforce (Ibid.: 7). Many civil servants are temporary, part-time workers or face the 
prospect  of  being  arbitrarily  transferred.  This  tendency  has  become  increasingly 
general as governmental measures in the face of the crisis include the dismantling of 
the foundations of public sector employment as constituted until  recently, and more 
specifically, the abolition of job security.
The pattern of the class structure described above is imprinted on all sectors of 
Greek economy. The construction sector has seen a massive development linked to a 
certain reluctance to invest in manufacturing. The construction industry is fueled by the 
housing  demand  of  a  rapidly  expanding  urban  population  and  underpinned  by  an 
entrenched tradition of parents providing housing for their children. This pattern is not 
only motivated by practical need, but also by the idea of the access to “property” as a 
safe  investment  in  an  economic  landscape  increasingly  dominated  by  risk  and 
uncertainty  (Moschonas 1986:  52-3;  Lytras  1993:  163).  Of  course,  the  overarching 
reason for investments being channeled towards the construction sector lies in the high 
rates of profit for investors (Mavris 1984: 11-2). The sector has been a dominant factor 
in the post-war Greek economy, although both the building industry and the property 
market have been characterized by low levels of capital investment. A network of small 
capital  and  artisanship  has  thus  been  able  to  develop.  Small  home  ownership 
flourished due to the fragmentation in land ownership and the absence of a strong 
bourgeois  fraction  of  landowners88.  Therefore,  small  scale  ownership  expanded, 
consolidating an alliance between the dominant class and the petty-bourgeois class as 
a  whole.  This  process  has  had  certain  ideological  consequences  (prospects  for 
87 Mavris, in a relevant argument suggests the term “half-proletarians” (1984: 6). 
88 Fragmentation in land ownership has allowed small owners to participate in the appropriation of social 
surplus in the form of rent.
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climbing the social  ladder, acquisition of private housing being a symbol of  upward 
social mobility, an underlying conservatism) (Ibid.: 12-4; Charalampis 1985: 88). Small 
ownership  in  real  estate  was  one  of  the  three  models  that  pervaded  the  entire 
heterogeneous, traditional petty-bourgeois strata in Greece, the other two being small 
production  and  self-employment  (Lytras  1993:  214).  The  imperative  for  home 
ownership has been,  for  most  people,  a guarantee of  social  stability, but  also their 
response to the necessity of covering housing needs in a stable way in an environment 
of high rents and employment instability. Small property could guarantee survival, in a 
context of a precarious labour market and reduced income or in the face of the threat of 
impoverishment of a broad swathe of the workforce (Lytras 1993: 247). 
Two more features of the Greek social formation must be borne in mind: (1) the 
historical role of the mechanisms of social reproduction, especially education and its 
fetishization, as one of the fundamental means of upward social mobility and economic 
security in a landscape of intense, competitive inequality lacking any “safety net” of 
welfare and social benefits (as examined in chapter II); and (2) the specific weight of 
immigrants in the Greek social formation and particularly in the division of labour89. As 
for the second factor, immigrant workers are rarely taken into account when studying 
the Greek labour market, although they have become agents of a transformation that 
strongly affects the composition and the structure of the Greek society. In 2005, before 
the last mass waves of migration into Greece, registered immigrant workers constituted 
9.6% of the entire active population workforce (Rombolis 2005: 35). According to the 
same study, 37% of them worked as unskilled, manual workers, 27% as craftsmen, 
4.4% as operators in the means of transport, 10.4% in services and sales (including 
work in street markets), 7% as farmers and 13.7% in other or undeclared occupations. 
In terms of sectors of economic activity, 25% worked in the construction industry, 18% 
in the primary sector, 12% in the industry, 11% in private households, 8% in sales and 
89 Immigrant labour is characterized by poor working conditions and pay far below the average, due to 
intimidation and fear of expulsion, low levels of trade-unionism, and the refusal of the host country to 
undertake  the  indirect  costs  of  reproduction  of  the  workforce.  Immigrants  have  been  massively 
exploited and treated as guinea pigs for experiments in decreasing levels of pay and employment 
rights for the entire working class, forced at the same time to work under terms that would have been 
totally unacceptable to the indigenous working class.
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8% in hotels and restaurants (Ibid.: 36). Thus, the vast majority of them have to be 
included in any assessment of the working class (respective findings may be found in a 
slightly subsequent research of INE-GSEE, Bagkavos 2008: 36-9 and in Kontis et al 
2006: 41).
c. The class structure and its transformations.
After having examined the main aspects of the class structure in the Greek social 
formation, I shall now analyze the transformations it underwent in the period preceding 
the crisis and its current characteristics. This analysis will lead to an account of the 
class structure during the period of the emergence of the movements which will  be 
studied  in  the  forthcoming  chapters.  The  consolidation  of  neoliberalism,  the 
modernization project and the processes of capitalist restructuring after the end of the 
1980s' reshaped the previous configuration and consolidated counteracting tendencies 
to the ones hitherto discussed. The main thrust of the capital-lead strategies which 
transformed the class structure lies in five tendencies: (1) the consolidation of austerity 
politics; (2) the expansion of forms of flexible employment; (3) the broadening of social 
inequalities;  (4)  the  destruction  of  the  productive  fabric;  and  (5)  the  growth  of 
unemployment (Sakellaropoulos 2014b: 14). Their result has been the intensification of 
downwards  social  mobility  and  the  exacerbation  of  class  struggle.  Petty-bourgeois 
strata have shrunk and the proportion of wage labour increased. Sakellaropoulos, in 
studying the 1981 -1991 period, has highlighted the transformation of the Greek society 
from a “traditional” one to “a society in transition”. This change consisted of a significant 
decrease in the poor rural strata, an increase both in sections of the petty-bourgeois 
class and in the working class, and a significant reduction of farmers (Sakellaropoulos 
2014a: 290). In the period that followed, capital expanded into areas and sectors which 
had not previously been the primary terrains of exploitation, or into services which were 
previously provided by the state in a non-commodified form. This whole process led to 
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an expansion of  the working class.  Furthermore,  a process of  real,  and not  simply 
formal, subordination of labour to capital took place, leading to the proletarianization of 
the  strata  which  had  formerly  kept  a  level  of  control  over  the  productive  process. 
Another important factor to be mentioned when estimating the size of the working class 
is the increase in the number of foreign workers, of workers on short term contracts90, 
and of unregistered family members working in family-owned businesses (Katsoridas 
2004: 159).
According to Moschonas (2004: 142), “the shifting logic of the class structure 
of Greek society is determined by the changing requirements and the dictates of the 
capital  accumulation  model”.  The  author  locates  three  main  factors  in  this 
transformation, especially in respect to the petty-bourgeois strata: The decisive one is 
the  dominant  position  of  capital.  Secondly,  the  state  withdrew  from  several  of  its 
traditional  functions  supporting  these  petty-bourgeois  strata  due  to  the  process  of 
market liberalization. Thirdly, there is a tendency towards rationalizing the productive 
process  in  the  small  property  and  small  production  sectors  in  order  to  increase 
competitiveness in the unified European market. This has brought about a polarization, 
both within petty-bourgeois strata, and in their relation to big capital  (Ibid.:  138-39). 
Entry into the EU and liberalization of the markets appear as crucial factors in those 
transformations (Moschonas 2004: 143; Lytras 2007: 55). The petty-bourgeois strata 
have turned towards cheap loans and the informal economy after the withdrawal of 
state  support  (Lytras  2007:  42-3);  while  the  share  of  wage  labour  has  increased, 
leading to an expansion of the working class (Ibid.: 52; Mavris 1984: 13). This tendency 
towards  the  proletarianization  of  petty-bourgeois  strata  has  had  two  potentially 
conflicting results: on the one hand these strata have tried to form an alliance with big 
capital  in  order  to  secure  their  future,  and  on  the  other  hand,  they  have  been 
radicalized against big capital in terms of political consciousness.
90 For the Labour Institute of GSEE, the total rise in rates of those registered as unemployed (there is 
such a rise during the 2000s') probably refers to false employment: it actually expresses an extension 
of  wage labour under the form of  short  term contracts (INE-GSEE 2012: 303),  entailing important 
advantages for employers and violations of fundamental rights for employees.
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These  tendencies  have  been  confirmed by  many  researchers.  Classic  Marxist 
analyses, although underestimating the historical constitution of petty-bourgeois strata 
in the Greek social formation and examining the class structure in a relatively static 
way, have shed some light  on these. Kappos (1987: 59-60) underlined the gradual 
increase of wage labour91. He noted that, despite the cross-class character of wage 
labourers,  such  statistics  provide  data  on  the  configuration  of  the  working  class 
(evolution over time, internal composition), though not on others (income and education 
level etc.). Fractions of the intellectual strata have also experienced proletarianization 
(including higher education graduates), in parallel with an expansion of the access to 
higher education for students of working class origin. Finally, the tendency for social 
knowledge to become a direct productive force developed (Kappos 1987: 152-53; KME 
2000:  101;  Kotzias  1979:  35-6,  163;  Papadopoulos  1987:  187-88).  The  Centre  for 
Marxist Studies has identified several factors contributing to the enlarged reproduction 
of the working class: changes in sectors of the economy, internal migration, the closure 
of small and medium size businesses in urban centres, the arrival of immigrants, the 
increase in the population etc (KME 2000: 120).
Researchers working from different theoretical starting points, have argued that the 
structure of  Greek society underwent a qualitative change;  with the petty-bourgeois 
strata  no  longer  constituting  its  dominant  element  (Lytras,  2007:  20).  The  policies 
dealing with the current crisis have rapidly exacerbated this shift by fully dismantling 
those elements of the previous implicit  social  contract  which provided certain basic 
guarantees  to  the  petty-bourgeois  strata.  The  memoranda  and  the  legislation  and 
regulations accompanying them, had a direct impact on the property rights and the 
economic activities of the petty-bourgeoisie92. Moreover, within the intensification of the 
concentration and centralization of capital, self-employment in small businesses has 
plunged and small retail outlets have struggled to survive. A new configuration has thus 
91 The numbers  go  as  follows:  1928:  28.6%,  1952:  36.9%,  1981:  48.8%.  Comparative  dynamics  in 
relation to other developed countries is of course important. Thus, in 1981 in Portugal the rate of wage 
labourers in comparison to the EAP is 67.1%. in Spain 69.8%, in Italy 71.3%, in France 83.1%, in  
Germany 85.3%, in the USA 90.6%, in Great Britain 91.1% and in Sweden 92.1% (Moschonas 1986: 
55).
92 Indicatively, such are the tax measures (“hikes”) which render small property finally unprofitable, in 
parallel with a weakness in disposing of properties to be rented or exploited because of the crisis.
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emerged in the class structure of the Greek society. In his study of the transformations 
of  the  social  structure  over  the  last  three  decades  Sakellaropoulos,  reached  the 
following conclusions concerning the situation in 2014 compared to the respective ones 
of 1981 (2014a: 316-20): (1) an increase of the bourgeois class to 2.8% (from 1.8%), 
as well as of the affluent rural strata (0.6% from 0.3%), due to the long pre-2008 period 
of  economic  growth  (accompanied  by  a  process  of  internationalization  and 
concentration of capital, especially in agricultural production), and to de-ruralization; (2) 
a  huge shrinkage in  the weight  of  the traditional  petty-bourgeois  class  (6.9% from 
16%), as well as reduction of the middle rural strata (1.3% from 3.3%), due to the 
intensification  of  the  same  processes  of  concentration  and  centralization;  (3)  an 
important increase of the new petty-bourgeois class (25.3% from 9.8%), due to the 
increasing demand for their abilities in achieving returns on capital and extending its 
scope. This tendency is however accompanied by efforts by the capital to subsume 
these  strata  into  more  direct  capital  exploitation  and  domination;  (4)  an  important 
increase  of  the  working  class  (55.3%  from  43.2%),  as  a  consequence  of  the 
centralization of the economy, of rural migration, and of the effects of the crisis; and (5) 
a decrease of the poor rural strata (7.1% from 21.9%), mainly due to the rural exodus. 
These figures suggest a clear tendency towards class polarization, a tendency which 
has intensified during the crisis and leads potentially to a social structure which would 
converge with other advanced European countries.  Indicatively, wage labour in 2011 
was estimated to have grown to 64% (Kouzis 2011a: 165) (from 48.8% in 1981). 
This tendency towards class polarization is re-enforced by the rise of inequality 
and poverty. According to the findings of Tsoulfidis, the ratio of the disposable income 
of the top 10% of the population in comparison to the lowest 10% has increased, from 
10.7 times higher in 2007 to 12.6 times higher in 2012. The number of the very rich 
people in Greece has risen considerably, since 505 persons in 2013 owned personal 
property the value of which is estimated above 30 million dollars (over 455 persons in 
2012 and 445 persons in 2010). In 2013, the value of this property increased by 20% 
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since 2012 and represents 24% of  GDP93 (Tsoulfidis  2014:  19).  Other indicators of 
inequality confirm this polarization. As shown in chapter II, inequality and poverty have 
always been particularly high in Greece. In 2010, Greece ranked second in the EU 
inequality indexes (Gini index: 33.9, in Papatheodorou and Dafermos 2010: 15). Other 
social transfers (excluding pensions)94 have been very low, contributing much less than 
in any other country in the EU27 (65.9%) to lowering inequalities and poverty95 (Ibid.: 
23).  According to several  studies,  none of  the  basic  population  characteristics  can 
satisfactorily explain the levels of inequality: thus the main reason is low incomes (Ibid.: 
25). Poverty indexes are just as high. In 2007, Greece had the highest poverty rate in 
the EU15 (20.1%, of which 14% was long-term poverty and the poverty gap was at 
24.7), excluding immigrants (Ibid.: 29). Simultaneously, the satisfaction of basic needs 
becomes increasingly problematic: in 2011, 29% could not easily pay their utility bills 
and  18.6%  could  not  ensure  heating  in  their  house,  whilst  the  index  of  material 
deprivation (weakness of satisfaction of at least three basic needs) was at 28.4% (INE-
GSEE n.d.). Just in 2010, 940,000 power cut off orders for unpaid bills were issued 
(whilst power prices were 40% higher for domestic consumption and 8.5% lower for 
large  companies)  (Mpogiopoulos  2011:  318).  Inequalities  affecting  specific  social 
groups, involving gender, regional, racial and other inequalities also rose dramatically, 
inducing  rates  of  social  marginalization  (Antonopoulou  et  al.  2011:  12).  The  social 
categories affected mostly by the crisis were the women, the youth and immigrants. At 
the same time no measures to counteract discrimination were passed (Kouzis et al. 
2012: 47-8), such measures being considered as a “luxury” in times of crisis.
The IMF is famous for advocating policies of austerity leading to the increase of 
income inequalities, the reduction of the share of labour in income distribution, the rise 
in  unemployment,  the  expansion of  informal  labour  and  the rise  of  poverty. These 
93 The tendency afterwards kept increasing: in 2014, the number of billionaires rose from 9 to 11 and their 
wealth from 16 to 18 billion dollars. Data coming from tax controls report that 850 persons have bank 
accounts above 100 million euros each, meaning that the total amount is above 85 billion euros, more 
than half of the country's GDP (Tsoulfidis 2014: 19).
94 Other social transfers include any sort of allowances provided by the state based on certain social 
criteria and constitute an index of social protection.
95 Pensions are the only ones having such a relative contribution,  but  policies during the crisis have 
resulted to a drastic decrease in the size of pensions.
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policies  primarily  affect  low  and  middle  income  families  and  are  accompanied  by 
negative social effects in the countries implementing them (Michopoulou 2012: 33-7). 
In  Greece,  those  policies  have  led  to  what  can  be  called  a  humanitarian  crisis 
(Papakonstantinou  2013:  12).  They  have  induced  a  sharp  rearrangement  of  the 
relationship between Greek capitalism and the social structure, and have, in practical 
terms, led to a direct assault on established rights gained during the previous decades 
and on collective organization.
A picture of the transformation in the Greek economy and society during the crisis 
reveals that just in 2011, real incomes fell by 25.3% (INE-GSEE 2012: 15), whilst real 
wages fell in 2010-2011 by 13.2% in comparison to 2009. The rate of real wages in 
relation to the EU15 average fell to 68.5%, returning to the 1993 levels (Ibid.: 22). The 
purchasing power fell in 2010-2011 by 22.8% (Ibid.: 21). In 2011, Greece outpaced any 
other EU country in the reduction of the labour cost and workers' earnings in the public 
and the private sector96. The disparity between the purchasing power of wage labourers 
and  labour  productivity  widened  dramatically  (Ibid.:  22).  Pensions  were  severely 
reduced, by 25-50% (Kouzis et al. 2012: 184). In 2009-2011, private consumption was 
reduced by 18.8%, whilst  in 2010-2011 public  consumption was reduced by 16.9% 
(INE-GSEE  2012:  21-2).  This  landscape  signaled  an  effort  to  realign  the  Greek 
economy to lower levels of production, investment and living standards (Ibid.: 110). The 
public sector was severely affected by limitations on recruitment, reduction in income 
and allowances, changes in the nature of employment, the facilitation of redundancies 
and more generally by an imposed convergence with the private sector (Kouzis et al. 
2012: 184). Unemployment ballooned, reaching 24% in 2012 (INE-GSEE 2012: 334), 
with  female  unemployment  much  greater  than  male  reaching  26.5%  in  the  first 
trimester of 2012 (Ibid.: 308). Youth unemployment reached 52.8% (Ibid.: 307), while 
long-term unemployment more than doubled (715,000 in absolute numbers in 2012 in 
comparison to 283,000 in 2010) (INE-GSEE n.d.)97. At the same time, unemployment 
96 Reduction of hourly labour cost per 6.8% (eurozone: +2.6% and EU27: +2.7%). Reduction of workers' 
incomes cost per 6.2% (eurozone +2.3% and EU27 +2.6%) (Georgiadou et al. 2012: 98).
97 According to Kouzis' data, long-term unemployment in 2011 formed the majority, while two thirds of the 
unemployed were not registered in OAED, because of the lack of benefits and of trust in its efficiency 
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benefits are very low, both in terms of their amount and their duration (INE-GSEE 2012: 
334).  Thus,  despite  the  important  fall  of  nominal  wages  and  labour  costs,  neither 
unemployment nor prices correspondingly declined (Ibid.: 24). Finally, a significant part 
of the workforce, especially the skilled and educated layers, emigrated in order to find 
jobs abroad (Ibid.: 335; Kouzis et al. 2012: 23).
The implementation of the memoranda also led to the abolition of the institutions of 
collective bargaining, accelerating the rise of inequalities and class polarization. After 
the implementation of the second memorandum, Greece is the only EU country to have 
seen a nominal reduction of the minimum wage by 22%, (32% for young people below 
the age of 25) (INE-GSEE 2012: 221). Multiple legislative interventions have aimed at 
decentralizing  collective  bargaining,  to  reduce  the  labour  cost  and  institute  the 
individualization of wages. Laws directly reducing the labour cost were imposed in the 
private  sector  (Kapsalis  and  Triantafyllou  2012:  10).  At  the  level  of  collective 
agreements, the principle of the most favourable setting was abolished98, employers 
were allowed to evade complying with the NGGA defining a national minimum wage, 
individual agreements were imposed (especially for the youth: up to 80% of the normal 
wage) and arbitration was restricted (Kouzis et al. 2012: 190). The average working 
week has been increased from 37.5 to 40 hours (contrary to the well-known clichés on 
the “lazy Greeks”), while employers were given the ability to require overtime above the 
legal working week (Ibid: 46-7, 51). Flexible forms of employment rose dramatically, 
consisting  mainly  in  part-time  and  job  rotation,  both  by  the  introduction  of  new 
agreements  and  by  altering  existing  ones99.  Further,  the  majority  of  part-time  job 
agreements  are non-voluntary (62% in  2012 in  comparison to  50% in  2010)  (INE-
GSEE n.d.). The share of those informally employed has increased (28.6% of GDP), 
(2011a: 166).
98 This  principle  defined  that  if  two  contradictory  settings  were  valid  for  the  same worker, the  most 
favourable for her would be applied.
99 The number of agreements in flexible forms of employment rose by 5.81% in 2011 in comparison to 
2009 (and by 22% in 2010 in comparison to 2009).  The greater change refers to contracts in full  
employment altered to part-time or job rotation (from 4,839 in 2009 to 26,542 in 2011, an increase of 
448%) (INE-GSEE 2012: 363-64). In 2011, agreements in flexible forms dominated in new recruitments 
for the first time. In the first nine months of 2011, the total rate of full employment agreements was 59% 
(79% in 2009), the rate of part-time agreements was 32.5% (17% in 2009) and that of job rotation was 
8.5% (4% in 2009) (Georgiadou et al. 2012: 143).
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and so have informal labour and the underground economy (Antonopoulou et al. 2011: 
37-8). Finally, cases of arbitrary practices by employers and of labour rights violation 
are proliferating,  with the share  of  jobs deprived of  social  insurance reaching 27% 
(Kouzis  et  al.  2012:  22,  199).  The  influence  of  trade-unionism  was  persistently 
attacked,  whilst  the  substantive  abolition  of  collective  agreements  has  effectively 
deprived unions of much of their power. The re-configuration of the social structure has 
been further influenced by increases in taxation (and particularly, in indirect taxation 
which intensify inequalities), by the reduction of the GDP100 and by the overall social 
and economic deterioration accompanying the recession (Michopoulou 2012).
d. Specific features of the working class.
As analyzed above,  the weight  of  the working class  has increased in  Greece, 
however still lagging behind the levels of the rest of Europe. But size alone is not the 
only important characteristic of the working class: it is necessary to look beyond size 
and study the forms and the structures of  its organization.  Broader changes in the 
productive  process  (including  automatization,  post-fordism  etc.)  influenced  the 
composition of the working class itself (Katsoridas 1994: 1), and increased its level of 
exploitation101 (KME 2000: 79-80). The expansion of the working class and the specific 
nature of  the Greek social  structure have both contributed to its fragmentation and 
heterogeneity.  Of  course,  the  working  class  has  never  been  fully  homogeneous 
anywhere; however, in Greece the level of this heterogeneity is particularly significant. 
The  factors  mainly  contributing  in  this  are:  (1)  the  serious  dispersion  in  terms  of 
consistency (due to small productive units, the diffusion of the productive process in 
space, the relocation of productive activities in areas with no trade-union traditions, the 
decay of industrial areas with militant and combative traditions etc.); (2) the intense 
100 GDP fell by 16.7% in 2009-2011 in relation to 2007 (INE-GSEE 2012: 20), thus GDP per capita was at 
82% of the average in the EU (Ibid.: 21).
101 Related to an increase in the extraction of surplus-value, the intensification of labour, and the extension 
of the working day.
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xenophobic and racist behaviour towards immigrants; and (3) the general deployment 
of a numerous and cheap workforce, contributing to the squeeze on labour costs and 
the increase in profitability of particular sectors of the Greek economy (Sakellaropoulos 
and  Sotiris  2004a:  124-25).  The  strategies  followed  by  capital  have  aimed  at  the 
dissolution of the large concentrations of the working class, mainly through flexibility in 
the setting up of the productive units (Moschonas 2005: 291-92). The persistence of 
small and middle-size enterprises has intensified the fragmentation and dispersal of the 
working class (Katsoridas 1994: 4).
Changes in  labour relations have substantially influenced the structure and the 
organization of  the work force,  as well  as the form of  its exploitation.  As Stratoulis 
emphasizes, “The substance of capitalist exploitation remains unchanged. The ways, 
however; the methods and forms of exploitation are not stable. They are constantly 
readjusted and their change is the result of the development of the production forces 
and of class struggle; the scientific and technical revolution; the exacerbation of the 
fundamental  contradiction  of  capitalism;  and  its  general  crisis”  (Stratoulis  1987:  9). 
Labour  flexibility  has  been  of  great  importance  in  this  process.  The  expansion  of 
flexible labour relations resulted in weakening the collective identity of workers and, 
ultimately, in the dissolution of their collective organization (Karakioulafi 2005: 192). In 
addition, workers under flexible labour relations have to face the constant stress of 
surviving in parallel to competition with each other for the renewal of their contracts or 
alternatively finding a new job. This reality, combined with the fluctuating working hours 
and  low  wages,  overwhelms  workers,  acting  upon  their  alienation  from  ideas  of 
collective organization.
The unprecedented rise in  unemployment,  which tends to become a structural 
feature, should also be taken into account when studying the forms of organization of 
labour and the difficulties they have to face. This phenomenon has exacerbated during 
the  crisis,  as  already  shown.  According  to  Fredric  Jameson,  “the  phenomenon  of 
unemployment today is a different and far more ominous symptom of systemic crisis 
than in previous depressions” and “the structural unemployment in Marx's conception 
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of the 'reserve army of capitalism,' once a secondary feature of this system, moves to 
the very forefront of its analysis today.”102 (Jameson 2011: 148). As Toscano (Toscano 
2012) underlines, “The incapacity to politicize unemployment outside of a weak and 
ambiguous demand for the right to work, job programmes and the retention of some of 
the benefit-structures of the welfare state is one of the salient features of the ongoing 
crisis.”
The consequences of rising unemployment are manifested in the breakdown in 
workers' organization, the rise of individualization and de-socialization and the difficulty 
in finding common references and countering union decline (Katsoridas 1994: 6). The 
absence of productive activity undermines the sense of identity and self-respect of the 
unemployed, in addition to the obvious material threat to their wellbeing, which is made 
worse by  their  lack  of  bargaining power  and their  difficulty  in  exercising organized 
social pressure103.  Unemployment is central  to the hurdles towards the formation of 
class consciousness, since the latter is articulated around the identity and not just the 
position of  a  working  class.  Thus,  proletarianization  straight  into  unemployment,  a 
phenomenon of frequent  occurrence,  has significant impact on the formation of  the 
subject's  consciousness. Moreover,  the  identity  of  the  unemployed  is  fluid,  often 
experienced as temporary and non-desirable. Their autonomous organization presents 
thus additional difficulties: the unemployed are inclined to repress their identity rather 
than using it as a reference for collective action and organization104. The psychological 
implications  and  effects  on  socialization  are  also  evident:  the  lack  of  a  social 
contribution  becomes  internalized  as  a  personal  problem,  whilst  unemployment  is 
102 It should be noted at this point that, for Marx, unemployment has never been a secondary feature of 
capitalism. On the contrary, it was a very central feature of the “capitalist population law”.
103 An abstract from an interview I conducted during my fieldwork is indicative at this point: (I1) speaks in 
favour of political participation claiming that “If I can participate, I will, because I want to, because it  
helps a collective cause, and, eh, it changes you, it makes you feel differently... in this whole situation,  
in which we all  feel  useless because we can do nothing...  because I  am unemployed and...  they  
exercise a psychological violence to you, and they... they want to destroy you. I feel like they want to  
make you feel like nobody, that you do not even need to speak, they know what to do, they will do it for  
you, they just want you to follow them. No! When I chose to be on the other side, I felt at last useful,  
and we are all useful, and we all have something to contribute, and something to give, if we participate  
in this whole thing”.
104 Intensification of  the long-term unemployment  has somehow transformed these feelings,  since the 
unemployed are less keen to blame exclusively themselves, and this identity is often experienced as 
less temporary. However, personal belief of being somehow able to overcome this situation, usually 
dominates over acceptance of the deadlock and action against it, at least at the level of consciousness.
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institutionalized  as  a  “natural  condition  of  existence”.  Structural  and  long-term 
unemployment tend to marginalize and impoverish a large segment of the population, 
resulting in the reduction of the size of workforce, while putting downward pressure on 
employment  rights  at  every level  of  workers actively  involved in  employment  (KME 
2000: 279). 
In  addition,  many  of  the  self-employed  are  actually  part  of  the  relative 
overpopulation, with incomes lower than those of unskilled workers, and an inability to 
obtain jobs as wage labourers (Papadopoulos 1987: 153; Kappos 1987: 119).  Finally, 
the weakness of the efforts to organize and mobilize immigrant workers for collective 
action must be recognized. As mentioned above, the jobs available to most immigrants 
are characterized by deplorable conditions, clearly violating fundamental labour rights. 
In  these fractions of  the working population,  pauperization,  the fear  of  deportation, 
intimidation,  and a weak bargaining position and lack of  trade-union representation 
prevail. Immigrants develop strong tendencies towards subordination to the dominant 
strategies, and are essentially excluded from collective processes and structures.
Thus,  to  sum up,  the working class as a whole in  Greece is  characterized by 
important  internal  differentiations,  related  to:  (1)  the  degree  of  accumulation  and 
working conditions per sector; (2) the degree of specialization; (3) education level; (4) 
social origin; (5) exclusive in one sector or not employment; (6) wage levels; and (7) 
way of life (Mavris 1983: 10; Katsoridas 2004: 148). Such a degree of differentiation 
compromises  the  potential  for  collective  action  and  the  viability  of  the  forms  of 
organization  of  the  social  (Katsoridas  2004:  148).  These  differences  have  had  an 
inevitable impact upon the levels of class consciousness of the different segments of 
the working class. Besides, class relations are not always evident, even among the 
mobilized  sectors,  mainly  due  to  the  lack  of  a  linear  continuity  between  social 
movements  and  their  political  expression.  Individualization  prevents  workers  from 
acquiring the consciousness of their  common class position.  In addition to the pre-
existing factors of heterogeneity, those newly proletarianized strata of petty-bourgeois 
origins have a type of consciousness different from the traditional working class. 
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These  multiple  differences  in  the  forms  of  consciousness  and  the  frames  of 
reference extend beyond the proletarianized petty-bourgeois  strata and encompass 
those still connected to small property. According to Kouzis (2007: 52), the relationship 
of a portion of wage labourers to small property and self-employment, either materially 
or  as  a  legacy  from  the  previous  generation,  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  the 
formation of their consciousness as wage earners. It has also contributed to efforts to 
maintain the links with small property ownership, which brings in some residual income 
(labour in the primary sector, rents from land or home ownership exploitation of real 
estate)105. In the present context of crisis, the weight of such factors declines and this 
aspect acquires  an  ideological rather  than  a  material role. Similar phenomena affect 
the proletarianized strata of intellectual labour, who still hold high level degrees and a 
potential for upwards class mobility out of the reach of the average worker (Kotzias 
1979: 36). This prospect impacts on their consciousness, in relation to their entry into 
the productive process and their difficulty  in building links with the rest of the labour 
movement. Such differentiations in consciousness are also apparent in proletarianized 
workers with origins related to rural or craft employment (Sarlis 1987: 25). To conclude 
on  this  point,  according  to  Kouzis,  “contemporary  wage  labourer  has  lost  the 
homogeneity  of  the  past  with  respect  to  the  composition  of  wage  labour”,  while 
“artificial  distinctions  appear  more  and  more  within  wage  labour,  limiting bonds  of 
solidarity among employees” (Kouzis 2011a: 188-89).
However, countering to a certain extent  this image, a certain consciousness of 
common interests among workers also seems to be emerging. In a related research 
conducted by Kouzis (2011a: 186-88), 85% of workers working in the same company 
thought of their interests as being common, 69% thought the same when asked about 
the distinction between young and old workers (though 25% thought the contrary), 62% 
claimed common interests between Greeks and foreigners (34% for different ones), 
56% between skilled  and unskilled  (40% different),  42% for  workers  in  the private 
105 Besides, in Greece there has existed a historical tendency of belittlement and deliberate avoidance of 
wage labour and being identified as working-class, as compared to maintaining typical independence, 
basically related to self-employment. See also (Alexatos 1997: 84; Tsoukalas 1987: 244, 267-85).
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sector and those in the public one (55% different). As for workers in different positions 
in the hierarchy, 26% supported having common interests (68% different), and when 
the question referred specifically to the interests between employers and employees, 
only 10% thought of them as common (86% different). This contradictory reality brings 
us to the contradictory nature of the working class itself. This contradiction is inherent 
to the formation of a class which is, on the one hand, the one term of the capital-labour 
relationship, contributing both objectively and subjectively to its reproduction, and, on 
the  other  hand, a  force  that  is  external  and  antagonistic  to  this  very  relationship 
(Mpelantis  2014:  252).  This  duality  results  in  the contradictory tendencies,  towards 
emancipation and subordination, which are inherent to the working class, as well as in 
the contradictory forms of the social and political consciousness of the working class. 
These points will be further examined later.
e. Main features of the labour and trade-union movement in Greece.
The analysis  of  the characteristics of  the class  structure in  Greece,  and of  its 
transformations  during the crisis  was necessary  for  a  deeper  understanding of  the 
forms and features of the labour and the broader social movement in Greece. I will now 
focus on the main historical elements that influenced its development. Three of these 
have been of decisive importance. Firstly, the national trade-union confederation GSEE 
was founded belatedly, in 1918, reflecting an overall weak organization of the working 
class. The identification of the foundation of active trade-union organizations with their 
constitutional legitimization has reinforced their law-abiding nature. This has been to 
the  detriment  of  their  engagement  in  more radical  demands  and  forms  of  protest. 
Secondly, the specific features of the Greek social structure worked against open class 
confrontation and led to the very principle of class struggle itself being disputed. The 
recognition of the existence of this struggle was one of  the first  debates within the 
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GSEE, and the principle was finally included in its constitutive charter (Kouzis 2007: 
34).
Lastly, the various governments have been consistent in following a dual strategy 
vis-a-vis trade-unions: continuous efforts were made to subvert them politically and, by 
exerting political control, turn confederations and trade-unions into virtual arms of the 
state,  while  simultaneously  suppressing  class-oriented  forces  within  the  labour 
movement106 (Katsoridas  2008:  59;  91).  Koukoules  mentions  that  the  GSEE itself, 
during  the  inter-war  period,  was  “a  state apparatus  of  a  police  nature  aimed  at 
debilitating  the  union  movement” (Koukoules  1995:  15).  Especially  during  the 
dictatorship of Metaxas (1936-1940), trade-unionism was directly subordinated to the 
state (Kouzis 2007: 34). Eventually, the two national confederations of workers and civil 
servants GSEE and ADEDY enthusiastically welcomed the military dictatorship of 1967 
(History Front 2013), while state intervention in the trade-union movement continued 
after the fall of the military regime in 1974. The leadership of GSEE and ADEDY were 
actually  appointed  by  the  successive  governments  and  the  whole  period  saw the 
continuation of the dual strategy of control and repression. It was not until 1982 that,  
thanks to the law 1264/1982, democratic elections in the trade-union movement were 
at last safeguarded, which allowed the first democratic congress of the GSEE to be 
convened in 1983. However, in 1985 the PASOK government intervened anew in the 
constitution  of  the  Confederation’s  leadership,  deposing  its  elected  executive 
committee. 
This historical reality has had contradictory effects for the ruling class: on the one 
hand, it  has, in certain cases, succeeded in the persecution and suppression of the 
most radical segments of the labour movement. On the other hand, it has allowed the 
potential of greater radicalization, raising levels of political conflict in parallel with the 
enervation of the official trade-union institutions. The Left has actually followed a policy 
aimed at maintaining the unity of the trade-union movement, historically establishing its 
106 Classic  examples  are  the  “idionymon”  act  (a  special  legal  act  of  Venizelos  government  in  1929 
penalizing  all  standard  practices  of  the  trade-union  movement),  the  persecutions  of  the  Metaxas 
dictatorship in 1936-1941, the constant expulsions of militants from trade-unions etc.
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unified  expression107.  At  the  same  time,  at  certain  moments  in  history,  the  labour 
movement has moved beyond from the boundaries of traditional trade-unionism. Two 
cases  are  worth  mentioning:  (1)  in  1962-63,  a  coalition  of  workers'  organizations, 
named SEO-115, managed to rally 682 trade-unions expelled from the GSEE, and (2) 
during  the  Metapolitefsi,  a  factory-based  industrial  movement  appeared  at  the 
grassroots  level,  outside  the  framework  of  official  bodies,  and  adopted  radical 
demands, forms of protest and organization. More generally, as Alexatos emphasizes, 
the trade-union movement has at all stages of modern Greek history developed in a 
political context very different from the “normal” standards of Western parliamentary 
democracy (1997: 77).
The trade-union movement has been historically active in terms of industrial action: 
strikes and work stoppages have been frequent, despite anti-labour laws banning strike 
action  and  the  application  of  severely  repressive  measures  against  the  labour 
movement108 (Kappos 1987: 92). A combative spirit also developed, rooted in the strong 
links between the trade-union movement and left-wing political parties and the reaction 
to the interventionist and confrontational role of the state and the authoritarian tradition 
of employers (Kouzis 2007: 222-25). In the period between 1970-1980, strikes were on 
the rise,  linked to the wider political  effervescence of  the time. Strike mobilizations 
have,  however, had the character  of  symbolic  protests rather than actual  demands 
(Dedousopoulos 2007).  A large number of  such strikes,  combined with their  limited 
duration  is  indicative  of  this  symbolic  character. Nevertheless,  in  relation  to  other 
European countries, union militancy and assertiveness have indeed remained active; 
44% (38 out of 98) of all the general strikes across Europe between 1980 and 2008 
took place in Greece (Kelly and Hamann 2010). This figure, although impressive, is 
related both to the specific political situation in Greece and the concrete features of 
trade-union  movements,  as  described  below,  and  also  to  the  generally  less 
confrontational  nature  of  trade-union  movements  in  the  rest  of  Europe.  During the 
107 The single exception was the foundation of Unified GSEE in 1928-34 because of intense persecution of 
left-wing trade-unionists.
108 Such was a special unit  in the police,  known as “the trade-union force”,  a section of  the National 
Security forces responsible for covertly monitoring trade-unionists and trade-union processes.
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1980s', industrial conflict peaked in Greek history and Greece became “the European 
champion of strikes for the entire 1970-1993 period”: 43% of the days not worked in 
Europe are the result  of  the Greek strikes alone (Aligisakis  1997:  86).  This  reality, 
among  the  other  reasons  examined  in  this  chapter,  is  strongly  related  to  the  real 
material  and  institutional  gains  for  labour  in  Greece  in  Metapolitefsi  (including  the 
-incomplete-  creation  of  welfare  structures  and  the  passing  of  one  of  the  most 
favourable to trade-unions labour legislation in Europe).
The election victory of PASOK in 1981 had a major influence on the development 
of  the trade-union movement.  A fairly favourable legislative framework was passed, 
based on a model of bureaucratic co-management between trade-unions and the state 
which also involved employers.  This model worked effectively in times of economic 
growth. In this context, trade-unions were for the first time institutionally integrated into 
a form of negotiated social compromise. The environment created by this new reality 
partly explains both the mollification of the confrontational nature of the trade-union 
movement, and the ability of the two systemic political parties, PASOK and ND, to build 
an exceptional hegemony lasting for decades. This hegemony also meant that both 
these  parties,  but  primarily  PASOK,  developed  organic  links  with  the  trade-union 
movement.  This  was  a  major  innovation  in  social  and  professional  relations,  and 
brought  with  it  new  complexities,  i.e.  in  the  mixture  of  party-mediated  clientelism, 
bureaucratized bargaining and instances of controlled confrontation. 
During the 1990s', successive governments gradually retreated from the idea of 
integrating workers' demands. The combative character of the trade-union movement 
declined  gradually  due  to  a  combination  of  factors:  a  moderation  in  the  forms  of 
politicization,  an  increase  of  EU  influence,  the  creation  of  institutions  for  social 
partnership, the decline in union density, and the emergence of a corporatist tradition 
favouring consensus (Kouzis 2007: 228-36)109. Consensual attitudes on behalf of the 
trade-unions have not only failed to prevent the deterioration of the workers' position, 
109 Indicatively,  in  the  2008  INE-GSEE/VPRC  research,  63%  of  participants  claimed  that  the  most 
appropriate way of  treating labour issues was with “dialogue and negotiation”,  whilst only 24% put 
forward “mobilizations/demonstrations and strikes”;  in  2010 respective figures were  72% and 18% 
(INE-GSEE/VPRC 2008; INE-GSEE/VPRC 2010).
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but  actually  led  to  a  further  decline  in  trade-union  density,  strength  and  credibility 
(Seferiades 1999). Thus, during the 1990s' and particularly after 1994, the number of 
strikes  and  of  the  workers  participating  (Kouzis  2007:  238)  declined  significantly. 
However, up until the crisis, the above reality was never completely reversed. This is 
the  reason why the memoranda targeted,  and succeeded,  in  dismantling  all  these 
elements of social compromise between capital and labour that are associated with 
Metapolitefsi. But they did because these elements were still there, although many of 
their  aspects  had degenerated  into  forms  of  extreme bureaucratic  and  clientelist 
management of social relations. In other terms, to understand the break brought by the 
Memoranda  we need  to  clarify  that  contrary  to  what  happened  in  most  European 
countries, where the 1980s' were the period of triumphant neoliberalism, in Greece that 
was essentially  a period of  consolidation of  certain gains for  labour in  the broader 
context of the socio-political compromise of the Metapolitefsi. This reality, in its turn, is 
tied  to  the  lack  of  such  gains  in  the  previous  of  Metapolitefsi  years,  and  the 
consolidation of an authoritarian, broadly anti-popular state.
 As  for  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  traditional  trade-union  movement  in 
Greece, only a few studies have delved into them, the most important being by Kouzis 
(2007). The trade-union movement is structured in local or workplace-based branches, 
federations  and  confederations.  The  dominant  form of  rank-and-file  organization  is 
trade-unions organized mainly at a workplace, company or professional branch level. 
Union density has not been particularly high (17% in 2004, according to VPRC 2004110) 
and declines over the last fifteen years, due to a combination of external and internal 
factors111. The trade-union movement's organizational expression has been reasonably 
110 The degree of unionization is difficult to calculate; thus different estimates exist in the literature. In a 
VPRC research (VPRC 2004), the extent of unionization is estimated to be 21.1% for 2003 and 17% 
for 2004. Kouzis has estimated it at 28% for 2004 (2007: 57-8). GSEE and ADEDY conferences in 
2004 have announced a 22% unionization rate, based on financial contribution (Vernardakis, Mayreas 
and Patronis, 2007: 12). According to the OECD statistics, the unionization rate was 26.8% in 1999, 
and declined down to 21.3% in 2012 (OECD n.d.). In any case, in the entire 2000 years, trade-union 
density in Greece is higher than the OECD average. In Europe, the countries with higher rates are the 
Northern European ones, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Ireland and the UK. Thus the union density in Greece 
is higher than in France or Germany and than in all countries of Southern Europe, with the exception of 
Italy. The downward trend is general (OECD average falls from 20,8% in 1999 to 16,9% in 2013), but in 
Greece the decline seems to follow the average (from 26,8 to 21,3%), despite the recession shock, a 
fact that is interpreted as a remarkable sign of resilience.
111 External factors refer to high unemployment; decline in industrial employment; development of flexible 
forms of employment; increase in female employment; intensification of internationalization; retreat of 
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unified, but also differentiated and fragmented according to the employment status112 
(Kouzis 2007: 92, 105). Trade-unionism has also been severely polarized between the 
public  and  private  sector113,  whilst  the  predominance  of  small  enterprises114 has 
exacerbated the lack of representation of broad groups of the workforce. Furthermore, 
unions have not generally been economically and political independent, especially from 
the state (Kouzis 2007: 131, 175; Tsakiris 2012).
Another important feature of the trade-union movement in Greece is its partisan 
nature:  unions  are  heavily  influenced  by  and  inter-connected  to  political  parties115. 
Clientelism has permeated these relationships, whilst  there is a particular  lack of a 
proper  union culture (Kouzis  2007:  42-3  and 191-203;  Katsoridas  2008:  143).  This 
process translates into the frequent access of union cadres to political posts, and the 
enhanced role of union leaders in internal party conflicts and party leadership elections 
(Sokos 2011). Practically, in most cases, trade-union tactics and strategy are decided 
by  centres  of  political  power  external  to  trade-unions  and  then  returned  to  them 
(Tsakiris 2012). Political identity has dominated over workers' social position on their 
representation. This reality is not of course a strictly Greek phenomenon, as Tsakiris 
notes (2004: 233). Its intensity in Greece is related to the historical conditions of the 
emergence of trade-unions (and particularly to the effort of the state to marginalize the 
Left),  but also to the class structure of society. “Civil  society, a part  of  which is the 
trade-union movement, was exiguous, permeable by the strategy of parties and the 
collective identities and prevalence of liberal values; individualization, heterogeneity and geographical 
dispersion among workers; limited time available to workers (related to the high average total working 
time). Internal factors refer to inability to attract new members coming from new fields of employment; 
intensity of conflict within the trade-union movement; decrease of efficiency; lack of union presence in 
workplace (Kouzis 2007: 63-89; Palaiologos 2006: 214; Kapsalis 2012: 6).
112 In the trade-union structure, there are two national confederations, 253 federal organizations and more 
than 5000 local ones, 119 branch federations and 134 “labour centres” in different regions (Nikolaou 
2011). In the 33rd GSEE conference in 2007, 472,304 members were represented, from 74 federations 
and 83 labour centres, with 2,425 grassroots unions. In the 32nd ADEDY conference in 2004, 289,469 
members were represented, from 46 federations, with 1,260 grassroots unions (Kouzis 2007: 101-114).
113 The level of unionization is 18% in the private sector and 65% in the public and broader public sector. 
This is reflected in the composition of the leading bodies of the confederations: 122 out of the 130 
members of the executive bodies of both GSEE and ADEDY, are employed in the public sector and 
only 8 in the private one (Nikolaou 2012). This reality follows the quasi-universal pattern of the trade-
union movement since the 1970s in the world, and particularly in Europe.
114 More specifically, 97% of enterprises employing up to 20 employees (Katsoridas 2008: 143).
115 There are also unions in which the Left is the only active political force (the so-called “red unions”,  
mainly affiliated to the KKE).
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state,  unable  to  a  great  degree  to  build  its  own  self-managed  and  self-organized 
institutions and organizations” (Ibid.) 
These tendencies, along with weaknesses in the internal structure and functioning 
of trade-unions, affected their effectiveness and their relationships with workers. This 
is, in large part, due to bureaucratization, but is also related to the failure to develop 
democratic structures for participation and information. Indicatively, according to the 
2008 EKA/VPRC research, 52% of participants claimed to be informed about union 
processes  through  the  media,  and  only  22%  from  unions  themselves.  As  for 
bureaucratization, union bureaucracy has been a historical factor of labour movement, 
established  by  the  dominant  class  via  venality  and  the  conferring  of  privileges.  In 
addition, changes in the legal framework have become a deterrent and obstruction to 
the founding and proper functioning of unions116. This tendency is reinforced by the fact 
that union density is directly related to the size of the company (Vernardakis, Mayreas 
and Patronis 2007: 15), thus creating an environment hindering union organization in 
the majority of  workplaces in Greece. However, it  should be noted that,  before the 
current  crisis,  Greece  had  some  of  the  strictest  employment  protection  legislation 
amongst the OECD countries, including legislation relating to temporary employment, 
high employer social security contributions, implicit permanent job status for the vast 
majority  of  public  servants,  constraints  on  hiring  and  firing  policies,  and  national 
collective agreements signed by confederations and employer associations (Kretsos 
2011:  265). It  also  had  some of  the  most  pro-union  legislation,  with  relatively  few 
restrictions  on  strike  activity  and  institutions  such  as  arbitration  and  the  more 
favourable clause that played in favour or trade-unionism. This is why the slashing of 
that legislation was a crucial objective of the memoranda.
Furthermore, trade-unionism is evidently mostly developed in some of the social 
groups that have constituted its traditional strongholds (men, the elderly, workers on 
stable employment), but remained clearly more limited in others (the youth, women, 
116 In order for a workplace to become unionized, the founding statement must be signed by at least 21 
employees. In the Greek context, where most employment is provided by small businesses, this makes 
unionization very difficult, if not impossible, especially since one of the main features of wage labour is 
its wide dispersion in small businesses (see footnote 114).
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precarious workers, immigrants, the unemployed) (Kouzis 2007: 46, 85-7; Palaiologos 
2006:  158-66;  Vernardakis,  Mayreas  and  Patronis  2007:  12).  The  growth  in 
unemployment  has  exacerbated  this  problem  since  union  organization  and 
membership among the unemployed is  extremely low;  in  addition,  legal  restrictions 
apply to their participation (Palaiologos 2006: 167, 185). With regard to the age factor, 
as  Vernardakis,  Mayreas and Patronis  have aptly  noted,  the social  basis  of  trade-
unionism is in an “aging phase” (2007: 15). Finally, traditional trade-unionism in Greece 
has often been hostile to the development of mobilizing practices and to the escalation 
of  labour conflicts.  On several occasions, it  has even been hostile to the demands 
formulated by workers117. There is of course a reciprocity in this attitude, since labour 
protests have often turned against the trade-union confederations, accusing them of 
“political inertia, party conciliation and a consensus/compromise strategy towards the 
government and employers, when ruthless and aggressive attacks imposes a more 
radical orientation” (Kapsalis 2012: 21). This attitude of rejection of traditional trade-
unionism has been evident during the strike movement of 2010-2011.
As  a  result  of  all  the  above  tendencies,  trade-union  representation  seriously 
eroded in the years before the crisis. This is illustrated by the constant decline in union 
density, as well as in the declining level of trust for trade-unions among the general 
public.  According to the 2008 EKA/VPRC research for the Attica region, 52% of all 
workers stated that no union existed at their workplace, only 27% stated they were a 
member  of  any  union  (37%  in  1997)118,  whilst  unionization  rates  among  younger 
workers were even lower (7% in the age category 18 to 24) (EKA/VPRC 2008: 110). In 
certain social categories, the situation was even worse: only 5% of the unemployed 
and of immigrant workers maintained an organizational relationship with unions at their 
workplace (Vernardakis, Mayreas and Patronis 2007: 15). In private sector enterprises, 
117 The GSEE was the first institution to announce the foundation of a private (non-state) university when 
the movement in higher education, lead by students and staff was fighting against the revision of the 
Greek Constitution which  prohibited such a move.  Furthermore,  the GSEE itself  subcontracted  its 
cleaning  service  to  a  private  company  when  the  main  cleaners'  union  was  protesting  about  the 
practices of such companies in the sector. 
118 In the 2008 INE-GSEE/VPRC research, 35% of wage labourers in the public sector and 82% of those 
in the private sector stated not being members of any union. The figures for 2010 are 38% and 77% 
respectively (INE-GSEE/VPRC 2008; INE-GSEE/VPRC 2010).
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only 2% of the employees were covered by collective representation (Kapsalis 2012: 
6). Lack of union support imposes severe limitations on participation in forms of protest: 
Only 9% of the non-unionized claimed to have participated in strikes, whilst, in terms of 
union  effectiveness,  56%  of  the  participants  stated  their  feeling  that  unions  were 
ineffective (EKA/VPRC 2008: 123), and 57-60% indicated having a lack of confidence 
in them (EKA/VPRC 2008: 126).
Regarding  this  last  point  (public  perception  of  unionism),  several  researchers 
found  evidence  of  a  deep  mistrust.  In  the  2000  VPRC/GSEE  research  on  wage 
labourers, the relative majority (40%) of respondents were neither union members nor 
did they trust their way of functioning, although they did recognize the necessity of their 
existence  in  principle.  Only  8%  claimed  to  be  completely  hostile  towards  them, 
rejecting both the possibility of joining and their sheer necessity. 18% were dissatisfied, 
despite being union members, but without trusting or considering them as necessary, 
while 17% trusted unions without being members. Only 16% were both members and 
trusted unions. In the 2008 research, 44% of union members and 53% of the total 
participants put no trust in trade-unions in terms of solving their problems (in 2010, the 
respective  figures  were  65% and  77%)  (INE-GSEE/VPRC  2008;  INE-GSEE/VPRC 
2010)119.  In certain workplaces with high union density, this mistrust is also broadly 
identified120.  However, in  the EKA/VPRC 2008 research,  answering a more general 
question (“are unions necessary for workers?”), only 10% responded negatively, and 
82% recognized the need for their existence. It is therefore difficult to affirm that trade-
unionism has declined as such in the popular perception. Indeed, especially after the 
large  scale  and  successful  protests  against  the  restructuring  of  the  insurance  and 
pension  system  in  2001121,  the  previous  decline  in  the  frequency  of  strikes  was 
reversed (Katsoridas and Labousaki 2012:  87).  Those strikes,  up to the 2010-2011 
119 The problem is even larger in the youth: its participation in unions is 4% for those aged 18-24, 20% for 
those aged 25-34 and then growing for those above that age (Kouzis 2011a: 179).
120 In ELTA, 49.2% of the workers belonging to unions did not trust them, while in banks the respective 
percentage was 56% and in OTE was 68% (Vernardakis, Mayreas and Patronis 2007: 13).
121 In which hundreds of thousands protesters took part, and strike participation rates approached 100% in 
the public sector and 75% in the private sector in two one-day strikes, in April 26 and May 17, 2001.
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period and as a result of the special circumstances that prevailed in the 2000s', were 
mostly about defending existing rights and gains rather than demanding new ones.
f. Specific features in the emergence of social protest
The crisis in the trade-union movement in Greece is not merely a reflection of one 
(or more) moments of its history, but one of its constitutive elements, almost from its 
start.  As  mentioned,  the  development  of  the  Greek  labour  and  of  the  trade-union 
movement was confronted with two main difficulties. On the one hand, the Greek state 
has  basically  been  hostile  to  trade-unionism  and  to  collective  action,  striving  to 
denigrate, undermine and finally repress and eliminate it (with the particular exception 
of  the  1980s',  when  a  somehow  different  strategy  was  employed,  as  examined 
above)122.  While,  on the other  hand,  it  had to contend with a  number  of  structural 
difficulties related to the particularities of class structure, the fragmentation of workforce 
and the specific features of the trade-union movement itself.  The preponderance of 
small businesses and of high levels of mobility in employment has militated against 
participation  in  trade-unions,  whilst  simultaneously  hampering  secondary-level 
organization  as  well.  The  slow  development  of  wage  labour  has  had  a  negative 
influence on its organization, in parallel with the specifics of the distribution of workers 
across productive sectors and types of business. A significant indicator of the nature of 
the problems is the fact that more than 30% of wage labourers have only been tied to 
wage labour for only up to three generations, with evident consequences for workers' 
ideology and culture. As Lytras emphasizes, “trade-union movements in general, as a 
type of organization of class-demarcated social groups, bear all problems of their class 
identification,  as  developed  first  and  foremost  through  the  diversity  and/or 
fragmentation of their productive integration and organization” (1993: 222).
122 This is not generally the case in European parliamentary regimes. Very often, a subdued-bureaucratic 
form of trade-unionism is more effective as a form of control than any repressive policy, at least at a  
state level; the way employers deal with the trade-union issue is another matter. For the Greek case 
and  state  interventionism,  see  the  work  of  (Seferiades  1998;  Seferiades  2005;  Koukoules  1995; 
Vernardakis and Mavris 1986).
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Major changes in legislation and the hardening of the institutions of the state that 
has been accompanied by a lowering of the status accorded to unions, have damaged 
the ability of labour and unions to engage in an effective struggle for workers’ rights. 
This tendency, examined in detail in chapter II, was reinforced by the diffusion of the 
ideological concept, ruthlessly promoted over the last years, of “unproductive unions”, 
which have allegedly become irrelevant in the “post-industrial age” (Kouzis 2011b). This 
ideological  framework  has  presented  trade-unions  as  obsolete  and  redundant 
constructions from the past, lacking any real representativeness, as a force ostensibly 
antithetical  to  human  autonomy  (Palaiologos  2006:  249).  Changes  in  working 
conditions and relations, and especially the growth of flexible working patterns have 
further abetted the forces eroding the basis of unionization. The strategies deployed by 
the  employers  to  create  fragmentation  and  division  among  workers  at  both  the 
ideological and the social levels (turning social groups against each other, devaluing 
the idea of collectivity in workplaces etc.) also pushed strongly in the same direction. 
Decline of trade-union membership and the consequent undermining of the status of 
trade-unions in industrial relations has inevitably resulted in a significant increase in 
income inequality123. 
From a more dialectical  perspective,  these structural  difficulties and the related 
paradigm shift  are not  simply  an objective process but  also  a consequence of  the 
failure  of  trade-unions  to  represent  these  rapidly  expanding  layers.  According  to 
Castells, what emerges from the observation of the huge organizational changes of the 
last two decades of 20th century is not a new, “better”, mode of production, but a crisis 
in the old one (Castells 2000: 179). The same applies to the trade-union movement 
that  reacted  against  the  imposition  of  a  neoliberal  model.  Instead  of  employing 
organizers involved in social movements to extend trade-unionism into more socially 
oriented  movements  (campaigns,  direct  and  participatory  democracy  etc.),  union 
leaders have tried to “ride out” the crisis by adopting a scientifically documented but 
purely technocratic discourse in place of the more politicized one of the past (Soros 
123 Participation  in  trade-unions  is  an  important  factor  of  reducing  inequality  (Dafermos  and 
Papatheodorou 2010: 32, 40).
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n.d.). Thus, for example, they have adopted the dominant narrative on “growth”, and 
they  have  identified  employers,  employees  and  the State  as  (equal)  partners  who 
cooperate for the sake of the national economy. Adopting this strategy, at a moment 
when  the  existing  welfare  state  structures  were  under  collapse,  has  been 
counterproductive in  terms of  union membership and public trust  (Seferiades 1999; 
Dedousopoulos 2007). Further, it was a deliberate political choice, linked to the direct 
connection of trade-unions to the state. This is reminiscent of Balibar's claim that in 
certain cases, depending on the correlation of forces, trade-union organization may be 
compatible with, or even an organic aspect of, capitalist relations (Balibar 2014: 195). 
As Agnoli has noted (1972: 93), the most effective parliamentary domestication of the 
opposition  is  achieved when the capital-labour  conflict  is  mitigated by  trade-unions 
oriented towards social “partnership”.
Certain  sectors  or  currents  within  trade-unions  have  tried  to  surmount  these 
difficulties. One such attempt was the creation of union structures across employment 
sectors, linking rather than separating individual workplaces. However these attempts 
have also proven inadequate in providing a strong enough pattern to ensure the unity 
and coherence of the entire working class (Lytras 1993: 217). This adverse reality has 
inevitably changed and compromised the structures and forms of organization of trade-
unionism. Nevertheless, new organizational forms outside the conventional boundaries 
of  traditional  trade-unionism have  emerged.  As  Lytras  has  underlined  (1993:  239), 
“during  the  more  critical  phases  of  development  of  assertive  struggles,  flexible 
organizational  forms emerge,  characterized by initiative-based,  original  and efficient 
constitution,  generally  in  correspondence  to  the  degree  of  sectoral  and  local 
participation  and  the  intensity  of  problems  and  demands.  These  formulations  are 
manifested  as  either  a  synthesis  of  specific  organizational  schemata  -usually 
secondary organizations- more or less loose, or as the conjunctural collaboration of 
local  associations  of  grassroots  unions,  lacking  the  recognition  of  superior 
organizations”124.
124 Examples of such forms are the several coalitions formed among them (SEO-115 in 1962, “Initiative of 
grassroots unions in the private and public sector” in 2009 etc.)
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Grassroots syndicalism, which played an important role during the crisis, has its 
origins in the 2000s'. Many grassroots unions were founded at this time, filling the void 
left by the gradual withering and irrelevance of traditional unionism125. These unions 
have made a qualitatively interesting contribution in building a new perspective for the 
trade-union movement,  despite their  limited,  initially  even marginal,  political  weight. 
Initially, these unions had been intensely politicized, and represented particular political 
currents (mainly the anticapitalist Left and anarchist currents). All of them despite not 
following the same practices (some employ activist forms of protest, others focus on 
more traditional repertoires of trade-unionism) share a number of common features. 
The December 2008 revolt was a milestone in this process. The cancellation by the 
GSEE  of  an  announced  protest,  a  decision  which  became  a  symbol  of  class 
collaboration, and its actual staging by grassroots unions, the occupation of the GSEE 
offices by rebellious workers and the formation of a coalition of grassroots unions after 
the murderous assault on Kostantina Kuneva (a trade-unionist in the cleaning sector), 
marked three decisive moments in this process. This period led up to the forming of the 
“Initiative  of  grassroots  unions  in  the  private  and  the  public  sector”  (hereafter 
mentioned as the “Initiative”).  It  was the first  time grassroots unions coordinated to 
mobilize  and  organize  large  scale  actions  outside  the  auspices  of  the  national 
confederations GSEE-ADEDY126. 
The scope of action of these forms embraces both exerting pressure on official 
trade-unions, and forming new, emergent, forms of labour politics. Examples of these 
forms are certain grassroots unions, whose role in the social protests of the 2010-2011 
period will be examined in section b of chapter IV. Their main characteristics are: (1) 
they organize predominantly at the inter-professional level; (2) their emphasis lies on 
their differentiation from the respective official or bureaucratic forms, on solidarity and 
125 Five such initiatives have been central to this: SMT, SYBXA, SBEOD, SSM and SEFK. See the field 
work of (Kretsos 2011), following the activities of SYBXA, expressing to an extent the logic of all these 
initiatives.
126 As has already been noted, the union movement in Greece has been relatively unified organizationally. 
The Communist  Party has founded a separate “autonomous centre”,  PAME, constituted by unions 
which tend to be “red unions”, without any real autonomy, following decisions actually taken by party 
instances.  However, the  KKE and the unions participating in  PAME still  operate within  the GSEE 
structures.
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the universality of protest against corporatist functions and on rank-and-file activism; 
(3)  they pursue or  emphasize the inclusion of  workers under  flexible  relations  and 
contract workers, in contrast to existing trade-unions; (4) they use new technologies 
and the social media to provide alternative information; (5) they put emphasis on issues 
of  democracy  and  organization.  Despite  these  organizations  exhibiting  all  the 
characteristics of “social movement unionism”, as defined by Moody (1997), a number 
of  weaknesses  and  problems  have  also  arisen,  the  main  ones  being:  (1)  their 
organization  at  a  partial,  sectoral  or  business  level,  which  results  in  fragmentary 
constitutions and in limiting their scope; (2) their difficulty in coordination processes; (3) 
their contradiction between the need to represent larger strata (thus based on more 
elementary  properties  of  protest  and  solidarity),  and  the  need  to  employ  more 
advanced  repertoires  of  action  (thus  less  universal)  because  of  government  and 
employers' aggressive policy towards them; (4) general functional problems127; (5) the 
structural limits of flexible work and unemployment impacting on political participation; 
and (6) their weak financial bases and lack of resources.
Seen from another perspective, social movements are not restricted to workplaces; 
class struggle occurs in areas outside the production sphere, and includes all those 
aspects  that  resist  the  expansion  of  capitalist  politics  and  strategies.  In  advanced 
capitalism, broader fields of everyday life beyond merely labour are commercialized 
and integrated into capitalist relations and market mechanisms; this process being far 
from a new one, constitutes a structural dimension of the capitalist mode of production 
(Harvey  1982;  Lefebvre  1968;  Benjamin  1999),  creating  a  new  field  for  social 
mobilization  and  protest.  The scope  of  urban space  is  indeed another  field  where 
capitalist relations are constituted and reproduced. As Harvey points out, this process 
is directly linked to the reality in the workplaces: what comes out of it is “a very different 
kind of proletariat...  characterized by insecurity, by episodic, temporary and spatially 
diffuse employment,  and [which]  is  very difficult  to  organize on a  workplace basis” 
127 For Vogiatzoglou, “a major challenge the grassroots unions need to surmount, is how to maintain a 
high degree of internal democracy whilst consolidating a wide and flexible inter-union organization” 
(Vogiatzoglou 2014: 9).
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(Harvey 2013: 130). This process doesn’t provide a substitute to the mobilization at the 
workplace: it rather suggests the need for a broader coordination, which should include 
the organization of the working class at a local level as well as experiments with other 
forms of  community organization (Triantafyllopoulou and Sayas 2012:  17).  Such an 
approach will be further studied later, when examining the appearance of several forms 
of urban and local mobilizations related to particular spaces and identities.
By stressing the importance of urban space and the potentialities it offers to the 
development  of  movements,  the  Greek  case  offers  an  example  of  “how  a  social 
movement's  urban  character  can  contribute  to  making  it  a  potential  threat  to  the 
national  political  and  economic  order”  (Arampatzi  and  Nicholls  2012:  2592).  The 
centrality  of  the  squares  is  characteristic  of  this  tendency  in  the  2010-2011 social 
protests  in  Greece.  The  authors'  argument  consists  of  three  points:  firstly,  the 
implementation  of  neoliberal  policies  in  the  1990s'  made  the  traditional  tools  for 
blocking resistance (clientelism and repression) inadequate for exercising control over 
multiple urban resistances. Secondly, these resistances were the sites in which diverse 
activists transcended their individualities or concrete spaces and connected with others 
over issues about their common lived space. Thirdly, parallel affiliations of activists with 
organizations and networks across the country functioned as “brokers” between local 
mobilizations and the wider social movement space. These urban mobilizations are not 
seen as geographically and conceptually “trapped in the city”, as if urban space were 
the end point of concrete protests. On the contrary, by studying the unique role of the 
city to movement development, movements become involved with issues beyond the 
city, triggering relational processes (Ibid.:  2592-3).  Thus, people are mobilized for a 
contemporary “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1968)128, which includes fundamental human 
rights: housing, decent work, education, health and quality of life. According to Purcell, 
“Lefebvre's  right  to  the  city  is  not  a  suggestion  for  reform,  nor  does  it  envision  a 
fragmented, tactical, or piecemeal resistance. His idea is instead a call for a radical 
128 Although this right needs to refer to the concrete context, since Harvey is right to note that this concept 
is often “an empty signifier; everything depends on who gets to fill it with meaning” (2013: xv).
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restructuring of social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond” 
(Purcell 2002: 101).
Thus,  reclaiming the city is  directly  linked to reclaiming the social  and political 
scene (Triantafyllopoulou and Sayas 2012: 8). Seen from that perspective, “the spatial 
context does not undermine the prevailing role of social relations, on the contrary it 
contributes to this direction, because it furthers the understanding of how social groups 
give particular meaning to certain places, and also how specific place-based narratives 
are constructed” (Poulios et al. 2013: 4). In Soja's words (2000: 9), “all social relations, 
whether they are linked to class, family, community, market,  or state power, remain 
abstract  and  ungrounded  until  they  are  specifically  spatialized,  that  is,  made  into 
material and symbolic spatial relations”129.
To conclude, many scholars have emphasized that traditional trade-unions must 
broaden their  scope and transform themselves to embrace these different  forms of 
protests (indicatively, Papadopoulos 1987: 242;  Katsoridas 2008: 148; Kouzis 2007: 
85- 7; Palaiologos 2006: 380-81). Others have argued in favour of the obsolescence of 
trade-unions,  claiming  that  movements  should  rely  on  entirely  new  forms  of 
organization.  Both  these  perspectives  fail,  in  my  view,  to  properly  understand  the 
fundamental functions of trade-unions. Our hypothesis is that the transformations in 
social relations lead to the emergence of new forms, which, by their nature, have to 
develop outside the limitations of traditional unions and of union representation (such 
structures have indeed emerged in Greece during the crisis, to be studied in the next 
chapter). However, these new forms should not be seen as being in inevitable conflict 
with  more  traditional  forms  of  organization,  including  trade-unions;  rather,  in 
coordination.  As Stratoulis  (Stratoulis  1987:  10)  underlines,  “We cannot  ignore 'old' 
forms of exploitation. Capitalism's development is not so much accompanied by the 
substitution of 'old' forms by 'new' ones, but by the supplementation of the first ones to 
the  seconds,  through  modernization  or  mutation  of  the  old  into  new  forms”.  The 
129 It seems interesting to note at this point that, etymologically, the word “politics” itself comes from the 
word “polis” (from the ancient Greek “kratos-polis”/State-city), meaning the political facet of living place 
(Babiniotis 2003).
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neoliberalist transformations at the economic and the political level, although radically 
aggravating  the  terms  of  social  integration,  also  create  the  possibility  of  new 
unifications.
Thus,  the  challenge  for  these  new  structures  (both  these  referring  to  the 
organization of labour in a different way than the traditional trade-unionism and these 
which organize at the level of “spatial politics”) is to deal with the need for coordination, 
joint action and cohesion, in order to be a force for unification of the exploited. This is 
actually referring to the well-known schema of “unity in diversity”,  as an attempt at 
unification  into  a  collective  subversive  force  which  transcends  its  internal 
contradictions, while still recognizing the relative autonomy of the different forms. In this 
process however, the political specificity of the organized industrial working class must 
not be superficially underestimated. Further, the challenge lies in the reconciliation of 
the differences at the subjective level (Marias n.d.: 34). This process of constituting a 
collective subjectivity does not, on its own, necessarily induce the construction of new, 
unified social bodies. It is rather about new forms of coordination and interaction, based 
on common practices and mutually in conflict with dominant policies (Stavrides 2011: 
180). Thus, the connections that are formed are not based on solidarity alone, but on 
concrete common interests,  demands and practices of  protest.  In Greece amid the 
crisis,  such  forms emphasizing  novelty  and  direct  participation,  in  parallel  to more 
central forms of social movement,  have emerged during the crisis,  and will  now be 
examined, under this perspective.
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CHAPTER IV: THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN GREECE IN 2010-
2011
“A moment is not only a vanishing point in time. It is also  
a momentum: the weight that tips the scales, producing a  
new balance or imbalance, an effective reframing of what  
the 'common' means, a reconfiguration of the universe of  
the possible” (Ranciere 2010: 173)
The first organized reaction in Greece against the economic, social and political 
reality was the youth revolt of December 2008130.  This movement was also the first 
organized expression of the need for new ways of exercising politics. Less than two 
years later, Greece's subjection to the “Troika mechanism” in April 2010 and the brutal 
implementation of memoranda policies were accompanied by a vigorous burst of social 
mobilization. A week after the announcement of signing up of the Memorandum by the 
MP George Papandreou,  hundreds of  thousands participated in  one of  the biggest 
protests in Greek history, the day of the general strike called by the GSEE on May 5,  
2010. During the winter and spring 2010, important mobilizations had been organized, 
mostly by strikes called by the two trade-union confederations GSEE and ADEDY (on 
February 10 and 24, on March 5 and 11, and tens of sectoral strikes). However, the 
entry into the “Troika mechanism” and the implementation of the memorandum policies 
brought the range and intensity of mobilization to a whole new level.
The period chosen for the present study spans from April 2010 to the end of 2011, 
when the first cycle of mobilizations peaked with the two-day general strike of 19-20 
October  and  the  disruption  by  crowds  of  protesters  of  the  official  festivities  of  the 
national day of October 28131. This period includes: (1) a significant wave of general 
130 The December 2008 revolt is not within the scope of the current work, but was the main topic of my MA 
thesis (see Gaitanou 2011a).
131 Indeed,  many researchers have identified this  period as a distinctive phase of  social  mobilization. 
Tsakiris  and  Koumandaraki  describe  a  similar  perspective  when  noting  that  this  first  period  is 
“characterized by the mass reactions of the people against the first Memorandum that culminates with 
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strikes; (2) the “movement of the squares” of May-June 2011, during which two huge 
strikes were held (on June 15 and June 28-29); (3) various forms of civil disobedience 
(the most  important  being the “I  won't  pay” movement,  which called  to  refuse the 
payment  of  fees  for  public  services,  specifically  road  tolls  but  also  bus  fares  and 
hospital  services),  local  protest  movements  (the  most  important  being  the Keratea 
rebellion,  where residents of  the  Attica  region blocked the construction  of  a waste 
treatment centre); and the disruption of the official parades of October 28, 2011 all over 
Greece to protest against austerity measures.
In the present chapter, I will examine the specific features of the social movement 
that developed during the first phase following the start of the “shock therapy” imposed 
to Greece by Troika rule. The first section will be devoted to some preliminary remarks 
on the rebellious cycle, presenting the interpretative framework that will be followed. 
The next section will be devoted to the study of the wave of strikes, with a particular 
focus on the limitations of the trade-union movement (as already examined in chapter 
III) and the emergence of new forms and structures within the labour movement. In the 
third section, I will  analyze the movement of the squares during the spring and the 
summer of 2011, and more particularly the conditions of  its emergence,  its specific 
features, its structures and its political character. The fourth section will examine the 
other forms of the social movement of this period and the last one will examine the 
overall  perspective  of  these mobilizations  in  relation  to  our  main  interest,  i.e.  their 
potential for expressing a new form of politicization and a different perception of the 
political.
the movement of the Indignados and the occupation of Constitution Square in front of the Parliament in 
Athens  and  the  squares  of  cities  throughout  Greece.  This  period  was  also  characterized  by  the 
manifestation of acts of civil disobedience, mass protests, the general strikes, the actions of the new 
labour  unions  of  people  with  precarious  employment,  and  the  riots  provoked  by  the  repressive 
apparatus of the state” (Tsakiris and Koumandaraki 2015: 16). I will proceed below on the particular 
characteristics that make this phase in my perspective distinctive.
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a. The social movement as a whole: The rebellious cycle of 2010-
2011.
The protests that have emerged in Greece in the first period of the crisis will be 
evaluated in a comparative perspective, as part of the “social movement in general”, in 
the sense the term was defined in chapter I, and in relation to a concrete question: 
political  participation  and  its  effect  on consciousness  transformation.  This  research 
focuses on Greece as a highly  specific  case:  crucially  different  but  still  part  of  the 
bigger picture, amid the crisis that has spread throughout Europe and the world. Thus, I 
don't embrace a view according to which all  movements that occurred worldwide in 
2011 are  part  of  a  single  “global  movement”132.  On the  contrary, I  will  argue  that, 
despite  the  elements  of  diffusion  and  resonance,  the  objective  and  subjective 
specificities of the Greek social formation determined in a singular way the different 
forms taken by the development of the movement. Of course, this perspective doesn’t 
wish  to  ignore  the commonalities  between  the various  movements  (and  especially 
between the movement of the squares in Greece and the Indignados in Spain), nor the 
common ground of the global crisis which determines their emergence.
It remains however the case that the rebellious cycle of 2010-2011 in Greece had 
unique features. First of all, it fully deserves to be called a “rebellious cycle” due to an 
exceptional  combination  of  factors:  the  scale  of  mobilization133,  its  diversity, 
massiveness,  decisiveness  and  radicalism,  the  escalation  of  the  confrontation,  its 
politicization and the development of forms of self-organization, the rearrangement of 
social  alliances and of  political  representation  and the ruptures it  produced134.  This 
132 This  is  the  dominant  view on these movements,  reproduced by the  media,  the  dominant  political 
discourse but also certain scholars (although the latter have been more reluctant to endorse such a 
view). For example,  Oikonomakis and Ross (2013: 6-7) speak of the “Real Democracy Movement”, 
and the media spoke of “the global protests/movement of 2011”.
133 Adopting the definition established in social  movement studies of “mega protests” as those protest 
events  in  which  over  30.000  people  participate,  all  main  events  of  the  period  2010-2011 under 
examination, were definitely mega protests, with often more than 200.000 participants.
134 As for the extent of the mobilization, according to data provided in the parliament by Nikos Dendias, the 
minister of public order and civil protection, 20,120 gatherings and protests were organized from May 
8, 2010 to March 28, 2014, 6,266 were organized in the Attica region. According to Sakellaropoulos,  
these rates make them the most dynamic mobilizations since the end of the civil war (Sakellaropoulos 
2014a: 189).
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approach  in  terms  of  a  “rebellious  cycle”  is  consistent  with  the  concept  of  the 
“contentious  cycle”  as  elaborated in  the  social  movement  literature.  In  chapter  I,  I 
referred to Tarrow's definition of the contentious cycle: in its phase of mobilization, the 
generalization  of  the  conflict  opens  up  new political  opportunities,  encourages  the 
creation of coalitions between actors and exacerbates instability within the elite. Early 
demands  highlight  the  vulnerability  of  authorities,  challenge  the  interests  of  other 
contenders  and  contribute  to  the  creation  of  new master frames,  thus  broadening 
participation and conflict (Psimitis 2011: 191-2). As a result, “an open field of social 
interaction with multiple actors and completely uncertain outcomes has been produced” 
(Ibid: 192). This is exactly the case of the 2010-2011 mobilizations in Greece, and this 
is also why this period will be studied as a new and distinctive, but unified protest cycle.
However,  the  unity,  or  rather,  unification  of  these  mobilizations  should  not  be 
assumed too hastily. The fact that these mobilizations were “objectively” part of  the 
same sequence, in the sense that they were related to the specific situation, does not 
necessarily mean that they constitute a movement conscious of its own unity, that is of 
a single “subject”. Rather, the unification of movements should be seen as a problem to 
be solved,  not  as a given.  This  dimension appears clearly  in  the participants'  own 
reactions and perceptions. To take just one example, which will be examined further 
below, during the squares  movement,  forms of  organized action  (including  political 
organizations and trade-unions) were initially thought as a negative influence on the 
movement.  This  perception  gradually  changed  and  gave  way  to  a  convergence 
between the squares' movement and the trade-union contingents, particularly during 
the general strikes. This convergence requires rigorous analysis. Bearing this in mind, 
social  mobilizations in  Greece are part  of  the “social  movement in  general”,  in  the 
sense of a movement “corresponding to a certain configuration of social protests and of 
the labour movement itself” (Kouvelakis 2007: 213).
Those  mobilizations  can  be  understood  as  following  a  strategy  of  “offensive 
defense”, alternating different forms and levels of protest in which expanding sections 
of the population were involved, as Kouvelakis has put it (Kouvelakis 2011a). This is a 
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process  which  reaches  successive  peak  stages,  with  clearly  rebellious  features, 
leading to a shift in the balance of forces. This process emerges “from below”, from the 
logic  of  the mobilizations themselves,  and derives from the fact  that  the  rebellious 
forms  of  action  tend  to  be  part  of  every  long-range  social  conflict,  signaling  the 
participation of  social  strata  normally  considered outside the conventionally  defined 
boundaries  of traditional  organizational  frames.  However,  at  a  stage  of  their 
development,  these  forms  inevitably  come  up  against  certain  limits.  This  point  is 
crucial: the politicization of the movements during that period derives from the fact that 
the memoranda do not bring a partial change, or a reform, of the terms of the social  
contract; they attack its very foundations. This attack is both frontal and quasi-general, 
leaving  few  sectors  of  society  untouched  (except  the  most  privileged  ones)  thus 
facilitating the unification of protest. This unification comes initially as a reaction against 
a common adversary, and this impulse opens up the possibility of a transformative 
process  at  the  level  of  consciousness. However,  within  this  process,  a  strong 
asymmetry between the two sides remains,  with the organizational  positions of  the 
subaltern classes severely weakened to the point of paralyzing their capacity to react to 
the new context.
In  terms of  the  mobilized social  subject,  this  period can be seen as having a 
potential  for  a  “unity  in  diversity”  pattern  to  materialize.  Diverse  social  strata  and 
categories  participated from different,  yet  relevant,  starting  points,  including groups 
very far from being the “usual suspects” with whom social movement activists are used 
to  get  interactions.  These  “usual  suspects”  include,  at  the  political  level, 
(over)politicized segments of the population (mainly attached to the radical Left and to 
activism in general), and essentially the youth at the level of social layers. To elaborate 
briefly on this last point, the youth has traditionally played an important role in social 
mobilizations in Greece, and the student movement, particularly after November 1973 
insurrection  against  the  dictatorship  and  the  Metapolitefsi.  The  specific  role  of  the 
educational  institutions135,  the particular  characteristics of  young age,  an underlying 
135 As seen in chapters II and III, education was perceived as a key means of upward social mobility and 
financial security by the popular classes.
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radicalism and the objective  conditions  in  higher  education  have  contributed to  an 
important  development  of  student  protests,  which  have  often  managed  to  block 
attempted reforms136.  The student movement of 2006-2007 in particular has been the 
most important in the recent years. It was partly successful and produced a model of 
mobilization and a cohort of young activists rather different than what existed before: a 
militant  type,  determined to fight,  with very strong commitments of  being united in 
struggle and solidarity137.  This type of  militancy had a “spill  over”  effect  on broader 
layers of the youth and an important impact on the mobilizations that emerged during 
the crisis,  both in terms of physical presence and of  forms of  action.  However, the 
mobilizations which will  be studied in this thesis have not been mobilizations of the 
youth  but  of  a  much  wider  part  of  the  society.  In  this  wider  part,  young  people 
participated more as individuals, lacking a common identity, an organizational form, 
and a common consciousness which would have been distinctive of the youth as such. 
One of the consequences of this relative absence was that the dominant perception in 
Greece, that activism should be left to the young, collapsed. 
What  replaced  it  was  the  recognition  of  the  participation  of  a  much  broader 
spectrum of society, contributing to the scale, effectiveness and social legitimation of 
these protests. This is evidenced by data from the beginning of the period discussed 
here. In a poll conducted in May 2010, there are interesting elements about the degree 
of  dissatisfaction and the social  layers supporting the protests.  There is  an almost 
universal awareness that the measures will affect people's lives, something supported 
by 91% of the participants. Two thirds of participants totally opposed the measures 
136 The most important ones have been the victorious school and university occupations in 1991, during 
which the murdered professor, Nikos Temponeras, became a symbol of the youth movements; the 
high-school and university student movement in 1997-98 against the “Arsenis law” which changed the 
path of entry into universities; and finally, the student movement in 2006-2007 against a law amending 
the  functioning  of  universities'  and  against  the  revision  of  the  Constitution  to  authorize  private 
universities. We could also briefly mention the university occupations in 1979 against the law 815, the 
mobilizations  against  respective  laws  in  1982  and  1987  and  those  in  1995  and  the  university 
occupations in 2001. Actually, each time a reform was proposed by government potentially changing 
the character of high education in a neoliberal direction, students vigorously opposed it.
137 This reality is identified by protesters themselves: during one of my interviews, the participant criticized 
her own lack of politicization in the past by arguing that: “I am not a child who studied in the Greek  
university, I came from a protected family environment, I studied abroad, I was a confused, apolitical  
person... Now I have completely changed. I think that my friends who studied in Greek universities, got  
this politicization at some point during their studies. I did not. I started getting it during the December  
2008 revolt” (I31). 
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while 77% thought of them as unfair, percentages which are astonishing considering 
this is in the start of the period, and the effects of the measures were yet to be evident 
in people's lives. In terms of class orientation, 57% of participants thought  that  the 
measures are intended to satisfy big capital, while social acceptance of mobilizations 
also  cut  across class  criteria:  those rejecting  them most  aggressively  were private 
sector (77%) and public sector employees (78%), the unemployed (73%) and students 
(75%).  Finally,  a  significant  39%  stated  their  willingness  to  take  part  in  protests, 
increasing in relation to level of education, more intense in ages 25-55, and in those 
positioning themselves on the Left (Public Issue 2010).
The  rebellious  processes  discussed  here  constituted  forms  of  protest  that 
challenged,  prevented  and  disrupted  consent  to  the  existing  social  order,  and  the 
management of  social  contradictions by the state. They thus manifested a crisis of 
hegemony, the failure of a successful articulation and coordination of interests within 
the  state138.  At  the  same  time,  any  expectation  of  partial  settlements,  moderate 
treatments, “productive/creative” reforms and social, institutional consultation practices, 
faded away. Neither the state allowed the emergence of such expectations, nor could 
the affected majorities find any realistic path to satisfy their aspirations by adopting this 
intermediate  path.  The  impossibility  to  reach  a  solution  of  compromise  led  to  the 
exacerbation  of  a  sui  generis  authoritarianism,  as  discussed  in  chapter  II.  This 
authoritarian  turn  progressively  impacted  into  the  consciousness  of  the  people, 
catalyzed by the display of the particular form of intransigence exhibited by the state 
and the police against popular protest. This has intensified popular frustration and a 
sense  of  political  deadlock  and  has  spurred  people  into  seeking  new  ways  of 
expressing themselves politically.
After the pivotal mobilization of February 12, 2012, when the second memorandum 
was passed in the parliament and tens of thousands of people went onto the streets in 
combative and mass protests, the social movement has entered a new phase. This 
138 This crisis of hegemony includes the inability of the dominant class to persuade the dominated masses 
that its particular, selfish interests are the interests of the nation as a whole, ie. identified with social  
interest, at least in the long-term.
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break does not  signal the end of the cycle of mobilizations. However, the two-year 
period  of  2010-2011  marked  a  first  phase,  with  certain  common  characteristics, 
especially in respect to consciousness formation and transformation through political 
participation. The period that followed, from spring 2012 until the new general elections 
in early 2015, was dominated by a shift in the terrain of confrontation and in the type of 
expectations  towards  the  parliamentary  level.  This  shift  culminated  in  the  double 
elections of May-June 2012. During the two-and-a-half year period that followed, the 
socio-economic  situation  worsened  significantly  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
implementation of the memoranda. The activity of social movements seemed to have 
reached  an  ebb,  although  certain  important  protests  did  develop  in  specific  social 
sectors (mostly against the closure of the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), in 
the youth and education sectors, in parts of the public sector and in Skouries town in 
Chalkidiki  against  the  gold  mines).  This  evolution  will  be  briefly  investigated in  the 
Conclusions, after the presentation of the research on the 2010-2011 social protests.
b. The waves of strikes139.
The main features of the labour and trade-union movement in Greece have been 
discussed in chapter III. To sum up, the role of trade-unionism during the current crisis 
has  been  in  retreat.  As  Kapsalis  notes,  “legislative  interventions  have  been  so 
numerous and so crucial that, compared to the framework that was valid until early 
2010, very few features remain today unchanged” (Kapsalis 2012: 11).  The primary 
thrust of this spate of new legislation has been to eviscerate the concept of collective 
bargaining and representation and relegate the labour contract to an individual level. 
Concurrently, trade-union leaders have been confronted with false dilemmas, which, 
139 For this  section,  the interviews I  conducted  with  cadres  of  the trade-union  movement  have  been 
decisive in deepening my understanding of its mode of functioning, its limitations and its mistakes. 
More specifically, I have conducted two personal interviews and one group interview (with three trade-
unionists).  I  would like to  thank Giorgos Charisis (unionist  in POE-OTA,  member of  the Executive 
Secretary of ADEDY and secretary of META), Despoina Spanou (former vice president of ADEDY and 
member of the General Council of META), and Stavi Saloufakou (former president of EKA), Metaxia 
Stekoulea (President of OIYE) and Panagiotis Kouloumparitsis (deputy Secretary-General of EKA), all 
three being founding members of EMEIS.
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within a depressed context in the labour market, left them with little room to maneuver. 
The gradual undermining of the combative sectors of the trade-union movement has 
exacerbated the crisis of their identity and role, especially at a time when government 
policies  have  been  directed  at  restricting  their  institutional  functioning,  making 
consensual  approaches both inappropriate and ineffective.  The framework of  social 
partnership has been further weakened and lost even its secondary role (Ibid.: 9-11). 
The target of this strategy goes beyond the weakening of the trade-union movement. 
Its wider objectives aim at a further erosion of social rights through the dismantling of 
any potential mechanism for collective response on the part of labour (Ibid.: 15). The 
governmental  strategy  has  thus  been  twofold:  surprise  attack  and  the 
misrepresentation and smearing of the trade-union movement.
This governmental attack on the labour movement, combined with the effects of 
the economic depression, had a debilitating effect on the organized labour movement, 
and damaged its ability to respond to the challenges of this period. It is true, as we will 
see  below,  that  this  two-year  period  culminated  in  a  wave  of  strikes,  numerous 
mobilizations,  with  thousands  of  protesters  taking  to  the  streets  and  occupying 
workplaces. However, the trade-union movement has failed to rise to the situation. It 
was a historical moment when the old configuration of the movement was confronted 
with its inherent limitations. Its crisis deepened and created the political space for the 
emergence  of  new  forms,  combined  with  some  important  problems  for  the  whole 
movement. To sum up the findings provided by the literature on the subject and by the 
interviews  conducted  with  some  of  the  cadres  of  the  trade-union  movement,  also 
confirmed by  my  research  presented  in  chapter  III  and  my  fieldwork  presented  in 
chapter  V, the salient  problems of  the trade-union movement can be presented as 
follows140:  (1)  a  particularly  low  level  of  participation  of  workers  in  the  unions, 
contributing to their irrelevance and ineffectiveness during the crisis; (2) low rates of 
participation and control of workers themselves in the functioning of trade-unions; (3) 
the pervasive corruption among trade-union cadres arising from their connections to 
140 All  these  points  were  emphasized  by  all  the  interviewed  cadres  of  the  trade-union  movement, 
independently of their particular political affiliation. 
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political  parties,  the  state  and  the  employers.  This  corruption  led  them to  a  try  to 
assuage the movement and mollify confrontational disposition of the workers instead of 
seizing the opportunity to escalate the movement141; (4) the adoption of a strategy that 
led to fragmentation among workers. This was also one of the main strategies of the 
state and the dominant class during the crisis: to turn private sector workers against 
those of  the  public  sector, one sector  against  another  etc.  The union bureaucracy 
actively  colluded  in  this  approach  which  resulted  in  the  fracturing  of  the  bonds  of 
solidarity142; (5) a divisive tactics among unions, in relation to differences regarding their 
combative  or  alternatively  consensual  orientation;  (6)  the  impact  of  coercion  and 
threats at workplaces and the prevalence of antidemocratic methods on the side of the 
employers, discouraging workers'  participation; (7) the weight  of structural  problems 
related to precarious work, unemployment, and the specific structure of the economy 
enervating union ability to mount mobilizations143.
Thus, the union bureaucracy, which in the past rested on broad consensus and 
indeed had previously  been able  to bring  certain  improvements for  large layers  of 
workers (though not for all  of them, and often favouring some against others),  now 
became  incapable  of  performing  this  role.  While  union  bureaucratic  elites  bore 
significant responsibility for this deadlock, they have proven to be remarkably resilient 
and  managed  to  retain  their  positions  in  union  elections,  especially  in  the  GSEE 
despite the deep crisis of political representation144. The main reasons for this resilience 
were the relatively  low union density  and increased bureaucratization,  but  also  the 
141 The  interviewed  unionists  have  labeled  the  union  bureaucracy  as  “the  arm  of  the  state”  or  as 
“controlled by the employers”. These expressions are often used in Greece, but of course of greater 
significance when used by members of unions' administrations themselves.
142 This was strongly emphasized by all unionists during our interviews. As a result, workers in supposedly 
safer environments (public sector, certain sectors with vested rights) participated less or separately, 
feeling reassured that their  rights would be least  affected. This salami-slicing practice was evident 
during the mobilizations of certain sectors throughout this period. As denounced by the interviewed 
unionists,  whenever  a  sector  started  a  protest  or  a  strike,  the  GSEE  leadership  would  try  to 
delegitimize it by repeating such arguments against workers (on several occasions: in the DEH strike 
against  property taxes,  in the strikes against  privatization in transport,  in the strikes in ALTER TV 
channel, at Hellenic Steel, in banks, or in small enterprises to be shut down etc).
143 Such limitations were related to a misguided theoretical approach about the causes of the crisis by 
union bureaucracy. The crisis was thought to be mainly a problem of public expenditure, which led to 
demanding the limitation of state benefits and privileges. This orientation has also had important impact 
on fragmentation among workers.
144 Thus, according to the results of the last General Congress of GSEE (March 2013), PASKE (linked to 
PASOK) held 19 seats, DAKE (linked to Nea Dimokratia) 11, PAME (linked to KKE) 10, AP (linked to  
SYRIZA) 5, and EMEIS (dissidents of PASKE) 3 seats. Thus the union fraction affiliated with the parties 
of PASOK and Nea Dimokratia held a clear majority of 30 out of 45 seats (Vogiatzoglou 2014: 4).
147
perception developed in the more combative unions that, due to the weaknesses of the 
trade-union  movement,  it  was  preferable  to  remain  at  a  distance  from  its  official 
structure.  Corruption,  the  prevalence  of  corporate  interests  and  of  antidemocratic 
practices  (even  direct  or  indirect  malpractice  in  elections145),  the  development  of 
clientelism in the re-election of trade-union officials, as well as the distance separating 
grassroots organizations from federations, have also played their part. The biased rules 
of representation across sectors, over-representing sectors with little effective contact 
with workers, should be also mentioned146. This resilience of the union bureaucracy in 
union elections has declined, since the Left has constantly increased its representation, 
mainly  in  grassroots  and  federal  organizations  but  also,  to  a  limited extent,  in  the 
confederations, but definitely not at the pace that effective political representation has 
been disintegrating in other fields.
This newly emerging reality has led to a major collapse in the credibility of the 
trade-union movement across a broad portion of the workforce. Of course, a distinction 
between different levels of organization is necessary. The above remark applies mainly 
to  the  level  of  the  confederations,  and  particularly  the  GSEE.  The  civil  servant 
confederation ADEDY should be distinguished to some degree, due to the existence of 
a different, and more combative tradition in the core of the public sector. Vested rights 
still  remain,  and organizational  processes are  more democratic,  leading to  a  more 
direct  accountability  of  the  confederation.  Memorandum  policies  targeted  first  and 
foremost  the public  sector, triggering thus more vigorous mobilizations.  In  addition, 
unionism in the public sector is easier for workers, since the workforce is less subjected 
to intimidation and to the threat of redundancies. Thus, the ADEDY often adopted more 
political demands, such as the public auditing of the debt and its non-payment. Other 
145 Conferences to elect leaderships are conducted every three years, with the last two being held in 2010 
and 2013. In the latter (2013), representatives from the unions were elected up to three years (!) prior 
to the conference and thus did not reflect the actual balance of forces at that moment. According to 
widespread allegations, the followed procedures were often undemocratic, opaque, or even illegitimate. 
They  resulted  in  staging  fake  unions,  unrepresentative  of  workers,  but  represented  in  the  GSEE 
congresses and other similar practices, multiple voting in union elections, inflating union membership to 
claim a greater numbers of delegates etc. These practices, far from marginal, had a decisive influence 
on the outcomes of the GSEE congresses.
146 We should mention the over-representation of certain sectors, mainly coming from banks, which make 
almost 40% of the delegates. At the same time, small unions and small workplaces, which form the 
majority  of  the  Greek  economy,  are  seriously  underrepresented,  or  in  some  cases  totally 
unrepresented.
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sectors  have  also  played  a  significant  role  during  the  two-year  period  under 
examination. Individual federations have mounted important strikes, mainly in sectors 
with a long tradition of mobilization, and having a more clearly working-class oriented 
class  composition.  Conflicts  also  erupted  where  the  dictates  of  the  memorandum 
impacted directly on workers’ vested interests. Such sectors became symbols of the 
workers' protest, and often contributed to a sense of continuity of the mobilization147.
This  reality  led to a resurgence of  new forms and structures within the labour 
movement.  The  most  important  ones  are  the  grassroots  unions,  sharing  specific 
features,  which  have  formed  the  “Initiative”,  and  have,  to  some  extent,  organized 
outside  the  GSEE148.  However,  as  Vogiatzoglou  notes,  “[organizing]  outside  GSEE 
neither means antagonizing it, nor placing oneself outside the organized trade-union 
movement. Although the PWU [grassroots unions] leaderships’ opinions range from a 
simple political opposition to a total defiance vis-a-vis the Confederation strategies and 
modus  operandi,  the  vast  majority  of  their  entities  are  participating  in  the  GSEE 
structures” (Vogiatzoglou 2014: 7). These grassroots unions played a crucial role in the 
labour  movement  during  the  period  examined  here.  As  emphasized  by  K.V.,  a 
grassroots  union  leader  participating  in  the  Initiative’s  assemblies,  conducted  by 
Vogiatzogou  (Ibid.:  8):  “During the austerity  years,  the  Initiative  had  a  distinct  and 
decisive presence in  all  the major  protests– this  includes its  participation in  all  the 
general strikes, as well as the occupation of Syntagma square, in Athens. Therefore, it 
is now widely recognized amongst the workers as a pole distinct from the employer-
friendly and bureaucratic unionism of GSEE.” Tens, occasionally even hundreds, of 
thousands of protesters participated in protests called by the Initiative, while, the GSEE 
often failed to mobilize more than a few thousand, sometimes even significantly less. 
These observations are strongly supported by the interviews I conducted during my 
fieldwork, which will be presented in the next chapter, and in which three tendencies 
emerge: a complete lack of respect for the confederations, and particularly GSEE, a 
147 Such examples are: POE-OTA, school caretakers, cleaning women in ministries, administrative staff in 
universities, school teachers under suspension, OLME etc.
148 These forms were discussed in more detail in section f of chapter III.
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recognition of the positive, though inadequate role of grassroots unions, and a relative 
adherence to the theoretical necessity of trade-unionism to enable workers to defend 
their interests.
The first important moment for the labour movement was the strike of May 5 2010, 
just a few days after the announcement of signing up of the memorandum and the 
implementation of its first measures. The strike led to a huge street protest in Athens, 
considered at the time to be the largest of the last 35 years, whilst strike participation 
reached 90% in most branches of the private sector and 100% in many branches of the 
public sector (Psimitis 2011: 195). During this protest, three employees died after an 
attack on a branch of Marfin bank149. Following this protest and in the ensuing months, 
despite a second mobilization held on May 20,  indecision and hesitation prevailed. 
Many attributed this reaction to the events linked to the incident in the Marfin bank; 
however, this conclusion isn’t supported by broader research using various sources, 
nor by our interview-based field research in which participants were specifically asked 
about the influence of those events on the development of the movement and their 
participations. Most respondents refused to attribute the way mobilizations evolved to 
the Marfin  incident,  and  many claimed that,  if  it  had  any  influence  at  all,  it  rather 
hardened their stance. Nevertheless, a possible unconscious reaction to the trauma 
associated to the death of the three employees has to be taken into account.
The hesitant  mood that  prevailed during the last  six months of  2010 is  mostly 
attributed to the combination of the effect of the “shock doctrine” of the memoranda, 
and  a  “wait  and  see”  reaction  on  the  part  of  the  majority  of  the  public.  The  full 
realization of the stakes had yet to sink in. What prevailed was the illusion that the 
situation would be temporary and its consequences limited. As a result the labour and 
trade-union movement did not develop a comprehensive strategy (Kapsalis 2012: 16). 
This complacency was soon shattered and radically transformed into a more offensive 
149 This was an important moment for the movement. A Marfin bank branch was attacked and set on fire 
by protesters  who were  assumed to  be  black-block  activists.  This  remains  unconfirmed,  since no 
arrests were made and many have attributed the attack to provocateurs and undercover police, who 
have often acted in such ways at important political instants. The bank shared part of the responsibility 
for the casualties, as attested by the judicial authorities, for not complying with safety legislation.
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reaction, with labour protests escalating, both in frequency and in scale. Traditional 
protest techniques, such as strikes, demonstrations and occupations reappeared at a 
mass scale while the government strove to narrow the legal definitions regarding the 
legal recognition of strikes, seeking to outlaw most of them and generally challenge the 
constitutional  right  to  engage to  strike  action150.  This  was a  direct  response to  the 
widespread return of strike action to the forefront of the struggle.
Despite this state and government tactics, the number of strikes and of workers on 
strike  rose  dramatically,  at  both  sectoral  and  general  levels,  starting  in  2010  and 
peaking in 2011. The numbers were the expression of a significant upsurge in militancy 
compared to previous years151. In 2011, four-hundred and forty-five strikes and work 
stoppages were recorded; two-hundred and forty strikes occurred in the private sector; 
ninety-one in the public sector; seventy strikes in the public services; two-hundred and 
twenty-four in various workplaces; fifteen in particular branches; seven across different 
branches; sixty-two strikes were sectoral; thirty-four inter-professional; two were local 
strikes (Katsoridas and Labousaki 2012: 90-1). A total of one-hundred and fifty-eight 
work stoppages took place, two-hundred twenty-four-hour strikes at different levels as 
well  as  eighty-four  forty-eight-hour  strikes  and  nine  longer  strikes.  Fifty-three 
occupations  of  workplaces  have  been  recorded.  Finally,  in  2011,  four  nationwide 
general strikes were held (Ibid.: 91).
All the strikes displayed interesting qualitative features marking a break from the 
past:  participation was massive, absence from work was conscious and not due to 
apathy or indolence, and new forms of mobilization were employed152 (Ibid.: 94). The 
workers  more  inclined  to  participate  were  those  employed  in  stable  and  full-time 
150 During that period there was an almost constant qualification of strikes as “illegal and abusive” by the 
courts in conjunction with a widespread use of legislation ordaining the conscription of the participants 
to the strikes.
151 As a comparison, in 1990, considered as a peak-year for strike activities, the number of strikes reached 
two-hundred (Katsoridas and Labousaki 2012: 84). Since then, the general tendency has been mainly 
downward.
152 The  demands  of  sectoral  strikes  mainly  concerned,  in  decreasing  order,  the  cancellation  of 
redundancies  (122  cases);  the  payment  of  salary  arrears  (112);  the  opposition  to  privatizations, 
restructurings,  and  changes  in  labour  relations  (105);  the  opposition  to  reductions  in  salary  (73); 
broader issues related to labour relations (51); the opposition to measures of forced unemployment 
(45); the compliance with the terms of the collective agreements (35);  demands for the signing of 
collective agreements  (33);  halting the implementation  of  job rotation (14);  pension and insurance 
claims (12); working time claims (8); solidarity (6), opposition to disadvantageous changes in working 
conditions (4), compliance with health and safety conditions (4) (Ibid.: 92-4).
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working conditions, institutionally covered by the legal framework and better organized 
(Ibid.: 99). As for the forms of action, the GSEE and ADEDY mostly employed one-day 
and,  less  often,  two-day  strikes.  Many  workers  criticized  this  choice,  claiming  that 
GSEE should  have opted for  greater  escalation  in  terms of  duration,  intensity  and 
persistence153. In 2011, the peak year of strike activity, seven national general strikes 
were called on February 23, May 11, June 9, June 15, June 28-29 (the June strikes 
were called in coordination with the squares' movement, as discussed below), October 
5, and October 19-20 (which was considered as the most massive strike and street 
protest since the period of the Metapolitefsi)154. During the same period, three important 
strikes were held in particular sectors or companies. The first  was in the Electricity 
Company  DEH,  against  the  issuing  of  bills  containing  a  special  property  tax.  The 
second strike, in Hellenic Steel, was directed against one hundred-eighty layoffs, and 
included the blockage of the factory by the workers (leading to a complete halt of the 
production).  It  was conducted  through  general  assemblies  and  lasted nine months 
(October 31, 2011 - July 28, 2012). The third strike was in ALTER channel, a private TV 
station, and was directed against layoffs and the non-payment of salaries. It led to the 
occupation of the station and its operation by the workers. These three strikes were 
examples of workers' determination, of their sense of solidarity and their intention to 
implement conflict repertoires. In some cases they also displayed an ability to run the 
companies in the form of workers' control. 
153 This was also evident during my field research. As one respondent said “Their line is to go for a walk  
and conduct a 24-hour strike, with no other organization, no other leverage, no other bargaining, and  
ok, we've opened our banners, we've been thrown some teargas and ok. This makes no sense, it  
doesn’t take us anywhere. As in everything, this is also multifactorial. In order to achieve change, in  
order  to  achieve  even  certain  objectives,  you  have  to  function  at  multiple  levels.  To function  in  
communication, organization, human resources management, bargaining, education... all these should 
function together. You cannot thus compensate the loss of all these with a 24-hour strike and a protest  
in the city for half an hour” (I27). Another interviewee claimed: “It is unacceptable that the people have 
suffered from all these things, so many people have come to commit suicide, they do not have a job,  
1,5 million unemployed registered (and so many working in black labour), and GSEE doing nothing! It  
hasn't gone on strike for more than six months, seven!” (I13).
154 The two-day strike of October 19 and 20 marked a milestone for the whole movement in the period 
under examination. At the time, a wave of occupations in working places was spread by thousands of 
workers organized through general assemblies, mainly in the public sector. More than half a million 
people protested on October 19, whilst strike participation reached record levels. Repressive police 
tactics managed to disperse mass concentrations late in the evening. On the second day of the strike, 
participation was lower, but people were determined to stay in Syntagma square. Violent confrontations 
there between protesters belonging to the KKE and anarchist groups ended up discrediting the protest.
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Furthermore,  the  mobilization  at  the  local  and  community  level  and  the 
participation of specific sectors and social groups was more prominent than in the past. 
To conclude this section, despite the significant strikes taking place during this period, 
the  traditional  organized  trade-union  and  labour  movement  has  not  been  the 
hegemonic and dominant force during this phase, as it was in the cycle of Metapolitefsi. 
This lack of effectiveness arises from the structural and conjunctural deficiencies of the 
trade-union  movement,  as  discussed  both  in  this  section  and  in  chapter  III.  This 
weakness  was  compounded  by  the  repressive  tactics  of  the  state  towards  trade-
unionism, and the partial suppression of the explicit class dimension of mobilizations, 
something examined below and in the following chapters. In general, the trade-union 
movement failed to unify the working class and acted in most cases as a defender of 
the interests of particular sectors, in this case restricted to the unionized sections of the 
workforce. The workers' mobilizations, although important, never seemed able to “lead” 
the movement, or to propose a discursive frame that would significantly influence it. 
This is one reason the squares' movement acquired such significance in this rebellious 
cycle.
c. “We don't owe, we won't sell, we won't pay”: The movement of the 
squares of 2011.
“We will not leave the squares until those who compelled  
us to come here leave the country: the governments, the  
Troika (EU, ECB, IMF), banks, the IMF memoranda, and  
everyone who wants  to exploit  us.  We send them the 
message that the debt is not ours.” Vote of the People's  
Assembly of Syntagma Square, Athens, May 27th 2011
153
“Stay quiet, or you'll wake up the Greeks!” This slogan had allegedly been written 
on  a  banner  hanging  in  Puerta  del  Sol,  in  Madrid,  during  their  “Indignados” 
mobilizations. “Allegedly”, since as Oikonomakis and Roos mention (2013: 15), the fact 
was  never  confirmed155.  However,  the  rumour,  reiterated  by  the  media,  sufficed  to 
produce an impact. The slogan that came out of it is considered to have triggered the 
squares'  movement in Greece in May-June 2011: “We are awake! What time is it?  
Time for them to go” was the banner by which the Greek protesters responded to their 
Spanish counterparts. What happened prior to this moment were some relatively minor 
protests at the Spanish embassy called by Spaniards living in Greece in solidarity with 
the mobilizations happening in  Spain.  Some Greek protesters joined in,  though no 
more than a few dozen, and started discussing calling a similar mobilization in Athens. 
These initiatives led to the “Thiseio gatherings”156, a fact that is not widely known, since 
the squares' movement in Athens is thought to have started simply with a Facebook 
call157. On May 22, the “Spanish Embassy Solidarity Assembly” moved in Syntagma 
square,  holding  discussions  in  both  Greek  and  Spanish,  and  constituting  the  first 
“thematic groups”. That was the start of a small-scale occupation of the place with tents 
and of  the launch of  the website “real-democracy.gr”.  At  the same time, a different 
group called “the 300 Greeks”,  more nationalistic in character, also issued a call  to 
occupy the Syntagma square, setting up a stall  in situ and gathering signatures for 
lifting the immunity of MPs from prosecution charges. In addition, several Facebook 
posts called for an occupation of Syntagma square to start on May 25, and reached 
17.000 signatures.
All these happened at a time when the debate on these new forms of mobilization, 
occasioned by both the Spanish Indignados and the Arab Spring movements, started to 
gain momentum. Furthermore, the Syntagma square is a place of special significance 
in Athens. Located in front of the Parliament, it is physically and symbolically one of the 
155 This was, however, a banner hanged during a football match, referring to the defeat of Panathinaikos, a 
Greek team, by Barcelona (Giovanopoulos and Mitropoulos 2011: 274).
156 The Spanish embassy is located in the Athenian neighbourhood of Thiseio.
157 Interviewees (Ι27) and (I37) have provided important information on these gatherings, since they both 
participated from the first instant. As both claimed, they had themselves no connection whatsoever with 
the people gathered there. They simply passed by one day and decided to participate.
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most central points of the city adjacent to the majority of the administrative buildings. Its 
symbolic importance has strong historical roots: the current Parliament being in the old 
palace buildings, the square was initially named “the palace square”. It was renamed 
“Syntagma  square”  (Syntagma  meaning  “the  Constitution”),  after  the  “revolution  of 
September 3, 1843”, when the people protested and demanded the establishment of a 
constitution  in  the  country  and  the  departure  of  the  Bavarian  officials  from  the 
government.  The  revolution  succeeded,  ushering  in  the  period  of  constitutional 
monarchy in lieu of absolute monarchy. Most contemporary protests, whatever their 
political orientation, end up at this square. The symbolic weight of the place is evident 
among protesters, especially during the movement of the squares.
 The  response  of  the  people  to  these  calls  went  beyond  any  expectation. 
Thousands  of  people,  30,000  according  to  some  estimations  (Giovanopoulos  and 
Mitropoulos 2011: 279) participated in this first rally. On Sunday 29, the first mass rally 
was held, with more than 150,000 gathering in Syntagma square and others gathering 
in  fifty-five  cities158 (Ibid.:  280).  The  following  Sunday,  more  than  half  a  million 
protesters gathered, while more than 10,000 participated in a popular assembly. The 
movement  reached  its  peak on  June  15,  when  the two trade-union confederations 
GSEE and  ADEDY called  a  national  strike.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  determined 
protesters remained in Syntagma square encircling the parliament, while, for the first 
time during the movement, the police used violent means in attempting to disperse the 
protesters. The sense of solidarity displayed by the protesters was impressive. The 
government was on the brink of resignation and started to show clear signs of collapse, 
which finally led to a government reshuffle. Another strike also acted as a landmark, in 
June 28-29, when the mid-term memorandum159 was to be voted in the parliament, and 
GSEE and ADEDY called for a two-day strike. The general assembly of the square and 
the unions issued a joint call  and hundreds of thousands participated. Despite high 
158 Some attempts at  a nationwide coordination among the different assemblies in the squares of  the 
country took place. On June 15 a nationwide call from all cities was issued in Syntagma square, whilst 
in July 9 and 10 a nationwide two-days assembly was conducted, an “Assembly of the assemblies” as 
it  was  called.  Coordination  processes  did  not  manage  to  substantially  link  the  different  squares' 
movements; however, a de-facto coordination did exist, due to the convergence of demands, forms of 
action, organization etc., with the Syntagma square movement playing the leading and pace setter role.
159 A new mid-term agreement bridging the initial and final targets set by the memorandum.
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levels  of  police  repression  and  brutality  the  protesters  proved  being  resilient.  The 
Syntagma square occupation lasted approximately two months, from May 25 until the 
end of July, but it  started to decline after June 30, when the last large protest was 
called  after  the  vote  in  Parliament.  Thousands  of  participants,  celebrities,  but  also 
ordinary  people  from  all  over  the  world,  sent  during  the  movement  messages  of 
solidarity in every imaginable way. On July 30, the state and municipal police forces 
invaded the square, destroying all the facilities. Several efforts to sustain or revive the 
movement afterwards failed.
The  Syntagma  protests  rallied  a  significant  proportion  of  Attica's  population. 
According to both estimates and research by academics and pollsters, more than 2,6 
million people (29% of the entire Greek population) at least passed by Syntagma at 
one or several of the calls during that month (Public Issue 2011). The main core of the 
stable participants, fully committed to the movement and the collective processes of 
any kind, was also significant (according to Kalamvokidis, two to four thousand people 
participated in assemblies and similar structures on a daily basis, in 2012: 7). Massive 
protests were mostly organized on Sundays, whilst thousands of people gathered in 
the square every day for the whole period. The days of general strikes (June 15 and 
28-29)  were  the  major  milestones  for  the  movement.  The  perception  of  the 
mobilizations by Greek society as a whole was also astonishing: more than 80% of the 
people stated approving them or having a positive opinion. The squares' movement 
refuted three axiomatic assumptions of  the dominant  discourse about  protests:  that 
public rage should be expressed only in a short time span; that revolt should be left to 
the young; and finally that protest is simply symbolic (Vradis 2011: 216-7).
As for the composition of the participants, it went clearly beyond the boundaries of 
the  “usual  suspects”  participating  in  social  movements.  A large  proportion  of  the 
participants had no prior experience of mobilizations or even involvement with politics, 
and  they  spanned  all  ages,  coming  from different  social  backgrounds,  origins  and 
professions. In terms of social groups, the participants came from the working class but 
also the petty bourgeoisie and the middle layers affected by the crisis and threatened 
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by proletarianization  and social  downgrading,  or  actually  proletarianized.  This  point 
confirms to a large extend our approach on the class structure and its transformations 
presented in chapter III. In general, this is a movement which had as its active core 
layers of young people from higher education backgrounds, seriously affected by the 
crisis, probably living even before its start in a situation of relative hardship. Although 
this movement was not organized explicitly along class lines, and the class dimension 
was rather underestimated, there was the potential of a social alliance underlying, as 
will  be  later  examined.  As  far  as  the  age  factor  is  concerned,  the  youth  did  not 
dominate but did set a tone in terms of both presence and forms of action.
A general assembly was held every evening since the very first day160. Two main 
political demands dominated its debates: the “cancellation of the memorandums”, and 
particularly  of  the  mid-term  Agreement  to  be  voted  on  June  29,  2011,  and  “real 
democracy”.  The  first  resolution  of  the  general  assembly,  which  served  as  the 
constitutive text, included three crucial points: (1) the identity of the protesters: “we are 
workers,  unemployed,  retirees,  young,  who  have  come  to  Syntagma,  to  fight  and 
struggle for our lives and our future”); (2) their demands: “we won't leave the squares, 
until all those who have led us here go away: the government, the Troika, the banks, 
the memoranda, and all those who exploit us”; and (3) a call to workers to join: “We call 
all workers to go on strike in the following period, and organize protests that will end up 
in  Syntagma and stay there” (First  Amendment 2011;  Mitropoulos 2011:  65-6).  The 
movement  expressed  in  a  salient  way  the  need  for  a  new  form  of  politicization, 
fostering new forms of organization and action and bringing to the surface the deep 
political  crisis  in  society.  This  need  was  also  expressed  through  one  of  its  most 
ambiguous features: the movement was not initiated by political parties or established 
political actors (unions etc.), but by “the people”, or so it was perceived. Its identity was 
therefore perceived as external or even to some extent opposed to political actors. This 
has often led to an opposition to the sheer presence of parties or even unions in the 
160 Actually, the assembly was a reference point mostly for protesters of the “lower square”, a distinction to 
be explained below.
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movement,  a  point  raising significant  issues.  This  is  one of  the core issues of  this 
thesis, to which we will return in detail below.
Returning for a while to the main features of the movement of the squares, this 
was,  as  Giovanopoulos  has  aptly  noted,  first  and  foremost  a  “living  organism” 
(Giovanopoulos 2011a: 41). In addition to the general assembly, thematic assemblies 
and groups were soon organized, and, simultaneously, tents were set up, initiating an 
occupation of the space of the square. In the first two days, more than six-thousand 
people were registered as volunteers for these various groups. A whole range of self-
organized  structures  sprang  up  in  the  square161.  All  these  forms  functioned  via 
assemblies  which  gathered  on a  daily  basis  and  rallied  thousands  of  people.  The 
problems  were  solved  as  they  emerged,  through  open  processes  of  control,  self-
institution  and  work  division,  in  a  horizontal  organizational  way  in  order  to  avoid 
problems of exclusion due to specialization (Giovanopoulos 2011a: 53); however, all 
these operations were far more amenable to organizing self-managed activities than to 
tackle broader issues, such as besieging the Parliament, organizing street blockades 
etc.  Additionally,  the  squares  have  also  been  the  site  of  “a  huge  artistic  event” 
(Stefanakis 2011: 85).  Actors, musicians, dancers, painters, laser and graffiti  artists, 
performers, contributed to a new form of everyday life in the squares. All these events 
conveyed an implicit refutation of the distinction between artists and audience, while 
even solidarity concerts by world-famous artists were performed without  a stage or 
platform. These practices functioned to a great degree in a redemptive and liberating 
way  for  the  participants:  personal  expression  was  stimulated  as  a  constituent 
component of the collective cause.
161 Installations included a first-aid station which was later turned into a proper mini-hospital under the 
responsibility of the metro workers' union; a media centre which also hosted the website www.real-
democracy.gr; an online radio station; a translation centre; a neighbourhood/local organization centre; 
a central organization centre with the technical responsibility for the entire occupation including the 
general  assembly  agenda;  a  performing  arts  centre;  and  several  stations  devoted  to  daily  needs 
(kitchen, cleaning services etc.). In total, nineteen working groups were formed: secretarial support and 
reception;  international  solidarity;  communication/multimedia;  campaigns;  laboratory  of  alternative 
communities/eco-communities;  material  supply/storage;  cleaning/environment;  artists;  translations; 
legal  support;  protest  organization  and  resistance  in  medium-term  plan;  safeguarding  and 
respect/peacemakers; first-aid/health; feeding; technical support; time bank; local assemblies mapping; 
calmness; homeless people. Twelve thematic working groups were also constituted: direct democracy; 
resistance to the medium-term plan; people with disabilities; justice and legal issues; employment and 
unemployment;  social  solidarity;  economy;  education;  politics;  technological  evolutions;  health  and 
insurance; gender (Giovanopoulos and Mitropoulos 2011: 341).
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Moreover, several “open consultation days” were organized, on various issues (the 
debt,  in  June  6  and  10,  direct  democracy,  in  June  17  and  July  7,  and  eco-
communities/transactions without money in June 23). On these days, contributions by 
professionals  and  experts  were  important  in  sustaining  the  campaign  in  terms  of 
information and of a persuasive and firmly based argumentation. However, a certain 
suspicion towards expertise also arose, under the argument of “direct democracy” not 
reproducing experts and buttressing the power implicit in expertise. Furthermore, the 
general assembly tried to ensure a democratic functioning: speakers were selected by 
lot, each one had only a minute and a half at their disposal in order to allow as many as 
possible  to  participate.  Direct  confrontation  between speakers  taking the form of  a 
dialogue was forbidden, and so were clapping and booing. These stipulations entailed 
risks of bureaucratic or even anti-democratic deviations despite the intentions aiming at 
a  more  participatory  and  democratic  process,  and  have  often  led  to  significant 
problems, which will be further examined in section e. Even more interesting than the - 
to a certain extent reasonable - existence of such deviations, is a tendency by some 
participants to deny them and to mythologize those assemblies by presenting them as 
paradigms of “direct democracy”.
All  these  processes  did  not  concern  equally  or  involve  all  the  those  who 
participated in the movement. A certain distinction, already implied, was considered as 
having  emerged  between  two  of  its  constitutive  parts.  This  distinction  was 
conceptualized in spatial terms, between the “upper square” and the “lower square”. 
There were indeed, obvious differences between the two. The “lower square” was the 
place where the more politicized protesters gathered. The general assembly and the 
meetings of the thematic groups were held there, which made it become the epicentre 
for the processes of self-organization and of direct democracy. On the other side, the 
“upper square”, the area in front of the parliament, became the place where the less 
politicized people gathered more spontaneously and in greater numbers. Many of these 
people  were participating  in  protests  for  the first  time,  had less  interest  in  political 
processes  in  the  past,  and  manifested  more  immediate  feelings  of  frustration, 
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indignation, anger or spontaneous reaction to the memorandum policies. Indeed, this 
was reflected in many elements, including slogans162, forms of action163 and even the 
protesters'  outlook164.  The point  raised here refers to the relation between the two. 
There was an obvious discrepancy between the number of people participating in the 
assemblies of  the “lower square” and the mass character  of  the big rallies,  raising 
questions about their broader representativeness. However, as it often happens, such 
structures even if they do not actually represent the whole, contribute to its organization 
and politicization. The “lower square” served such a purpose, without however actually 
functioning  as  a  “vanguard”  for  the  whole  movement.  Interviewee  (I12)  claimed 
characteristically:  “Yes,  the 'lower square'  did help,  and by providing an ideological  
background. In the movement. If only the 'upper' one existed, it would be much more  
unstable. The 'lower' one was the basis. But they did not express the whole movement.  
If  I  think  of  the  people  being  in  the  'upper  square',  well,  I  cannot  say  they  were  
expressed by the 'lower' ones.”165
However the distinction has often been over-emphasized, particularly by politicized 
protesters.  In  many  cases,  they  denigrated  protesters  of  the  upper  square,  for 
supposedly being totally ”non-political”166. This perception, elitist in its origin, ignored 
the potentialities of a situation where, for the first time, those who participated extended 
far beyond the fairly narrow spectrum of usual activists167. Such an approach would 
lead to severe limitations on a movement,  which provided the possibility  of  a new, 
162 “Upper square” protesters used more superficial and less politicized slogans, often including insults, 
such as “Traitors”, “Burn, burn the brothel parliament” etc. whilst the “lower square” ones adopted far 
more political, in the narrow sense, slogans, and insisted on direct democracy terms.
163 “Upper square” protesters generally used whistles, saucepans, handmade instruments of every kind to 
make noise, whilst “lower square” ones employed more conventional forms of action.
164 (I12) characteristically  noted when asked on the distinction:  “If  I  am not  mistaken, there were the 
'upper' ones, those who wanted to express their outbreak, and the 'lower' ones, who were kind of  
intellectuals, they wanted to express themselves with arguments etc.”
165 (I4)  claimed: “Ok, the 'upper  square'  seemed like a temporary festival,  but  the 'lower square'  was 
neither effective nor... there were some people who were thinkers, but they could not offer a cohesion,  
well, how should I say this, a common ground, eh, a common reference point.”
166 On the contrary, as a protester of the upper square noted, the latter had its own procedures, not as 
structured, coherent  and clear, but  equally interesting (stalls,  material,  megaphones,  loudspeakers, 
whistles, placards, motorcycle protests, slogans, banners, lasers, painted faces, artistic interventions); 
constituting what has been aptly termed “a popular liberating feast” (Stavrou 2011: 32). Their demands 
also focused on  anti-systemic,  anti-governmental,  anti-memorandum,  democratic  elements,  though 
uttered in different manners.
167 As for the potentialities, suffice to give the following description, in an upper square protester's words, 
“You could see people of a progressive origin yelling loud “Traitors” [an old slogan of a far-right tint] and 
of  conservative  origins  emotionally  singing  “When  will  the  skies  be  clear”  [a  well-known  Left, 
revolutionary song].” (Stavrou 2011: 35).
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broader, social alliance. This perception of clear-cut distinction did not correspond to 
the actual constitution of the movement. It is true that a number of differences emerged 
separating  these  two  spaces,  which  at  some  points  even  dissociated  into  distinct 
worlds. In terms of discourse, this was particularly striking: an abyss separated the 
sophisticated, political and intellectual discourse of the general assemblies from the 
“football stadium” type of atmosphere of the “upper square”. However, in some cases 
“the  two  squares”  merged,  many  people  passed  through  both,  shared  common 
reflections and basic demands (even if not always identified as such), showed solidarity 
and protected each other against the police168.  Interestingly, some protesters seemed 
to have started by participating in the “upper square” and then gradually migrated to the 
“lower” one169. A duality did exist, but not a polarization (Leontidou 2012: 310). As an 
“upper square” protester claimed, “apart from some 'fanatics' of each square, the vast 
majority of the people participating were in motion and went up and down the stairs all 
the time”  (Stavrou 2011:  37).  The distinction was,  in  reality, more sociological  than 
political.
This distinction has also been relevant to a debate on whether, and to what extent, 
far-right forces actually participated in the movement. This assumption was linked, on 
the one hand, to the perception mentioned above of the profile of the participants of the 
“upper  square”,  and on the other  hand,  to  the use of  Greek flags  by  those same 
participants170. Indeed, the use of patriotic symbols is unusual in protests in Greece. 
They  are  often  being  seen  as  referring  to  nationalist  or  right-wing  political  forces, 
because  of  ideological  connotations  related  to  the  “nation”171.  In  the  squares' 
movement,  Greek symbols and flags appeared at a mass scale for the first  time in 
168 (I29) claimed: “The problem lies in this 'divide and conquer'  attitude, which suits everybody in this  
damn country, and in all  countries I think. We split the people, and instead of being two thousand  
people all together, and say 'the square', we said, 'we are one thousand here and one thousand in the  
lower square'. I did not have such issues, I went to both squares and I did not feel like being cut-off”.
169 According to (I31) (and a relevant story was narrated by I28): “At first, I was wandering around. I sat  
upstairs, and downstairs, everywhere. I have shouted insults towards the politicians, and everything,  
without feeling that there is a problem with this. Gradually, as time went by, I felt that, ok, we've done  
this, let's now go downstairs to make some sense. I felt that the “upper” thing stopped to make sense.”
170 Such conclusions are usually linked to the impressive rise in GD's electoral support after 2012, to be 
dealt with briefly in the next chapters.
171 In the 1940-1944 Resistance against German occupation, left-wing forces and EAM itself extensively 
used both patriotic references and symbols. Defeat of EAM and a sustained effort  by the Right to 
marginalize  the  Left  has  led  it  to  appropriate  for  its  own  interests  such  discourse  and  symbols, 
identifying the Left as external to the “whole national social body”.
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years. This must not lead us to identify these protesters with the far-right. In our view, 
this unusual phenomenon was linked firstly to the fact that new strata were participating 
in protests with no prior experience of such political participation, without being familiar 
with traditional references and symbols of the social and labour movement, and with 
more mainstream political and ideological references. Secondly, the use of the Greek 
flag revealed a deep social (“national”) crisis, structurally destabilizing and affecting the 
entire  social  body  (Kouvelakis  2011b:  145).  It  is  actually  an  indication  of 
disengagement  of  broader  social  strata  from  official  politics  and  narratives  and 
expresses the potential of reconstructing the “people” as a social subject (Sotiris 2011: 
160-1)172.  The fact that the perceived threat, incarnated by the Troika, was to some 
extent external and identified with Germany definitely contributed to the construction of 
this frame with national characteristics and references. This is a major development, 
which affected the very unifying identity of the movement, to be dealt with in the next 
chapters, combined with the outcomes of the fieldwork.
The prior assessment on the disconnection between the use of flags and the far-
right, does not mean that far-right wing forces did not participate at all in the movement, 
particularly  in  the  upper  square.  Their  participation  however  was  neither  tightly 
organized nor hegemonic. Far-right wing forces rarely aim at, or have succeeded in, 
developing practices within social mobilizations, a terrain largely dominated by the Left 
in Greece due to the specificities of its tradition. The far-right has always been more 
directly  linked  with  certain  institutions  and  sectors  of  the  State,  and  its  relative 
autonomy has  been  more  limited.  Its  presence  in  the  movement  was  thus  mainly 
suggested a posteriori, as an aspect of the constant struggle for meaning attribution. 
Whether  the  social  dynamics  of  squares'  movement  are  considered  as  carrying  a 
172 Interviewees' responses on this point are interesting, as will also be examined in the next chapter: 
hesitation prevailed, and most claimed that at the time they did not associate the presence of flags with 
the extreme right but that nowadays they do. The majority did not, or would not, carry a flag, however, 
most of them also claimed not to have a problem with their presence, as expressing a certain unity. 
Indicatively, from an interviewee who clarified himself as not being fond of flags: “Greek flags were 
used because protesters  had differentiated their  position from parties -  because in  most  previous  
protests,  people always participated in party blocks.  While now...  simple people went  down in the  
streets. And there was also at the time a devaluation – much-used word but it is true – the political  
system is devalued, and no one wanted to participate under a party flag. They wanted to be there  
because of what was happening, in Greece, in their lives, and this is how they expressed it. That is  
why this whole... 'Greekness' existed” (I11).
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subversive  dimension,  or  incorporated  into  official  discourses  or  even  exploited  by 
extreme far-wing narratives, depends, to a great extent, on the balance of forces at the 
level  of  the  discursive  struggle  for  the  attribution  of  meaning.  What  has  actually 
emerged in the squares regarding this debate on national symbols is a peculiar “flag 
battle”, during which, instead of opposing Greek flags, protesters carried flags of other 
countries  as  well,  mostly  of  countries  in  which  similar  movements  were  emerging 
(Spain, Portugal etc.). This sort of competition, ended up producing a colorful feast with 
less nationalistic connotations.
Furthermore,  during  the  movement  of  the  squares,  space  was  of  crucial 
importance, in the sense examined in section f of chapter III. As Vradis notes, “every 
incident of collective action is indelibly etched in space […] Every form of collective 
action has an inherent spatiality” (2011: 211). In this case, Syntagma square, as other 
squares in many Greek cities, acted as the meeting point for thousands of protesters. A 
struggle  for  the  domination  over  the  city  centre  unfolded,  which  manifested  the 
spatialized aspect of the social conflict (Poulios et al 2013: 13). Syntagma square faces 
the parliament, surrounded by other government buildings, and functions as a symbol 
of  central  power  structures.  Here,  “the  urban returns  as  the  place  of  collective 
resistance  against  a  political  stratum  that  is  in  crisis,  as  a  space  of  conflict  and 
encounter” (Ibid.). Space itself, and its use was (again) at stake. As Leontidou notes, 
“material spaces are often recurrent: the same spaces are used for different political 
activities through time” (2012: 303). Open air presence becomes a focus for struggle 
itself, a claim and demand, a statement on a different political function, which includes 
citizens,  being  both  seen and  gathered  together in  the  same  place  as  collective 
subjectivities.  Squares  in  Greece  have  always  been  “spaces  of  concentration, 
interaction and socialization”, playing a central role in the life of the city (Mpresta 2011: 
92).  Such  a  focus  on  the  local  space  expresses  a  tendency  towards  the  re-
territorialization of politics.
This point is also relevant to the debate on the “digital” or “virtual” character of 
these movements.  In  our  view, although the role  of  social  media was important,  it 
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consisted mainly in facilitating the organization and the coordination of the movements, 
neither substituting the physical presence, nor expressing a supposed “new era”, in 
which movements would be constituted in virtual rather than in material space. In other 
words,  these media  were  means and  tools  and  not  constituents  of  the  movement 
themselves; this was evident among participants173. Of course, these new means are 
not simply an extension of the old ones; they do actually serve and express a new 
logic,  the  main  element  of  which  being  that  users  are  creators  and  not  simply 
consumers of their own products (Giovanopoulos 2011b: 239-40). This innovation does 
have an impact on the constitution of the movements as well as on the transformation 
of the participants' consciousness. But in reality, social media have supported the re-
territorialization of politics, not worked against it  (Stavrides 2011: 172). Furthermore, 
collective  forms  of  organization  can  basically  emerge  in  material  spaces,  as  a 
necessary condition to forge trust (Leontidou 2012: 307). This is why the police always 
tries to disperse concentrations in space, in many cases rather aggressively, linking 
physical dispersion – rightly – to the dissolution of the movement itself. Occupation as 
a  practice  interrupts,  and  potentially  subverts,  normality,  and  specifically  the 
supposedly “normal” uses of space. Police control and the maintenance of law and 
order is thus aimed at redefining the material and spatial substance of public space and 
its transformation into controlled space, as the material subject of daily life control. In 
other words, spatial control acts as an indicator of its materiality sustained by certain 
usages aiming at disciplining and controlling human activity (Dalakoglou 2011: 222-3). 
This strategy does not simply aim at preventing or dispersing social concentrations, but 
also at hindering their future development. As Butler notes, “social body constitution in 
public  view, and despite those forms of  police and economic power  which seek to 
isolate it again, sets the fundamental terms for future political demands”174 (Butler 2014: 
63-4). Politics, according to Rancière (Rancière 2001), in opposition to the will of the 
173 For  example,  in  a  relevant  debate  in  the  assembly,  the  majority  of  participants  have  positioned 
themselves against the use of electronic consultation. 
174 This “bodification” is identified by protesters as well. This is the argument used by an interviewee to 
claim that  the  “upper  square”  protesters  had a  political  orientation  as  well:  “Their  way  was  more 
'bodified', let's say, an indication of their political character. Of the political devaluation, which in the  
lower square assembly could be imprinted through the texts” (I12).
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police  ordering  bodies  to  “move  along”,  to  simply  circulate  in  space,  “consists  in 
transforming this space of “moving-along” into a space for the appearance of a subject: 
i.e., the people, the workers, the citizens: It consists in refiguring the space, of what 
there is to do there, what is to be seen or named therein”.
To conclude this section, this analysis of the spatial dimension has also lead us to 
name  the  movement  under  discussion  as  the  “squares'  movement”  and  not  the 
“movement  of  the  outraged”,  in  Greek  the  “aganaktismenoi”  in  reference  to  the 
“Spanish Indignados”. This issue has been a semi-open debate on the definition and 
identification  of  the  movement,  both  among  activists  and  researchers.  The  first 
formulation has been selected here for the following four reasons: (1) the location, the 
centrality of Syntagma square and of urban space more generally is of vital importance 
to the constitution of the movement as approached above; (2) the reference to squares 
emphasizes the open and nodal  centre of  material  and virtual  communication,  with 
open-air living and complex activities taking place, a reference to the ancient Greek 
agora,  with  similar  connotations  -  a  link  identified  by  the  protesters  themselves 
(Leontidou 2012: 302); (3) the term “outraged/aganaktismenoi”, though used elsewhere 
(especially in Spain), has a particular connotation in Greek, linked to the activity of far-
right  groups appearing under  the cover  of  “outraged citizens”;  (4)  indignation  as a 
spontaneous reaction united those who gathered in the squares, but soon proved being 
inadequate,  first  and foremost  among the protesters themselves175.  For  these main 
reasons, the term “squares' movement” has been retained. For reasons of accuracy, it 
should however be noted that different approaches of the identity of the movement are 
to be found among protesters,  which are essentially related to their  participation in 
either  the  “upper”  or  the  “lower”  square.  The  latter  firmly  repudiated  the  term 
“outraged”, whilst the former more easily either adopted it, or accepted both terms. This 
element came also as a finding in our field research, in which a few participants of the 
“upper square” hadn’t even heard the term “squares' movement” and referred to it as 
175 One of the most prominent banners hanging in Syntagma square during nearly the whole movement 
declared “we are not outraged, we are determined”.
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“the outraged”. The mainstream media referred to the movement exclusively as “the 
outraged”, a factor that also played a role in shaping its perception.
d. Other forms and structures of the social movement.
Apart  from  the  two  main  forms  examined  above:  strikes  and  the  squares' 
movement, various other forms of protest developed in the period under examination; 
more particularly practices of civil disobedience, local resistances and various thematic 
mobilizations. The most significant initiative of civil disobedience was the movement 
called “I won't pay”, which called on people to refuse to pay the fees for certain public 
services, mainly road tolls but also bus fares and hospital services. The movement 
started in 2008, when the inhabitants living close to a rough and unmaintained road 
refused to pay the toll. Shortly afterwards, following an increase in toll fees all over the 
country despite the problematic state of the roads, the movement generalized. During 
the years 2010-2011, it emerged as one of the main forms of civil resistance, with a 
large part  of  the general  population participating.  The movement  was organized in 
direct democratic forms, through citizens' co-ordinations, and received, in some cases, 
support from institutional actors, mainly local authorities. Later, it spread to other areas 
of  daily  life,  mostly  related  to  access to  beaches  and  public  transport  services.  In 
autumn 2011, after the imposition by the government of a property tax paid through 
electricity bills, the movement spilled to the refusal to pay the bills, and in some cases 
reconnected to the power grid households which, due to non-payment of the bills, had 
been  cut  from  electricity.  This  unauthorized  reconnection  often  involved  the 
participation of employees of the electricity company, who refused to execute orders to 
cut  off electricity and occupied the company’s offices. Participation in those actions 
over the 2010-2011 period was very broad. Concerning the tolls, according to several 
estimates  by  the  companies,  more  than  25%  of  users  refused  to  pay.  These 
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movements were confronted with the repressive attitude of the government and the 
courts which prosecuted hundreds of participants.
The  choice  of  civil  disobedience  as  a  form  of  protest  was  triggered  by  the 
inadequacy of public services and by the economic inability of an growing part of the 
population to pay for the increased fees176. These acts of civil disobedience appeared 
thus as legitimate practices, and led to debates on the judicial system and its inherent 
injustices. This is another case in which a crisis in the legitimacy of the state and its 
mechanisms becomes evident, but also, through mass praxis, is intensified177. Indeed, 
the point  at  which broad sections of  society  consider  that  laws are in  conflict  with 
ethics,  with  their  perception  of  morality,  is  deeply  destabilizing  for  the  normal 
functioning of capitalist societies. In such cases, the foundation of the social contract 
underpinning the  acceptance  and  implementation  of  laws  appears  clearly 
compromised.  According to  Douzinas,  “behind economic  systems and legal  codes, 
there are implicit customs, conventions and habits, a whole social ethos, which allows 
their operation and mitigates their strict and unfair results” (Douzinas 2011a: 58). The 
rupture  of  this  implicit  compact  forces  the  state  to  resort  to  physical  force  and 
repression  to  support  its  function,  thus  further  eroding  its  social  legitimacy178.  The 
reaction to civil disobedience practices by state officials has been Draconian, both in 
terms of repression/persecution, and in terms of the stridency of public debate. This 
response, accompanied by the insistent claim that citizens have an obligation to obey 
the law, amounts to an acknowledgement of its very failure. The government loses its 
legitimacy when mass disobedience does not allow the application of laws (Ibid.: 117). 
The decision to disobey an unjust and unethical law, perceived almost as an obligation 
176 A protester participating in the “I do not pay the tolls” movement, claimed characteristically: “As a logic,  
it was reasonable. People were tired of paying. Yes, we stepped out of the car, even the motorcycle,  
we lifted the bar, or we followed closely the front car and went through the tolls with it. I had absolutely  
no hesitation, I felt no regret for what I was doing, I felt like doing what was absolutely reasonable. And  
the same goes for public transportation, public television, the electricity, yes, everything. In a welfare  
state, all these should be provided... Some times I simply did not have the money to pay, in other  
cases this was my reaction. I felt satisfaction, for not paying” (I11).
177 Engagement in these practices led often directly to illegal and possibly dangerous actions (eg. refusing 
to pay tolls often meant confronting the employees collecting them, or even getting out of the car and 
lifting the barrier).
178 This is reminiscent of Melucci  when noting that “the closer the conflict  advances towards the vital 
nodes of  the system, the  more probable repressive reaction and recourse  to violence become,  if 
political  channels  are  not  able  to  transform  collective pressures  into  reformist  policies  and 
democratization of decision-making.” (Melucci 1989: 371).
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by citizens, transforms them from beings simply subjected to law to real citizens (Ibid.: 
134). This is the reason why state officials have so strenuously opposed such acts.
The other forms of disobedience and protest examined here also present similar 
features. The Keratea rebellion consisted of the residents' reaction to a planned waste 
treatment centre. Although this rebellion had clearly different, and very specific, roots 
and significance (environmental, local, of personal well-being etc.), what is of interest 
here is its correlation to resistances and grievances in the general context of the crisis. 
The emergence and the characteristics of this form of action are firmly linked to the 
broader environment of the crisis. The dispute began back in 1995, and in 2007 the 
municipality of Keratea lost its appeal to the Council of State, despite the fact the area 
was  characterized  as  an  archaeological  site  and  a  “place  of  outstanding  natural 
beauty”. At that point, the residents and the local authorities formed a joint coordinating 
committee for mobilization. In 2008 they prevented the start  of  work on the landfill, 
while developing multiple social, cultural and political initiatives, involving the majority 
of residents. The main protest cycle began in 2010, when the contractors attempted to 
start  the  construction  of  the  waste  treatment  centre.  By  early  2011,  the  area  was 
practically occupied by residents on the one hand and police on the other. The open 
confrontation started on December 10, 2010, and ended 128 days later, in April 18, 
2011. A vast repertoire of action, including street fighting, roadblocks, occupations and 
sabotage, was used during the clashes between the residents and the anti-riot police 
forces (Evaggelinidis 2012: 44). The actions were both violent and inclusive, with the 
majority of residents participating, including high school students and representatives 
of local authorities (the mayor, priest, teachers, etc.). This cycle ended with a partial 
victory of the residents, the project being indefinitely postponed.
The motivations of this protracted movement are unrelated to the crisis and the 
memoranda policies, since its re-emergence is the consequence of the decision of the 
state authorities to start the construction of the waste treatment centre. However, the 
Keratea  rebellion  interacted  with  other  mobilizations  discussed  previously.  Indeed, 
many  of  their  features  do  have  similar  connotations,  especially  in  relation  to 
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perceptions  of  politics,  the  de-legitimization  of  state  institutions  and  the  ability  to 
express  these  feelings  through  collective  mobilization  and  self-organization.  The 
movement included frames related to the crisis. The generalized grievances acted as a 
mean  for  legitimizing  both  the  mobilization  and  the  confrontational  actions  of  the 
residents both in  their  own eyes and in  broader  sections of  the society. Two main 
diagnostic frameworks have been detected: injustice and attribution of responsibility 
(Evaggelinidis 2012: 66). These frameworks, alongside the emotional dynamics of the 
movement  and  solidarity  feelings  and  practices,  were  the  connecting  links  to  the 
broader movements.  Thus,  the movement's development,  its effects on participants 
and its forms of action and organization have resulted in its connection to the broader 
social movement in Greece amid the crisis.
Another  manifestation of  the social  movement  in  the period under  examination 
consisted in disrupting the national day parades, on October 28 2011 all over Greece to 
protest against the austerity measures179.  These actions followed the mass two-day 
strike on October 19 and 20, and a wave of occupations of government buildings by 
labour  movement  activists  which escalated during that  entire month,  leading to an 
almost complete paralysis of public administration. The disruption of parades happened 
across the country. As Kouvelakis (2011c) notes, “The army march past was canceled; 
school delegations, civilians and reservists marched in its place, many with fists raised, 
to the acclaim of the crowd. Slogans taken up by protesters across the country linked 
the ‘No’ of 1940 with the current situation, likening today’s leaders with the wartime 
collaborators;  chants  and  songs  from the  Resistance  mingled  with  those  from the 
mobilization against the military dictatorship, while German and EU flags were burned 
before jubilant crowds. A symbolic threshold had been crossed: for large swathes of 
society, it  seemed that a connection was emerging between the social and national 
elements of the protests, linking the present with popular memory. It was in response to 
this situation that a shaken Papandreou suggested his high-risk referendum initiative, 
179 In October 28, Greece's refusal to surrender to Italian forces, symbolizing the beginning of World War II 
and  the  resistance,  is  nationally  celebrated  each  year.  Parades  by  students  and  the  military  are 
normally organized in all regions and cities.
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which turned out to be fatal.” In certain places, such as in Thessaloniki, the disruption 
had exceptional characteristics hinting at rebellion, and officials were chased from the 
platforms including Karolos Papoulias, the President of the Republic.
The act  of  disrupting national  parades had an obvious ideological  significance, 
since it directly challenged the official narrative on the construction of the nation and 
the people's role in it. The form taken by the action is also significant. Citizens all over 
Greece did not simply protest during the parades, but in most cases turned the parades 
themselves  into  protests,  marching  with  banners  and  shouting  slogans  against 
austerity  measures  and  the  government.  This  action  was  yet  another  example  of 
people taking possession of their history and of past protests, using them to oppose the 
official  narrative.  The  events  of  October  28  2011  led  to  a  deeper  political 
destabilization, with the state and the police trying to re-assert their authority over the 
celebration,  and  mainstream  media  attacking  the  protests  as  “blasphemous”.  The 
debates on national parades continued for  years,  resulting in  a militarization of  the 
celebrations, which, in many cases, led to their complete closure to the public. This 
kind of protest makes evident the character of the political crisis as a “national” one, in 
which  different  interpretations  of  the  function  of  the  society  as  a  whole  come into 
collision. This point confirms our prior estimation, on the more unified pattern of the 
mobilized layers of the society, providing at the same time the perspective of a more 
hegemonic unification under a class dimension in the broader sense, as a potential 
(with exploitation remaining strongly at the forefront of such protests).
A similar  tendency is  also  evident  in  a tactic  employed frequently  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  movement  of  that  period,  i.e.  physical  attacks  against  politicians. 
Provoking wide controversy, these attacks became a concrete expression of  public 
outrage. If,  as Douzinas notes, indignation is an emotional and moral reaction, and 
rage is its moral-political maturation, this rage was personalized against those who are 
thought  to  have  committed  injustices,  by  means  of  verbal  and  physical  attacks 
(Douzinas 2011a: 166-7). This expression of political hostility was not at first motivated 
by personal hatred against the opponent himself, but against his position, a position 
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operating against the interests of the majority of society, and it was a strong indication 
of  the  crisis  of  legitimation  unfolding180.  However,  it  became  eventually  more 
personalized,  and  turned against  those representatives  taking  the most  aggressive 
attitudes against the popular protest, but also, though to a lesser extent,  in general 
against  politicians  of  the  main  systemic  political  parties.  This  type of  action  led  to 
attacks  without  extensive  use  of  violence,  mostly  of  a  verbal  and  symbolically 
humiliating character, such as pelting the targeted person with eggs or yogurt. These 
tactics became so widespread that  those politicians who had become the focus of 
popular anger hesitated before taking a walk in public spaces. It is no coincidence that 
these tactics were most evident at the beginning of the period of crisis. The reasons of 
their decline are twofold: on the one hand, the state and governmental officials made 
strenuous efforts to de-legitimize them, as part of a campaign against “blind forms of 
violence”.  This campaign was to some point  successful,  since these tactics usually 
were individualized, without any collective backing, thus easier to denigrate. On the 
other  hand,  the  gradual  transformation  of  indignation  and  rage  into  more  political 
reactions, based on collective mobilization, and the politicization of the debate and of 
the practices that were adopted, led to a noticeable reduction in the number of that type 
of individualistic and spontaneous acts.
To conclude on this point, the crucial element in all the practices discussed above, 
apart from their common starting points, causes and forms, is the convergence of some 
of  their  specific  features  and  their  relative  unification  into  a  common  mobilization 
against  austerity  measures  imposed  through  the  memorandum  policies.  In  this 
mobilization,  the  perceptions  of  politics,  the  modes  of  self-involvement  and  self-
organization are of particular importance. The moments at which these different forms 
coalesced  were precisely  the  moments  during which  the movement  escalated and 
developed its enhanced potential. The most characteristic example is the fusion of the 
squares' movement with the two general strikes of June and October. Until that point, a 
180 (I38) claimed characteristically, while laughing: “In my mind, in an ideal situation, or anyway, in a good  
situation, a representative of the people does not need police protection. Only against a lunatic! Right?  
But when you see a deputy eating under the protection of the riot police... hahaha... well??”
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debate was going on over the potential of including trade-unions in the movement of 
the squares with one side claiming that the unions antagonized the movement's cause 
and the other trying to build the convergence. The shift in opinion on this crucial issue 
provided a new dynamic to the movement. This shift was largely brought about by the 
successful  intervention of  the most radical elements of the Left,  who systematically 
tried to overcome the initial, and to some degree instinctive, reaction against the trade-
unions and make such a conjunction of forces effective181.
A second element common to all these practices was that their mode of functioning 
was preserved to some extent in the period that followed, a period which was less 
characterized  by  mass  political  protests  moving  centre  stage.  Several  structures 
flourished  based  on  that  logic182.  Some  of  these  initiatives were  projects  of 
neighbourhood  class  reconstruction,  trying  to  build  up  a  response  to  social 
fragmentation  and  unemployment.  Others  consisted  in  forms of  popular/youth  self-
organization  and emancipation,  aimed at  building  “from below”  the  conditions  of  a 
dignified life. They were structured by the principles of contestability, class solidarity 
and of an alternative culture. The impact of the crisis, leading to the marginalization 
and the impoverishment of significant parts of the population, boosted the emergence 
of solidarity structures, with more or less institutionalized features.  Their main slogan 
was “no one should be left alone to face the crisis”, and their key principle was that 
self-organization and participation were the only  way to reclaim a better  life  in  the 
present and in the future (Triantafyllopoulou and Sayas 2012: 9). In other words, “the 
main aim of these initiatives is to create spaces where the local community can search 
for survival paths, fostering also cultural expression and creativity. Some of them focus 
on creating new forms of organizing the unemployed people and the working class at a 
181 Though in overall it seems fair to argue that the Left intervened in the movement of the squares in a 
rather ambivalent way, balancing between the submission to the spontaneity of the movement and an 
external critique, without actually getting implicated, at least not in the sense defined by Marx as the 
need for “the educator [to be] himself educated” (Marx and Engels 1969: 13) – a point to be further  
examined later.
182 Such  as  local  initiatives,  labour  clubs  in  neighbourhoods,  solidarity  structures,  social  clinics  and 
pharmacies, collective kitchens, initiatives against electricity cuts due to unpaid bills, cultural initiatives, 
collectives providing free school lessons to students  in need or lessons of  the Greek language to 
migrants, local assemblies, antifascist initiatives.
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local level, some others mainly on upgrading the life conditions dealing with cultural 
and social issues” (Triantafyllopoulou et al. 2012: 17).
As Poulios et al. underline (2013: 12), the notion of “community” played a decisive 
role in the shaping of these movements. This kind of activism, strongly mediated by 
spatial practices, urban issues and forms of local organization, led to the development 
of  specific  unifying  processes.  Mutual  objectives  coalesced  among  residents  from 
different areas of the city, due to the tangible nature of local issues. Addressing these 
common issues drew diverse actors into common interactions, reinforcing feelings of 
trust and emotional solidarity. It also reduced the feelings of individual insecurity about 
risks  and  helped  in  overcoming  problems  of  collective  action.  Solidarity  indeed 
counters phenomena of escalating social competition, and allows the actors to engage 
into increasingly risky conflicts183. Such practice and experimentation becomes thus a 
way to acquire the basic skills of political agency and knowledge.
This process led to the construction of new frames that created a new common 
collective identity and offered the possibility of gaining support and resonance in the 
public  sphere,  leading  to  the  potential  constitution  of  new  political  subjectivities 
(Arampatzi and Nicholls 2012: 2600-02). In this sense, partial protests, such as the 
local ones, can be a fruitful example of how barriers between political identities can be 
demolished rather than reinforced, acting as a bridge between different actors or even 
political  traditions.  Of  course,  internal  problems  of  organization,  function  and 
coordination have emerged, as well as difficulties in generalizing the confrontation and 
surmounting individual or local barriers, or even problems such as the lack of funding 
or resources. Further, participation in these forms has not been massive, especially in 
the  period  following  the  mobilizations  under  study,  proving  on  the  one  hand  the 
insufficiency  of  decentralized  structures  alone,  in  the  absence  of  processes  in  the 
183 State and governmental  mechanisms have developed a two-fold  strategy  towards such initiatives, 
aiming at either their integration into mainstream, politically innocuous causes (using NGOs, the church 
or municipal initiatives, trying to deprive them of their political and self-managed character), or their 
suppression, often by violent means and with the assistance of the local government power, especially 
in the municipality of Athens.
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central political level,  and on the other hand, the difficulty of a durable commitment 
among participants, extended over larger periods of time.
e.  The expression  of  a  new politicization:  Street  politics  and the 
question of political participation.
“People  came  crying.  People  came  saying:  'I  always  
voted for ND, I had never participated in a protest, and  
now, with all this that is happening, I woke up', and they  
cried  in  front  of  you.  'And  what  was  I  doing  all  these  
years? I stayed on my sofa'. Things that make everything  
come upside down.” (I37).
One of the most interesting elements of the protests of the 2010-2011 two-year 
period  was  their  unification  and  their  transformation  into  something  more  than  an 
aggregation of resistances: these mobilizations became highly politicized in the sense 
of a new mode of politicization. Amid the rapid disintegration of the mainstream political 
forces,  broad sectors of  society started looking for  new forms of  practicing politics, 
separated from, and in certain cases in opposition to, traditional ones. These forms 
expressed a need for a re-appropriation of politics, a need for collective participation, 
for  the  creation  of  public  spaces,  spaces  of  social  experimentation,  of  alternative 
counter-institutions. What is at stake here is a need for a “move to the political”, but not 
in mainstream or institutional terms; a move to politics outside its traditional forms of 
exercise; having street politics as its strong component. This new impulse opens up a 
possibility to reflect anew upon the political, beyond, and in contrast with, the focus of 
conventional  politics  operating  solely  in  the  legal-institutional  sphere.  This  also 
presupposes a whole new type of political practice, rather than the simple intervention 
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within existing mechanisms.  Obviously, a  key point  here is  the definition of  politics 
itself. 
This approach constitutes the main argument of this thesis, and the perspective 
under  which  the  transformation  of  the  consciousness  of  protesters  is  examined. 
Contrary  to  an  hypothesis  of  the  masses  being  against  politics,  or  incapable  of 
exercising it, the approach adopted in this thesis considers the masses indeed capable 
of exercising politics, at all levels of political organization; a theoretical formulation that 
will  be empirically  evaluated in  chapter  V and further  analyzed in  chapter  VI.  This 
capacity  implies  that  the  political  character  of  a  movement  is  not  restricted  to  its 
program or demands, nor to its repertoire of action. According to Rancière, the political 
character of a movement is mainly related to finding spaces of action, of discourse and 
thought, exceeding the mere affirmation of a concrete group (2011: 156-7). It actually 
refers  to  constructing  processes  of  debate  and  praxis,  and  self-organized  spaces, 
pursuing a different  way of  organizing society. In this  respect,  the public  sphere is 
expanded,  and  people's  participation  is  effected  in  less  mediated  ways.  Thus,  the 
political,  in  this  sense,  may  question  even  fundamental  aspects  of  official  politics. 
Protesters, especially in Syntagma square, have managed “to inhabit a public space, 
day and night, and to organize it around a collective political interrogation” (Gourgouris 
2011). From this perspective, Vradis' summing up of events (2011: 215) seems relevant 
in suggesting that, on the one hand, “lower square” protesters, speaking more directly 
of a radical transformation of the governance system and of the way we comprehend 
and live our lives, encapsulated this view of the political. On the other hand, “upper 
square protesters”, contrary to an argument frequently heard about them being non-
political or even anti-political, were actually adopting a more conventional perception of 
politics, addressing their claims to the state and the government. They therefore sought 
a change of policy or even the resignation of the government and its replacement by 
another  one,  without  initially  questioning  the  basic  principles  underlying  the 
conventional concepts of how politics is exercised.
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This perspective however must not be perceived in an absolute way, since the 
political  experience  of  these  actors  transformed  and  radicalized  their  views  and 
perceptions, at least partially. In a poll conducted in July 2011, immediately after the 
movement  of  the squares,  78% claimed to actively  discuss  politics,  with only  21% 
responding negatively. There was also an overall mistrust of the two systemic parties: 
91% of respondents claimed being dissatisfied by the government (PASOK) and 89% 
by  the  main  opposition  (ND),  while  71%  stated  that  neither  a  PASOK  nor  a  ND 
government would be good for the country184 (Public Issue 2011). Therefore, during 
these protests, politics actually returned to the level of daily discourse and debates, 
even among people showing little prior interest in it.  As a participant in the squares 
movement aptly noted, “People were talking politically; and were open to listening to 
every opinion and line of argument” (Stavrou 2011: 36).
This  perception  of  politics  is  far  from  irrelevant  to  the  deep  political  crisis  in 
Greece. This crisis refers specifically to the deadlock and to the contradictions inherent 
to parliamentary democracy as such, but more concretely to its dysfunctioning in the 
contemporary Greek context.  People acted in the way described by Tilly;  when the 
established democratic institutions consistently undermined their own purported role 
and the situation became intolerable for a large proportion of ostensible participants. 
Thus, the only way to act was to step outside the established framework of political 
governance and engage in different practices better able to serve this role (Tilly 1994: 
13). Our field research, to be presented in the next chapter, revealed that participants 
tend to locate the problem in the specific  functioning of  the Greek political  system 
rather than questioning the structure of the system as such, to a greater degree than 
expected. In any case, the movements contributed in the exposure of the fundamental 
flaws of the present political model and the potential of a viable alternative.
184 In the same poll, only 34% thought elections were necessary at the time (although this was a greater 
proportion than previously), whilst 60% responded negatively. Such a response may be interpreted in 
several ways, but is mainly related to the lack of concrete alternatives, the de-legitimation of the official 
political scene, and the weakness of the Left to intervene in this crisis of political representation. It is  
also related to the ideological hegemony of an effort trying to frighten people based on a supposed 
chaos induced by elections.
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The forms of action that were adopted are consistent with this concept of politics. 
The  repertoires  of  action  in  the  protests  involve  what  has  been  called  a  “direct-
democratic action repertoire”, consisting of “mobile phone action call, creation of blogs, 
collection of signatures, launching of referendums, extensive use of youtube, facebook, 
twitter, to expose, communicate and coordinate, public space camping/campaigns. The 
main  characteristic  of  this  form  of  action  is  that  it  is  decisively  decentralized  and 
horizontal. Its adherents are distrustful of political parties, bureaucratic organizations, 
and the system of representation in general. Direct democratic repertoire of action can 
sometimes be conventional, disruptive or violent, but is neither exclusively attached to 
convention, disruption or violence, nor categorically excludes anyone of these forms” 
(Kanellopoulos 2012: 13). One of the much debated novelties of these movements has 
been the use of new means of communication, of social media, of digital means etc. 
This choice is related both to the profile of the actors (people familiar with such tools, 
the youth, workers under a new division of labour and flexible working relations etc.), 
and  to  the  crisis  of  political  representation,  which  has  also  affected  the traditional 
networks of political representation. The logic of those means (their network nature, 
their emphasis on functions from below and the abolition of the distinction between 
transmitter  and receiver)  indeed leads us into a different  world of  organizing social 
relationships.
It is the case that during the movement of the squares, and especially among the 
“lower  square”  participants,  this  perception  has  also  led  to  a  certain  “fetishism  of 
participation”, as Gerbaudo has defined it when referring at the diverse movements of 
the squares (Gerbaudo 2016: 142). This distortion derived from a particular kind of rigid 
proceduralism  characterizing  assemblies,  often  leading  to  a  deadlock  due  to  “the 
stubborn  adherence  to  principles  of  consensus  turning  decision-making  into  an 
extremely  painstaking process”  (Ibid.:  143).  This  has  sometimes led  to  assemblies 
becoming ineffective, constantly running over time, and often incapable of arriving at 
any decisions. In addition, it frequently led to conflicts among participants, on whether 
they should prioritize democracy or efficiency. These limitations have sometimes left a 
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legacy of  disappointment  or  disillusionment  that  participants themselves  have been 
reluctant  to  acknowledge  (Ibid.:  142).  This  “fetishism  of  participation”  failed  to 
acknowledge the limitations in the availability of the actors or in their will to participate 
in  permanent  public  consultation  processes,  due  to  material  (limited  free  time, 
economic problems), ideological and cultural reasons (fatigue, frequently observed in 
mass  mobilization  processes,  individualism  etc.)185 (Mpelantis  2011).  As  Gerbaudo 
noted, “Considering participation the highest of goods, they [activists] have ended up 
developing an unrealistic view of people's effective material possibility to participate, as 
well  as  of  their  desire  to  participate.  While  this  principle  contains  emancipatory 
possibilities, it easily runs the risk of being conjoined with an individualistic drive that 
sees  the  experience  of  individual  participants  as  the  higher  good,  higher  than  the 
commitment to collective decisions” (Gerbaudo 2016: 146). This individualistic drive is 
vividly confirmed in my field work, and will be presented in chapter V. The weaknesses 
of the assembly-model had also to do with the difficulties in applying their mode of 
functioning to larger audiences or over longer time spans. In another vein, assemblies 
have  often  functioned  as  psycho-therapeutic  processes  where  people  felt  able  to 
express  themselves,  share  their  feelings  or  their  thoughts,  independently  of  their 
contribution to a collective cause or their ability to collaborate with others – with the risk 
of “problematic narcissistic implications” (Ibid.: 145). The sense of the political deadlock 
described above, amid the generalized political crisis and the lack of spaces in which 
citizens  felt  they  could  be  heard,  accentuated  their  need  to  express  themselves; 
assemblies often played that role, to the detriment of their organizational outputs.
Despite these critiques and limitations (to be further discussed below), these are 
processes which have indeed contributed in the rearrangement of people's perception 
of politics, and of their own political participation, conceptualizing the political as an 
active  determination.  A  more  participatory  conception  of  politics  was  at  work, 
185 This point was evident in people's perception as well. According to (I5): “This whole thing needs people 
who are very organized, very informed, very selfless, because it needs too much time and effort and  
energy. So it is hard for someone, if she works 10 hours a day, as the average person does, of the  
private  sector  ok,  to  participate  in  all  this.  A student,  an  unemployed,  a  self-employed,  a  public  
employee will participate more.” Simply to add however: “Of course, now that we discuss it and I'm  
thinking of it, all those people are too many, they are probably enough”.
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transforming the ways people position themselves in the broader political field. This is a 
key point for this research, to which we will return in the next two chapters. One last 
point will be raised here, with respect to the relation between the socioeconomic and 
the political level. This debate is relevant, since certain interpretations of the movement 
of the squares have led either to the underestimation of the political factor or to an 
over-politicization that discounts the importance of the economic factor186. With regard 
to its underestimation, the most obvious example comes from purely orthodox Marxist 
approaches, which have often neglected the importance of the political grievances of 
the people and the severity of the crisis in political representation. The analysis of the 
KKE in this whole period characterizes this tendency. The KKE has insisted claiming 
that the whole political  personnel represents the same interests, antagonistic to the 
working class, thus the only cleavage emerging is between the working class and the 
dominant class. This mode of thought has completely underestimated ideology and the 
broader  field  of  the  political,  and  has  ended  up  in  an  approach  where  economic 
interests  are  apparently  directly  reflected at  the  political  level:  thus  the schema of 
“many parties, two policies”,  the one policy supposedly expressed by the KKE and 
representing the working class, and the other one by all the other parties, representing 
the interests of the dominant class. In such an interpretation, the political nature of 
grievances is discounted and fully subordinated to the economic field.
The lack of emphasis on the economic and social crisis on the other hand, often 
originates  from  a  focus  solely  on  democratic  demands  and  organization  (eg. 
Gourgouris  2011;  Xristina  L.  2011).  In  these approaches,  democracy  is  posited as 
simply a moral (or even political, in the narrow sense) imperative, and not in relation to 
social  structures  and  the  economic  base.  This  perception  does  not  simply 
underestimate the socio-economic factors, it also undervalues the depth and impact of 
political and democratic demands. Democracy is not simply a mode of political power 
but a self-transforming process; thus materiality of the socioeconomic relations is not 
186 I  argue  that  this  is  not  actually  an  “either/or”  relationship.  The  perspective  of  this  thesis,  on  the 
dialectical relationship between the economic and the political factor, in which the economic one is the 
determinative in the last instance, and on the role of the political, will further clarify this statement.
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inherently opposed to political ideals of democracy. A higher type of unity between the 
two is necessary, not  as extraneously connected but  as integral  parts of  the same 
whole.  Such  an  approach  may  respond  both  to  the  depth  of  the  crisis  and  the 
complexity  of  mobilization.  This  is  of  course  a  theoretical  challenge.  I  argue  that 
protesters have actually constituted attempts to deal with this challenge, though these 
attempts  have  remained  incomplete.  The  responsibility  for  this  incompleteness  is 
mainly related to the deficiencies of the political organizational forms intervening in the 
movement,  and particularly  of  the Left.  At  this particular  point,  the statement of  an 
elderly interviewee was astonishing in her perception of this linkage between the social 
situation and democracy: “Our contributions for the medicines have increased. So, I do  
not care if a medicine has cheapened, since I pay double the price for it and since my  
salary... if someone looks at my salary, they would spit on it, they would not even touch  
it, and I cannot cope with my life. I must give my whole salary for medications, the  
moment I receive it. Thus... is there a democracy? There is no democracy!” (I7).
Indeed, in my perspective, activists in the movement focused neither exclusively 
on  their  economic  hardships  nor  simply  on  political  demands.  The  latter  held  a 
prominent position, especially in the movement of the squares (much less in strikes, as 
expected),  but  an interesting  linkage between the two seemed to  develop,  both  in 
terms of people's perception of the situation and at the level of demands, discourse, 
and forms of action and organization. The specific relation of these movements to the 
whole field of the economy needs to be clarified. Opposition to the memoranda has 
been  a  key  point,  since  it  encompassed  both  political  and  economic  demands187. 
Frames referring to both the economic and the political context prevailed: the demands 
for  bold  actions  to  improve  the  economic  situation  co-existed  with  opposition  to 
corruption and the hollowing out of contemporary democracy. The broadly known (or 
feared) and denounced by the protesters, role of the IMF had a prominent position 
among the motives for participation. The majority of my interviewees explicitly referred 
187 These demands were quite specific. As (I5) claimed: “In the Grigoropoulos [December 2008] events, 
protests had a more or less symbolic character. Meaning that you did not have a concrete demand.  
While the “outraged” were specifically against the memorandum, they had one, two, three, specific  
demands. This had a more political character... it had the form of demands”.
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negatively to it, while more than a quarter of them mentioned specifically the subjection 
of the country to the IMF as a motive for their participation. According to statements 
that followed a certain pattern, interviewees stated being familiar with IMF policies in 
other countries, and being motivated to participate the moment they heard that the IMF 
would intervene in the country: according to (I10), “I was scared of the IMF. When I  
heard 'IMF' I immediately thought 'madness will prevail'”. 
General political slogans (mainly against the memoranda and the debt) prevailed 
over  direct  labour  ones  (referring  to  wages,  labour  conditions  etc.),  including  the 
investigation of a potential of constructing an alternative strategic goal for the country 
(in the form of “constructing a new Greece”)188. Further, protests did not have an explicit 
class  connotation,  in  the  sense  of  targeting  directly  major  business  interests189: 
frustration  was  primarily  against  politicians,  and  through  them,  against  economic 
interests  which  “are  hidden  behind  them”  (a  pattern  often  repeated  among  the 
interviewees). However, I would not claim that protesters dealt with corruption between 
political and economic interests only in terms of “cheating” or establishing an illegal 
confusion:  there  was  a  deeper  comprehension  of  politicians  expressing  specific 
interests  over  others,  in  terms  of  class  interests,  mainly  articulated  as  a  pattern 
opposing “the rich, those who are above” and “the poor, the people, those who are 
below and exploited”. Another reaction was an assessment that politics as such were 
losing importance: “Economic interests are behind everything! All  those who are up  
there? They are servants of others who hide behind them!” (I19). This constitutes in my 
perspective an existing class dimension. On the other hand, class discourse is indeed 
always latent and indirect in class societies: the main issue at stake is whether this is 
articulated in class consciousness, a point to be explored in the next chapters.
The above relation between economic and political demands is confirmed by my 
fieldwork; forcing me to give here an idea of its findings regarding this specific point. 
188 This was more evident in central political protests, and in the squares' movement par excellence. On 
the contrary, in  strikes in  specific  sectors  or  businesses,  concrete direct  demands were the ones 
motivating the people to go on strike, prevailing over general ones (see footnote 152 for an overview of 
these demands).
189 In the form of older protests, or those of other countries, which targeted directly specific businessmen. 
However, this is also due to a consciousness of the battle as a broader one, interrelated to international 
centres of power.
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According to the vast majority of participants, their initial motives for participating were 
the worsening of their economic and social situation and opposition to the memoranda. 
(I27) claimed characteristically: “Let me tell you this. If the situation did not touch on  
people's wallets and their lives, nothing would happen. … Because in the end of the  
day, everything is about how we live. If we live ok, we do not care. If we do not live ok,  
then everything is discussed. This whole debate, of how will we change, comes from  
the fact that our lives are awful, in conclusion.” For (I28), people protested “against the 
memoranda of course. And against the government,  and against all  the things that  
those people voted for, and those laws they applied in detriment of those protesting.  
This was it. The rage that they had at least something in common. After all, everyone  
participating, regardless their political ideology, suffered. Some more, some less, but  
they all suffered from these specific policies and they went out in the streets to express  
it.”  Three main  reasons seem to  have sustained  participation:  (1)  the  continuously 
deteriorating  economic  situation190;  (2)  massiveness  and  innovation  in  protests 
combined with a sense that things might actually change; and (3) the broader political 
dissatisfaction.  Further,  economic  demands  constituted an initial  explicit  motivation, 
while political ones followed. This is a pattern that is repeated in many interviews191, 
creating a very interesting potential for a unification on a higher level of economic and 
political demands. This point is also evident in the various structures of organization 
(solidarity networks, working groups etc.), which have deliberately included both the 
need for a concrete, material response to people's actual needs, and another concept 
of  participation  and  self-organization,  leading  to  a  dialectical  transcendence  of  the 
distinction between the social and the political.
The political representations emerging in the following period also confirm such a 
claim, since the strengthening of the Left (basically through support for SYRIZA192), has 
expressed both the people's need for an alternative political plan, including “political 
190 According to (I7), “For four years now, we go through the same torture. And instead of getting better, it  
gets worse. We've lost our patience, we've lost our laughter, everybody is sad, others take medication,  
others are have mental health issues. This is not nice. This thing. Something must be done eventually.”
191 Indicatively, clearly in I1, I8, I10, I11, I16, I19, I23, I27, I28.
192 Partisan representations have not been in the core interest  of this research. However, certain key 
points will be examined in the next chapters and in the conclusions.
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purification”, and fairer policies on the socio-economic level, reducing exploitation and 
inequalities.  The  social  cleavages that  have been produced  after  the  mobilizations 
under study, also confirm, in our view, the intensification of the class features of social 
polarization, peaking in the conduct of the referendum in 2015. Of course, this has not 
been  a  linear  process:  on  the  contrary,  it  has  consisted  of  a  path  beset  by 
controversies, contradictions, containments and reversals. These problems are clearly 
linked to two key factors: on the one hand, the central political developments, and, on 
the other hand, the weakness of the organized trade-union movement and its inability 
to play a leading role over the whole of this period, it being the most directly class-
oriented force. These are points to which I intend to return.
To conclude this chapter, these movements re-established a feeling of ordinary 
people getting an opportunity to participate in political life, together with the exercise of 
politics  in  a  new  way.  This  is  a  rather  revolutionary  concept  of  politics,  in  which 
movements  function  as  social  laboratories,  allocating  space  for  social  interaction, 
experimenting with new ideas and innovative social norms and codes, coming into live 
contact  with  creative  and  collective  processes.  Movement  activists  have  had  the 
opportunity  to  explore  the  concrete  effects  of  contesting  established  norms  while 
simultaneously testing new ones (Della Porta 2009: 20). This point refers both to the 
exacerbation of the crisis of political representation, of legitimation of the state and the 
institutions  (its  depth  to  be proven in  detail  in  my fieldwork,  presented in  the next 
chapter),  and to the material  formulation  of  alternative  ways of  conducting  politics. 
Citizens  become this  way  active  rather  than passive,  they  re-establish  their  social 
identities bringing concrete political results. As Douzinas notes, “What [the Syntagma 
movement] has left is that it has reversed citizens' passivity, their belief, that is, that 
democracy and politics are effected somewhere else, outside of our lives, and change 
nothing” (Douzinas 2012). This assessment means, first and foremost, a repudiation of 
the  notions  that  define  politics  as  only  existing  in  their  official  and  institutionalized 
forms.  On the contrary, politics  are  conceived in  a  broader, thus more proper  and 
substantial, meaning.
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Bearing these remarks in mind, and having examined in detail the movements of 
the chosen period and their concrete features, I shall now pass on to the analysis of the 
findings of the field research I conducted through interviews with participants of these 
movements. These interviews aimed at empirically exploring the extent and depth of 
the  issues  posited:  the  importance  of  political  participation;  the  perception  of  the 
political; its connection with the crisis of political representation and the extent of the 
crisis of legitimation of the state and its apparatuses. The aim was to explore both the 
crisis of hegemony of capitalism in Greece and the potential for new ways of social and 
political  engagement.  Most  importantly, I  intended to investigate the role of  political 
participation  in  movements  in  the  transformation  of  people's  consciousness.  The 
theoretical connotations of this point will be further explored in chapter VI.
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CHAPTER  V:  POLITICAL  PARTICIPATION  AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS  TRANSFORMATION.  THE  OUTCOMES  OF 
THE FIELD RESEARCH
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  have  presented  and  examined  in  detail  the  social 
movements that developed in Greece during the first period of the crisis, in all their 
forms and features, placing emphasis on the question of political participation. In this 
fifth  chapter  of  the thesis,  I  will  present  my field work and its  outcomes.  This  first 
section will start with some remarks about the methodology, including the presentation 
of the main features of the fieldwork, a brief discussion about qualitative research in 
general and the reasons it was chosen, as well as a presentation of my sample. In the 
section that follows, before considering the analysis of the basic data from my field 
research,  I  will  present  some  initial  results  on  political  determination  and  identity 
attribution, which are relevant regarding the question of perceiving the political by the 
people.  Subsequently,  I  will  analyze  responses  related  to  political  participation  in 
movements,  including motivation,  subsequent  involvement  after  a first  participation, 
and a general overview on certain issues connected with participation (use of violence, 
existence of social discrimination). In the fourth section of the chapter I will discuss the 
extent and depth of the delegitimation of the political system, as became evident from 
the interviews, including the extent this involved both systemic parties and the Left. 
Then,  I  will  deal  with  similar  perspectives relating  to the state and the institutions, 
including the police, official trade-unionism, the media and the EU. Section e presents 
the  results  of  posing  the  question  of  consciousness  transformation  directly  to 
participants  in  interviews,  regarding  participation  per  se  and  its  effects  on  various 
levels. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I will examine the political perspective 
of participation, in respect to an allegedly inevitable institutionalization of conflict, the 
formation of a political alternative and the role of political forms in this process.
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a. Methodological remarks and sample.
Starting  with  an  explanation  of  the  methodology  of  my  research,  the  data 
presented below are extracted from a body of field research that included 40 semi-
structured  interviews,  conducted  in  the  years  2013  and  2014193.  Before  the 
presentation of the data, it should be noted that the time context of the interviews was 
obviously a major factor influencing the tendencies and findings presented here. The 
period from spring 2012 until the parliamentary elections in early 2015 was defined by 
a shift  in  the confrontation with  the authorities and in  people’s expectations  at  the 
parliamentary level, combined with the worsening of the socio-political situation and a 
relative decline in  the activity  of  movements.  This  period was characterized by the 
development of individualistic tendencies among the public and the implementation of 
neoliberal measures by the authorities together with the intensification of the social and 
economic  deadlock.  There  was  also  a  sharpening  and  hardening  of  governmental 
attitudes and actions, breaching the accepted democratic consensus in Greece and 
sometimes leading to undemocratic deviations.
The presentation that follows should be read bearing these elements in mind. In 
choosing the topic and the methodology for this thesis, the nature of the chronological 
context for the interviews and the effect this might have, was, of course, taken into 
consideration. This has been one of the parameters in defining the research targets of 
the  present  study.  Since  our  main  objective  is  the  examination  of  consciousness 
transformation in relation to political participation, it  was crucial to examine the self-
evaluation  of  this  transformation  in  the  period  after the  rise  and  escalation  of 
movements, when feelings aroused by the intensity, optimism and emotional upheaval 
of the events had settled. On the other hand, there was also the danger of this being a 
period  of  extreme  pessimism,  disillusionment  in  the  strength  and  importance  of 
movements  and  their  effects,  and  a  shift  in  attention  and  emphasis  to  different 
193 For the conduct of this research, full ethical approval was granted by the Research Ethics Committee, 
approval number REP-H/12/13- 26.
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processes (the elections, the official political scene etc.). All these factors must be kept 
in mind when evaluating the results of this qualitative research. However, it should be 
stated  right  from  the  outset  that,  despite  the  existence  of  these  tendencies,  the 
participants'  evaluation  of  movements  and  their  effects  were  more  positive  than 
expected.
Further, the methodology chosen did not  aim at  a quantitative approach which 
although  statistically  measurable,  would  have  failed  to  differentiate  the  population 
studied194.  In  contrast,  the  sample  was  chosen so  as  to  provide an opportunity  to 
investigate  forms  and  effects  of  political  participation;  interviewing  people  who 
belonged  to  different  social  groups,  especially  with  reference  to  their  previous 
participation  and  engagement.  More  specifically,  the  crucial  point  of  this  research 
concerns the study of various forms of political participation and the transformation of 
people's  consciousness  in  relation  to  this  participation  and  experience  (particularly 
regarding the objective circumstances, their own social position in society, and ways of 
conceptualizing the “political”). I am specifically interested in the development of new 
relationships between people and politics and in their relationship with various forms of 
political  representation (either  existing or  emerging).  Thus,  the sample was chosen 
focusing on people with little or no prior relationship to politics and activism, and, more 
specifically,  non-members  of  political  organizations  or  parties  at  the  time  of  their 
participation (and, for the vast majority, nor when the interview was conducted). This 
criterion ensured that the interviewees had participated in movements from personal 
motivation  and  not  due  to  allegiance  to  any  political  group.  It  also  provided  the 
opportunity  to  study  the  transformational  effects  of  participation,  since  the  chosen 
sample had come to participation as a relatively new experience.
Therefore, I chose to use a qualitative methodology in the light of the nature of the 
research question and my particular approach to it. This research is basically targeted 
at  investigating  and  understanding  non-countable  and  non-quantifiable  elements  of 
social  phenomena  and  of  social  behaviour  (Hay  2000).  On  the  other  hand,  as 
194 I  support  the  claim  that  quantitative  research  involves  important  limitations,  which  prevent  the 
acquirement of detailed elements, in comparison to qualitative analysis (Kasimati 2004).
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suggested in the Introduction of the thesis, and to avoid a strictly empirical approach, 
data  from  the  interviews,  personal  representations  and  individual  meanings  are 
examined in parallel and relation to the particular context in which they are posited, the 
particular socio-economic and political conditions and mechanisms which produce and 
reproduce social reality (Apostolopoulou 2009: 41). Further, individual consciousness is 
approached as interwoven with and reflecting each individual's position in the broader 
social organization and dominant ideology; and not as if  they existed independently 
from these crucial factors.
The  main  technique  employed  included  the  conduct  of  in-depth  interviews 
involving  a  number  of  both  general  and  more  concrete  questions  on  issues 
predetermined by the researcher, without a strict order or formulation. The researcher's 
presence was helpful to the respondent (to clarify the question or her thought etc.) and 
to provide slight guidance where necessary (Paraskevopoulou-Kollia 2008). The semi-
structured form of the interviews allowed the deepening of particular theoretical points 
in the course of individual interviews and from one interview to another, creating a 
reflexive process for the researcher as well.  Thus,  the interview structure remained 
flexible,  the  questions  were  quite  broad  and  the  questionnaires  were  readjusted 
throughout the period of the interviews195, whilst discussion with the respondent was 
relatively  free  to  transcend  the  limits  of  a  stricter,  conventional  approach,  without 
compromising its basic targets (Apostolopoulou and Pantis 2010: 986). We took pains 
to avoid replicating or confirming a preconceived pattern, in which interviews would 
simply  validate  a  theoretical  schema  already  consciously  or  unconsciously  in  the 
researcher's mind. On the contrary, theory was constructed progressively, in parallel 
with data analysis, and the main conclusions of the research, and its specific focus, 
were formulated during the research itself.  According to Maxwell,  far from simply a 
source of additional concepts for the theory, this method provides the researcher with 
an understanding of the meaning that these phenomena and events have for the actors 
who are involved in them, and the perspectives that inform their actions (Maxwell 2008: 
195 Therefore, a part of data analysis was conducted simultaneously with data collection (Maxwell 2008: 
236).
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228). In data elaboration, microanalysis formed the first  step in order to locate and 
efficiently  develop  the  range  of  potential  meanings  emerging  from  the  interviews 
(Apostolopoulou and Pantis 2010: 988). Subsequently, a stage of analytical elaboration 
enabled the identification of relationships with the broader socio-political environment. 
Codification  in  data analysis  was made according to the method of  data grouping, 
following the main axes of the research questions of interest, in order to form specific 
categories/frames.  After  defining  thematic  categories  based  on  our  main  research 
questions,  the  whole  material  from  the  interviews  was  re-elaborated  from  the 
perspective  of  each  separate  category, and  then  re-categorized  under  these  main 
categories. Thus an open-coding approach helped to progressively identify key themes 
and sub-themes. This was a challenging process: frame analysis is a useful method for 
investigating multiple interpretations, nevertheless categorization and analysis present 
several  obstacles  to  be  overcome,  including  both  unconsciously  imposing  the 
researcher's point of view, and missing the central axis and target of the research, thus 
losing  orientation  within  a  chaos  of  data.  These  challenges  were  successfully 
overcome by  a combination  of  methods:  formulating  main  frames according to  the 
basic  research  question,  encouraging  respondents  to  prioritize  the  most  important 
elements by themselves,  constantly  clearing off  data which seemed interesting but 
could not be inserted in the main frames of interest196 etc. At the same time, in the 
transcription and the elaboration of  interviews,  particular  attention was given to the 
extra-verbal  communication,  interviewees'  reactions,  hesitations,  difficulties  in 
understanding or responding to certain questions, misunderstandings, perplexity etc.
In terms of  constituting the sample,  the main strategy followed was purposeful 
sampling: “a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately 
selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well 
196 At this point, it should be noted that interviews were scheduled to last forty-five minutes to one hour, 
but  there  was  a  previously  unexpected  willingness  on  the  part  of  respondents  to  continue  the 
discussion, to recall memories, to narrate stories and to deviate from the main axes of the discussion. 
This finding is discussed below and is quite interesting. Many interviewees expressed very positive 
personal feelings about that period, and said they enjoyed talking about it: indicatively, in the end of the 
interviews, the vast majority did not let me thank them; instead, many thanked me back for giving them 
the opportunity to remember/think/speak of the time. Eg. (I12): “No, no, it was my pleasure, this was  
one of my happiest periods, and for me the interview was a chance to speak, to express my opinion,  
and I am glad that there is someone to listen to it”.
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from other choices” (Maxwell 2008: 235). The technique employed went as follows: I 
started by finding a sufficient first circle of people using my personal contacts and by 
broadly circulating a “Call For Interview” via emails and social networks. In a similar 
fashion, I contacted several social centres, working clubs and unions in working places, 
active during the strikes I was interested in, and other scholars who were working on 
similar  subjects  and  had  conducted  interviews  with  members  of  committees  in 
local/civil disobedience movements etc. In the suite, using the “snowball technique”, I 
asked people I interviewed to recommend other acquaintances to me. Being aware of 
the limitations of this technique (mainly that the recruited participants are likely to come 
from the same network, have similar motivations for participation and views), I avoided 
using multiple recommendations from the same person (in most cases, I asked each 
person to recommend one contact, and no more). Moreover, since the study covers 
different movements in the context of a certain period, I tried to find people that had 
participated  in  a  range  of  different  movements,  focusing  mostly  on  the  squares' 
movement (whose main characteristics are significantly associated with my research 
questions),  and, secondarily, in the various strikes taking place during the period in 
question. Finally, I have chosen to present the findings from the interviews uniformly, 
without distinguishing among interviewees participating in different forms of the social 
movement of the period (and mainly between those participating in strikes and in the 
squares'  movement).  This  choice  is  mainly  due  to  two  reasons:  firstly,  the  overall 
perspective of this thesis wishes to cope with movements in a rather uniform manner, 
identifying common patterns in relation to our main questions. Secondly, because of 
the character of the interviewees (people with no prior organized political engagement), 
most of them have participated simultaneously in most different forms (eg. strikers who 
were  also  active  in  the  squares'  movement)  and  have  elaborated  on  the  various 
questions during the interviews based on this uniform experience.
Of  course,  even  though  in  qualitative  methodology  we  are  not  interested  in 
quantitative figures and a proportional distribution of the sample, I have tried to achieve 
a relative representativeness, with respect to gender, age group, education level and 
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region of residence (as related to class position)197. Having said that, I did not attempt 
to represent all categories, but rather those of greater prominence in the composition of 
what we could call “the Greek people” (mostly in terms of class structure and education 
level) and those particularly significant for my research. Thus, as far as age groups are 
concerned, I mostly focused on the group aged 26-35, since younger people played an 
important role, both in the movements and in the emergence of new relationships with 
politics, and those 36-45/46-55, representing those strata formed in the context of the 
relative stability of the period 1990-2000 and now facing a virtually total collapse, not 
only in their way of life, but also in their conceptions of political representation.
Finally, anonymity was respected, though the vast majority of the interviewees did 
not ask for it, or even stated, when informed that the interviews would be anonymous, 
that they didn't mind either way. Some indicative, categorized figures of the sample are 
presented below, in Tables 1-5198:
GENDER NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES
Female 18
Male 22
Table 1: Gender distribution of the sample






Table 2: Age distribution of the sample
197 In  the  sense  that  in  qualitative  methodology  we  do  ensure  that  chosen  respondents  constitute 
characteristic,  typical  cases  and  represent  the  main  categories  of  the  population  –  or  the  main 
categories of interest for the research (Kedraka 2008: 2).
198 All the data are presented in detail in the Appendix.
191





Post-graduates (Master and PhD graduates) 8
Table 3: Education level of the sample







Table 4: Working status of the sample
REGION OF RESIDENCE NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES
Wider centre of Athens 11
In dilapidated suburbs of the broader centre 6
Western suburbs 8




Table 5: Region of residence of the sample
Given the data and requirements of my research, this sample can be considered 
as satisfactory. Data saturation, in the sense of finding frequencies in responses and 
recycling same concepts, started to grow after approximately thirty interviews. Lastly, 
the sample does not simply validate the representativeness, but is also indicative of the 
strata that participated in the movements and were willing to participate in relevant 
research  (explaining  in  part  a  greater  enthusiasm  regarding  participation  among 
interviewees). Thus, the over-representation of the youth for example is less a sign of 
bias in the research and more a sign of the strata that considered it more useful to 
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participate, both in the movement and in such a study. Moreover, participants' class 
position  is  a  reflection  of  the  current  class  structure  of  the  society  and  the  class 
composition of the movements, considering of course that this sample concerns those 
who  have  participated  in  the  movements,  and  not  society  as  a  whole.  Two  main 
elements of over-representation resulted from the above sampling: firstly, there is a 
significant proportion of the unemployed and of precarious workers. Secondly, there is 
an over-representation of university graduates (twenty-three out of forty) and even of 
people holding masters and PhDs (postgraduate studies), who are twice as numerous 
as those coming just from primary education backgrounds (eight against three). These 
two points are significant for studying the class composition of participants, in relation 
to the Greek class structure as presented in chapter III, to be dealt with in more detail 
later.
b. Political self-determination and identity attribution.
Before considering the concrete analysis of the data collected in the main corps of 
the interviews, it is interesting to study the answers given in the question referring to 
political  self-determination.  The  question  was  specifically:  “Speaking  of  politics  in  
general, where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 10, if 1 is the extreme left  
and  10  is  the  extreme-right?”.  This  is  a  relatively  simple  and  typical  question  in 
questionnaires, related to sample distribution rather than the main objective of each 
research. However, interesting conclusions can be elicited at this point. Firstly, there 
was  a  significant  reluctance  to  answer  the  question.  Some  participants  claimed 
difficulty in positioning themselves, others rejected having a label or identity attributed 
to them, while others questioned the definition itself and the distinction between the 
Left  and  the  Right,  and  a  few  declined  to  answer  from  an  ultra-Left/anarchist 
perspective.  Many  even  expressed  annoyance:  “Nowhere!  Don't  put  me  in  these  
things!”  (I15).  This  finding  is  thought  to  be  related  to  the  broad  crisis  of  political 
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representation, and is revealing about the depth of this crisis at the time, since the 
existing political identities, once accepted as given norms and reference points,  are 
now under challenge and appear ever more tenuous. At the same time, no new such 
identities seem to be created. 
Secondly, when eventually responding, most participants tended to self-position 
themselves  towards  the left  side  of  the  scale;  to  a  larger  extent  than  my general 
evaluation of their political perspective from the whole interview would have indicated. 
In short, they tended to consider themselves more easily as part of the broader Left 
spectrum199. This is due to many factors related to concrete features of the Greek social 
formation at the social, political and historical level. Prominent among these is a strong 
left  historical  narrative  that  has  influenced  Greek  society  and  especially  its  more 
militant sectors, a relative hegemony of the Left  in certain sectors of society200,  the 
centrality of the leftist culture and ideology, a broad social legitimation of the militant, 
combative and partly confrontational character of the Left, and a strong division and 
political polarization of society historically still, to an extent, reproducing the legitimation 
of its militant character.
In the same vein, similar difficulties were revealed about stating in which social 
class participants would place themselves. Most  felt  confused when asked, tried to 
clarify the meaning of the question or expressed difficulty in responding. Many gave 
vague answers tending to describe a broader category than the one defined by class, 
mainly as “workers”. Indicatively, (I1) responded “I don't know – in the one most of us 
are  in  maybe?”. Further,  it  was  far  easier  to  state  being  a  “worker”  than  a 
“proletarian/member of  the working class”201.  Unemployment was the most  concrete 
199 See Table 1 in the Appendix for the analytical figures.  Aside the fact  that none of  the participants 
posited herself in the scale 7-10 -towards the Right- (a fact which is however quite expected, especially 
since the answers refer to the identity participants chose to attribute to themselves, and especially in 
the context of a research like this one), the answers were as follows (though, in some cases, with 
significant hesitance):  1 (5),  2 (3),  3 (8),  4 (2),  5 (9),  6 (2),  left-wing in general  (3),  anarchist  (1), 
resisting any classification (7).
200 This refers to particularly those related to social mobilization, a point that partly explains the weakness 
of  the  far-right  and  of  the  fascist  GD  in  acquiring  an  important  reference  to  the  streets  and  to 
movementist processes.
201 It should be kept in mind that in Greek there is a distinction in terminology between the more general 
term “worker”  [ergazomenos]  and the  more  concrete  “member of  the  working  class”  [ergatis],  the 
second referring directly to a leftist terminology and not broadly used. The second also refers almost 
exclusively to manual labour, perhaps even more than a sense of belonging to the working class. It is 
therefore inconceivable for a “white collar” worker to define herself as an [ergatis]. 
194
category  to  be  easily  stated,  and  most  participants  focused  on  working  conditions 
rather than class identity (salaried, self-employed, employer etc.). These findings show, 
in our view, an underestimation of certain analytical tools, used basically by the Left 
(even of class analysis itself), in people's perception. This is due to three main reasons; 
firstly,  the  dominance  of  the  neoliberal  ideology  in  the  1990s'  which  worked 
methodically  on deconstructing class theory. Secondly, the insistence of  the Left  in 
using  what  is  thought  to  be  “stereotyped  language”,  which  has  led  to  a  certain 
underestimation  of  some  of  its  analytical  tools,  both  in  terms  of  discourse  and 
analysis202. And thirdly, the relatively low weight of the organized trade-union and labour 
movement  in  the  protests,  along  with  its  deficiencies  as  examined  in  the  previous 
chapters.  Indeed,  this  is  the  only  component  of  the  movement  explicitly  organized 
along class lines, and its more active presence as such would have influenced the 
identity,  discourse  and  orientation  of  the  whole  movement  in  terms  of  its  class 
dimension.  However,  even  if  not  used  as  such  in  terms  of  discourse,  the  actual 
meaning  of  what  class  theory  defines  is  reflected  as  indirect  descriptions  in  most 
participants' views. For example, a large proportion of them refer explicitly or implicitly 
to exploitation, or to an identity based on those who come “from below”.
This  difficulty  in  adopting  an  identity  was  obvious  during  the  whole  set  of 
interviews. To the question “As for your own participation, did you feel to participate on  
the  basis  of  an  identity?  As  a  Greek,  a  leftist,  a  worker?  Another?”,  the  majority 
responded negatively. Almost everybody stated their participation as “a citizen”, or as 
“an individual”. Some also included their identity as “workers”; these answers coming 
mainly from wage labourers, or those working under precarious conditions, but also by 
some self-employed (I6, I7, I9, I13 etc.). Such reluctance is related to a weakness in 
describing a common identity in strict terms: eg, (I36) responded “as a simple person”, 
whilst (I28) stated to have participated “as an aggrieved and desperate and indignant”. 
202 This is certainly  changeable based on political  participation.  A participant  who had no relationship 
whatsoever  with  politics,  and considered herself  being  deeply  politicized through her  participation, 
claimed when speaking of her past: “I thought that there are certain words, which are used again and  
again, without me being able to... to bring them in my life, in my reality, words that I now understand...  
For example, “class struggle”! It was like a key-word, but without me understanding its meaning. Today 
I don't consider it as a mistaken expression, on the contrary. Back then, I could not understand it. I  
didn't have the information. So everytime I heard it, I felt really annoyed!”
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(I33) stated characteristically the main reason why adopting such an identity seemed 
problematic:  “If  I  chose an identity besides the one of  a citizen, I  would segregate  
participants, as if saying that some people should not have participated or that some  
people are unaffected by the situation”. These findings confirm the need for unification 
(of participants and not of the society as a whole, based on the need to avoid internal 
fragmentation in various levels), but mostly the prevalence of a certain individualism in 
the popular perception (consistent with Gerbaudo's findings, in 2016: 146, presented in 
chapter  IV).  This  was  evident  in  the  whole  atmosphere  of  most  interviews:  while 
participants spoke highly  of  political  participation  and of  the  movements,  they  also 
seemed to have internalized important aspects of the neoliberal ideology with respect 
to individualism and “personal freedom”. This emerged as a core value for them, and 
the majority  emphasized the importance of  their  personal  freedom being respected 
concerning their decision to participate in the movements. This was one of the main 
reasons they gave for deciding to participate in the movement of the squares, when 
opposed  to  the  other  ones  (namely,  that  they  felt  their  personal  autonomy  to  be 
respected). Furthermore, in this question it generally seemed easier for participants to 
adopt a vague political identity (mainly, “leftist”), than that of a concrete social position 
(eg. as a member of the working class), confirming an underestimation of the class 
dimension in people's minds.
As for national identity, in general it was less emphasized than expected. It was not 
easily adopted, and very few stated they felt they were participating in the movements 
as  Greeks203.  Such  an  identity,  as  an  active  determination,  was  relatively  easily 
associated with fascism/racism and particularly  with GD by many. This  is  evidently 
related to the concrete period of the interviews, characterized by a significant rise in the 
popularity of GD and a degree of polarization in Greek society204. It is indicative that, 
203 One of those few who most clearly stated participating as Greek and a patriot,  also expressed his 
preference for GD (I17). Others adopted Greek identity, but as a natural assessment rather than an 
active denotation.
204 There  is  a  large  debate  on  whether  GD was strengthened by  the  squares'  movement.  We have 
opposed the claim that  GD has intervened in  the  movement  as such,  in  section c  of  chapter  IV. 
However, the question  on whether  it  has subsequently  increased its  electoral  audience is  a  quite 
different one. A faction of all those people that have participated in some degree in the movement of  
the  squares  have  turned  towards  GD,  mainly  because  of  its  anti-memorandum  rhetoric  and  its 
denunciation of the whole political system as such, two points that have been hegemonic in the popular 
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when asked, participants acknowledged this attribution as an a posteriori one (saying 
that at the time they did not consider flags and national slogans as related to GD, 
unlike the time of the interview). Many tended to identify the question with a part of the 
interview dealing with fascism in Greece, though I took pains not to pose the question 
in  a phase when this  linkage could be easily  made205.  Nevertheless,  most  of  them 
disagreed  with  the  expulsion  of  people  displaying  national  symbols  from  the 
manifestations.  They  did  not  consider  them  as  a  priori  competing  groups;  on  the 
contrary, some of them said that they understood the need to participate with national 
symbols, mostly as an indication of a unified social mobilization.
One final remark on identity attribution should be made at this point. There was a 
certain  hesitation  among  participants  to  identify  themselves  as  organic  or  active 
members of  the movement,  mainly  due to a certain self-effacement  regarding their 
contribution, rather than a desire to distance themselves from the movement. In the 
relevant question (“Did you feel like an active part of the movement or did you mostly  
participate as an observer?”), only the most active ones identified themselves as such. 
Still, even those who I evaluated, from their overall image during the interview, as fairly 
organic  members,  tended  to  underestimate  the  importance  of  their  personal 
contribution.  This finding is symptomatic  of  the difficulty people felt  in  feeling firmly 
positioning within a collective identity, leading to a need to distance themselves in order 
to preserve certain individualistic values, as discussed in the findings above. Evidently, 
participants also thought of their participation as having a temporary nature, rather than 
signaling  the  start  of  a  more  durable  commitment.  This  reluctance  in  commitment 
tended finally to reproduce the distinction between experts and followers, a well-known 
stereotype in politics. Of course, such depictions of the dominant ideology would be 
evident in participants in movements. One of the main aims of this thesis is to examine 
their transformation through political participation, its steps and grounds as well as its 
perception of the fundamental problematic of the Greek situation. However, this turning towards GD 
has multiple parameters and cannot be easily or directly attributed to the movements (including the 
crisis of political representation, subjective deficiencies of the political system and of the Left, the way 
in which the establishment in Greece has dealt with the GD etc.). Further, a very significant section of 
the  participants  has  been  polarized  against  it,  explaining  the  reflective  reaction  against  it  in  the 
respective questions.
205 Eg. I had not previously implied anything about fascism or GD in previous questions.
197
limits.  Reluctance in actively positing oneself  as being in the leadership and/or the 
organic entity of a movement is the result of both the dominant view on politics and the 
real limitations of the movements in producing active engagement.
 
c. Participation in movements.
“Syntagma square movement has been a huge injection  
of hope and optimism in a broadly very dark landscape”  
(I31)
As mentioned above, the sample chosen included people who had little or no prior 
relationship with politics and activism. Thus, for the majority of them participation in 
movements  has been a  relatively  new experience.  It  is  interesting  to  examine  the 
motivations  for  this  participation,  as  well  as  their  views  on  the  movements  that 
developed. This section is basically related to the squares' movement (since this has 
been the one with the most innovative features) but includes, of course, other types of 
participants  and  of  experiences.  As  far  as  initial  information  is  concerned,  most 
participants claimed to have been informed about the existence of mobilizations from 
the  Internet  and  social  networks,  as  well  as  by  politicized  friends  and  circles  of 
acquaintances.  Most  of  those participating in  strikes were informed via their  union. 
Thus, resources in terms of information are important, as expected, with alternative 
media playing a significant role. However, there is a distinction to be made here: in the 
squares' movement, information circulated with less clarity and was loosely network-
based, confirming an individualistic and relatively disconnected tendency whereas in 
strikes, it came from the traditional and organized political networks. In the question 
regarding their decision to participate for the first time, most people tended to stress 
that this was a “conscious choice”, emphasizing its nature as a personal decision (and 
stating that they either went or would go, even alone) but also stating that participation 
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along with others from their close environment facilitated this choice (mostly in terms of 
having someone as company, and of being with someone they trusted in case of need). 
On  the  other  hand,  there  was  relative  indifference  towards  activists  or  people  not 
personally known as a motive for participation.
As  for  the  various  reasons  given  as  a  motivation  for  participation  (already 
presented in chapter IV), the socio-economic situation, insecurity, economic deadlocks, 
politics of austerity and memoranda in particular were mentioned or implied as self-
evident motivations; as were the political situation, and specifically authoritarianism and 
corruption, and indeed, the latter often emerged in a second phase. Thus, this fieldwork 
confirms  a  linkage  between  political  and  economic  demands,  since  the  dominant 
frames referred to both the economic  and the political  context.  The challenging of 
acquired rights seems to recurrently emerge. Many attributed their participation and 
their state of mind (namely mainly rage and anger), to the latent political crisis that had 
accumulated over the previous years. Two additional motivations are interesting. Firstly, 
there  was  a  repeated  pattern  of  choosing  to  participate  as  a  form  of  personal 
responsibility, a debt towards oneself, society and future generations (or even towards 
one's own children, especially among older participants – for example, I11, I13, I19). 
(I4) said in particular “I felt ashamed not to participate. I just wanted to be there”. This 
reaction is interesting in many respects: it shows that political participation is thought, 
even unconsciously, to be necessary as a response to the problems experienced at the 
time, including an element of  ethos, and not simply material concerns. On the other 
hand, and in the way it was expressed, it also seems as an indirect acceptance of the 
futility of participation: it was presented as necessary though not particularly effective. 
This  pattern  was  repeated  when  discussing  self-evaluation  of  consciousness 
transformation  through  political  participation  (as  will  be  examined  in  section  f). 
Secondly, choosing to participate in the first  place was often related to the specific 
features of the movements, particularly of the squares. As (I3) underlined: “I needed 
something to pull me over, to excite me, to convince me”. Many participants claimed to 
have  decided  to  come  in  because  of  the  movements'  innovative  characteristics 
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(“enormously massive demonstrations”,  “imaginative ways of  protest”,  “people of all  
social categories and ages participating”, “universality in opposition to strictly corporate  
interests”,  “centrality  of  location”  etc.)  and because of  the fact  that  these were not 
protests called by political parties. 
This latter point, important for many interviewees, is directly related to the crisis of 
political representation, which also affects the Left, and with which I will deal in detail in 
the next section. Different reactions came from interviewees in this respect: some set 
as a precondition for their participation the fact that political parties played little evident 
part,  some  stressed  the  fact  that  the  presence  of  parties  divides  protesters  and 
imposes differentiations, others stated that they preferred parties not to be present, 
although banning them seemed antidemocratic206,  whilst  many claimed the right  of 
anybody to be present, saying that being all together is power for the movement207. 
Evidently,  this  was  a  firm  debate  among  participants.  Finally,  a  few  claimed  that 
previous manifestations of  movements, mainly the student  and the December 2008 
revolt208, were a motive, regardless of whether they had participated themselves or not. 
Many also identified the development of respective movements abroad as a stimulus to 
participate.  These  movements,  especially  the  Spanish  “Indignados”,  were  often 
mentioned as an example spurring Greeks into mobilization at  that  specific  period. 
Generally,  there  was  a  recognition  of  a  certain  connection  with  those  various 
movements209,  most  participants however tended to underline their belief  that  these 
similarities were rather superficial, and that it was the Greek specificities which were 
credited with the emergence of the movements.
A certain  pattern  emerged  on  the  question  regarding  their  choice  to  continue 
participating in protests after their first involvement. Almost all interviewees emphasized 
206 (I28): “Let me tell you my opinion: if they had let Left parties participate, I don't think that anything  
better would happen. But it was still bad that they didn't let them speak because, if you like, if you claim  
doing something democratic here, and especially direct democratic, I don't think that banning them fits  
this idea.”
207 (I12): “I did not really care [if Left parties were present]. But I consider it... Yes, I consider it right for  
them to be there. Like everyone else. Who had no particular identity but finally in a way they obtained  
an identity since they became 'the indignant', let's say. So, I don't see why.. why should pre-existing  
identities not be able to participate.”
208 (I9): “It was at the time that people learned to come into the streets and participate into protests”.
209 Mainly that of Spain, less those of the Arab Spring or the Occupy movements.
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the massiveness of protests, the heterogeneity of people participating (neither coming 
from  particular  social  groups  nor  being  the  “usual  suspects”  of  mobilizations)  and 
innovation.  The  fact  that  different  things  were  always  happening,  thus  sustaining 
interest and engagement, was emphasized by many. Some claimed that there was a 
pervasive  atmosphere  and  sense  of  feeling  strong,  motivating  participation.  These 
were  also  repeated  as  those  features  of  the  movements  that  appeared  most 
remarkable to participants, in addition to spontaneity and people's persistence, as well 
as the extensive use of repression by the police, and its brutality. Three main axes 
emerged with respect to the choice to repeat participation: firstly, novelty and a feeling 
permeating  the  movements  that  individual  participation  is  important  and  makes  a 
difference (thus  the specific  features of  the movements and their  ability  to  engage 
people into acts that seem both interesting and meaningful). Secondly, the perceived 
attitude of the “enemy” as manifested through police repression but also by economic 
and  political  policies;  and  thirdly,  the  feeling  that  these  protests  were  not  directly 
instigated or manipulated by political parties. Regarding specific protests which were 
thought  to  be  the  most  important,  most  interviewees  claimed,  or  implied,  that 
mobilizations represented in their minds a unified protest cycle, and not just a sum of 
different protests, some more, some less important. However, the first protest of the 
period, the May 5, 2010 strike, as well as the peaks of the squares' movement during 
the strike calls (June 15 and June 28-29), and the major GSEE-ADEDY strikes (for 
example, in October 19-20, 2011) were mentioned by many as the landmarks of the 
period.
Returning  to  the  specific  features  of  the  movements  contributing  to  people's 
activation, it is interesting to examine the way people spoke about them, and especially 
about the squares' movement. The language used here is revealing about personal 
activation, importance of collective action and re-legitimation of political participation. 
The squares were for interviewees “a living organism” (I14), a “festival” (I2), “a constant 
celebration” (I21), “a small society”, “a small city built” (I3, I24), “the organization of a  
state” (I24), “part of our daily lives” (I11), “a life experiment” (I12), “a meeting place” 
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(I31). The way interviewees spoke of the movement and their non-verbal behaviour is 
notable: almost all smiled, felt more relaxed when discussion reached that point, and 
many repeated phrases such as: “I felt beautifully” (I1), “it was really really nice” (I11), 
“I felt happy” (I21), “I really felt things were... would be different” (I21). (I23) said: “I  
would recommend participation to others. This is a very good psychotherapy as well!” 
Solidarity and a sense of comradeship were repeatedly stressed. Many emphasized 
the  broader  atmosphere  (I11:  “the  climate  was  playful”)  and  particularly  the 
socialization  associated  with  mobilizations;  the  way  people  who  were  strangers 
communicated and talked to each other. Even though most participants claimed having 
retained new acquaintances after these protests, but not actual friendships, there were 
cases in which a pivotal influence on one's life was described, almost a Damascus 
moment210. Further, relationships with the existing acquaintances and friends were also 
claimed as  improved among people  who participated in  protests  together211.  When 
discussing with (I24) on this socialization during the movement, he conceptualized the 
communication between people taking place as follows: “we were translating language 
from Greek to Greek”. Further, the majority stated that they felt “at last useful”.
Such feelings were also expressed when speaking of the assemblies in Syntagma 
square.  Two  participants  characteristically  spoke  of  the  assembly  paralleling  it  to 
“ecclesia of the demos”, the principal assembly of the democracy of ancient Athens and 
a symbol of the foundation of democracy (I5 and I24). Almost all of them emphasized 
the democratic procedures, the open character, the ability of everyone to participate by 
either  speaking  or  voting  and  contributing  to  the  decision212.  In  general,  the  same 
positive  attitude  persisted  towards  the  various  working  and  thematic  groups,  with 
interviewees emphasizing their  usefulness in  three areas:  firstly, helping to develop 
210 (I27) was the most indicative case, who met his future wife in these protests, and they got married a 
year later, on the first anniversary date of the movement. (I31) quit her job, and so did two of her  
friends, and they all together started their own business in a different sector. The interviewee, who used 
to  work  in  a  big  firm  in  management,  described  her  choice  to  quit  as  a  direct  outcome  of  the 
transformation of her consciousness because of her participation.
211 As (I3) claimed, “I feel more tied to my own people since”.
212 However, few participants stated that they had tried to speak or had actually spoken in an assembly. 
Some said  characteristically  that  they chose not  to  speak  because they  felt  having  nothing  more 
important to say than the others. Obviously,  feeling  being into a democratic environment does not 
automatically mean actually outdoing all hesitations originating from alienation from politics, or other 
sources.
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social  consciousness  and  solidarity,  thus  impacting  on  people's  consciousness; 
secondly, offering material aid to people in need, helping movement's organization; and 
thirdly, contributing to sustaining the movement by solving problems that could have 
prevented  people's  participation.  Indeed,  these  structures  seem  to  appear  quite 
effective on the material level as well, in the perception of the participants. In contrast, 
something frequently repeated about the assemblies is that they were quite democratic 
but not very effective. Many spoke of “utopias”, of ideas that were neither realizable nor 
concrete,  but  expressed  needs  and  thoughts  that  were  “pure  and  beautiful”  (I11). 
Discussions were thought to be “interesting but inconclusive” (I33). This is the main 
reason why most participants thought they were evanescent, along with deterioration 
stemming from fear (mostly of repression) and fatigue. The interviewees referred to a 
gradual  decline  in  the quality  of  the  assembly  over  time,  combined with  efforts  by 
organized forces of  the Left  to intervene in  order  to influence its  outcomes.  Those 
practices of partisan manipulation and the gradual decline in participation were thought 
to have gradually facilitated bureaucratism, while the insistence on discussing every 
single  detail  ended  up  in  a  failure  to  prioritize  important  matters. Other  relevant 
problems that have emerged from the interviews refer to the lack of coordination and 
communication between different groups, bureaucratic deviations even presented as 
democratic concerns, introversion and self-referential attitudes or practices appearing 
as those of a “determined centre” issuing calls to follow its instructions (also mentioned 
in  Giovanopoulos  2011a:  58).  These  last  two  points  are  interesting  in  that  many 
participants  referred  to  the  rejection  of  political  organizations  as  a  sign  of  such 
deviations, although they maintained a negative attitude towards these organizations: 
they often claimed their exclusion from participating as a sign of proprietorial behaviour 
on the part of the most active participants in the assemblies.
Another  part  of  the  interviews  referred  to  people's  perspectives,  views  and 
experience in movements on certain primary aspects of  this participation (violence, 
various kinds of discrimination). As for discrimination based on gender or race in the 
context  of  movements,  it  was not  identified by anyone.  All  the women were asked 
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whether they felt any discrimination: all replied negatively (although, one of them (I31) 
claimed to have witnessed sexist behaviours during the movement). There were many 
who did not understand or felt puzzled by the question, or thought of the matter as 
insignificant. Many seemed to have not been intimidated by this issue in their lives. 
Bearing in mind that gender discrimination is quite strong in Greek society on many 
levels213, this reaction seems to reveal the adoption of the dominant sexist narrative 
rather than its repudiation. The few who did identify with the question, distinguished 
between the discrimination they feel in their everyday lives, and a certain lack of similar 
discrimination  during  the  movement.  A woman  interviewee,  active  in  the  Keratea 
movement, emphasized that in the movement there was a “women assembly”, which 
she considered “really innovative” (I26)214. The same goes with racial discrimination, 
about which all respondents replied that they felt there was no discrimination based on 
race215.
On violence, responses tended to be both contradictory and hesitant. All possible 
reactions  and  attitudes  were  displayed  by  different  interviewees.  From  vigorously 
supporting  violent  acts  to  espousing complete  pacifism,  this  was  the question  that 
divided participants the most. If a common pattern was to be found, it was that most 
people  were  not  against  the  use  of  violence  on  principle,  but  were  firmly  against 
gratuitous forms. Many have stated that at some point, they found the use of violence 
to be unavoidable, for many different reasons. Two main categories could be detected: 
some focused on the use of violence by the state and the police, thus they thought of 
violence on the part of the movement as a necessary defensive mechanism (a form of 
213 Both the movement and the Left have been historically constituted around a masculine model, leading 
to an underestimation of gender issues, although women’s struggles for emancipation and women’s 
trade-unionism are not to be overlooked. Women have been very disproportionately affected by the 
crisis on many different levels, whilst prior to the crisis, they had to deal with massive inequalities in the 
labour market, and in their daily lives. Examining the ideological  shell  around the Greek society, it 
retains strong elements of a traditional one. The particular development of capitalism in Greece, under 
the shadow of Ottoman and Balkan legacies and religion, combined with the specific class structure of 
the society have deeply influenced gender construction and position. Religion, forms of nationalism and 
petty-bourgeois  ideology  containing  the  reinforcement  and  reproduction  of  the  role  of  the  family 
ideological apparatus have also largely contributed in the above. Neither the Left nor movements and 
their constitution have been immune to this sexist reality. For a more detailed approach on this issue, 
see (Gaitanou 2012).
214 Keratea is a small village, where traditional values, behaviour and the customs of the local community 
are very dominant. Thus, this choice is even more important.
215 However, I  was able to interview only one immigrant participating in the movements (I25). He also 
stated that he felt no such discrimination.
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counter-violence), whilst  others defended it  as an active means of changing society 
and/or the political system (without clearly defining the latter as a “revolution”). The vast 
majority stressed, however, that the use of violence should be in pursuit of a concrete 
purpose and strategy, as opposed to “blind forms”: “violence could be a means for  
protesters to use, but it should have a concrete target” (I13, but also I33, I37). In the 
same way, interviewees differentiated their  attitude depending on where and when 
violence  was  exercised:  as  (I12)  stated,  “violence  against  the  police...  I  could 
understand this choice, it  did not bother me, but against stores for example, it  was  
meaningless”. In general, there was a climate where the exercise of violence especially 
against  the  police  and/or  the  banks  was  acceptable  or  comprehensible  by  many 
respondents216. There was a widespread perception that the state exercises violence, 
either through repressive mechanisms (especially the police), or through its political 
and economic decisions: as (I12) said, “economic and political measures themselves 
were  arbitrary  and  unlawful”.  Many  tended  to  search  for  the  provocations  and 
justifications behind the use of violence by some protesters: the most recurring patterns 
cited justified anger, impunity and injustice. However, a strange sense of guilt appeared 
when discussions turned to the subject of violence: many tried to attribute responsibility 
to the state and not to the protesters, feeling themselves as part of a unified whole, 
even if  they had not personally exercised violence at any point. Further, the use of 
violence was identified as a mass practice: many noted that ordinary people could be 
seen throwing stones or reacting violently in certain circumstances. These findings on 
violence,  a  generally  controversial  subject,  reveal  a  certain  deepening  of  people's 
consciousness with respect to realizing the irreconcilability of their interests with the 
dominant socio-political system and the state.
On the other hand, many participants defended pacifism from a theoretical stand 
point. A few supported it on principle (defense of values, pro-life), whilst the majority 
216 (I9): “People's anger is explicit, you cannot restrict it into molds. Trashing a bank is a justified form of  
reaction for me. I'm not 100% sure if this helps the movement or not. I find it justified. And the reaction  
against police violence, which was provocative – I also find it justified. So, if there is a revolt, I do not  
know... I cannot think of a revolt without acts of violence. Because we have already suffered too much  
violence, and you witness this violence in practice as well, from forces of repression, but in many other  
forms.  For  example,  if  you  owe  money and  banks  pressure  you,  you  will  manifest  this  violence  
somehow. You see, it is absolutely natural for me.”
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saw non-violence as a tactic, a necessary principle in increasing mass participation, 
and enhancing the legitimacy of  movements in  the eyes of  society. (I15) noted for 
example that the use of violence ends by serving the government’s purposes, since it 
makes the protesters appear culpable instead of the government. A few participants 
identified the use of violence with provocateurs, or persons incited by the government 
or the police. A few identified certain positive effects of the use of violence: mainly, 
functioning as a spectacle, they thought of it as a means for publicizing the movement 
through media attention (I37). It should be noted at this point that interviewees spoke of 
violence as acts meant to physically damage people or property; other practices, such 
as  the occupation  of  buildings,  which both  state  mechanisms and the media  have 
striven to stigmatize as violent acts, were not thought of as violent (indicatively, I15 said 
on occupation as a practice: “I consider it to be legal – I do not know why...”)217.
d.  The crisis  of  political  representation and of  legitimation of the 
state and its institutions.
One  of  the  main  sections  of  the  interviews  concerned  the  dominant  popular 
perception of politics. It is worth noting that most participants had an initial hesitancy in 
conceiving of  politics outside political  parties.  However, as the discussion unfolded, 
there was an almost universal emphasis on the fact that movement processes, and 
especially general assemblies and the various structures, were political in character. 
The question on the definition of politics usually ended up in a profound conversation. 
With regard to the political system, a very deep, almost indiscriminate, loss of respect 
was revealed. This was often linked to the frequently used slogan by protesters calling 
for punishment of politicians, visualized by gallows appearing as symbols during the 
squares' movement, or even a sense of degradation of politics vis-a-vis the economy 
217 We can  in  certain  cases  detect  the  opposite  reaction:  (I7),  when  speaking  of  the  “I  won't  pay” 
movement and her choice not to pay tickets in public transport, seemed scared to admit her choice and 
was anxious to appear as law-abiding: she rushed to state that she did not pay, but even if she wanted, 
she wouldn't be able to, since protesters often blocked machines.
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(see section e of chapter IV). As for political parties, the majority attributed the main 
blame for the current socio-political situation to the two parties in power (PASOK and 
ND), emphasizing that the whole “old political personnel” was thought to be implicated, 
even if parts of it had moved to new parties. This finding is important, given the Greek 
phenomenon of new parties being created, mainly by former cadres of the two parties 
in power, as way for the broader political system to ensure its survival and maintain 
overall stability218. 
There was however a wider tendency to distrust all parties, even if theoretically 
most participants recognized differences between them (I20: “ok, I cannot speak of all  
the parties since they have not all  been in power”).  Several claimed that achieving 
power inevitably leads to corruption: a characteristic statement concerning the Left was 
that even if it initially has good intentions, it will become one just like the others if it  
acquires power, because if transformed into an institution, it will be incorporated into 
the system (however, most were prepared to exercise the benefit of doubt, at  least 
temporarily). This broader mistrust was expressed basically through a pattern among 
interviewees  of  criticizing  political  parties  for:  producing  cleavages  among  people, 
having self-interested rather than altruistic motives, fiscal irresponsibility, functioning as 
a  network  for  clientelism  and  corruption219and  a  lack  of  internal  democracy.  As  a 
potentially positive way forward, some participants laid emphasis on the participation of 
new people  in  politics,  and  especially  of  young  people  (I19,  I20).  Most,  however, 
seemed rather pessimistic about the possibility of actually solving these problems and 
218 This was the initial tendency, in front of a deep crisis of political representation. That tactics had poor 
results in  integrating citizens into a new strategic plan under  the hegemony of  neoliberalism.  The 
tactics that followed included the emergence of new parties, now linked to persons who had no prior 
relationship to politics. This has been more effective for the stabilization of the political system, since it 
has incorporated the broad feeling that  politicians are the people most responsible for the current 
situation in Greece. It included the engagement in politics of technocrats but also of journalists and 
persons related to the mainstream celebrity system. Indicatively, the fourth party in the elections of 
January  25,  2015,  with  6.05% of  the  vote,  was  a  new one  created  by  a  former  journalist  from 
mainstream media (“Potami”  by Stavros Theodorakis),  with  a pro-memorandum neoliberal  political 
program. Having said that, this tactic has not been able to fully mollify the feelings of political deadlock 
experienced by the mass of the population,  mainly because of  the concrete political and historical 
tradition in Greece. On the contrary, the Left has been more successful in intervening into this crisis of 
political representation (as expressed mainly by the rise of SYRIZA). This explains why in Greece it 
was more difficult for phenomena to develop such as the Beppe Grillo party (Five Star Movement) in 
Italy.
219 Many interviewees stressed on this point. (I4) kept repeating that in his decision on whether it is worth 
participating in an action, the most important criterion was whether someone, and especially a political 
party, would “benefit” from their participation in any way.
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formulating a realistic  and achievable way of  exercising politics  without  the defects 
detailed above220. Almost all respondents stated their unwillingness to join a political 
party as members; suggesting, further to the mistrust towards political parties, the lack 
of a durable commitment to politics among them, not being interested in participating in 
permanent forms of political activism. There are, thus, two rather different groups with 
little overlap: one with more organic ties with the organizational web of parties, and one 
with no such a relationship or perspective221.
However, interviewees did not  seem to be led to complete disillusionment with 
democracy  as  such.  The  majority  of  participants  claimed  that  the  problem  is  not 
inherent in parliamentary democracy as a regime, but in the way it functions in Greece 
or in its political representatives (parties, politicians etc.). This did not simply refer to 
scandals  or  corruption:  practically  all  forty  interviewees  have  claimed  explicitly  or 
implicitly  that  the  actual  functioning of  the  political  system does not  correspond  to 
parliamentary  democracy  (the  majority  comparing  it  to  dictatorships).  (I19)  claimed 
characteristically that “ok, in theory we have democracy. What we are experiencing, is  
it  really  democracy?? What  we are experiencing is  a junta!  They pass along laws  
without us knowing. They claim something and they apply something else!” Almost all 
participants explicitly  claimed to support  democracy as a system,  and many linked 
negatively the rejection of democracy as such with GD and fascism, or their thought 
went reflexively straight there when the relevant question was posed. This persistence 
in parliamentary democracy also counters certain anarchist views of the movement, 
which stressed “direct democracy” as a “paradigm”, that would, generalized as such, 
provide the solution to the question of a new form of politics. The inadequacy of such 
an  argument  is  even  more  evident,  when  thinking  of  the  real  problems that  were 
reproduced in the “direct democratic structures”, and people's identification of them as 
the proof that such models cannot be viable in large scale and in the long-run.
220 This is reminiscent of a classic populist pattern of “the people against the politicians”, or “the political  
regime”. It  is actually quite close to the “people against  the casta” of the Indignados, or even “the 
people against the leader/regime” of the Arab spring.
221 As (I31) interestingly put it, “[The Left] could be completely right, I am not questioning that... But if you  
are...  There is  an 'in'  and an 'out'  in any case.  And if  you are 'out',  you do not  have a link,  the  
interconnection is missing.”
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As far as the Left  in particular is concerned, there was a considerable level of 
skepticism  and  mistrust.  This  referred  both  to  its  attitude  in  parliament  and  its 
intervention in movements. Of course, as mentioned above, many made the distinction 
between the Left and systemic parties that have actually governed. Not having colluded 
with power was thought to exempt the Left  from the general denigration (I14).  This 
point is important: it proves that, for the Left to be part of the solution, and not of the 
problem, it has to claim governmental power not as other parties, but with a different 
strategic orientation – if not, it will soon be thought merely to complement the frame of  
devaluation and mistrust222. As for the main critiques made of the Left, these included 
its distance from the people (many referred to its “stereotyped language”) leading to its 
inability  to  actually  express  their  interests,  or  represent  them.  Many  interviewees 
claimed  that  the  Left,  when  participating  in  the  movements,  is  motivated  by  self-
interest, aiming at achieving its own objectives rather than those of the people. Some 
opinions went further to say that the Left does not listen to, or care for, what the people 
have to say, that it is rigid, inflexible and suppresses individual opinions. In the squares' 
movement, a large debate developed about whether the Left should participate in the 
movement  with  its  own  party  signs,  based  on  the  argument  that  people  should 
participate  without  any  political  mediation.  Most  interviewees  were  aware  of  this 
debate, and actually agreed that the Left should not have participated as such (unlike 
trade-unions). This type of presence of the Left would, for them, have created divisions 
among the people and, as characteristically stated, would have “reproduced classical  
political  stereotypes”  (I27).  The  perceived  gradual  degeneration  of  the  Syntagma 
Square general assemblies, as mentioned above, was attributed by some to the Left: 
“they only sought to impose their views”, “they did not listen to us ordinary people”, 
“they tried to impose their own way of functioning, usually in an underground way” etc. 
222 This is relevant to the years that followed: in 2015, SYRIZA gained governmental power. Its rapid and 
violent adjustment to memorandum politics was to be to the detriment of the Left as a whole, since it  
was perceived from the people as a proof that “they are all the same”, that no potential for an actually 
different politics is left and that a kind of TINA is again enshrined. The grounds for such a perception 
are clearly detected in the interviews conducted, however, at the time of the interviews, the Left was 
thought capable of providing, at least in theory, a genuine alternative. I would estimate that the collapse 
of these expectations will have important consequences for the political scene as a whole, let alone for 
the specific role and position of the Left.
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A contradiction appears here in feelings about the role of the Left. The majority 
claimed that movements faced certain problems and limitations, and that the presence 
of  an  organized  and  experienced  political  force  could  have  been  a  catalyst  for 
consolidating  their  organization,  political  formulation,  strategy  and  planning, 
persistence and determination223 (thus, the KKE which had chosen not to participate in 
many such movements, was presented by most interviewees as completely discredited 
in  their  consciousness,  eg.  I10,  I11,  I16).  On  the  other  hand,  many  respondents 
denounced the existing leftist groups that participated, along the lines of the criticism 
elaborated above. Therefore, we observe a general recognition and legitimation of the 
potential role of the Left at a theoretical level, in parallel to the disappointment caused 
by the failure of  existing  leftist  organizations and parties  to fulfill  such a  role.  This 
general mistrust, and lack of positive engagement with the Left, was also expressed by 
many when discussing their personal attitude in the elections224. Overall, many placed 
emphasis on the need for a unity among the Left, as a spontaneous reflection, being 
relatively indifferent to any deeper elaboration on its terms (the program, the strategic 
goal,  tactics,  coalitions  etc.).  These findings  are  directly  tied  to  the debate  on the 
question and the role of “leadership” in movements. Leadership is acknowledged by 
interviewees as an important factor missing from the movements (and resulting in their 
evanescence), while at the same time the dominant formulation with respect to the 
motor of their participation, has been that these were “leaderless movements”, in the 
sense of not being directly linked to political actors. This whole point will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter.
Regarding the state and its institutions, an overwhelming sense of delegitimation 
prevailed, while participants identified a shift in their opinions after participating in the 
223 There are some who appeared more positive towards the actual contribution of the Left. For example 
(I30) said: “The Left had... had as a target of this whole thing to end up in... in a mobilization, in a  
position in the street, concrete. It tried to make this whole thing a movement in the streets, based on a  
concrete plan, which would end up in a designed presence. This was positive.”
224 This mistrust refers mainly to low expectations of a potential election victory by the Left: actually, many 
participants, although the interviews did not at all focus on electoral representation, stated at some 
point that they probably  would vote for the Left,  and especially SYRIZA, but with low expectations 
regarding its actual radicalism and potential.
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movements towards a greater degree of disillusionment and contempt225.  The police 
were almost totally discredited, seen as an instrument of repression, rather than as a 
mechanism for protecting citizens. The majority of respondents claimed this was clear 
to them prior to their participation, but their experience provided graphic confirmation of 
the  degree of  brutality  and arbitrariness  exercised by the forces  of  law and order. 
Literally  everyone  laid  emphasis  on  the  arbitrary  and  unprovoked  nature  of  police 
violence.  For  (I3),  “it  was  astonishing to  realize  how easy  it  was to  be  injured  or  
harmed without  having done absolutely  anything wrong”.  A significant  minority  also 
claimed that their outrage had been clearly exacerbated by observing police behaviour 
in the streets, “the unprovoked and irrational character of their action”. Almost every 
participant had a story of police arbitrariness to tell from personal experience226, whilst, 
as (I31) aptly noted, participating in or witnessing a specific incident could function as a 
powerful  experience;  for  someone to feel  real  fear  and determine her  participatory 
behaviour. However, the vast majority claimed that although they considered that the 
police presence did discourage “others”/“the majority of the society” from participating 
in  mobilizations,  it  did  not  discourage them personally. Thus,  they  recognized “the 
efficacy  of  repression  and of  terrorization”,  but  for others227.  Many said  that  police 
behaviour  made  them  feel  more  determined  in  their  participation,  rather  than 
discouraging  them  from  participating  (I14,  I17).  Although  police  behaviour  was 
presented as predictable, almost everyone claimed to have felt fear, whilst a range of 
relevant emotions revealed the effects of police repression on people's psychology: 
“horrifying” (I3), “seemed so powerful that made me feel helpless” (I4) etc. In a relevant 
question  about  the  state,  participants  had  had  difficulty  understanding  what  the 
225 (I17) claimed characteristically: “I've realized that the state has a different role than the one I imagined,  
until  now. That the state has an additional  aspect,  the exercise of  violence. As a service for...  for  
someone, let's say for the government... Well, the state has shown me its hard facade”.
226 (I31) noted this as such: “Most people have an incident of police violence to narrate”.
227 Interpreting such a reaction, I would emphasize two points: on the one hand, it  seemed easier for 
respondents to attribute feelings or behaviours to others than directly to themselves, probably out of 
hesitation or even a sense of shame, since such feelings are thought to be “negative” or “defensive”. 
On the other hand, attribution to others implies a cognitive elaboration: in other words, it expresses 
what participants  think that such an intervention by the police should logically provoke to people. A 
distinction between what respondents think that “others should feel” and what they themselves feel 
proves the gap between a logical  reaction in  a sterile  environment  and the actual  reaction in the 
context of the movement: it  proves in other words the effect of collective political participation into 
people feeling stronger and more self-confident.
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question referred to, and often answered as if  it  referred to the police. This finding 
shows  belief  in  a  deep  interconnection  between  the  state  and  police,  and  the 
identification of the state with repression in character and behaviour.
As for trade-unionism, both GSEE and ADEDY fell low in people's consideration, 
together with trade-unionism in general,  though to an evidently lesser extent.  Their 
identification as “bureaucratized” or “corrupt” was a recurrent pattern, whilst the most 
important element denounced by almost all was their dependence on political parties 
(I5: “every single cadre of them becomes a deputy afterwards”). The majority claimed 
explicitly  not  to  feel  that  these organizations  represent  workers'  interests,  and that 
instead they constitute “state or  employees mechanisms”  (I16).  As for  the common 
practice of these confederations to call sporadic one-day strikes, the vast majority of 
interviewees thought of it as woefully insufficient and delegitimizing, as was examined 
in chapter IV. As (I4) and (I13) both claimed, this practice was “nothing more than a 
gunshot  in  the  air”228.  On the other  hand,  most  participants  distinguished  between 
confederations and grassroots unionism (irrespectively of their actual knowledge, or 
ignorance, as self-attested, of the actions of the grassroots unionism; still, those with 
no direct contact with grassroots trade-unions were generally more reluctant to express 
a  firm  opinion,  but  had  a  tentatively  positive  attitude).  Grassroots  unionism  was 
believed  to  actually  pursue  to  represent  workers'  true  interests,  but  having  less 
opportunity to do so, being weaker. In general, the majority's attitude towards trade-
unionism was more favourable than expected: the necessity of union representation 
was widely  recognized,  and trade-unionism itself  was thought  to be necessary and 
positive  in  principle. These  findings  confirm  to  a  large  extend  the  theoretical 
formulations posed in chapter III, on the deficiencies and the overall delegitimation of 
the organized trade-union movement,  along with  the recognition  of  the  contribution 
(and the structural and conjunctural weaknesses) of the new, emergent forms of the 
labour movement.
228 (I27): “For as long as the practice is to take a walk, to make a 24-hour strike with no other organization,  
with no other leverage, with no other negotiation, and ok, we've shaken our banners, we've had five  
chemical weapons thrown at us, and ok, then it is meaningless, this goes nowhere.”
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There was also a deep disillusionment with the media,  seen as directly tied to 
political  power  and  functioning  as  a  propaganda  mechanism.  The  main  pattern 
emerging was that the media follow the line of economic and political interests. Many 
claimed that  this  became clear  to  them immediately  after  their  participation,  when, 
returning  home  from  a  protest,  they  witnessed  the  media  presenting  it  in  a  light 
completely at odds with their personal experience. Almost all reacted as if the intrinsic 
character  of  the  mainstream  media  and  their  role  were  viewed  with  considerable 
suspicion and were deeply delegitimized. In fact,  the media was regarded with less 
respect  than  any  other  institution  in  participants'  minds,  and,  as  they  themselves 
stated, this has been evident even prior to their participation in movements. Regarding 
the alternative media,  the  attitude of  the interviewees was generally  positive.  They 
were presented to help both providing comprehensive and universal information and 
disseminating  knowledge,  while  simultaneously  strengthening  organization  inside 
movements. There was a certain hesitancy by some participants about whether these 
means are also tied to particular interests (I4), their anonymity blurring purposes and 
credibility)  (I11),  their  function as a safety valve,  harmlessly releasing pressure that 
might  otherwise  lead  to  action  (I11),  their  weakness  in  contributing  to  actual 
organization (I13).  Thus, they were not unconditionally and universally esteemed and 
approved of, confirming our estimation of their role as tools of the movements, but in 
contrast to an ostensible “digitalization” of movements (see also section c of chapter 
IV). However, everyone admitted their generally positive contribution to movements.
Finally, when asked about the EU, most people expressed disillusionment with its 
policies and role. A significant share of the responsibility for the situation in Greece was 
attributed to the EU. However, in the question “to whom do you attribute responsibility  
for the current situation?”, the vast majority spoke clearly and with little confusion of the 
responsibility of both internal and external centres of power: very few referred to the 
country's “occupation” or of the Greek politicians as simply “pawns” of the European 
ones.  Actually,  many  perceived  the  question  as  a  tendency  to  discount  the 
responsibility of Greek politicians, and react negatively. The majority claimed that the 
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EU functions  in  the  interests  of  north-Western  countries  (most  of  them referred  to 
Germany and secondarily to France). Many claimed to be skeptical but not completely 
hostile  to  the  idea of  leaving the EU:  some claimed the existence of  a  theoretical 
potential for European countries to be linked together for the benefit of their people, but 
very few considered this practically feasible in the current situation. Few fully supported 
exiting the EU and some seem very puzzled about the issue, saying that possibly, if 
Greece was to exit the EU, the first period would be difficult but eventually “we would 
get round things” (I15, I16). Others emphasized the structural defects of the EU, but 
were very hesitant about concluding that this should lead Greece to exit the EU229. The 
general  tone  of  all  the  responses  confirmed  the  lack  of  any  active  and  positive 
engagement with the EU. These findings lead us to the conclusion that  there is  a 
relative acknowledgement of the problematic and potentially strategic defects of the 
EU. However, the lack of a fully elaborated, coherent alternative path and of a political 
organizational  form  reliably  representing  such  an  alternative,  combined  with  a 
pervasive campaign of fear in Greece about the supposed consequences of a potential 
exit, lead to people being very reluctant to formulate such a demand. This finding is 
important since in the years that followed the potential of exiting the EU was and still is 
a growing concern in the public discourse and in society, with the potential of more 
people leaning towards such an option.
Therefore,  to  conclude  and  summarize  at  this  point:  this  research,  conducted 
through interviews with people who participated in the mobilizations of 2010-2011 but 
had  no  prior  political  commitment  or  concrete  participation,  confirmed  the  initial 
assumption of a very deep crisis of political representation and of legitimation of the 
state and its institutions. Its persistence and generalization is deeply destabilizing for 
the functioning of the political system. The research also confirmed the centrality and 
significance  of  the  debate  about  leadership  of  movements,  combined  with  the 
weaknesses  of  the  Left  in  people's  perception  and  experience.  Finally,  it  has 
229 (I19) characteristically described numerous structural problems of the EU and her perception of its 
responsibility for the current situation in Greece, but when I asked her if this implies that she thought 
that Greece should exit the EU, she responded in panic: “Exit? No! No no no no! I do not know what  
should happen, but something else, something else, yes!”
214
highlighted the deficiencies of the traditional trade-union movement. These points will 
be further examined in the next chapter.
e.  The  role  of  participation  and  self-evaluation  in  consciousness 
transformation.
“A 'conscience of rupture' expresses a rupture, first of all,  
with the present  eternity  of  current  time,  when nothing  
essential  changes...  and  when  we  are  assured  that  
tomorrow will be made of the same ingredients that today  
is” (Kouvelakis 2007: 169-70)
The main research question of the present thesis refers to the transformation of 
consciousness in respect to political participation. I chose to posit this question directly 
to participants in interviews to stimulate them to reflect on this potential transformation. 
The findings are very interesting, since participants were, if  anything, over-eager to 
enter  into  this  process.  In  response  to  questions  related  to  consciousness 
transformation230,  most participants detected, on reflection,  a significant shift  in their 
own opinions and feelings,  stating that,  prior  to their  participation,  they were either 
indifferent or had a rather out of focus image of what participation might entail. The 
biggest shifts in opinions concern the political system, the role of the state and their 
own social position, and to a lesser extent, the police (whose role they thought of as 
known, but whose predisposition towards brutality became reinforced) and even less 
the media (which appeared to have lost  any legitimacy even before participation in 
movements).  As  for  political  parties,  there  was  a  firm  statement  by  many  that 
participation reinforced their opinion that all parties were essentially similar.
230 Such questions went as following: “Has the way you perceive the social reality / the political system /  
your social position / the role of the state / the media / the police changed after your participation in the  
protests, and if so, how?”
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A crucial point of this part of the interviews is the evaluation of the importance of 
participation,  its  effects  on  self-transformation  and  on  consciousness  formation.  To 
begin with, a deeper than expected trust in social mobilization, an optimism about its 
potential, and a positive attitude towards its meaning and effectiveness came to the 
surface231. Many participants stressed the increase of consciousness of society as a 
whole. As (I13) emphasized: “You become more... more properly thinking. You think of  
things more comprehensively. You do not think of them like before: 'OK, the only thing  
that matters is for me to be well, to have my little job, to mind only so as to keep it'; you  
think  of  things  in  a  more  global  way, this  is  very  positive”.  The  question  on  how 
participants evaluated the importance of participation was divided into two thematic 
sections: the practical effects and the effects on consciousness. In general, participants 
tended  to  identify  consequences  at  the  level  of  consciousness  rather  than  in  the 
practical/material  level (ie.  in their  lives).  In terms of practical  consequences,  many 
interviewees concluded that the concrete impact of participation was limited or even 
non-existent.  The  greater  the  extent  of  participation,  the  more  emphatic  this 
assessment was. The case of a worker in a company that had not paid workers for 
months,  leading  to  them  carrying  out  a  long-lasting  strike,  was  indicative:  to  the 
question on whether participation in collective actions has any results, she responded 
“For sure, ok, than doing nothing.. It goes without saying, we must… we must always  
try, react, participate wherever we can, show that, in any case, we do not accept all  
those things that they impose on us without a fight. Against doing nothing, for sure, for  
sure. But all struggles should be united, for me. Because there is no result. None. They  
just happen only to happen, do you understand? We've reached this point.” A degree of 
vagueness characterized many respondents on this point. Some stated that there are 
specific positive effects – for example, learning how to take a decision, helping people 
in need or making new acquaintances and friendships. Others, however, highlighted 
negative effects as well: a waste of time and good mood (I28), or witnessing problems 
reproduced in collective processes, such as lust for power or conservatism (I31).
231 This lower expectation is due, among other things, to the specific conjuncture when the interviews were 
conducted.
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As for the effects on consciousness at the personal level, the responses were quite 
different  from  those  mentioned  above.  Participants  were  enthusiastic  in  identifying 
significant  effects.  Many  of  them  said  that  afterwards  they  realized  that  they 
themselves, even as single individuals, “do have power and can offer something”. Most 
stressed the value of coming into contact with collective values, challenging hierarchies 
in life, suppressing selfish motives and realizing the importance of civic engagement in 
new terms. As an older participant movingly noted: “I have created a better relationship  
with my child since in the movements I saw the 'we'” (I14). Participation was thought to 
be an answer to a prevailing broader individualistic tendency: “You do not stay closed 
with yourself, which is a problem of our epoch” (I28); “I've learned and understood the 
problems of other people” (I11). In general, a recurring pattern was that of an existing 
mentality in Greek people that was considered selfish and individualistic; many spoke 
of the “nature/culture of the Greeks”,  and stressed the need for education in order to 
change it. However, many stated that after acquiring experience of this movement they 
have appreciated more “the society” and “the people”, to an extent they would never 
have anticipated beforehand. Information and the sharing of ideas are also thought to 
be important gains resulting from political participation: “You do not live in your own  
ivory tower, you are in touch with reality” (I4); “It enriches yourself as a human being” 
(I2). Some emphasized a feeling of fulfilling a debt, by not being simply passive: “ I feel  
fine with myself above all” (I9). Certain negative aspects were detected as well, mainly 
the onset of disappointment, because of inefficiency (I15) or of coming up against other 
people's selfishness (I33).
As  for  the  possibility  of  subsequently  participating  again  in  collective  actions, 
almost  all  interviewees  have  stated  a  greater  inclination  to  participate  on  another 
occasion. There was a recurrent pattern in statements, saying that even if participation 
was futile in terms of practical effects, participants did not regret their choice and would 
do it  again.  They did however  seem selective about  the sort  of  actions that  would 
trigger  this  participation.  For  instance,  although  their  importance  was  widely 
recognized, the overwhelming majority has not participated in solidarity structures that 
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have developed in  Greece since the movements,  as the ones examined above (in 
section d of chapter IV, mentioned in note 182 in particular). Obviously, more central 
political  actions  can  engage  people  more  widely,  even  those  who  have  a  prior 
experience of participation such as our interviewees, whereas solidarity structures and 
particular  actions  refer  mainly  to  those  who  have  developed  a  more  organic 
relationship with politics and political organizations. Massiveness of movements was 
posited as a necessary condition for effectiveness and a motivation for participation (as 
an indicator of potential success and a sign that what is happening is exceptional). 
Further, some stated that after their first  participation in the period 2010-2011,  they 
would participate again, but more selectively and with greater wariness (I29, I33). In 
(I26)'s words, “Today I  would participate in a movement but with less emphasis on  
spontaneity  and  more  on  organization  and  action”.  As  a  conclusion,  participants 
seemed to have a need to acknowledge the importance of their participation. However, 
inability to identify concrete gains and effects from this participation made them more 
hesitant in committing to more intensive future participation. This is a key point, since it 
reveals  an  important limit  and  limitation  of  the  transformations  on  the  level  of 
consciousness. Participation does not seem to have had significant durable impacts on 
the  political  practices  and  the daily  life  of  the  participants. Despite  the  excitement 
demonstrated during the interviews, this participation is conceptualized as temporary, 
and not the starting point of a durable commitment. This is also proven by the fact that 
few of the interviewees were interested in participating in any durable form of political 
activism (parties, solidarity networks, campaigns). This finding is strengthened taking in 
mind the sample of the research: being people who have actively agreed to participate 
in the research, they are probably those who have actually undergone an even more 
important consciousness transformation through participation (hence their willingness 
to share their views on the movements). Thus, we could be led to the conclusion that, 
for the great mass of participants, once the movements were over, everything “went 
back to normal” to an important degree, with respect to their political engagement and 
active participation.
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Having said that,  the theoretical point on consciousness transformation through 
political  participation  and people's  own  praxis  and autonomous politics  exercise,  is 
strongly confirmed. Indeed, political participation in movements induces an even more 
acute transformation in people's perception of the state, politics, the media and other 
institutional  mechanisms  and  institutions  like  the  EU.  There  is,  further,  a  certain 
radicalization and sharpening of perspectives linked to participation, under the limits 
and limitations also presented. These tendencies are evident with respect to both the 
effects  of  political  participation  and  certain  elements  and findings  presented  in  the 
whole chapter (for example, on popular belief in forms of protest, the use of violence by 
protesters,  the perception of  their  interests as competing with those of  other social 
groups etc.).
f.  New  forms  of  exercising  politics:  Towards  an  inevitable 
institutionalization or another practice of politics?
“I think that this is the core of politics, its DNA, it's where  
it  starts  from.  If  politics  in  Greece  started  that  way,  I  
would participate” (I5)232
As  examined  in  chapter  I,  classic  social  movement  theories  often  present  a 
trajectory  of  movements  in  which  their  institutionalization  and  integration  into  the 
dominant political system is inevitable. The NSMT, on the one hand, tends to study 
movements in their  partiality, as heterogeneous and fragmented phenomena, finally 
underestimating  their  radicalism  and  effectiveness  in  questioning  the  bourgeois 
hegemony as a whole. The PPT tradition, on the other hand, is inclined to a descriptive 
and empirical approach, also fragmentary in the sense of not being dialectical, which 
again results in a certain determinism regarding movements'  emergence,  outcomes 
232 Response  to  the  question  “Do you  consider  what  happened  in  the  squares  movement,  with  the  
assemblies and the thematic groups, as a way to exercise politics?”
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and overall  evolution.  This  course of  institutionalization  is  often firmly  linked to the 
existence of social movement organizations. A “natural course” is supposed to exist for 
a movement, which entails either its institutionalization and integration into the political 
system, or its radicalization and thus its repression and evanescence. For others (for 
example, Tarrow 1989; Fillieule et Della Porta 2006: 85-112), the perception of this 
“determinism of institutionalization” as the only option for social movements is due to 
the  continuous  democratization  of  contemporary  representative  democracies, 
transforming  them  into  “societies  of  movements”,  able  to  integrate  them into  their 
normal functioning (Serdedakis criticizing this in 2007: 389). This perspective idealizes 
a process of democratization in modern societies, which, especially concerning recent 
history, should be heavily contested, as examined in chapters II and III233. Regarding 
the  current  crisis  in  particular,  one  of  the  main  flaws  shared  by  social  movement 
theories  from  different  traditions  is  the  collapse  of  one  of  their  fundamental 
preconditions: the ostensible democratization and pacification of modern societies, due 
to a supposed general rise in living standards and generalized prosperity. Aside from 
the various critiques that were raised in chapter I, this misconception has led to an 
overall weakness in adjusting and responding to the challenges currently prevailing in 
studying social movements in countries affected by the global crisis.
It should be underlined at this point that, when referring to “institutionalization”, we 
have to make a distinction: On the one hand, there is the – correct - assessment that 
any movement is situated in the terrain of the state, perceived in the broad sense as 
the unity of “civil” and “political society” in Gramscian terms (Thomas 2009b: 30). On 
the other hand, institutionalization may refer to a process that inevitably leads to the 
integration of movements into (capitalist) institutions, hence their commitment or even 
subordination, in the last instance, to the dominant political strategy. In other words, 
following such an analysis, movements are somehow predestined to become part of 
233 In these studies, too often contemporary democracies are considered more democratic than they truly 
are. For example, Fillieule et Della Porta approach contemporary police as evolving into a “police of 
citizens”  (2006:  20).  The general  tendency  that  is  promoted  in  this  work is  that  of  a  gradual  but  
constant democratization,  normalization and pacification of social  conflicts (for  example,  Fillieule et 
Della Porta 2006: 21-2, 87-8, 97, 110, 127).
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the status quo, and this is considered as inherent in their emergence and make-up. On 
the contrary, I  argue that  what  differentiates social  movements is  that,  despite this 
reference to the state, they also have an additional component, which cannot be simply 
reduced  to  institutional  arrangements  and  procedures  and  which,  simultaneously, 
reveals the limits of this very “institutionalization”.
The  major  theoretical  themes  of  this  approach  presupposing  inevitable 
institutionalization  will  be  further  examined  in  the  next  chapter.  At  this  point,  I  will 
examine the interviewees' own perception of the possibility of constituting new forms of 
exercising politics through movement processes. Our primary interest is to examine the 
possibility that participants significantly change their whole perception of politics, or if, 
on the contrary, this “determinism of institutionalization” seems to be confirmed in their 
minds.  It  is  important,  in  this  respect,  that  participants perceived the various forms 
developed in the context of the movements (structures, assemblies, focus and thematic 
groups) as having a political character, attributing to them both a practical usefulness 
and a function in terms of a political paradigm. A positive attitude regarding general 
assemblies prevailed,  especially concerning their  democratic  nature and functioning 
and the ability  of  everyone to participate234,  despite the strong reservations among 
them about their effectiveness in praxis. Many stated that assemblies have functioned 
as “a space for expression”, “a forum for everyone to state their problem”, or as “a 
psychological  uplift”,  but  with  few opportunities  to  actually  organize  and concretely 
bring about  political  change.  The thematic and working groups were thought  to  be 
generally more effective in material terms. However, there seemed to be a reluctance 
to think about generalizing this model as a paradigm for exercising politics: the majority 
claimed not being able to understand how this could function on a larger scale. This 
finding  is  important,  as  I  have  already  noted  above,  against  an  “anarchist” 
interpretation,  according  to  which  direct  democracy  could  be  generalized  as  a 
paradigm for the function of the whole society. 
234 These points have been more analytically presented in section e of chapter IV. Here, I shall focus on 
the relationship of these structures with a different way of perceiving politics.
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Thus, in terms of their political function, there was a difficulty among participants in 
forming, through this personal experience, a specific model of an alternative political 
constitution,  although  acknowledging  this  as  a  necessity.  Technical  and  practical 
reasons were mainly raised with respect to this difficulty in recognizing movements as 
potentially something more than a reaction (thus as having a productive potential in the 
long-term, functioning as structures of counter-power). It is however interesting that, in 
their  answers  to  the relevant  question,  many interviewees did  try  to  imagine such 
alternative solutions or models. A few stated that this was an issue that had already 
preoccupied them after their participation in these movements. Some even suggested 
certain  ideas  or  models:  from  making  political  participation  on  a  regular  basis 
obligatory,  to  focusing  more  on  local  organization,  small  communities  and 
decentralization.  Nevertheless,  the vast  majority did not  seem persuaded that  such 
solutions could evolve into a viable model for general implementation. The most difficult 
thing to think about seemed any possible interconnection between the central political 
power and such ventures: interviewees tended to think of the potential of either one or 
the  other  dominating,  but  not  of  a  model  that  could  incorporate  both.  This  line  of 
thinking  indicates  that  at  some  point  the  two  are  perceived  as  antagonistic  (with 
different objectives, interests to satisfy, modes of functioning etc.). This is a significant 
point  which reflects one of  the most  serious deficiencies of  the Left,  to be studied 
below: the overall weakness in perceiving a dialectical relationship between the social 
and  the political  levels,  in  the  sense  of  providing  a  model  which would  potentially 
incorporate both structures of counter-hegemony or social control from below, and an 
alternative  political  proposition  in  the  central  political  scene,  including  (but  not 
exhausted at) the parliamentary level.
The way the structures emerging after the movements of 2010-2011 were viewed 
by  interviewees  is  indicative.  As  already  discussed,  a  number  of  different  social 
structures have arisen at both local and sectoral levels. Social centres, working clubs, 
networks of solidarity, social clinics and pharmacies, popular assemblies at a local level 
and occupations of public buildings to be used as centres of self-organization comprise 
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some of these forms. Their primary target has been to provide a network of solidarity 
and  fulfill  certain  basic  needs,  while  simultaneously  forming  different  exemplars  of 
social and political organization. Most participants were aware of such structures, and 
their  contributions were generally highly regarded, both at the material  and political 
levels.  However, very few had in  any way participated in  them.  These forms have 
mainly  functioned  as  an  avenue  of  organization  and  intervention  for  the  Left  and 
activists  affiliated to  it  (even in  the  broader  sense)  rather  than a  means  of  actual 
engagement with society. 
At  this  point,  it  should  be  stressed  that  Greece  lacks  a  coherent  tradition  of 
counter-power structures; movements have usually had a reactive character, basically 
constituted  at  the  central-political  level,  without  building  or  leaving  any  permanent 
legacy of structures of counter-power and counter-hegemony. As previously discussed, 
after  the  civil  war,  the  radical  Left,  in  all  its  forms,  followed  a  line  of  class 
defensiveness. It neither chose or was able to employ a strategy of alternative counter-
power (in material and not simply ideological terms), precisely because it  exercised 
politics  in  such  a  way  that  the  issue  of  power  was  never  actually  posed  in  an 
antagonistic manner. This has inevitably had an impact on how workers and citizens 
have conceived of  their  own existence and potential  for  action.  Thus,  examples of 
practices of alternative organization laying claim to areas of power are absent from the 
collective consciousness.
In the Metapolitefsi, the structures of the movement of factory unionism have been 
the only real example of such projects. The emergence and rise of PASOK to power 
contained this process, since an important sector of society and the social movement 
conceived  of  its  struggle  in  terms  of  exerting  pressure  on  the  state  rather  than 
constituting  a concrete alternative  in  competition  with  it.  Labour  protesters claimed 
resources from central power and resisted restructuring rather than creating new forms 
of  organization,  which  would  potentially  be  more  appropriate  and  effective  in  the 
specific  circumstances.  The  state  has  never  been  seriously  challenged  as  the 
organizer of production and of daily life. Demands and aspirations were addressed to 
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the state as the omniscient  provider, rather  than as efforts  to  formulate alternative 
solutions  to  problems.  The  Left  seemed to  have  neither  the  will  nor  the  ability  to 
challenge such a reality. A system of consensus and social alliances evolved which 
became pivotal in forming both material and ideological conditions and correlations, 
producing a  situation  where the state  and the political  power  as  such were never 
questioned. Thus, the Left was able to present itself as a force of resistance, and even 
to be acclaimed as a champion of social interests in certain periods, but never seen as 
constituting a really hegemonic alternative force in a durable perspective. This has also 
relied on material  terms and limits:  in  a period of  economic growth,  with the state 
actually forming stable social alliances through certain benefits, as we have already 
examined in chapter II, certain social strata have been more materially linked to the 
state.
Furthermore, in the current period, the dominant and pervasive sense of weakness 
of  the Left  combined with the lack of  an alternative positive engagement  and of  a 
specific and convincing strategy and vision, both in terms of social organization and of 
political  function,  have  deterred  the  mass  of  society  from  vigorously  engaging  in 
possible alternative ways of perceiving politics with any aspirations of success. The 
idea that the acquisition of power is inherently corrupting, repeated in many interviews, 
is  another  way of  expressing mistrust  towards  the Left,  but  also  of  highlighting  its 
impotence in persuading people of the viability of a different political and strategic plan. 
The movements of the period examined here have contributed in highlighting this lack 
of an alternative vision of politics, without providing solutions as to how the problem 
could be surmounted. This points to the role of the political subject, and of its relative 
autonomy, to be further examined in the next chapter.
Regarding  the  structures  that  emerged  out  of  the  movements,  interviewees 
situated their weaknesses in constituting potential solutions under two headings: the 
inability to imagine how they could be viable and sustainable in the long run, and the 
failure in adequately responding to all the emergent needs regarding organization. The 
tendency of many people to project a defense of the need for autonomy as a reflexive 
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reaction against the Left,  as they experienced it (eg. I32), further compromised any 
such potential. Of course, this emphasis on autonomy simultaneously expresses an 
actual need: as (I5) underlined, “the thought that the very community decides for itself  
is very positive”. Neither the “lower square” activist core was able to provide this kind of 
“vanguard”,  mainly  due  to  its  lack  of  representativeness  (both  qualitatively  and 
quantitatively), its lack of organization and its inability to function in the long-term and to 
provide a common strategic  orientation.  These weaknesses were expressed in  the 
absence of a commonly elaborated political programme and in the inability to form a 
common will and unify the social subject involved in this process. In other words, as 
already examined in chapter IV, this activist core could not “provide actual leadership” - 
or even attempt to do so. What it has been able to do, successfully to some degree, 
was to contribute in the short-term, in terms of direct organization, diffusion of protest 
and information and of coordination between different mobilizations and social groups.
Therefore, the gap between the need for a different way of perceiving politics, and 
the actual practical steps towards its formulation, becomes a given, and is probably 
even  exacerbated  by  the  participation  in  movements.  There  remains,  even  if  not 
specifically and organizationally formulated, a strongly felt demand for a deepening of 
democratic  processes  and  greater  involvement  of  people  in  politics.  After  having 
examined people's views on these points, I will proceed to the last chapter of my thesis 
where I  will  theoretically  systematize  these results  in  respect  to  the formation and 
transformation of consciousness and the perception of the political, based on political 
participation.
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CHAPTER  VI:  MAKING  HISTORY.  ON  THE  FORMATION  OF 
SUBJECTIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS
The previous chapters have examined the socio-economic and political reality in 
Greece in times of crisis, and the parallel and significant rise of the social movement in 
all its aspects. I have also presented the results of my field work and focused on the 
transformation in the consciousness of the movement participants. The starting point 
has been the assumption that if  the objective circumstances, the socio-political  and 
economic  reality  and  the  hardening  of  the  state  management  of  the  crisis  have 
decisively influenced the rise of the social movement, the subjective factor and class 
struggle have significantly changed its constitutive make-up. The development of social 
protests not only transforms the consciousness of those participating, but also of the 
society as a whole, thus becoming a factor in its own development.  Indeed, since a 
movement is a process,  it  must  be seen “in terms of  action”,  including how actors 
produce the “we” of  their action (Melucci 1989: 19-20),  without underestimating the 
distance between an action and its meaning.
The main focus of this research is on people's consciousness of their participation 
and engagement, and the transformative effects of action upon them.  The theoretical 
point  that  arises  is  linked  to  the  constitutive  terms  of  subjectivity  and  class 
consciousness  within  specified  conditions.  The  formation  of  subjectivity,  its  basic 
features and potentialities,  its position and role in the context of  the broader social 
protests  that  develop,  and  broader  issues  on  the  structure/agency  problem  are 
interesting  in  this  respect;  so  is  the  formation  and  transformation  of  (class) 
consciousness, and its relationship to the spontaneous movements of people, social 
groups  and  classes.  The  role  of  organizational  forms and  the  political  subject  are 
significant in this process. My perspective, previously outlined from chapter I onwards, 
is based on a philosophy of praxis approach, posed in the context of a broader Marxist 
tradition.  This approach is perceived as the theoretical  affirmation “that every 'truth' 
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believed  eternal  and  absolute  has  had  practical  origins  and  has  represented  a 
'provisional' value” (Gramsci 1971: 406), and in the sense that praxis itself transforms 
reality.
In  this  last  chapter  of  the  thesis,  these  theoretical  points  will  be  examined  in 
relation to the findings  of  my field research.  Thus,  in  section  a,  I  will  posit  certain 
theoretical  points  on  the  formation  of  subjectivity  and  consciousness.  Taking  into 
account  the  results  from  my  research  with  respect  to  the  role  of  trade-unionism, 
people's perception on class identity and the specific features of the movements, I will 
elaborate on the role of the various social identities, primarily that of class identity. In 
section b, I will deal with the organizational issue in relation to spontaneity, focusing on 
the role of  the political  subject  and discussing the findings of  my field research as 
presented  in  the  previous  chapter.  Finally, in  the  last  section  of  the  chapter,  I  will 
discuss the ultimate problem of  defining and conceiving the political,  based on the 
experience emerging from the social movements in Greece during the first period of the 
crisis.
a. Theoretical thoughts on subjectivity and class consciousness.
“It might seem that there can exist an extra-historical and 
extra-human  objectivity.  But  who  is  the  judge  of  such  
objectivity?  Who  is  able  to  put  himself  in  this  kind  of  
'standpoint of the cosmos in itself' and what could such a  
standpoint  mean?...  Objective  always  means  'humanly  
objective'  which  can  be  held  to  correspond  exactly  to  
'historically  subjective':  in  other  words,  objective  would  
mean 'universal subjective'. Man knows objectively in so  
far  as  knowledge  is  real  for  the  whole  human  race 
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historically  unified  in  a  single  unitary  cultural  system.”  
(Gramsci 1971: 445).
In  this  section,  I  will  examine  the  main  theoretical  points  on  the  formation  of 
subjectivity and class consciousness as they emerged from my fieldwork and studying 
the relevant bibliography. This discussion will help us clarify the relation between the 
objective and the subjective factor, and its role in the emergence of protest movements. 
According  to  a  well-known  statement,  Marx,  after  defining  the  material,  objective 
conditions shaping social reality, claimed that “it is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but,  on the contrary, their social  being that determines their 
consciousness”  (Marx  1904:  11-12). This  argumentation  has  been  read  in  various 
ways,  implying  different  understandings  of  the  relationship  between  the  objective 
conditions and consciousness. A dominant interpretation has been the implication that 
consciousness is a non-mediated and linear reflection of objective circumstances, in 
which  people  are  forcibly  subsumed.  The  problem  with  this  definition  is  the 
conceptualization of consciousness as a direct product or derivative of the social being. 
Thus, other mediations are neglected, and consciousness is deprived of its role as an 
active determination which can transform social being itself.
Nevertheless,  there  are  numerous  references  supporting  the  thesis  that  Marx 
himself thought of the role of consciousness as a catalyst235. Significant among these 
are  the  well-known  Theses  on  Feuerbach,  in  which  Marx  breaks  with  existing 
materialism  in  emphasizing  the  perception  of  reality  “as  sensuous  human  activity, 
practice, not subjectively” and “not in the form of the object or of contemplation” (Marx 
and Engels 2010b: 3).  The decisive element of  praxis is established as a necessary 
condition for perceiving reality, since it defines the only way to conceive and rationally 
understand “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or 
235 Engels explained this over-emphasis on the economic factor to the detriment of the subjective one, in 
two ways: firstly, due to the need to emphasize the so far neglected role of the economic factor (thus a 
bend of the stick), and secondly, due to the political necessity of highlighting the potential of a different 
social organization (Marx and Engels 1976: 441).
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self-changing” (Marx  and  Engels  2010b:  4).  This  position  posits a  dialectical 
relationship between the subject and the object.
Such  a  debate  alludes  to  the  notion  of  historical  materialism  as  a  concept 
emphasizing the materialist  conception of  history, as a theory of  history236.  If  “men 
make  their  own  history,  but  they  do  not  make  it  as  they  please...  but  under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past”237 (Marx 2010a: 
103),  what  is  the  role  of  the  movements  in  this  process? To answer  this  question 
requires  contravening  a  more  “orthodox”,  objectivist  description  of  history  as  the 
process of the development of productive forces in which the subjective factor has no 
real  space  to  act.  It  also  requires  conflicting  with  a  subjectivist  approach in  which 
human action is deified irrespective of the objective conditions. Fredric Jameson has 
read these formulations, as “two fundamental languages, which could alternate with 
one another, be substituted for one another or translated into each other”238 (Jameson 
2011:  142).  According  to  the  author,  accepting  such  a  dualism  would  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  either  the  system  is  all-powerful  (thus  producing  fatalism),  or  that 
subjects  may  simply  surpass  any  limit  posed  by  the  system  (thus  producing  a 
dangerous voluntarism) (Jameson 2011: 144-45).
Gramsci (1971: 345) suggests a historicist view of the problem, putting the rational 
will (equaling, in the last instance, practical or political activity, and corresponding to 
objective historical  necessities)  at  the base of  philosophy239.  This,  for  the author, is 
“universal history itself in the moment of its progressive actualization”. Thus, in contrast 
to a perception of history moving in successive stages, the actual question is: How can 
we find a way of approaching the relationship between the objective and the subjective 
236 “These three elements – the existence of a weak tendency for the productive forces to develop, the 
consequent likelihood of organic crises and the primacy of structural capacities and class interests in 
explaining social action – make of classical historical materialism a theory of history, a theory, that is, 
which claims to account for the dynamic processes through which social systems are transformed. It is 
also one in which human agency plays a pivotal role - in the terrible, bloody struggles which unfold in a 
period of organic crisis.” (Callinicos 2004: 106).
237 A formulation which Jean Paul Sartre has claimed consists  of  the fundamental  thesis  of  historical 
materialism.
238 The dichotomy between the two is succinctly conceptualized in (Eagleton 2003).
239 “Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the 
subject.” (Engels 1959: 157). According to Mpitsakis, freedom is “the knowledge of necessity and at the 
same time  the  active  intervention  for  its  acceptance  or  even  its  denial”  (2013:  118).  Besides,  in 
Gramsci, will “can be made more powerful in that, by obeying, by disciplining itself to necessity, it finally 
dominates necessity itself, identifying it with its own ends” (Gramsci 2012: 154).
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factor while distancing ourselves from voluntarism, fatalism or evolutionism240? This is 
the question that this last chapter attempts to answer. The answer has to be perceived 
in relation to social protest and class struggle, since this question is not posited in the 
same way in all periods: its meaning is different when, on the one hand, events seem 
to repeat themselves; reality is seen as virtually unchanged; the potential for radical 
change seems pure madness; and, on the other hand, in history's sharp turns; when 
the creativity and inventiveness of classes bursts out (Gaitanou and Gousis 2015: 127). 
This is why Eagleton argued that “the kind of Marxism for which human agency was an 
agreeable  bonus”  is  under  attack  precisely  in  times  of  intensified  class  struggle 
(Eagleton 2003).
In this investigation, history as a process is defined as a field of possibilities, a vast 
structure of  alternatives (Benjamin in  Löwy 2005:  105,  107),  in which the objective 
conditions  are  also  the  conditions  of  that  possibility.  Class  struggle  is  not  an 
instantiated concept moving linearly towards a specific direction but a real conflict of 
real  people with determined positions in  production and society, whose outcome is 
posited  inside  a  range  of  possibilities,  and  having  a  high  degree  of  contingency 
(Gaitanou and Gousis 2015: 139-40). Within this range of possibilities, choice, rather 
than  being  simply  determined  or  preplanned,  includes  unintentional  consequences, 
multiple different results, and a special role for the accidental and even the mistaken, 
whereas the subjective factor has an enhanced role. Active intervention influences and 
ultimately changes the correlation of forces in a dialectical interaction of the objective 
conditions and the subjective factor: what is today a subjective intervention, tomorrow 
has influenced the objective conditions themselves (Gaitanou and Gousis 2015: 138; 
see also Kail and Sobel 2005: 40, for conditions being subjected to transformation). In 
that respect, the existing situations are in fact the result of prior action, even if, in the 
240 For Rancière, “We should have learned at last how problematic all strategies based on the analysis of 
social evolution may be. Emancipation can neither be the accomplishment of a historical necessity, nor 
the heroic reversal of this necessity. It has to be thought out of its un-timeliness, which means two 
things: first the absence of historical necessity for its existence, second its heterogeneity with respect 
to forms of experience structured by the time of domination.” (2010: 176).
230
present, they are thought of as the only material reality. From this point emerges the 
distinction between the material and the “natural” conditions (Jameson 2005: 21).
 Based  on  the  above  approach,  I  will return  to  the  findings  from the  present 
research, focusing on the formation of the participants in the movements as agents. 
Since I have suggested a theoretical framework for the approach of the object/subject 
relationship, the point of interest here is the consciousness of those potentially acting 
as such agents, and its transformation through political participation in the movements. 
I will, first, discuss the investigation of the development of class consciousness among 
them, in connection to their participation. As argued in the two previous chapters, in the 
two main forms of movements (the movement of the squares and the strikes), class 
lines were not explicit. Inevitably, the strikes had a much clearer class dimension but 
the labour  movement was unable,  for  reasons already discussed241,  to become the 
leading force of this whole period. The movement of the squares, on the other hand, 
was more hegemonic as a form, but class reference was less evident: on the one hand, 
there was a clear hesitation by participants to define their own class identity, as seen 
from the previous chapter. On the other hand, the structures and organization of the 
movement did not favour a clear class connotation.
Still,  there  were  signs  of  a  deepening  of  class  consciousness  in  participants 
detectable in the interviews. First indication is their view on trade-unionism: while the 
confederations were totally discounted, combined with the relatively low diffusion of 
grassroots unions in a large scale,  participants did identify differences between the 
grassroots unions and the confederations (in favour of the first) and still maintained the 
value  of  trade-unionism  in  theory242.  For  example,  they  themselves  describe  their 
gradual, during the course of the movement, acceptance of, or desire for, trade-unions 
to  be  present  in  the  squares'  movement.  Furthermore,  although  most  participants 
highlighted  the  dominant  tendency  by  the  state  and  political  power  to  produce 
241 In section b of chapter IV.
242 Indicatively, this was clear in (I1, I8, I10, I11, I12, I13, I15, I18, I35), all of whom elaborated analytically 
on their  view regarding  the positive  effects  of  having  a union  presence at  the  workplace,  on  the 
unification of workers that this entails, on the necessity of trade-unionism in order to defend one's 
interests at work etc. However, a few interviewees who tended to fully underestimate it did exist (I3, I4).
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cleavages among workers (mainly during sectoral strikes which affect daily life), not a 
single one endorsed them as such; quite the opposite actually243. Of course, since an 
anti-strike  reflex  has  indeed appeared  in  the  Greek  society,  these  responses  are 
basically indicative of the effect of participation in people's consciousness.
The second indication is a, to a certain point, class discourse, though not explicitly 
articulated as  such (thus,  not  fully  conscious).  Economic distress was a constantly 
recurring theme, both as a motivation for action and as a factor explaining inequality244. 
This was actually even more evident in participants coming from the more exploited 
social layers. Indicatively, a self-employed lawyer with her own practice saw politics 
and the authoritarian turn of the state as a motive for her participation (I16), while an 
elderly woman formerly working as a cleaner focused clearly on economic poverty and 
inequality245.  This  point  was  also  evident  when  defining  “the  adversary”:  many 
interviewees highlighted the interconnection between economic and political interests, 
even under the dominance of the former246.
Furthermore, when examining the social forces participating in the movement, in 
the light of the field work and the quantitative data presented in chapter IV, we can see 
a specific social composition consisting of the strata analytically examined in chapter III 
243 (I10) and (I13) elaborated in detail  on this point, but  all  interviewees when asked stated that they 
supported  workers'  strikes  in  specific  sectors,  even  if  these  complicated  their  lives  (eg.  in 
transportation, electricity etc.)
244 As already shown in chapter IV, economic grievances and the gradual realization of the effects of the 
policies followed on one's life were the initial  motivation of  participants,  along with a total  mistrust 
towards the IMF and its policies. Many people spoke of this alteration in their conditions of life in terms 
of a shock. Indicatively: “Everything changed! Our way of life changed! Our social level, our economic  
level, with all the things that happened... And it was a change... dramatic! So we had to participate, in  
some form of  reaction”  (I23).  In the second level,  there emerged the patterns of  political  mistrust, 
satisfaction from participation and from “feeling useful”, and recognition of the importance of collective 
action.
245 (I7), after describing in detail the effects of the economic policies for the life of herself and her family, 
claimed “When you cut my income and you tell me to pay the bills, how can I pay? Can THEY live with  
500 euros a month that WE take? They should take 500 euros per month. And then we'll see... How  
will they live? Don't they see these things, don't they know? The thing speaks for itself. When I get up  
in  the  morning  and cannot  buy  the  necessary, and  HE has  his  huge car, his  holiday  house,  his  
excursions, and he shops and he revels... Isn't he in a better position from me? Are we the same? And  
then, why should I pay for what they ask for?”
246 “Neither the politicians, nor the parties, nor the governments take decisions. Our social life, anyway...  
our life, is controlled and led by others, either states-Great Forces, or corporates-Great Forces, and the  
two are tied to each other” (I4). (135) claimed: “Politicians are simply trying to solve a problem with the  
'easy' and, for many people, painful, way, while they don't touch others. Eg. the rich are not to pay, if  
possible, their interests are to be fully satisfied, and the poor people are to pay for everything, as  
usual”. For (I39), “the political system is the executive of the economic system. They are employees of  
the system, in a way. Big employees, but still employees. Behind them are the real economic interests.  
The foreign ones, and certain domestic ones, the big Greek capital, ship-owners and manufacturers”. 
Similar examples were quoted in section e of chapter IV.
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as members of the working class and the petty-bourgeoisie, particularly those of its 
layers most drastically affected by the crisis, with a greater proportion of those with 
higher educational backgrounds. Does this peculiar social alliance allow us to speak of 
the formation of a “historical bloc” in the Gramscian sense as a concrete social force 
(Gramsci 1971: 418)? In our view this is not the case, although the potential for such a 
formation existed247. The historical bloc expresses a social alliance hegemonized by the 
“fundamental class” of the mode of production, a formation which would induce “the 
penetration of  political  practice into the sphere of  labour, ie.  of  production”  (Balibar 
2014:  53)  and  the  present  Greek  example  fails  to  show  such  a  tendency  in  a 
generalized manner. The failure can be mainly attributed to the weaknesses of  the 
political organizations, and of the Left in particular, to function as the force enabling 
unification  of  the movement  at  a higher  level  (a point  to  be discussed in  the next 
section).  The  trade-union  movement  showed  similar  failings  and  the  objective 
conditions related to the transformation of labour were also unfavourable.
At the same time, this absence of a clear class connotation present in people's 
consciousness is not of minor importance. Other major movements have happened in 
the past in which the working class was not the leading force: a characteristic example 
is the 1973 November insurgency, which was hegemonized by the student movement 
(so by the “new petty bourgeoisie” in the making). However, the discourse was at that 
time heavily left-wing, saturated with class references and symbols coming from the 
revolutionary  tradition.  In  the  current  case,  the  lack  of  an  explicit  class  dimension 
entailed  important  effects,  particularly  regarding  the  consciousness  of  a  strategic 
confrontation, where a social bloc  realizes the incompatibility of its interests with the 
socio-political system as a whole. This has also contributed to the persistence of the 
individualistic tendencies among the participants. These findings prove the concrete 
247 I  will  provide  at  this  point  two formulations  by  the  interviewees  themselves,  indicative  of  such  a 
potential. (I33) argued: “All this will leave something. The fact that at some point, some girls in high  
heels and some fallen yuppies were found together in the same square with people who in their last  
job may have been the storekeepers, or manual workers and all these people saw that... it does not  
mean much and it is temporary if one is favoured by a situation. And even if this is the case, that this is  
not enough, if you want to be a member of a society”. For (I35): “Everybody was expressed by these 
protests. Ok, we don't speak of the rich. The middle class and the poor, all those who suffered from a  
hard hit. They all became much poorer...”
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importance and the political specificity of the organized industrial working class, along 
with the significant results of its absence as an hegemonic segment of the mobilized 
strata. Indeed, all class societies include a “latent”, or “indirect” class reference, even 
the reactionary ones, and, of course, protest discourses even more: the issue here is 
the articulation of this class reference into consciousness, with people being aware of 
its own meaning. Proletarianization evidently does not induce linearly the formation of a 
class  consciousness,  if  the political  affordances or  focuses of  identification are not 
present.  Thus, the question is the transformation of the character of consciousness 
from “theoretical and latent” into “active and practical” (Luxemburg 1986).
This distinction must not however be perceived in a static way. In a similar vein, 
the organized layer does not represent the whole of the movement: neither must the 
role of  the relatively  unorganized layer  be underestimated,  nor the level of  political 
consciousness of the organized layer be overestimated (Ibid.; see also Barker 2007: 
27). Ultimately, as approached in chapter III, there are two tendencies appearing at the 
same  time  in  the  working  class,  a  tendency  of  emancipation  and  one  of 
subordination248. For Meszároš, “consciousness can be out at the service of alienated 
life, just as it can envisage the supercession of alienation” (Meszároš 1971b: 88). Class 
consciousness is not a mental construction but  an actual potential dimension of the 
reality;  besides  “consciousness  always  represents  some piece  of  reality”  (Vygotski 
1987: 190). Barker has also underlined the dualities existing in the working class, both 
potentially  unified  under  exploitation  and  divided  vis-a-vis  competition,  thus  both 
subject  to  impulses  to  revolt  and  to  pressures  that  reproduce  subordination.  Such 
dualities mean that “popular responses... to their alienated condition might be expected 
to be both 'contradictory' and 'heterogeneous'” (Barker 2007: 14-5). It is precisely on 
the one hand the praxis  of  the masses that  mediates reducing the above gap (by 
248 This debate takes us to the Lukácsian concept of imputed consciousness (Lukács 1971; 2002) and the 
Gramscian  “two theoretical  consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness)”  (Gramsci  1971: 
333).
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producing new, collective knowledge), and on the other hand, the practical character of 
the organizational forms249.
Another point to investigate at this point is the following: what is actually the 
relationship  of  class  consciousness  to  class  position?  The  challenge  is  to  avoid 
mechanistic  approaches  where  a  person’s  consciousness  is  assumed  to  be  an 
automatic reflection of their class and origins. Barker has argued that four ambiguities 
in  the Marxian legacy are traceable in  this respect:  (1)  a certain form of  economic 
determinism and evolutionism, in which consciousness is seen as a direct outcome of 
the  experience  of  mobilization;  (2)  an  underestimation  of  the  role  of  reformist 
leaderships in mass workers'  parties,  attributing it  simply to external factors;  (3) an 
underestimation of the mediations in class struggle and of the political and ideological 
differentiations  among workers;  and  (4)  an ambiguity  in  the  treatment  of  the  party 
question, with an absence of clear answers about its character and its organizational 
mode (Barker 2007: 6-13). A series of mediations complexify the issue, while schemes 
of  mere  reflection  fall  into  irrelevance  due  to  the  relative  autonomy  between  the 
superstructure and the base; class reductionism is inappropriate for dealing with such 
complex issues. The mediations to be considered here are the dominant ideology (as 
examined in chapter I) and the role of organization (analyzed in the following section). 
The various social identities that impact on the formation of consciousness (gender, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation etc.) cannot be neglected either; while, as Bensaid (2002) 
underlined,  relations  of  exploitation  and  class  conflict  in  the  capitalist  mode  of 
production constitute an over-determinative framework which runs through and unifies 
all other contradictions. Finally, the effects of the transformations in the labour process 
on  consciousness  must  also  be  taken  into  account.  Fragmentation,  unstable 
employment, the low degree of concentration of workers and the employment structure 
(as examined in chapter III), influence the formation of a consciousness of common 
interests250.  There arises again,  at  this  point,  the ambiguity of  the working class in 
249 For Gramsci,  this is politics:  “[“Ought to  be”]  alone is history in the making and philosophy in  the 
making, it alone is politics.” (Gramsci 1971: 172).
250 This is reminiscent of the Sartrian analysis of fusion and seriality resulting to very different forms of 
class consciousness (Sartre 1970: 234-35).
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Greece which keeps both growing and getting weaker; specifically, in terms of political 
constitution and experience (as examined in chapter III).
To conclude this section, four points need to be emphasized (Gaitanou and Gousis 
2015: 133). Firstly, the relation between social being and consciousness must be seen 
in  the  context  of  the  totality;  as  opposed  to  the  fragmentation  dominating  in 
contemporary societies. Lukács' analysis on the totality is relevant at this point, when 
he notes that “For the social being of the proletariat places it  immediately only in a 
relationship  of  struggle  with  the  capitalists,  while  proletarian  class  consciousness 
becomes class consciousness proper when it incorporates a knowledge of the totality 
of  bourgeois  society”  (Lukács  2002:  83)251.  Secondly,  the  relationship  between  an 
economic  crisis  and  radicalization  is  crucial252:  systemic  crises  do  not  necessarily 
produce social  events,  but  they do create a more favourable environment  for  their 
development and their linkage to the totality. Thirdly, the role of dominant ideology is 
significant, since it leads to a perception of reality as natural and unchangeable making 
it  difficult to conceive of a different way of organizing society (this point on different 
interpretations of reality will be dealt with in section d of the current chapter). Lastly, 
processes only touched on obliquely here, such as the role of linguistic signification 
and  of  discursive  processes,  should  not  be  overlooked,  although  they  have  to  be 
considered in the context of material reality, and not seen in isolation253, since they can 
divert  attention  towards  less  conscious  desires,  fantasies,  motives  and  psychic 
impulses254.
In this sense, the movements under examination had the potential of inducing such 
a transformation in consciousness, but, as will be argued below and in the conclusions, 
the real impact of them has fallen short of this potential255. The outcomes of the real 
251 We suggest the perception of  this concept  in  terms of  “totalization”,  in the sense that Sartre  and 
Jameson have used the term, to distinguish it from perceiving it as suppressing diversity and forcing 
homogeneity (Jameson 2005: 19).
252 I have dealt with this in detail in sections a and d of chapter I.
253 “Every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow of reality, but is also itself a material segment 
of that very reality” (Volosinov 1986: 11).
254 Speech  produces  changes  in  consciousness,  and  word  meaning  develops  depending  on 
consciousness transformation. Communication itself generalizes (Vygotsky 1934).
255 Although I consider the subjective factor to be the decisive one for this weakness, this is in contrast to 
a subjectivist approach. The reminder of the determinations to which an act is subjected is always 
present; determinations in which the human course is necessarily registered (Tertullian 2006: 67). As 
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struggle must not however be underestimated: the claim of an interviewee, working as 
a driver in public transportation and previously indifferent to politics as he stated, a 
former voter  of  PASOK, is  very interesting in this respect:  “Class consciousness is  
acquired  through  struggle.  If  you  live  in  such  a  system,  socio-politico-economical,  
which provides you with no class consciousness, and it educates you precisely as it  
wants, already from school, then... you have to do something... You will participate, you  
will fight, you will fail, you will win certain things, and you will gradually acquire class  
consciousness. You aren't born with it, it becomes in the process. It is formulated. And  
there are people, many people in my perspective, who in this whole situation, have  
started formulating it.  A class consciousness, which they did not have, in no case.” 
(I13). At this point, we have examined certain key points on the formation of subjectivity 
and consciousness, discussing the various conclusions emerging from this research, 
emphasizing the rejection of schemata of mere reflection between social being and 
consciousness. I shall now pass on to a key point when dealing with the formation and 
transformation  of  consciousness,  which  is  related  to  the character  and  the  role  of 
organization. 
b. Spontaneous and conscious element. Organizational forms.
“The real Organisationsfrage today is not the affirmation  
or negation of the party, conceived in the abstract,  but  
rather, the question regarding the particular type of the  
party-form that could help these movements to continue  
to grow” (Thomas 2013)
A basic  concept  related  to  the  formation  of  consciousness  is  the  relationship 
between organization and spontaneity. This  is  one of  the main issues arising from 
Bourdieu  has  noted,  “The  rupture  cannot  result  from  a  simple  awakening  of  consciousness,  the 
transformation  of  dispositions  cannot  occur  without  a  prior  or  concomitant  transformation  of  the 
objective structures of which they are the product and which they can survive” (Bourdieu 1998: 122).
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studying  the  movements  of  the  period  2010-2011  in  Greece.  This  period  was 
characterized by a crisis of political representation combined with the failure of the Left 
to provide any realistic alternative vision, while protesters demanded deeper forms of 
democracy involving more direct participation. As argued in the previous chapters and 
earlier in this chapter, weaknesses in organization have been the Achilles heel of the 
movements of 2010-2011, preventing them from having a greater and longer lasting 
impact. This underlines the importance of examining the role of organization. The role 
of  the  political  party  seems  here,  in  my  view,  to  be  essential,  but  by  no  means 
sufficient. In contrast to emphasizing the importance of the party on the basis of an 
alleged weakness of the masses to make politics for themselves (restricting their role to 
economic protests), we think of the masses as perfectly capable of exercising politics 
at all three levels: the party, the front and the movement. The organized leadership is 
however crucial for the people to conceptualize its interests as a totality, to establish a 
strategic independence vis-a-vis its adversaries  and to realize the irreconcilability of 
this  interest  with  the  socio-political  system  as  a  whole  (Shandro  2007:  311).  If, 
according  to  Bensaid,  relations  of  exploitation  determine  all  internal  conflicts  in 
capitalism, and if capital itself is the “big unifier subordinating every aspect of social 
production  and  reproduction”,  then  “a  party  [is]  not  simply  the  sum  of  social 
movements,  [but]  the  best  mediator  of  conscious  unification”  (Bensaid  2002).  The 
masses can spontaneously realize their oppression and rebel against it, but left on their 
own they lack the means to emancipate themselves in a way that dissolves the political 
structure of oppression; thus the necessity for an organizational form (Agnoli 1972: 85-
6).
Social movement theorists have also dealt with the problem of organization and its 
importance in the emergence of social movements in detail. Organization in RMT and 
PPT is thought as one of the fundamental resources  of activists, although it is often 
approached as a means to an end. In NSMT, participation is not subjected to a cause, 
but an end in itself: through participation, individuals transform their own identity and 
create a collective one, a “we”. This approach argues that movements are informal 
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networks, loosely structured (or even relatively disorganized, eg. Melucci 1996: 344). In 
that respect, organized forms are most suited to the campaign-oriented, goal-directed 
mobilization  of  movements256 (Melucci  1996:  222).  Leadership  within  organizational 
structures is only partly legitimized in these approaches, decision-making processes 
are considered less formal,  and representatives are more temporary257 (Ibid.:  345). 
Other social movement theorists tend to undervalue the role of SMOs, claiming they 
contribute to the institutionalization and decline of a movement258. At the core of this 
approach lies the claim that “consciousness smothers spontaneity” (Tarrow 1989: 219).
Such a line of thinking has been contested by many social movement theorists 
whose objections we share. The findings of the present fieldwork also argue in favour 
of the role of organizations. Tarrow stresses that organization should not be contrasted 
with disruption (Ibid.:  341) and suggests a more dialectical  approach to leadership, 
claiming that organizations “'led the masses as long as there were masses to be led; 
but they could not lead people where they did not wish to go” (Ibid.: 342). Melucci also 
opposes the inevitability of bureaucratization, claiming that organizations change by 
following non-linear processes (Melucci 1996: 325). Seferiades rejects the linearity of 
the relationship between hierarchical organization and institutionalization/conventional 
politics by arguing against determinism: he speaks of the existence of informal groups 
with conventional actions and speech, as well as of hierarchical organizations that are 
very radical (Seferiades 2006: 29).
As Tarrow notes,  “part  of  the  reason for  the  confusion is  that  we often fail  to 
distinguish  among three different  aspects of  movement  organization.  The dominant 
meaning of  the term is  formal hierarchical organization… A second meaning is  the 
organization of collective action at the point of contact with opponents.  These range 
256 This looseness regarding forms of organization is presumed to correspond to objective (resulting from 
the characteristics of postmodern identity, being hybrid and constantly changing) and subjective factors 
(as a conscious choice of  the participants,  rejecting the stricter form of  organization of  the labour 
movement).
257 This approach, although useful because of criticizing the rigid forms of organization, which have often 
proven undemocratic and inadequate, has failed in our view to respond to the imperatives of the Greek 
movement, as described by participants themselves above.
258 Organizations ostensibly tend to blunt militancy because of their vulnerability to internal oligarchy and 
stasis and to external integration with elites, thus destroying movements' spontaneity, routinizing and 
suffocating them (Piven and Cloward 1977: xxi).
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from temporary assemblies of challengers, to informal networks, to formal branches, 
clubs, and even military-like cells....  The third meaning of organization refers to the 
connective structures that link leaders and followers, centre and periphery, and different 
parts of a movement sector” (Tarrow 1998: 123-24). Overall,  most social movement 
scholars have underlined the need for organization. The crucial element here is the 
recognition  of  a  dialectical  relationship  between  organization  and  protest,  in  which 
organization is approached through interaction with the masses, and presupposes their 
active participation. Thus, to return to the initial formulation of Peter Thomas quoted at 
the  beginning  of  this  section,  the  main  question  is  which  form  of  organization  is 
adequate in respect to the imperatives of a movement.
The role of the political organizations is a point appreciated by the participants in 
the movements themselves: despite the deep crisis of political representation, which 
also  affected the Left  (though to  a  lesser  degree,  at  the time),  many interviewees 
emphasized  the  theoretical  necessity  of  an  organizing  form  which  would  unite, 
coordinate and motivate the protesters. This was referred on the one hand to the need 
for  trade-unions  and  related  structures  to  intervene  in  the  movement,  as  forms  of 
organization of the working class259, and on the other hand, to the existence of political 
organizations  able  to  elaborate  a  cohesive  alternative  political  orientation  for  the 
movement. As for the trade-unions, participants seemed to underline both the necessity 
of their existence as such260, and the need of them co-existing and coordinating with 
other forms of the social movement. This comes as an objective need, but also results 
from trade-unionism suffering from the broader crisis of legitimation already discussed. 
Thus (I1), after speaking of the deficiencies of the existing trade-unionism combined 
with its positive aspects in theory, claimed: “Movements must work together with trade-
unions. Trade-unions must be an active part but other collective forms must also exist,  
259 This comes in contrast to Piven and Cloward (1977), as well as Lumley (1990), who denounce unions 
as forms completely external to the movements, which structurally aim to deescalate, institutionalise, 
control and constrict them.
260 (I8) claimed, when speaking of the necessity for trade-unions to be parts of  the movement of  the 
squares: “The connection with trade-unions in the square should be greater. Workspaces should be  
present and... they should be the vanguard. This would help as a means of rallying the people, and of  
workers being part of all this. Then, workspaces would unite, they would... coordinate and participate  
all together, because when they go on strike separately, this does not help, it is meaningless. The  
basic thing is for all to be there, united”.
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other initiatives of the people, and all these forms must be coordinated”. This need also 
comes from the realization that trade-unions themselves cannot respond to the broader 
issue of political orientation. For (I6), “Through a trade-union you can demand certain  
things. But they... they cannot speak of broader changes, of an overthrow. This cannot  
be  accomplished  by  a  trade-union  alone.  A  movement;  this  has  broader,  more  
fundamental goals”.
Indeed,  many  participants  attributed  the  weakness  of  the  movements  under 
discussion to accomplish more concrete long-term outcomes, to the lack of a more 
centrally articulated political plan. (I8) claimed speaking of his view on whether that his 
participation in the movement was worth it: “Yes. And yes, I do think that a movement  
can  have  concrete  results.  The  results  I  have  seen  so  far  are  mostly  in  the  
consciousness level of course.  But..  for something to actually change, we must  go  
further. ... I mean.... nothing is over. I cannot say that we have tried it, we saw what  
happened and its over, let's say. I think it is able to... But it needs something more. It  
needs the contribution of political subjects, yes, this is it.” Some participants claimed to 
have realized that spontaneity through participation alone is insufficient. (I26),  when 
asked if she would mobilize in the same way today, responded that “I would, in the 
80%. But  today I  would participate more critically. If  I  now look back at  this whole  
struggle and my participation,  I  would try  to contribute at  creating organizations;  a  
collectivity, in which we would discuss and decide for the next steps. This is the first  
thing I would have in mind. Not only spontaneity! Let's do this! Because this is how you  
can go further.” (I36) argued characteristically: “What was missing was organization.  
And the objective of the next step. Ok, we went there and we shouted. And let's say we  
accomplished our target. And then? Then what? How will we manage all this? Which  
are the mechanisms? And there must  be mechanisms! Who will  manage all  these  
people? All this indignation?”.
However, in contrast to the trade-unions, which consist of a structure identifiable as 
such by the people, the narrative is not equally clear when the discussion moves to the 
need  for  political  coordination,  in  the  sense  of  specific  organizational  forms.  (I18) 
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claimed: “A certain organization must definitely exist. If not, there will be chaos. People  
cannot  coordinate  by  themselves.  Some people  must  be  more  active,  organizing,  
coordinating.  The problem is...  who these people should be,  and how will  they be  
appointed. But definitely, some forms of organization are necessary, some groups...  
But they must be both informed and leading people towards the right direction, they  
must be uninfluenced by others, they must have a purpose and serve it faithfully, they  
must be devoted.” Hesitation in arguing for specific organizational forms which would 
accomplish such imperatives was evident in most interviewees.
Participants  in  the  movements  exercise,  further,  a  strict  critique  towards  the 
existing political organizations; basically, towards the formations of the Left in Greece, 
as examined in chapters IV and V. The party form as such was perceived as necessary 
for the majority of participants in the interviews261. However, several interviewees were 
apprehensive about the sheer idea, believing that it inevitably leads to antidemocratic 
practices262.  This  apprehension  is  related  to  a  general  mistrust  of  power  and  its 
tendency to corrupt263. The main critique by participants referred both to the structural 
deficiencies  of  the  Left  and  the  party-form,  and  to  its  specific  intervention  in  the 
movements under study. As for the first, they focused on its rigid, even antidemocratic, 
constitution, the suppression of freedom in its internal functioning, its “stereotyped” and 
incomprehensible language, and its indifference towards the interests of the people. 
However, critiques at this level did not go very deep. This was to be expected, since I 
261 (I10) noted: “Parties always existed. Since the ancient Greece, the Byzantium.. Human nature cannot  
probably be organized otherwise. I can accept this. Thus the party is necessary. Political groupings are  
necessary, I don't know how to formulate this, I don't like the term, well, being in a group, being broadly  
in line with some people, yes. This is probably necessary, yes”. Many participants describe a view of 
parties as the “necessary evil”, eg. (I10): “We cannot avoid them, they are the necessary evil, do you  
understand?”
262 (I6), when questioned whether he thought that all parties would objectively be led to such deviations, 
he answered: “Probably yes. How could this not be? I cannot imagine a different way.. In what other  
way could this work? But I don't know, we haven't experienced a better way, maybe...” The role of 
experience is  to  be  highlighted  here.  Nevertheless,  it  should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  similar 
antidemocratic deviations have emerged in the forms of the movement as well, and especially in the 
assemblies, as examined in detail in section e of chapter IV.
263 Many interviewees insisted, as mentioned, that the Left was not exactly part of the broader picture of 
political delegitimation, because it had not yet gained power, claiming that, if it did, it would present the 
same deficiencies with the rest political parties. (I1) claimed “I think that if the Left gains power, it will  
reproduce the same problems, this is why I feel like I am pushed towards more radical views, towards  
those who reject power”.
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chose to interview people who had little or no prior political involvement, thus little or no 
experience of participation in political forms.
Participants focused more on a critique towards  the attitude of  the Left  in  the 
movements  under  study. I  have  claimed  in  chapter  IV  that  this  attitude  has  been 
ambivalent, oscillating between the submission to the spontaneity of the movement and 
an external critique, often accompanied by abstaining from any participation, as was 
the case with the KKE. Interviewees focused more on a “selfish” attitude which they 
attributed to the Left, seeking to dominate over the movement for its own purposes, 
widely perceived as different from, or even antagonistic to, those of the people, or of 
the movements. Thus, (I8) claimed that “The Left could have organized the people,  
instead of seeking to take them on its side. It  could have tried to help them...  and  
provide of course its political beliefs, but... I think those who know how to organize,  
should be a little more... honestly helpful. For example, the KKE in the very old times: it  
went down on strikes and helped, irrespectively of whether it had its own members in  
them or not. The Left has indeed disappointed me in the movement. I didn't like the fact  
that  it  was  negative  towards  it  in  the  beginning,  nor  that  it  tried  to  dominate  in  it  
afterwards. I would like for the Left to have honestly endorsed it. I think that in that way,  
both the Left and the society would have things to gain”.
This  inadequacy  of  political  organizational  forms  has  led  to  the  inability  for  a 
“common will” to be formed and organized. The above formulations bring in mind the 
role  of  the  political  party  as  elaborated by  Gramsci  when speaking of  the  modern 
prince:  “The  modern prince,  the  myth-prince,  cannot  be a  real  person,  a  concrete 
individual.  It  can  only  be  an  organism,  a  complex  element  of  society  in  which  a 
collective will,  which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted 
itself  in  action,  begins  to  take  concrete  form.  History  has  already  provided  this 
organism, and it is the political party - the first cell in which there come together germs 
of a collective will tending to become universal and total” (Gramsci 1971: 129). This 
modern prince is not  restricted to its articulation in  the form of  the party nor to its 
institutional dimension: the latter being definitive, it is however “the tip of the iceberg of 
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a broader process of collective political activation of the popular classes, in all of the 
instances of deliberation and decision-making throughout the society” (Thomas 2013). 
Thus, the difficulties lie in the presence and role of leadership, its interconnection to the 
broader political activation of the people and the power relations developing within the 
various political organizations.
The overwhelming theoretical question emerging here is the relationship between 
the political party and the spontaneous movements of the people. “The emancipation of 
the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves”, was the 
first  sentence  of  the  Rules  of  the  International  Workingmen’s  Association  in  1867. 
According to Shandro (Shandro 1995: 269), “this thesis involves two claims: first, that 
the working class is capable of autonomous revolutionary activity in the sense that its 
struggles need not be subordinated to the ends of others... Second, the end and aim of 
proletarian  emancipation,  the  supercession  of  capitalism and  the  construction  of  a 
socialist society can be attained only through the independent activity of the working 
class.”  Marx  and  Engels  emphasized  that  “against  the  collective  power  of  the 
propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself 
into  a  political  party,  distinct  from,  and  opposed  to,  all  old  parties  formed  by  the 
propertied  classes”  (Marx 2010c:  201).  They did  not,  however, develop a coherent 
theory of the party in its concrete form any further, but only described different party 
models at various historical moments264 (Johnstone 1967: 122).
Later elaborations attempted to deal with the organizational forms of the political 
subject and its relationship with the spontaneous element of the masses265.  A well-
known debate  based on the Leninist  elaborations  on organizational  forms and the 
264 They  did  however  draw  certain  methodological  lines,  eg.  organizational  forms  are  thought  to  be 
dynamic;  interrelated  with  the  development  of  the  social  movement,  rather  than  static  and 
predetermined (Ibid.: 135).
265 For Zizek, the role of the political subject in the concrete form of the political party, is undeniable,  
otherwise movements seem condemned to a vicious cycle of resistance, which, in the absence of the 
party, will be a form of “politics without politics” (Zizek 2001). Lewis proposes the notion of a dialectical 
alliance between spontaneity and organization (Lewis 2007: 288). For Thomas, the party-form must be 
thought neither as simply acting in favour of a composition of different elements in a period of multiple 
movements and demands (following the Negri-Hardt  analysis),  nor  as a laboratory  for  a  totalizing 
political  subject  (in  the  Lukácsian  sense),  but  as  integrating  both  compositional  and  totalizing 
dimensions (Thomas 2013). The Gramscian analysis on the organic intellectuals is also relevant at this 
point (Gramsci 1971: 5-14).
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political party, refers to his formulation of consciousness coming to the working class 
“from without”266. This thesis supports an understanding of this formulation as referring 
to consciousness coming from beyond the realm of the purely economic struggle, and 
not as coming from elements external to the class, acting as a deus ex machina (thus 
discounting  the ability  of  the masses to produce political  activity  by  themselves)267. 
Lenin started from the internal contradictions of the working class of which we spoke 
above; having both a spontaneous tendency towards socialism, and a tendency to be 
manipulated because of it being the “repository of bourgeois ideology” (Shandro 2007: 
309).  This  spontaneous  dialectics  of  consciousness  has  limits,  therefore  the 
spontaneous element must at the same time be fostered, guided and even combated 
(Shandro  2007:  309).  This  echoes  another  finding  from  this  fieldwork:  although 
participants were keen to realize the need of organizational forms, an individualism and 
insistence  on  “personal  freedom”  as  an  ultimate  value  was  evident  in  their  whole 
perspective, as examined in section b of chapter V268. This is, in my estimation, both 
due to the weakness of the Left to actively engage people in an alternative collective 
plan, and the prevalence of neoliberal ideology; the two being evidently in dialectical 
interaction.
As  Bensaid  (2002)  has underlined,  this  is  precisely  what  the  specificity  of  the 
political  field  is  about:  the political  field  does not  simply express a reflection or  an 
extension of the social correlation of forces. It is the ground for the transformation of 
social relations and class struggle in political terms, with its own, as psychoanalysts 
would  say, displacements  and  condensations.  Thus,  the  truth  is  neither  objectively 
defined nor  simply out there, and reinforcement of the level of consciousness is not 
merely related to “enlightenment” or a cognitive clarification, but is directly related to 
266 “Class political  consciousness can be brought  to the workers  only from without,  that  is,  only from 
outside of the economic struggle, outside of the sphere of relations between workers and employers”, 
(Lenin 1950a: 204).
267 In accordance with Althusser who, quoting Lenin, claimed that he did not want to assume an enhanced 
role for the intellectuals, but for revolutionary theory and a revolutionary political party; thus he aimed at 
fending off economism (2006: 22).
268 Thus,  (I15)  clearly  stated  that  “Syntagma was a form which contained no parties.  It  expressed a  
common ground of people wanting the same thing, independent of their ideology. I.. I don't believe in  
ideologies. That's it”. And (I20) argued against participating in a party by saying: “I don't want to. I want  
to be able to leave whenever I  want.  If  you are there,  you are stigmatized. What's  the reason to  
participate if I don't agree 100%? If I agreed 100%, then maybe... Maybe then I would feel that it would  
worth it. Until now I have not felt that.”
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social transformation, in the sense of constituting an act which intervenes in the given 
circumstances and transforms them (Gaitanou and Gousis  2015:  138).  For  Barker, 
“individual  and  collective  'emancipation'  or  'liberation'  is  an  at  once  'practical'  and 
'cognitive' process involving changing the self and societal relations”269 (Barker 2007: 
21). This is the reason why no political party can claim the monopoly on expressing the 
interests  of,  or  represent,  the  working  class:  from  this  emerges  the  potential  of 
multipartism.  Further,  these  imperatives  call  for  more  open  forms  of  political 
organization, which will dialectically interact with the actual movement of people, being 
open by the movements' inventiveness and ready to experiment with new forms and 
structures.
This  quest  of  an  open  political  form  was  raised  explicitly  by  some  of  the 
participants. (I8) claimed: “A political space more open, socially, can be very useful.  
Useful  for  the  radicalization  of  the  people,  for  their  participation,  for  a  material  
contribution,  all  these things that  can help us all  cope with our  daily  lives.  Closed  
structures, in which those who are already radicalized stay with each other, cannot  
offer much. These people are even anti-social. Such forms must have an actual target,  
and they must really try to be socially useful”. For (I11), “we need more fluid structures.  
Structures that will be more accessible to the people. And more... free. Structures that  
will not function like cliques. Because I think parties function a bit like cliques. And they  
end up alienating the persons who participate in them. The members are alienated by  
the party.”
Finally, the emergence of class struggle, in any form, never emerges or progresses 
exactly as planned by the political organizations intervening in it: a movement seen as 
exactly determined in advance is an abstract theoretical schema270 (Luxembourg 2004: 
172-3).  Some  participants  expressed  indeed  the  hope  that  the  lesson  of  the 
movements  under  discussion  will  be  taken;  in  correspondence  with  Thomas  who 
269 In a similar vein, possession of knowledge is not itself like possessing an object: it is equivalent to the 
insertion of the individual  into a network, in which individuality is at the same time demanded and 
contested, and the cognitive process is itself a practice (Balibar 2014: 218-9).
270 For Gramsci, “reality produces a wealth of the most bizarre combinations” and “it is not reality which 
should  be  expected  to  conform to  the  abstract  schema.  This  will  never  happen,  and  hence  this 
conception is nothing but an expression of passivity.” (Gramsci 1971: 200).
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argues  that  the  party-form  must  be  “immanent  to  the  'content'  of  contemporary 
movements” (Thomas 2013)271. (I31) claimed that “taking into account how things are,  
in Greece, the way that most people, we, feel about parties, politics, corruption etc.;  
probably  only  something  like  [the  movement  of]  Syntagma  square  could  bring  us  
close”.  And  for  (I37):  “Those  people  who  are  more  enlightened,  and  who  gained  
experience by the Syntagma [square movement], must try, through parties and other  
forms, to prove that they have actually received the messages of the times. So that we  
arrive at something new, that we have not seen before. And probably we cannot even  
guess it, and will be a mixture. A mixture of both having a political opinion and arguing  
for it,  AND gaining actual respect...  by everyone. I want to see this from people in  
politics. I don't ask for them to lose their political identity, their ideas etc.. Only to feel  
freer.” 
At this point, after discussing the main features of political organization, I will now 
pass to the final section of this thesis: the exploration of the conception of the political, 
after the experience of political participation in the movements under study.
c. Politics of emancipation.
“I  shall  therefore  ask  the  limit-question  (the  hardest  
question is always the best)”272 (Althusser 2006: 13)
The question to be raised at this point can be formulated as follows: what is the 
actual meaning and role of politics, under the perspective adopted in this thesis, i.e. in 
relation to the development of social movements in times of crisis? The challenge is to 
271 For Sotiris, this means being open towards the inventiveness of the movements, ready to experiment 
with new forms and structures;  in the sense of  a laboratory of constant political experimentation, a 
mechanism of counter-hegemony and a learning process, in a vital dialectics of theory and practice 
and in conditions of anti-hierarchical and participatory democracy (Sotiris 2012b: 66).
272 We would however endorse Kouvelakis' view when dealing with the problem of the political in Marx's 
thought: “a problem is however not the same thing with a 'lacuna' or an 'absolute limit', it is rather the 
sign of a thought which is in search, explores its internal contradictions by displacing its relation with 
the real that exceeds it, and, by doing so, it gives us already 'open' outcomes, themselves awaiting 
resumption” (Kouvelakis 2015: 3).
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formulate a non-instrumental approach, based on the analysis of the participation in the 
movements that developed in Greece in times of crisis. This requires thinking about 
politics in its specificity and conceptualizing a political form, in the sense of not simply 
referring  to  the whole  of  the  institutional  and state  superstructures,  but  also  to  an 
“active  determination”,  a  process  of  being  and  transformation  in  the  course  of 
emancipation (Kouvelakis 2015:  2).  Politics is something more than the exercise of 
power (but not beyond it); it is actually a “mode of acting”, a political relationship which 
allows  us  “to  think  of  the  possibility  of  a  political  subject(/ivity),  not  the  other  way 
around” (Rancière 2001). Self-organization of the masses is not simply an instrument 
of,  but  a precondition for, social  transformation.  Furthermore,  class struggle always 
exists in mediated forms, and classes cannot be defined as homogeneous and uniform 
political  entities  with  explicitly  defined  causes.  Classes  are  to  be  understood  as 
“corresponding  to  common  but  non-identical  practices  and  interests,  a  nominalist 
description of real multiplicity” (Thomas 2013). Simultaneously, class struggles do not 
always and equally include all workers (Barker 2007: 14).
Politics is perceived exactly in that sense: not as a sphere separate from the other 
ones, but as the expression of surmounting the fragmentation into separate spheres 
and of the possibility of a potentially unifying dynamics, of an hegemonic dimension 
that  enables  the  re-establishment  of  the  whole,  in  its  internal  articulation  with  the 
partial. Social transformation cannot thus be perceived as inducing the end of politics, 
as if people were to achieve self-fulfillment at the individual and collective levels once 
and for all. In that case, the only stake would be a “technical” management of affairs for 
the normal functioning of the whole, in a somehow perfect human society273. Such an 
approach would culminate either in a technological dystopia or an authoritarian system 
of social organization, in which people would be the perfect non-human beings.
On the contrary, politics, and thus democracy, are to be comprehended as ways of 
life, as an art of life. From this point of view, they also express ways of transition and of 
273 At the philosophical level, this takes us back to the Gramscian argument about the historicist character 
of philosophy of praxis, and its nature as an expression of historical contradictions, which thus is bound 
to be superseded (Gramsci 1971: 405). Only to add that, “This is not to say that utopia cannot have a 
philosophical value, for it has a political value and every politics is implicitly a philosophy” (Ibid.).
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organization  of  society,  as  well  as  processes  of  constant  self-transformation, 
democratization  and  learning:  processes  of  constituting  the  people  as  a  collective 
subject.  Democracy and politics are not remotely simple means or instruments, but 
determinants of the autonomy of the subject, as inherent to the concept of freedom. 
Realization  of  freedom  being  the  essence  of  the  socialized  human,  social 
transformation requires a long practice, involving processes of collective life and self-
institution.  Thus, political organization is not simply conceived as preparation for an 
objective to be pursued in the future, but as the articulation in the present of concrete 
aspects of the tendency towards a different organization of society (Sotiris 2014: 231).
From such a perspective, the experience of the social movements in Greece in the 
first period of the crisis has much to offer in terms of the practice of the constitution of 
the  movements  and of  the  perspective  they  bring  on rethinking  the political.  Their 
experimentation with structures and forms of protest, their very constitution, have dealt 
with such issues at the levels of both discourse and praxis. The intensification of class 
struggle has also increased politicization, leading to the emergence of new political 
forms and challenges. It has forced the dominant class to engage with politics, and to 
allow the state to use, control and repress the working class (Balibar 2014: 162). These 
thoughts were reflected in most interviewees' perception when discussing politics: while 
initially  confused  and  hesitant  towards  the  conception  of  politics  outside  its  official 
forms, in the course of the discussion, they all stated clearly that they understood their 
participation  in  the  movements  as  exercising  politics.  According  to  (I2),  “in  the 
assemblies, there was the sense that what was going on was very serious. This is why  
most people returned the next day. No one thought of it as funny, or simply relieving.  
They saw their presence very seriously, the fact that people with different concerns met  
there, in the square. They all narrated a similar story: 'I leave my child with my mother  
and come here every night, or I come right after my job, before going home'. There  
was the need of an actual,  an essential change. Things were not posited in a very  
organized  political  context,  that  is  true,  the  debate  was  not  political  in  the  strict  
definition of the term. However, in my view, it was essentially political.”
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Such  a  self-institution  is  not  a  situation but  a  continuous  process without  an 
endpoint.  The  struggle  for  democracy  is  something  which  will  never  be  integrally 
fulfilled. The point is, to reach a critical limit of transcendence: a rupture consisting of 
the transition into a different mode of organizing society. Real democracy is a moment 
in  a  dialectical  process,  with  continuities  and  discontinuities,  in  the  course  of 
conquering autonomy and approaching the realization of the socialized human being. 
Thus, the end of politics will have the meaning of the end of official politics as it  is 
currently  comprehended,  and  determined  by  domination.  This  current  definition 
conceptualizes  politics  as  the separate  exercise  of  power  by  a  body  of  experts  in 
political knowledge and bureaucracy, and as a privilege, an expression and satisfaction 
of the partial interest, falsely projected as universal. This is the view of politics to which 
Greek activists have striven to oppose.  But  this  in no way signifies the end of  the 
political  as  such.  Political  participation  contributes  decisively  to  the  deepening  of 
politicization and of a potential radicalization of those participating. This was evident to 
participants  themselves:  for  (I32),  “this  whole  thing  has  put  me into  a  process  of  
searching things, investigating what is going on, why things are the way they are, why  
things are different in the social level and different in the political one.” (I1) claimed that 
“all discussions have changed, they don't refer to 'what happened today, where were  
you, what did you do, how are you'. They all refer to what is going on in the social and  
the  political  level,  around  us,  because  this  is  what  matters  for  us  all”.  This  is 
reminiscent of Marx performing the crucial reversal in Hegel's perception of the political 
as a force of conservation (as the reproduction of the existing status quo): politics is 
perceived by him as a process of refusal and transformation of the existing status quo. 
This expresses a radical version of the recognition of the distinction between reality 
and existence, in which the determinative element is the application of the criterion of 
praxis, a turn towards the philosophy of praxis. 
The demand of human autonomy, from the viewpoint of a philosophy of praxis, has 
a  political  and social  content,  rather  than a  simply  anthropological  one.  Thus,  it  is 
directly linked to the social issue: if politics has par excellence a strategic dimension, 
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abstract democratic ideals are not to be perceived antithetical to the existing material 
reality. The democratic issue is not posited as external, or on a different plane from the 
one of  material  life,  but  integral  to it.  It  expresses a revolutionary process which is 
intended both to achieve freedom and the solution of the social issue (consisting of 
inequality and poverty).  According to Chrysis,  such a theory of  democracy aims at 
founding politics in the social field: as an intervention precisely in the same field where 
inequality is produced and reproduced (Chrysis 2014: 113). Again the Greek case has 
much to offer: it expressed a unique combination of both, realizing in a sense such a 
connection, as I have examined in detail. Mobilized against the memorandums and the 
violent effects of the economic crisis, participants in movements simultaneously posited 
issues of  democracy and political  constitution. Interviewee (I19) gave an interesting 
insight into this perception: “Speaking of the squares, well, we can do politics! Based  
on what we are experiencing, we can do politics. Our voice can be heard, they can  
actually see our needs, they are obliged to stop seeing us as numbers. They cannot  
say 'you have 500 euros per month to live, and this is enough' while they don't have a  
clue what's that like. While for them, the 500 euros last for one day. For some hours,  
for their shoes! And you? You cannot pay the rent, you cannot go to the supermarket,  
you need or want something but you cannot acquire it because you lack the money. 
Well no. From that point of view, we can do politics!”
Bensaid  (2010)  spoke  of  communism  as  a  “regulating  strategic  hypothesis”, 
determining decisively the today of social protests, and not simply alluding to a vague 
future.  In  a similar  vein,  for  Badiou the communist  hypothesis  is  the hypothesis  of 
emancipation. In  Rancière's interpretation, this means that communism is intrinsic to 
practices of emancipation, being a form of universality constructed by those practices 
(Rancière 2010: 167).  Such a statement bears the burden of potentially suggesting 
constructing small communist utopias or enclaves within capitalism274, a problem with 
which I will  deal with right below, in relation to the fundamental question of political 
274 Holloway's  statement  on  the  character  of  a  self-managed  park  in  a  district  of  Athens  after  the 
December 2008 revolt is very indicative of such a tendency: In the SWP conference on Marxism in  
2010  in  London,  in  his  speech  on  the  idea  of  communism,  he  claimed  that  the  park  was  “the 
communism itself, revolution itself!” (Callinicos, Holloway and Zizek 2010).
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power.  However,  at  this  point  I  would  like  to  stress  the  emphasis  of  the  above 
statement  on  “universality”  and  on  emancipation  as  a  process  of  consciousness 
transformation, in relation to the self-organization and self-management of the masses. 
Equality being a starting point rather than simply a goal and intelligence being one, 
rather  than  divided,  Rancière defined  emancipation  as  “the  appropriation  of  this 
intelligence  which  is  one,  and  the  verification  of  the  potential  of  the  equality  of 
intelligence” (Ibid.: 168). He also stressed the contradiction within such a statement: 
while the communist hypothesis is possible on the basis of emancipation, meaning the 
collectivization of the power of anyone, the communist movement has at the same time 
been  permeated  by  the  inegalitarian  presupposition  of  multiple  divisions  (of 
intelligence,  fragmentation,  pedagogy  etc.)  (Ibid.:  171).  As  Barker  has  noted, 
“'subaltern cultures' contain a variety of potentials for development: being anything but 
homogeneous, they are fields of dialogue and contest” (2007: 17).
Participants in the movements of 2010-2011 seem to attest the failure of political 
organizations in Greece to confront such limits and contradictions; failing to stimulate 
the self-activation of the masses, the structures and experiments emerging from their 
movement, and to propose a credible path to the deepening of democracy at all levels. 
Aspects  of  this  debate  have  been  incorporated,  both  into  the  developing  political 
dialogue and into protesters' decisions and processes, in two ways: an active and a 
defensive, both of which have been thoroughly examined in this thesis. The defensive 
aspect of activists' reaction is the sharp critique against the existing political parties and 
organizations of the Left. The active aspect is the development of structures of self-
organization and forms of protest which facilitated direct participation into both action 
and political  decisions.  Such experiments and structures of  popular  self-acting  and 
inventiveness, of collective will,  of labour organization, of antifascist-antiracist  action 
and solidarity, have the potential to function as constituent forms of the people, thus as 
structures of emancipation and consciousness transformation. Such active or hidden 
networks of support may have “powerful transforming effects on working people and 
their social relations, empowering them, posing ultimate issues to do with 'control', and 
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providing a different route to politicization. It is not a matter of discounting 'idealism', but 
of  discovering  its  concrete  practical  content  and  thus  its  developmental  potentials” 
(Barker  2007:  29-30).  Such  structures  can  also  guarantee  the  persistence  of 
participation; par excellence in response to repression. As (I3) said, “Well, despite the 
troubles  and  police  violence,  people  felt  the  need  to  defend  what  was  happening  
there... Because, you know, I think that most people felt it like their own. So, they had a  
great need to defend it, I don't know, at least this is how I felt, that I am here, and I will  
fight for it, I won't just leave”.
These  experimental  processes  are  not  effective  just  at  the  ideological  level, 
through the generation and transformation of consciousness, but also on the material 
one, through “the production and/or imposition of faits accomplis” (Shandro 2007: 322). 
The  structures  of  the  Greek  movement,  and  particularly  of  the  squares,  have 
experimented  with  different  political  tactics  and  organizational  proposals  (thus  their 
demands for constitutional assembly, the practical measures on the functioning of the 
assemblies, the insistence on more direct democratic measures etc.). Far from simply 
prefiguring  some  future  society,  since  they  are  largely  determined  by  the  struggle 
against their opponent (the state and the political power), such efforts express a conflict 
concerning the question of the political in its relation with the struggle for emancipation 
(Kouvelakis 2015: 30). They have, of course, often being led to the reproduction of 
respective  problems  and  limits,  of  the  danger  of  simple  moral  invocations,  or 
apotheosizing the spontaneous element to the detriment of the organizational form275.
Furthermore, implied above and in opposition to approaches which focus on the 
appeal of power rather than its seizure (Holloway 2010 being indicative)276, we endorse 
the argument by Bensaid, that social relations cut across the field of institutions and of 
political  representation,  thus  it  is  futile  to  pretend  to  ignore  this  very  simple  fact 
(Bensaid 2006:  183).  A transformative process does not  emerge out  of  a void,  but 
275 These deficits were examined in section e of chapter IV and section f of chapter V.
276 These approaches imply the creation of  islets  of  communism inside capitalism,  ostensibly  at/on a 
different  level  from that of  social  organization.  According to  Bensaid's  apt formulation,  they simply 
evade reality in order to find refuge in abstraction (Bensaid 2006: 178-179) . For an analytical critique 
of these approaches with respect to the 2008 December revolt in Greece, see (Gousis 2009).
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matures in the contradictions of the existing situation, thus it  requires a struggle for 
hegemony. For Toscano “communism cannot be separated from the problem — rather 
than the programme — of its realization”, thus “it can also not be separated from the 
question of power.” According to the author, “for the problem of communism and power 
to  be  even  posed  without  falling  into  the  usual  traps,  we  need  to  overcome  the 
apparent  antinomy  between  communism  as  the  name  for  a  form  of  political 
organization with social transformation as its aim, and communism as a form of social 
and economic association with social equality as its practice277... In trying to overcome 
the antinomy between organization and association, between the instruments and the 
everyday practice of communism, we are obliged to address the question of power. But 
we cannot blithely reduce this question to the dimension of the state.” (Toscano 2010: 
202). For Rancière (2001), the way to be led to such a reduction of the political to the 
state, is to accept “the supposed purification of the political, freed from domestic and 
social necessity”278. Or, as Harvey posits it more vividly, “Enough of relationalities and 
immaterialities! How about concrete proposals, actual political organization, and real 
actions?” (Harvey 2009).
Finally, moving away from any form of class reductionism, the development of all 
different  forms of  protest  may contribute  to  this  broader  process of  consciousness 
transformation. I have implied the existence of an approach combining the potential of 
unification  into  a  broader  mobilization  with  a  strategic  orientation  which  is  also 
respectful of differences and autonomy, throughout the whole thesis. All these different 
forms and structures deal with the need for coordination, joint action and cohesion, in 
order  to  be  effective  as  a  force  for  unification279.  Their  constitution,  based  on  the 
awareness of common interests and the opposition to a common enemy founded on 
277 “It is the least one can say that in the twentieth century the relations between crafting the means for the 
conquest of power and enacting the transformation of everyday life have been immensely problematic, 
and  that  the  very  notion  of  a  'politics  of  producers’,  to  use  the  Marxian  formulation,  has  been 
overwhelmed by historical conflicts that have left the legacies of commune, council and soviet, with 
some rare exceptions, in a state of abeyance”, as he continues (Toscano 2010: 202).
278 The elaborations of Althusser (1980: 13; although the main point at issue of the class struggle is still 
the state, politics should not be defined exclusively as to the state) and Balibar (2014; speaking of the 
need of “another practice of politics”) are also relative on this matter.
279 As Sartre has underlined, such a unification must not be considered as certain or be taken for granted 
(1974: 134).
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exploitation, is a condition for restraining fragmentation. Their challenge is to maintain 
an  “open  and  irreducible  relation  between  the  unitary moment,  which  falls  to  the 
political organization of the class, and the moments of self-government, the councils, 
the fused groups” (Sartre 1970: 248). Therefore, a common collective identity can be 
formed,  based  on the Leninist  schema of  “unity  in  diversity”,  meaning an effort  of 
unification into a collective subject of subversion which transcends, without neglecting, 
its internal contradictions, and recognizes the relative autonomy of the different strata. 
The  interviews  show a pattern  of  participants  appreciating  such  a  need.  They 
seemed  to  emphasize  both  the  need  for  such  a  unification,  and  for  respecting 
differences  and  diversities.  For  (I33)  for  example,  this  unification  must  not  mean 
“homogenization”: “This homogenization is not desired. This would be kind of fascist: to  
ask everyone to agree or disagree with things that each person experiences differently;  
even the same fact,  the same incident,  the same taste,  the same food,  the same  
music. But if we agree that the minimum accord and the minimum condescension is  
necessary for a society to function, we can thus say that my own thought might help  
precisely this, that... You know something? Yes, that me and you, who are in different  
courses of life, are experiencing the same problems. What can we do about that?” To 
quote Audre Lorde (Lorde 1984) when speaking of the feminist movement, “differences 
must not be merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which 
our  creativity  can  spark  like  a  dialectic”.  In  this  unifying  process,  the  role  of  the 
movements is crucial. As interviewee (I35) put it: “This blurred and undetermined thing 
that each person had in their minds in their own way (and this was evident: you could  
find among the five thousands in the square, at least two thousand perceptions of what  
was  happening:  one  was  fired,  another  lost  her  salary...  perceptions  of  what  was  
happening  to  us  all  were  promiscuous)...  Yes,  but  through  discussions  and  
demonstrations and the whole story happening there, this mixed thing was suddenly in  
line.  And in  the end,  it  was gathered into a unique perspective...  This  was,  in  my  
opinion, the most important factor of these protests”. 
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Here comes again the role of the party for this unification to happen. Indeed, the 
“modern prince” takes the form of a politics of a constant united front of the popular 
classes, in which unity is accomplished actively inside the struggle, even, and mostly, 
through  productive  conflicts  (Thomas  2012).  It  “includes  within  it  processes  of 
disaggregation and conflictuality as constitutive moments”, meaning that unity is not 
thought of in terms of identity and homogeneity but “in terms of constitutive difference 
as  the  precondition  of  processes  of  unification  that  necessarily  always  remain 
'incomplete'”, in the sense that unification presupposes differentiation, “in an expansive 
dialectic without definitive synthesis” (Thomas 2013). It aims at furthering their process 
of becoming concrete rather than fusing them into an identity or submitting them to a 
sovereign  instance.  Thus,  the  party-form  functions  as  the  active  organizational 
synthesis  of  all  these  levels  and  instances,  “capable  of  effecting  the  political 
recomposition  of  the  class,  representing,  expressing  and  thereby  transforming  its 
myriad interests and forms”, conceived “as a laboratory for processes of unification of 
these differences”, gathering up the partial collective wills already in motion (Ibid.).
This collective identity and its formation in, and through, struggle is itself a process 
of political constitution, since identities are no more than political processes in progress 
(Badiou 2014: 13). Political participation is a crucial factor in the transformation of the 
consciousness of the difference: “If the plural subject is constituted in the course of its 
performative action, then it is not already constituted, which means that whatever form 
it has before its performative exercise, it is not the same as the form it takes during the 
action and after the action” (Butler 2014: 58). This “unity in diversity” does not refer 
merely to individuals, but also to relations between groups. Coordinations become a 
sort of nomadic forms, moving from one group to another, revealing the potential of 
coordinating protests through constituting a common front (Kouvelakis 2007: 99-100). 
This is a concrete articulation of the universal and the particular, of the whole and the 
partial,  where  one  commences  from the  partial  as  if  this  contains  the  whole.  For 
Meszároš,  universality  is  to  be  conceived “as  inherent in,  and  not  as  opposed to, 
dynamically evolving particularity” (Meszároš 1971a: 1). This leads to the realization of 
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universality  rather  than  its  negation (Ibid.:  1-2).  Thus,  connections  are  not  formed 
simply based on solidarity, but on the basis of common interests, common demands 
and mobilization. 
In other words, and speaking in Gramscian terms, this effort of unification through 
organizational forms in the sense of “unity in diversity” requires creating the roots, here 
and now, of  another  way of  organizing society, not  as islets  of  communism inside 
capitalism accepting  the  partial  as  such,  but  as  the  material  base  of  change,  the 
articulation of the partial with the whole, the material challenge of capitalist hegemony. 
This has been the implicit goal, and what has been at stake in the social movements 
developing in Greece in the first, intense period of the crisis. Its potential realization has 
been contradictory, and certainly incomplete. Still, it remains an experience with much 
to offer. At this point, I have examined the fundamental theoretical points arising from 
this  research  with  respect  to  subjectivity  and  consciousness  formation  and 
transformation, and I have articulated a theoretical approach of the political, in relation 
to popular participation. I have shown the related processes that developed during the 
movements under examination to be contradictory, with potentials especially in respect 
to popular identification of the stakes, and certain weaknesses in their completion.
I have identified the main factors for these weaknesses, emphasizing the role of 
the subjective factor  (acting as the primary factor  in  specific  moments,  which  force 
together the essential tendencies of the process, Lukács 2002: 55; Lenin 1964: 213-
214). I have, at the same time, insisted on the structural, objective determinations of 
the  environment  and  the  conjuncture,  opposing  an  approach  based  on  a  radical 
indeterminacy, according to which anything could happen at any time280. This is why I 
have chosen to examine these factors in chapters II and III. In the next final sect ion of 
the thesis, I will have the opportunity to sum up the fundamental conclusions resulting 
from my field research in relation to the theoretical points posited in this thesis covering 
the  economic  and  the  political  crisis  in  Greece,  with  particular  focus  on  popular 
280 This is the conception of insurrection as an art. If instead the “moment” is to be thought as turned into 
“the abstract falsehood of a permanently decisive influenceability of the process”, then insurrection as 
an art would be turned into insurrection as a game, and this debate would end up into “an empty 
phraseology of subjectivism” (Lukacs 2002: 59). 
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perception of the political. The political conjuncture of the years following the 2010-
2011 period will be briefly evaluated from the perspective of the movements and the 
transformations examined here.
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CONCLUSIONS:  SOCIAL  MOVEMENT  AS  A  RUPTURE  IN 
CONTINUITY
“These  things  have  never  happened again;  never.  For  
something to be effective in the overall, time must pass  
by. We will go through many challenges, many mistakes  
will be made, this is normal. First of all, this is something  
new. But the fact that the initiative was there, that people  
who thought of it  and started it,  were there, they were  
present, they did it... well this can only lead to a positive  
outcome. Someone.. ok, maybe someone could find all  
this  ineffective,  because  it  did  not  have  a  concrete  
outcome in their life. This is not right. When something  
new  is  starting,  when  for  example  you  try  to  fix  a  
furniture, a table... the most probable is that when you fix  
it, you will put the glass on it and... it will break! The fact  
that you bought the materials, and you nailed the nails  
and... You sat down and you tried and you constructed  
it... Well this... This is politics.” (I21)
The development, structures and forms of the movement act as a catalyst in the 
formation and transformation of the consciousness of those who have been part of it. 
This is, as argued, neither a linear, nor an evolutionary process: the actual movement 
of real people intervenes decisively at certain crucial moments, which encapsulate the 
essential  tendencies  of  the  process281.  Such  an  active  intervention  by  the  people 
themselves transforms the balance of forces, shifting in a dialectical way the interaction 
281 This  “moment”  comes in  the  sense of  the  Lukácsian  “Augenblick”:  the moment  when there is  an 
opening for  an act  to intervene in  the current  situation (Lukács 2002:  55).  It  is  precisely  in those 
moments that the subjective factor is most determinant and functions as the primary force.
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between the objective forces and the subjective factor. Practice in its turn is constituted 
and developed in leaps and ruptures, rather than linearly. This approach is central to 
the way I have dealt with the movements as an important “moment” amid the turbulent 
Greek  situation,  proving  both  potentialities  and  limitations  which  were  to  become 
evident in the years that followed and until the present day. At this point, on the basis of 
my research, I will formulate the following thesis: although the 2010-2011 movements 
in Greece had the dynamics, scope, repertoire of action, initial resources and depth to 
bring more concrete changes to the socio-political  landscape,  their  real impact  has 
fallen  short  of  this  potential.  I  have  argued  that  the  causes  of  this  failure  are 
predominantly related to weaknesses of the broader “subjective factor”, and not to the 
objective conditions, its limits and limitations, though these did exist and have been 
thoroughly studied. At the same time, the Left has proven incapable of transcending the 
fragmentation,  the  strategic  and  programmatic  insufficiency  and  the  lack  of  vision 
pervasive in its various factions. This conclusion does not mean that these movements 
have lacked any significant concrete outcome, both at the material/practical and the 
ideological  levels.  However, it  underlines  the necessity  of  reading the study of  the 
transformative  effects  of  action  bearing  in  mind  both  the  potentialities  and  the 
weaknesses of that period. Having said that, this has evidently the danger of speaking 
of an “absence”, even more an absence signifying a diversion from a regulative ideal, 
irrespective of the particular moment, locus, articulation of capital, historical and class 
conjuncture.  This  is  neither  my objective  nor  my perspective,  as developed in  this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the Greek case has proven ideal for testing precisely a case in 
which a moment signifies an opening for an act to intervene, when the subjective factor 
is  determinant.  Further,  interviewees  themselves  have  often  highlighted  such 
“absences”, reflecting on what could have been done.
In general, my field work, using interviews with people participating in the protests 
of  2010-2011 but  without  any  prior  political  commitment  or  concrete  participation, 
confirms first and foremost what was formulated in theory in chapter II: the prevalence 
of a deep crisis of political representation. This refers to the entire political system, the 
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political parties and their representatives, but mainly to the particular political parties in 
power at the time (PASOK and ND), as examined in detail in chapter V. This has been 
deeply destabilizing for the functioning of the political system. Political destabilization 
has been growing for  many years,  exacerbated by  a lack  of  an adequate  political 
representation and by the resulting failure of the people to identify with or to be actively 
engaged  with  a  strategic  perspective.  During  the  period  under  study,  the  overall 
political scene as previously known and tacitly accepted, has progressively collapsed, 
with efforts to shore it up or restructure it, at best, only partially successful. The social 
mobilizations of 2010-2011 exacerbated this crisis of legitimacy of the parties, and of 
the political system in general, leading to a bout of political maneuvering282, culminating 
in the double elections of May and June 2012. These elections underlined the depth of 
the crisis and the intensity of social polarization. They also highlighted the weakness of 
the traditional  political  system to resist  destabilization and its  inability  to produce a 
viable political  alternative: “The elections of May were those of  de-aggregation and 
fragmentation par excellence, in which no party surpassed 20% of the vote. In the June 
elections, tendencies towards re-alignment appeared, with the emergence of two main 
parties  (ND  and  SYRIZA),  but  in  a  landscape  of  multipartism”  (Voulgaris  and 
Nikolakopoulos 2014: 9). A total reformation of the party system was under way. The 
old  bipartisan  system  disintegrated283;  new  parties  emerged;  the  broader,  and 
previously dominant “political Centre” proved incapable of reconstructing its forces. The 
Left  reorganized,  and  enhanced  its  impact  and  political  and  electoral  influence 
significantly, through SYRIZA in particular284; whilst the right-wing forces went through 
processes  of  successive  transformations.  In  addition,  an  openly  fascist  party  (GD) 
282 Among these maneuvers were:  the near resignation of  the Papandreou government in June 2011 
(during the peak of the squares' movement), which at the last moment became a government reshuffle, 
Papandreou's final resignation in autumn 2011 and the designation in November of the Papadimos 
government,  a  government  of  “broader  consensus”  with  an  unelected  banker  acting  as  a  prime 
minister.
283 “Old” bipartisanship (PASOK and ND) reached 32% in May 2012 elections, from 77.4% in 2009 (which 
was the lowest after 1981). The sum of the two first parties in the May 2012 elections was 35.6%.
284 SYRIZA's electorate changed as follows: 4.6% in 2009, 16.78% in May 2012, 26.89% in June 2012, to 
reach 36.34% in January 2015 and be elected to government.
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invaded the political scene, with its support ominously growing to 7% in successive 
elections285. 
This  process  has  not  culminated  in  any  new,  but  stable,  configuration  of  the 
political system, despite a temporary, but potentially precarious, lull in instability. One 
last, but not least, point to be underlined is the generalization of this crisis of political 
representation, affecting the whole spectrum of the political scene, including now the 
Left.  The  crisis  of  representation  may  have  primarily  affected  the  systemic  parties 
previously  dominating  governance,  however  it  spilled  over  to  other  parties,  and 
particularly the parties of the Left, which are now largely seen as part of the problem. 
This  is  especially  because  of  the  evolution  of  SYRIZA,  a  party  that  assumed the 
responsibility  of  accessing  power  without  being  able  to  articulate  an  alternative 
strategic vision and a tactical orientation. This weakness of the Left is due to its specific 
mode of functioning, its strategic failures and its membership being weakly grounded in 
class  terms.  The  interviewees  have  further  highlighted  its  lack  of  democratic  and 
participatory processes and the reproduction of a strictly hierarchical model on different 
levels. Finally, the failure of the Left in promoting a united front politics is also one of  
the causes of  its  ineffectiveness and its  difficulty  in  actively  engaging with broader 
strata of the population.  This generalized disillusionment took a latent form for some 
time, as indicated in the interviews. However it had not been validated since the Left 
had not, at that point, acceded to power. SYRIZA's electoral success that brought it into 
government, overviewed below, accentuated this process. The perception of the Left as 
being part of the problem rather than a potential part of the solution, amounts to an 
important transformation, the consequences of which remain to be seen286. 
The  theoretical  point  on  consciousness  transformation  through  political 
participation and through people's own praxis  and autonomous exercise of politics is 
further  confirmed.  Political  participation  in  movements  has  accelerated  the  de-
285 GD's electorate changed as following: 0.29% in 2009, 6.97% in May 2012, 6.92% in June 2012, and 
6.28% in January 2015.
286 (I5)'s claim was indicative of this generalized crisis of political representation: “The political system is 
structured in a way that, in my opinion, even if those 300 deputies left, the next 300 ones will be like  
them. And you know, in essence, you win nothing. This whole thing is simply symbolic. This is how I  
saw it, more tangibly, through these events. If I can speak of a more general change in my philosophy.”
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legitimation of the state, of its apparatuses, and of other mechanisms and institutions 
like the EU in public  opinion.  Participation  triggered a process of  radicalization,  as 
demonstrated by the findings presented in chapter V with respect to the perception of 
protest, the use of violence and the role of interests antagonistic to those of the ruling 
class. A deeper than expected287 theoretical trust in the power of social mobilization, an 
optimism  about  its  potential,  and  a  positive  attitude  towards  its  meaning  and 
effectiveness  dominate  the  assessment  of  the  movements  by  the  participants 
themselves. Even if they are not formulated in an explicit way and/or in organizational 
terms, a strong demand for the deepening of the democratic functioning, for greater 
involvement of people in politics and for forms and structures that would guarantee this 
participation also came to the surface288. The main points underlined by the majority of 
the  interviewees  were the emergence  of  a  feeling  of  usefulness,  combined with  a 
transformation of  values towards more human-oriented ones along with a sense of 
pure happiness linked to participation,  which was evident  in  the discourse and the 
general attitude of the interviewees' during the discussion.
However it is equally important to note that an amount of skepticism, sometimes 
verging on despondency, was also present among the participants with respect to the 
concrete gains obtained by political participation. Despite the emphasis on the positive 
subjective effects of participation, often with a strong ethical connotation, interviewees 
have  been  far  less  confident  concerning  its  material  outcomes.  Lack  of  concrete 
material bonds, and/or the realization of this lack as such, makes it easier for feelings 
of  mistrust  to  emerge,  undermining  the  faith  in  the  potentials  of  future  political 
mobilization. The prevalence of certain individualistic tendencies and values was also 
apparent,  as  examined  in  chapter  V.  Participation  did  produce  changes  in  the 
perception of  a certain number  of  issues although little  seems to have changed in 
practical terms in the life of the participants once the movements were over. The most 
important of these changes has probably been their voting behaviour, a fact that is 
287 Mainly due to the specific conjuncture in which the interviews were conducted.
288 Although similar deviations to the ones denounced by participants when speaking of the Left, were 
denounced as being reproduced in the processes of the movement, par excellence in the assemblies: 
eg. anti-democratic, bureaucratic or even corruptive practices.
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significant  but  remains  still  in  the  repertoire  of  a  certain  political  passivity. This 
hesitancy is obliquely indicated by the participants themselves, when they declare that 
in the future they would be keen to participate, but in a more selective, even skeptical,  
way. Indeed,  they  have  not  seemed interested  in  participating  in  durable  forms of 
political activism afterwards. Furthermore, in terms of political functioning, a difficulty in 
forming, through this personal experience, a specific collective alternative potential for 
a  political  configuration (identified,  though,  by  many  as  a  necessity)  persisted 
throughout the period. This phenomenon is also linked to difficulties in perceiving of 
politics as an interrelationship between the central political scene and structures of self-
organization and self-management from below functioning in a complementary rather 
than in an antagonistic way.
As for the role of national symbols in the protests, the use of national symbols and 
flags has to some extent contributed to the broader integration of the movement and 
the  avoidance  of  its  limitation  to  the  “usual  suspects”  of  the  political  Left.  This 
assessment is supported by two more elements: firstly, whilst  there was an intense 
debate during the movements on several issues (the participation of parties, trade-
unions etc.), the presence of flags was generally more easily accepted. And secondly, 
no other symbol did or could assume a respective, unifying role. However, participants' 
discourse  and  broader  attitude  do  not  correspond  to  a  generalized  “populist” 
constitutive pattern.  It  is  my perspective that  popular  references to national identity 
have not precisely acted in a unifying way for the protesters as a whole289, nor are they 
likely to do so in future participations. The persistent hesitancy of left-wing activists 
concerning  the  use of  national  symbols290,  combined  with  the  fact  that  the  Left  in 
Greece remains at the core of social movement activism, makes national symbols an 
unlikely unifying factor in a generalized manner. This hesitancy was to some extent 
evident in the interviews, where the vast majority of participants remained reluctant or 
289 Even more, since all forms of protest must be taken into account, and not simply the movement of the 
squares; and in other forms (the strikes par excellence), flags were completely missing.
290 This hesitancy is a result of the broader historical and socio-political environment in Greece examined 
in this thesis.
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indifferent towards the use of national symbols, a tendency further exacerbated after 
the parliamentary rise of GD since 2012 and its association with such symbols.
Finally, it is clear that one of the main weaknesses that has emerged is the lack of 
a force, or a process, acting to unify the movements and the people participating in 
them.  According  to  Kouvelakis,  “in  order  for  them  to  be  effective,  therefore  have 
perspective, these diverse rebellious actions must be integrated into a wider project, 
with determined objectives and selection of specific means for their achievement.  A 
project  which,  briefly, opens up two potentials:  either a quick dispersion of  actions, 
horizontally (in society, in space) and vertically (frontal confrontation with the dominant 
block) and their subsequent conversion into a general uprising (ala Tunisia or Egypt), 
or their articulation with other forms of struggle, following different collective practices, 
forms  of  intervention  in  social  fabric  and  of  subjective  constitution,  thus  different, 
unevenly growing rhythms” (Kouvelakis 2011a). This has not occurred in the Greek 
case, or only to a very limited extent. The inability of these forms of mobilization to last 
and  the lack  of  an  explicit  awareness  of  the  class  nature  of  the  confrontation,  as 
examined in chapters IV and VI, are two major symptoms of this limitation.
 “First comes indignation, then rebellion, then we shall see”291.
“Hope  is  very  important.  In  my  opinion,  it  is  a  great  
revolutionary force, namely the idea that you can reach  
something”292 (Sartre 1974: 205)
But  what  actually  comes  next?  After  2010-2011,  the  political  evolution  in  the 
country has been rapid. At the start of 2015, Greek society entered a new era, since 
SYRIZA, a party of a Left background, won the parliamentary elections and formed a 
291 According to the well-known quote by Daniel Bensaid (2001).
292 For Eagleton, hope “is necessary precisely because one is able to confess how grave a situation is”, in 
contrast  to  optimism,  which  expresses  “a  form  of  psychological  disavowal”,  “a  moral  evasion”, 
underestimating the obstacles to tackling it, and thus ending up with a worthless kind of assurance. 
Optimism simply does not take despair seriously enough (Eagleton 2015).
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government in coalition with ANEL, a newly formed party of the Right, initially with an 
anti-memorandum outlook. The pace of change has accelerated since. SYRIZA was 
elected  after  an  anti-memorandum  campaign,  but  soon  repudiated  this  crucial 
commitment. The real intentions of its leadership became evident when it rejected any 
possibility of breaking with the existing EU and IMF mechanisms or with the broader 
memoranda framework to which the country has been subjected since the eruption of 
the  crisis.  The  SYRIZA-led  government  confirmed  its  commitment  to  meet  every 
obligation  contracted  by  the  previous  governments  and  complied  with  the fiscal 
adjustment and stability objectives, while renouncing any unilateral action and possible 
strategy of rupture. At the same time, it  excised from its political program the most 
progressive  and  “movementist”  aspects,  turning  its  back  to  a  strategy  aiming  at 
stimulating  popular  mobilization  and political  participation.  Thus,  the  SYRIZA-ANEL 
government was very soon obliged to face its inability to implement even minor aspects 
of its political program, regarding for example the protection of elementary civil rights.
A point of rupture in this course of retreat was the referendum on July 5, 2015 on 
the new memorandum agreement proposed by the Troika.  61,3% of  the population 
voted “No” in an astonishingly defiant response to kinds of blackmail,  rejecting five 
years of extremely unpopular memorandum policies. It is not the object of this thesis to 
study this period. Nevertheless, the conduct and the result of the referendum bear the 
footprint of the social and class struggles of the last years, and especially those of the 
2010-2011 period  studied  here.  Moreover,  it  has  highlighted  the  transformation  of 
consciousness and the potential for radicalization discussed in this thesis. Despite this 
referendum result,  the  SYRIZA-ANEL government  signed to the memorandum one 
week later, amid various types of threat and blackmail293. A major organizational split in 
SYRIZA followed, with the splintering of its left wing. However, in the September 2015 
293 A “triple coup” has actually been effected: firstly, by the EU on the Greek people as a whole and its 
government in particular, blackmailing it to accept the agreement or else exit the EMU. Secondly, by 
the Greek dominant class against the popular classes, threatening to respond in various ways (among 
which,  the  threat  of  an  actual  coup)  in  case  the  pro-memorandum  and  pro-EU  policies  were 
questioned.  And  thirdly,  by  the  SYRIZA-ANEL government  towards  the  Greek  people,  who  voted 
against the agreement with the Troika but saw it being implemented a week later.
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elections that followed, SYRIZA maintained its share of the vote, despite its acceptance 
of a pro-memorandum framework and a diluted political program. 
This  thesis  is  not  meant  as  a  study  of  partisan  representations. However,  I 
consider its main conclusions as contributing to an explanation for the events that have 
followed since the period under study. These developments constitute a sequence that 
includes the closure of  this  first  cycle of  protests in  2010-2011,  the transfer  of  the 
contradictions to the electoral terrain, and the emergence of SYRIZA, with its specific 
features,  as  the  main  political  “alternative”.  This  emergence  came  along  with  the 
important  parliamentary  rise  of  fascist  GD,  whose  scope  should  not  be 
underestimated294.  In  terms  of  political  representation,  the  overall  landscape  has 
definitely changed since the two-year period of 2010-2011, when the political scene 
and political affiliations were much more fluid. The situation appears nowadays more 
stable. Politics in the official sense, dominates again the public discourse. At the same 
time, movement practices and structures have faded into the background, and their 
scope is essentially restrained to the provision of  material  assistance to those who 
most  need  it,  moving  away  from  the  search  of  a  different  paradigm of  exercising 
politics295.  The restriction of  the range of  the participants in  these structures to the 
“usual suspects” of activism also proves the inadequacy of this strictly “decentralized” 
political intervention, and the specific weight of central  political  processes, including 
demands  for  seizing  political  power  rather  than  appealing  to  it.  Furthermore,  the 
potential of a new sort of TINA dominating again in the political discourse, based on the 
strategic  defeat  of  SYRIZA (and of  the  Left  as  a  whole,  albeit  its  various  factions 
bearing different  degrees of  responsibility),  may have significant  implications  in  the 
formulation of the future social and political landscape.
294 This radicalization both on the Right and the Left has been evident since the movements under study 
here. In a poll conducted during the movement of the squares, the parties which seem to benefit most 
are  SYRIZA  and  LAOS  (the  existing  small  party  of  the  extreme-right,  since  ANEL  was  formed 
afterwards) (Public Issue 2011). It is clear that the tendency that would dominate in the entire period 
emerged at that moment, as a result of the shift in the balance of forces which took place under the 
powerful impulse of social protest.
295 This  material  contribution  contains of manifestations of  solidarity  towards the most  affected  social 
groups, the coverage of basic necessities, and the partial defense against the hostility by the state or 
the employees.
267
However, based on evidence provided by the research for  this  thesis,  I  would 
support the view that the social rift within Greek society remains very deep, and that 
the political system, though more stable, does not have the ability to integrate large 
segments of the society in a coherent perspective. Neither the current management of 
the crisis, nor the political orientation of the SYRIZA-ANEL government offer a viable 
way out of the crisis or any prospect of a better future for the social majority. This social 
and  political  rift  is  expected  to  deepen.  Besides,  independently  of  the  politics 
implemented by the SYRIZA-ANEL government in the future, the dynamic precipitated 
by its election is unpredictable and opens up the possibility of a new emergence of 
popular mobilizations.
Before concluding I have to point out that there are, of course, certain limitations of 
this research. For example,  I have not studied the connection of the movements in 
Greece with those developed in  other  countries in  the same period,  having similar 
features: par excellence the “Indignados” movement in Spain, but also the “Occupy 
movements”,  the  “Arab spring”  etc.  A comparative  perspective  subsequently  to  the 
present  research  and  its  conclusions  would  undoubtedly  have  much  to  offer  in  a 
deeper comprehension of  these forms and their  emergence in  the specific  national 
contexts. It  would also  probably  help  to further  clarify  the specific  character  of  the 
Greek  movements  of  the  period:  for  example,  it  is  my  belief  that  a  comparative 
perspective would highlight the less populist character of the Greek case compared to 
the Spanish one, or the different social subject mobilized as compared to the Occupy 
movements. Further, I have not studied in detail the rise of reactionary political plans, 
par  excellence that  of  GD,  and its  interconnection  with  the social  dynamics  of  the 
period under examination here.
Finally, I claim that what Harman (1968-9) has suggested some decades ago is 
still  valid in this particular case: “...there is a continual stress on the possibilities of 
sudden transformations of working-class consciousness, on the unexpected upsurge 
that characterizes working-class self-activity, on deep-rooted instincts in the working 
class that lead it to begin to reject habits of deference and subservience”. Furthermore, 
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I believe that it is necessary to argue against an approach predicting that movements 
are destined to end up either in institutionalization or evanescence and dissolution. It 
has  been  my  intention  to  show that  these  processes  are  far  more  complex,  their 
outcomes less linear and not always immediately evident. This claim transcends the 
limits of the concrete short-term material results of the movements or of the current 
situation in Greece. Besides, an actual phenomenon cannot  simply be explained in 
terms  of  its  direct  consequences  (Callinicos  2004:  92).  During  this  period,  class 
struggle  has re-emerged,  surging to  the forefront.  With  it  the most  oppressed and 
exploited  strata  moved  centre  stage,  becoming  the  main  actors  of  popular 
mobilizations.  Of  course,  the  outcome of  class  struggle  is  never  univocal,  oriented 
necessarily towards a radical rearrangement of the social reality: it may be a force of 
transformation (of the state, the society, the subjects, the regime) towards a new point 
of balance, itself unstable and dynamic (Kouvelakis 2015: 17).
Therefore,  the study conducted in these pages ends on a note of  actual  hope 
concerning the potential of popular mobilization and political participation, as processes 
able to overcome their own limitations and even their defeats. This entire sequence of 
social movements in Greece in times of crisis has definitely contained enough of these 
defeats,  as  emphasized  by  the  actors  themselves,  especially  in  the  current 
conjuncture. As Perry Anderson underlined “defeat is a hard experience to master: the 
temptation  is  always  to  sublimate  it.  But  if  it  is  eventually  to  be  overcome,  it  is 
necessary  to  be  able  to  look  theoretical  adversaries  in  the  face,  without  either 
indulgence  or  self-deception.  That  requires  a  culture  of  curiosity  and  critique”.
(Anderson 2005: xiv). Self-reflection, curiosity and critique are indeed the necessary 
resources in order to confront the actual situation in Greece, with a different perception 
of  the  dialectic  between  victory  and  defeat.  By  pursuing  the  unity  of  theory  and 
practice, reassessing the consequences of defeats under the light of the subsequent 
developments and studying the ongoing social and ideological transformations, we can 
progress towards an alternative conception of  the current  situation.  To achieve this 
objective, such an endeavour should avoid the temptation of futile political mourning 
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and aim at the theoretical and political ruptures that are necessary for creative thought. 
The experience of the social movements in Greece in the first period of the crisis, and 
the transformation of consciousness brought about by them in the great masses of 
people participating to them, have undoubtedly a lot to offer in this respect.
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I16 F 46-55 Self-
employed
Higher 1,5 Centre  of 
Athens




6 Centre  of 
Athens









I19 F 36-45 Part-time/ 
flexibility
Current 
student  in 









student  in 
an  evening 
high school
5 (HH) Peristeri 
(western)






















Higher 3 (HH) Peristeri 
(western)
311














1 Centre  of 
Athens





Crete  / 
Keratea
I27 M 36-45 Self-
employed
Secondary 3 Chalandri 
(nothern)
I28 M 36-45 Wage 
labourer




I29 F 46-55 Self-
employed
Secondary 5 Galatsi 
(centre)







N.  Hrakleio 
(nothern)




1 (HH) Nea  Smirni 
(southern)




















5 Nea  Ionia 
(nothern)
I35 M 36-45 Wage 
labourer
Higher 5 (HH) Marousi 
(nothern)
I36 M 26-35 Wage 
labourer
Higher 1 Goudi 
(centre)









I38 M 36-45 Unemploy-
ed
Higher 5 (HH) Nikaia/ 
Piraeus
314










I40 F 36-45 Part-time/ 
flexibility
Secondary 6 Kipseli 
(centre)
• All the above data are after participants' self-identification
• (H) declares hesitation in answering
• (HH) declares strong hesitation in answering
315
